# APT28-Linked HOOKEDGE Backdoor Targets Diplomatic and Government Organizations in Romania, Spain, and Türkiye

> APT28 (Fancy Bear / Forest Blizzard), tracked by Recorded Future's Insikt Group as BlueDelta, ran a series of initial-access campaigns between late September 2025 and early April 2026 against government and diplomatic organizations in Romania, Spain, and Türkiye, delivering a lightweight Windows batch-script backdoor dubbed HOOKEDGE via macro-enabled Word documents.

- **Published:** 2026-08-29T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-29T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2213
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-apt28-hookedge-diplomatic-espionage-tl-2026-2213.webp?v=cc6254c1 (Threadlinqs threat intel: APT28 HOOKEDGE Diplomatic Backdoor: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2213) — High severity, 20 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2213
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** APT28 (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 20 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Insikt Group assesses with moderate confidence that BlueDelta, which overlaps with APT28/Fancy Bear/Forest Blizzard and is attributed to Russia's GRU Main Directorate of the General Staff, ran an espionage campaign against European government and diplomatic targets from late September 2025 through early April 2026. The campaign opened with a macro-enabled Word document impersonating material from Spain's Ministry of the Presidency, Justice and Relations with the Cortes, created shortly after a September 8, 2025 meeting between Spanish and Moldovan officials, and later pivoted to generic 'Enable Content' lures with fake error dialogs targeting Romania, and eventually Türkiye by April 2026.

Opening the document's AutoOpen() macro drops six files into %userprofile%, including a GUID-named .bat/.vbs/.cmd chain (the HOOKEDGE payload, its launcher, and an installer) plus .htm/.xhtml staging files used to format exfiltrated output. The installer creates a scheduled task that re-executes the HOOKEDGE launcher every 30 minutes (later widened to 61 minutes, timed to outlast the roughly one-hour observation window of common sandboxes) and then self-deletes. HOOKEDGE itself is a polling-loop batch backdoor: it launches Microsoft Edge in headless or hidden-window mode to retrieve a `.cmd` payload from a dedicated webhook.site tasking endpoint, executes it locally via cmd.exe, and posts the results to a second, separate webhook.site endpoint for exfiltration, then cleans up temporary files. High-value targets receive a dedicated second-stage HOOKEDGE instance with its own webhook pair and a much tighter 5-minute beacon interval, enabling near-interactive tasking. Because webhook.site's free tier caps each endpoint at 100 requests, BlueDelta rotated endpoints frequently and lengthened beacon intervals to stretch the quota; operators accessed the webhook.site administration panel through NordVPN egress IPs to obscure themselves. Lure engineering included phishing-funnel tracking pixels (`docopened.jpg`, later `mailopened.jpg`) that beacon to webhook.site the moment a target opens the email or the document, giving operators delivery-success telemetry before any payload runs.

HOOKEDGE shares extensive code and tradecraft overlap with APT28's earlier HEADLACE backdoor (in use against diplomats since at least April 2023, including a March 2024 car-for-sale-themed campaign using an Audi Q7 decoy and DLL-sideloading via a trojanized calculator binary), including identical second-stage JavaScript variable names, structure, and base64 encoding schemes, near-identical GUID file-naming conventions, and the same reliance on abusing free web services (webhook.site, and previously Mocky) instead of adversary-owned infrastructure. Insikt Group assesses HOOKEDGE is a direct evolutionary successor to HEADLACE maintained by the same operators, reflecting BlueDelta's preference for lightweight, rapidly modifiable tooling over more complex implants.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.005 Visual Basic
- T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1070.004 File Deletion
- T1564.003 Hidden Window
- T1497.003 Time Based Checks
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication
- T1567.004 Exfiltration Over Webhook
- T1583.006 Web Services

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Scheduled Task With 5/30/61-Minute Interval Invoking cmd.exe/wscript.exe (HOOKEDGE Persistence)** (`TL-2026-2213-SPL-002`)

Detects schtasks.exe process creation or Security 4698 scheduled-task-creation events using a 5, 30, or 61-minute repeat interval whose action invokes cmd.exe or wscript.exe. HOOKEDGE's installer creates such a task to re-execute its .vbs launcher (30 min for standard targets, 61 min to outlast a ~1-hour sandbox window, 5 min for high-value second-stage instances) and then self-deletes.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1053.005, T1059.003, T1070.004, T1027.013, T1564.003, T1497.003
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security_eventlog
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
(index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\schtasks.exe")
OR
(index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4698)
| eval action_target=coalesce(CommandLine, TaskContent)
| where match(action_target, "(?i)\/sc\s+minute.*\/mo\s+(5|30|61)\b") OR match(action_target, "(?i)PT(5|30|61)M")
| where match(action_target, "(?i)(cmd\.exe|wscript\.exe)")
| table _time, ComputerName, User, SubjectUserName, TaskName, action_target
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let taskProc = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)/create"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)/sc\s+minute.*\/mo\s+(5|30|61)\b"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("cmd.exe", "wscript.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, Source = "DeviceProcessEvents";
taskProc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Scheduled Task Created With 5/30/61-Minute Interval Invoking cmd.exe or wscript.exe (HOOKEDGE Persistence)
id: 3d6b7e44-1a2f-4c9d-9b0e-5a7c8f1d3e02
status: experimental
description: Detects schtasks.exe or Security 4698 scheduled-task creation events using a 5, 30, or 61-minute repeat interval whose action invokes cmd.exe or wscript.exe, consistent with HOOKEDGE's installer persisting its launcher and re-executing outside the ~1-hour sandbox observation window.
references:
    - https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/bluedelta-targets-with-hookedge
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/apt28-linked-hookedge-backdoor-targets.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1070.004
    - attack.t1564.003
    - attack.t1497.003
    - attack.g0007
    - detection.hookedge
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
    selection_create:
        CommandLine|contains: '/create'
    selection_interval:
        CommandLine|re: '(?i)/sc\s+minute.*\/mo\s+(5|30|61)\b'
    selection_target:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'cmd.exe'
            - 'wscript.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate RMM, patch-management, or monitoring agents that create short-interval scheduled tasks invoking cmd.exe or wscript.exe
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate RMM, patch-management, or endpoint-monitoring agents that create short-interval scheduled tasks invoking cmd.exe or wscript.exe as part of normal operation

**Tuning notes:** Allowlist known RMM/monitoring task names, publishers, and install paths; raise confidence by requiring the task action reference a script path under %userprofile% (outside Program Files) to filter legitimate enterprise software.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- HOOKEDGE Maldoc Drops GUID-Named Payload Set to User Profile (Sentinel/KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Scheduled Task With 5/30/61-Minute Interval Invoking cmd.exe/wscript.exe (HOOKEDGE Persistence, Sentinel/KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Headless Microsoft Edge Requesting [indicator] for Tasking/Exfiltration (HOOKEDGE C2, Sentinel/KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HOOKEDGE Maldoc Drops GUID-Named Payload Set to User Profile (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Scheduled Task With 5/30/61-Minute Interval Invoking cmd.exe/wscript.exe (HOOKEDGE Persistence, Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Headless Microsoft Edge Requesting [indicator] for Tasking/Exfiltration (HOOKEDGE C2, Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HOOKEDGE Maldoc Drops GUID-Named Payload Set to User Profile (Splunk) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Headless Microsoft Edge Requesting [indicator] for Tasking/Exfiltration (HOOKEDGE C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 20)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `webhook[.]site`
- File hash: `001b57368c10bee9e62374e3b3f232b113eb75a1f198243d43a5bb90e1d0f500`
- File hash: `206bd177f3f3b637b0a444ce2dd6d5aaaefc9d66c866ac6ec0c9e946ce140991`

Full set of 20 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [BlueDelta Targets Defense and Diplomacy with HOOKEDGE](https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/bluedelta-targets-with-hookedge)
- [APT28-Linked HOOKEDGE Backdoor Targets Diplomatic Organizations in Romania, Spain, and Türkiye](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/apt28-linked-hookedge-backdoor-targets.html)
- [Russian APT BlueDelta Uses HOOKEDGE to Target Defense and Diplomatic Organizations](https://securityaffairs.com/197996/apt/russian-apt-bluedelta-uses-hookedge-to-target-defense-and-diplomatic-organizations.html)
- [BlueDelta Targets Defense and Diplomatic Organizations With HOOKEDGE Malware](https://gbhackers.com/hookedge-malware-campaign/)
- [APT28 HOOKEDGE Backdoor Abuses Microsoft Edge and webhook.site for C2 and Data Exfiltration](https://cyberpress.org/apt28-hookedge-exploits-edge-webhooks/)
- [APT28 Targets Diplomats with HeadLace Malware via Car Sale Phishing Lure](https://thehackernews.com/2024/08/apt28-targets-diplomats-with-headlace.html)
- [Russian Hackers Target Europe with HeadLace Malware and Credential Harvesting](https://thehackernews.com/2024/05/russian-hackers-target-europe-with.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2213
