# DragonForce Ransomware Abuses Microsoft Teams TURN Relays to Hide Backdoor.Turn C2 Traffic

> Symantec's Broadcom Threat Hunter Team identified Backdoor.Turn, a Go-based backdoor deployed by the DragonForce ransomware cartel (tracked as Hackledorb), that abuses legitimate Microsoft Teams TURN relay infrastructure to conceal C2 traffic. Deployed during a 1-2 month intrusion at a U.S. services firm, the backdoor obtains an anonymous Teams visitor token, routes through a genuine Microsoft TURN relay, and then opens a direct QUIC session to the real C2 server before the DragonForce ransomware payload is dropped.

- **Published:** 2026-06-16T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-06-16T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2181
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-backdoor-turn-quic-tunnel-c2-tl-2026-2181.webp?v=59060b79 (Threadlinqs threat intel: DragonForce Teams TURN Relay C2 Traffic: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2181) — Critical severity, 30 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2181
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** DragonForce (Malaysia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 30 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2023-52271, CVE-2025-61155, CVE-2025-1055

## Description

Symantec/Broadcom's Threat Hunter Team documented an intrusion at a U.S. services firm in which the DragonForce ransomware cartel (the group Symantec tracks internally as Hackledorb) maintained access for one to two months before deploying its ransomware payload. Initial access is suspected to involve exploitation of an internet-facing SQL or Microsoft SQL Server, or purchase of existing access from an initial access broker; the exact entry point was not conclusively determined. In December 2025 the operators executed PowerShell commands to retrieve a ZIP archive disguised as a tech-support hotfix ('TechSupV18Fix3.zip') from 192.36.27.51, then used DLL side-loading of a legitimate VirtualBox/DbgView64.exe binary paired with a malicious 'vboxrt.dll' to run reconnaissance and evasion code.

The attackers escalated defense evasion using a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD) chain: three previously known vulnerable, signed kernel drivers (Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys / CVE-2023-52271, Tower of Fantasy GameDriverX64.sys / CVE-2025-61155, and K7 Security K7RKScan.sys / CVE-2025-1055) were abused to terminate protected security processes via crafted IOCTL requests, alongside a novel abuse of a Huawei HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys driver (documented publicly by Huntress only in March 2026, after this intrusion) and ABYSSWORKER -- a custom malicious driver, signed with likely-stolen certificates, that masquerades as a CrowdStrike Falcon driver and was first documented powering Medusa ransomware EDR-killing attacks.

The centerpiece of the intrusion is Backdoor.Turn, a Go-based remote access backdoor injected into the legitimate DbgView64.exe process. Backdoor.Turn requests an anonymous Microsoft Teams visitor token from Microsoft's Skype-backed identity services, uses that token to obtain credentials for a legitimate Microsoft TURN (Traversal Using Relays around NAT) relay server, and then tunnels a direct QUIC session to the attacker's real C2 server through that relay. Because the only traffic a network defender observes is an outbound connection to genuine Microsoft Teams/Skype infrastructure, the technique conceals the true C2 channel entirely within trusted collaboration-platform traffic. Symantec states this is the first known in-the-wild abuse of TURN relay infrastructure for C2 in this manner; the approach mirrors 'Ghost Calls,' a WebRTC/TURN-tunneling C2 technique against Zoom, Teams, and Google Meet publicly presented by Praetorian researcher Adam Crosser (open-sourced as the 'TURNt' tool) at Black Hat USA. Backdoor.Turn supports command execution, process creation, network/TLS-certificate/web-title scanning, LDAP and Active Directory searching, credential-based lateral movement, and browser credential theft.

For persistence and further defense evasion, the operators modified the LimitBlankPassword registry setting, created local backdoor accounts, and altered host firewall rules to permit their C2 communications. After roughly one to two months of dwell time, DragonForce deployed its ransomware payload, encrypting and exfiltrating victim data. DragonForce, active since June 2023, has since March 2025 operated as a formalized ransomware 'cartel' offering white-label branding to affiliates under its 'Ransom Bay' program, and by August-September 2025 had announced coordination partnerships with LockBit and Qilin -- evidence Symantec cites of the group's growing organizational maturity and technical sophistication.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1136.001 Local Account
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall
- T1112 Modify Registry
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1087.002 Domain Account
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1090.002 External Proxy
- T1573 Encrypted Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**DragonForce BYOVD Driver Abuse and DbgView64 DLL Side-Loading** (`TL-2026-2181-SPL-002`)

Detects loading of the vulnerable/malicious kernel drivers (Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys, Tower of Fantasy GameDriverX64.sys, K7 Security K7RKScan.sys, Huawei HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, and the ABYSSWORKER driver masquerading as CrowdStrike Falcon) that DragonForce operators abuse via crafted IOCTL requests to terminate protected security processes, plus the companion DLL side-load of vboxrt.dll into the legitimate DbgView64.exe process used to host Backdoor.Turn, and the LimitBlankPassword registry change, local backdoor-account creation, and host firewall modifications used for follow-on persistence.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1574.002, T1562.001, T1562.004, T1112, T1136.001, T1036.005
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security_event_log, windows_firewall_log
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
(index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=6 (ImageLoaded="*wsftprm.sys" OR ImageLoaded="*GameDriverX64.sys" OR ImageLoaded="*K7RKScan.sys" OR ImageLoaded="*HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys" OR Hashes="*8284c8676cc22c4b2e66826ac16986da7ddecba1f2776b16771be17bfdc45dc2*"))
OR (index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7 Image="*DbgView64.exe" ImageLoaded="*vboxrt.dll")
OR (index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4657 ObjectName="*LimitBlankPassword*")
OR (index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4720)
OR (index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Firewall" (EventCode=2004 OR EventCode=2005))
| eval detection_reason=case(
    EventCode=6, "BYOVD vulnerable/malicious driver load",
    EventCode=7, "DLL side-load into DbgView64.exe (vboxrt.dll)",
    EventCode=4657, "LimitBlankPassword registry modification",
    EventCode=4720, "Local backdoor account creation",
    (EventCode=2004 OR EventCode=2005), "Host firewall rule added/modified to permit C2")
| table _time, Computer, EventCode, detection_reason, Image, ImageLoaded, ObjectName, TargetUserName, Hashes, User
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "DriverLoad"
| where FileName has_any ("wsftprm.sys","GameDriverX64.sys","K7RKScan.sys","HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys") or SHA256 == "8284c8676cc22c4b2e66826ac16986da7ddecba1f2776b16771be17bfdc45dc2"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| union (
    DeviceImageLoadEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "DbgView64.exe" and FileName =~ "vboxrt.dll"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType="DLLSideLoad", FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessAccountName
)
| union (
    DeviceRegistryEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where RegistryValueName =~ "LimitBlankPassword"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType="RegistryModify", FileName=RegistryKey, FolderPath="", SHA256="", InitiatingProcessAccountName
)
| union (
    DeviceEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType == "UserAccountCreated"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName=AccountName, FolderPath="", SHA256="", InitiatingProcessAccountName
)
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: DragonForce BYOVD Vulnerable Kernel Driver Load (Backdoor.Turn Intrusion)
id: 9b2f4d6a-1c3e-4a7b-8d5f-2e6a1b3c4d5e
status: experimental
description: Detects loading of kernel drivers known to be abused by DragonForce/Backdoor.Turn operators (Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys CVE-2023-52271, Tower of Fantasy GameDriverX64.sys CVE-2025-61155, K7 Security K7RKScan.sys CVE-2025-1055, Huawei HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, and the ABYSSWORKER driver masquerading as CrowdStrike Falcon) to terminate protected security processes via crafted IOCTL requests ahead of ransomware deployment.
references:
    - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/dragonforce-msteams-backdoor
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/abyssworker
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-06-16
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1562.001
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.tool.abyssworker
    - cve.2023.52271
    - cve.2025.61155
    - cve.2025.1055
logsource:
    category: driver_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_filename:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\wsftprm.sys'
            - '\GameDriverX64.sys'
            - '\K7RKScan.sys'
            - '\HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys'
    selection_hash:
        Hashes|contains: '8284C8676CC22C4B2E66826AC16986DA7DDECBA1F2776B16771BE17BFDC45DC2'
    condition: selection_filename or selection_hash
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Topaz Antifraud, Tower of Fantasy, or K7 Security Anti-Malware products still running an unpatched driver version (rare in hardened enterprise environments)
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate installation/update of Topaz Antifraud, Tower of Fantasy, or K7 Security Anti-Malware software still running an unpatched driver version
- Legitimate Sysinternals DebugView usage alongside a genuine VirtualBox install where a vboxrt.dll load is coincidental and the hash/driver-name checks do not match

**Tuning notes:** Maintain the vulnerable-driver filename/hash list against Microsoft's official vulnerable-driver blocklist and update as new BYOVD drivers are disclosed (the Huawei HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys abuse here predates its March 2026 public documentation); suppress the firewall/registry/account-creation branches for known change-management windows and correlate the driver-load branch with detection 3's C2 alert on the same host to prioritize triage.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- TechSupV18Fix3 PowerShell Dropper Retrieval — DragonForce Initial Foothold (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DragonForce BYOVD Driver Abuse and DbgView64 DLL Side-Loading (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Backdoor.Turn C2 via Microsoft Teams TURN Relay and Post-Compromise Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TechSupV18Fix3 PowerShell Dropper Retrieval — DragonForce Initial Foothold (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DragonForce BYOVD Driver Abuse and DbgView64 DLL Side-Loading (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Backdoor.Turn C2 via Microsoft Teams TURN Relay and Post-Compromise Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TechSupV18Fix3 PowerShell Dropper Retrieval — DragonForce Initial Foothold (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Backdoor.Turn C2 via Microsoft Teams TURN Relay and Post-Compromise Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 30)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `62.164.177[.]25`
- Domain: `projetosmecanicos[.]com[.]br`
- File hash: `82b37a92589dfd4d67ca87eb9e52ac8e682e8e60d2211f59074cd5ccc693013b`

Full set of 30 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Hidden in Teams: DragonForce Attackers Weaponize Microsoft Teams Relays to Stay Hidden](https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/dragonforce-msteams-backdoor)
- [Cybercriminals mask malicious communications through Microsoft Teams relays](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/06/16/dragonforce-microsoft-teams-malware-backdoor-turn/)
- [DragonForce Hackers Abuse Microsoft Teams Relays to Hide Backdoor.Turn C2 Traffic](https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/dragonforce-hackers-abuse-microsoft.html)
- [NVD - CVE-2023-52271](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2023-52271)
- [NVD - CVE-2025-61155](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2025-61155)
- [NVD - CVE-2025-1055](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2025-1055)
- [Shedding light on the ABYSSWORKER driver](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/abyssworker)
- [Medusa Ransomware Uses Malicious Driver to Disable Anti-Malware with Stolen Certificates](https://thehackernews.com/2025/03/medusa-ransomware-uses-malicious-driver.html)
- [Ghost Calls: Abusing Web Conferencing for Covert Command & Control (Part 1 of 2)](https://www.praetorian.com/blog/ghost-calls-abusing-web-conferencing-for-covert-command-control-part-1-of-2/)
- [Ghost Calls: Abusing Web Conferencing for Covert Command & Control (Part 2 of 2)](https://www.praetorian.com/blog/ghost-calls-abusing-web-conferencing-for-covert-command-control-part-2-of-2/)
- [The DragonForce Cartel: Scattered Spider at the gate](https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/the-dragonforce-cartel-scattered-spider-at-the-gate/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2181
