# TerminalFix: ClickFix-Style Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA Delivers DLL Sideloading and Python Reverse-Tunnel Backdoor

> TerminalFix, a ClickFix-variant social-engineering campaign disclosed by Microsoft on 2026-08-28, uses fake Cloudflare Turnstile CAPTCHA overlays on compromised websites to trick victims into pasting malicious PowerShell into Windows Terminal. The resulting multi-stage intrusion sideloads a rogue dui70.dll via the signed LockScreenContentServer.exe, pulls next-stage payloads hidden in PNG steganography, performs Active Directory reconnaissance, and deploys a custom Python reverse-tunnel implant (client.py) that proxies arbitrary TCP traffic to gitnow[.]dev over an encrypted WebSocket.

- **Published:** 2026-08-30T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-30T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2237
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-terminalfix-python-reverse-tunnel-tl-2026-2237.webp?v=d6a31c00 (Threadlinqs threat intel: TerminalFix Reverse-Tunnel Backdoor: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2237) — High severity, 25 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2237
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 25 (3 shown free below)

## Description

TerminalFix is a newly documented ClickFix variant that Microsoft Threat Intelligence (researchers Sagar Patil, Suriyaraj Natarajan, and Parasharan Raghavan) disclosed on 2026-08-28. Unlike earlier ClickFix campaigns that lure victims to the Windows Run dialog to deploy a single infostealer, TerminalFix directs victims to Windows Terminal or PowerShell — improving reliability for longer, multi-line scripts — and delivers a far more elaborate, multi-stage intrusion chain.

Victims land on compromised websites displaying a fake Cloudflare Turnstile verification overlay. The "verification" instructs the user to paste and run a PowerShell command, which downloads a ZIP archive (SHA-256 18c2090e8a0ae0568af9b87e59eaf8270f23d2909600ed9db91a9444fd8b278f) using a custom User-Agent header, extracts it to a hidden staging folder (C:\ProgramData\f47f2a8c21c9df4e, hidden via attrib +h +s), and launches a batch file (1.bat) that silently starts the legitimate signed binary LockScreenContentServer.exe while the terminal prints fake Cloudflare verification text to keep the user occupied.

LockScreenContentServer.exe has a static import dependency on the real Windows DirectUI Engine DLL, dui70.dll. Because the Windows loader searches the application directory before System32, dropping a malicious dui70.dll (observed in at least nine SHA-256 variants) alongside the legitimate EXE causes the trusted binary to load and execute attacker code — classic DLL side-loading (T1574.002). The sideloaded DLL then retrieves further payloads hidden inside PNG images via a custom PowerShell function (Extract-RawFileFromImage) that reads the RGBA pixel channels: the first 8 bytes encode a 64-bit payload length, the remainder is the embedded file. Three images are fetched via POST requests from bestsocialmedianewspapper[.]com (primary) or offlineupdater[.]com (failover), with the DLL payload split across two images to hinder static analysis; source images are deleted after extraction to reduce forensic residue.

Persistence is established two ways: a Registry Run key (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\LockScreenContentServer_MuODG5yBM) and a scheduled task of the same name that re-executes LockScreenContentServer.exe every 60 minutes.

The implant then performs extensive Active Directory reconnaissance: domain trust discovery (nltest /domain_trusts, nltest /dclist:), domain admin group enumeration (net group "domain admins" /domain), AD user/computer searches via ADSI with description-field harvesting, systeminfo collection with multilingual (English/Spanish/German) findstr filters, and ping sweeps of discovered infrastructure roles (domain controllers, database servers, backup systems, gateways, mail systems). A persistent PowerShell file-watch loop also monitors a text file for attacker commands, executes them via Invoke-Expression, and writes results to an output file — a rudimentary asynchronous, filesystem-based C2 channel that runs in parallel with the primary implant.

The final stage deploys client.py (SHA-256 b8d107800403b9197e5b7609ceacd8e4cac1b0f9a1d156e6dacd6c3f7794b36a), a custom reverse-tunnel implant run under an unmodified, official python.org Python 3.14.5 distribution via pythonw.exe (no visible window) to avoid raising suspicion. The implant connects outbound over TLS on port 443 to gitnow[.]dev, upgrades to a WebSocket at the /tunnel endpoint, disables certificate verification (CERT_NONE), and rotates among four realistic browser User-Agent strings. A 7-byte custom binary header (message type + stream ID + length) multiplexes multiple tunneled streams, with SOCKS5-style address parsing supporting IPv4, IPv6, and hostname targets — giving the operator arbitrary TCP proxy access to any host reachable from the compromised endpoint. Message types cover implant identification, connection setup, data relay, keepalive, and remote termination (MSG_SHUTDOWN, which calls os._exit() to bypass normal Python cleanup).

Microsoft did not attribute the campaign to a named actor or group and did not specify targeted sectors or regions beyond "organizations across multiple industries." Microsoft assesses that the reverse-tunnel access this campaign establishes could subsequently be leveraged for privilege escalation, security-control tampering, data exfiltration, and ransomware deployment across enterprise networks, though no such follow-on activity has been confirmed in the public reporting. Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects components under Trojan:Win32/ClickFix.*, Trojan:Win32/TermFix.*, Trojan:Win32/Posilod.*, Trojan:Win64/DLLHijack.DAB!MTB, and Trojan:Python/Indigo.SA, and Microsoft published Defender XDR/Sentinel KQL hunting queries for the ClickFix PowerShell launch, the DLL sideload, the client.py execution, and network connections to the campaign's domains.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1027.003 Steganography
- T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1069.002 Domain Groups
- T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
- T1087.002 Domain Account
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1071.001 Web Protocols

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**TerminalFix Dual Persistence and AD Reconnaissance (SPL)** (`TL-2026-2237-SPL-002`)

Detects post-exploitation persistence via the LockScreenContentServer_MuODG5yBM Registry Run key and matching scheduled task, alongside the Active Directory reconnaissance commands (nltest domain trust/DC discovery, domain admin group enumeration, systeminfo) that TerminalFix runs after establishing its foothold.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1547.001, T1053.005, T1482, T1069.002, T1087.002, T1082, T1018
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, windows_task_scheduler
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=wineventlog OR index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
(EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\\Run\\LockScreenContentServer_MuODG5yBM")
OR (EventCode=1 CommandLine="*schtasks*LockScreenContentServer_MuODG5yBM*")
OR (EventCode=1 (CommandLine="*nltest*domain_trusts*" OR CommandLine="*nltest*dclist*" OR CommandLine="*net group*domain admins*" OR CommandLine="*systeminfo*"))
| eval technique=case(
    match(TargetObject, "Run\\\\LockScreenContentServer"), "T1547.001",
    match(CommandLine, "schtasks"), "T1053.005",
    match(CommandLine, "domain_trusts|dclist"), "T1482",
    match(CommandLine, "domain admins"), "T1069.002",
    match(CommandLine, "systeminfo"), "T1082",
    true(), "unknown")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen values(CommandLine) as commands values(technique) as techniques by ComputerName, User
| where count >= 1
| sort - first_seen
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let recon_cmds = dynamic(["nltest", "domain_trusts", "dclist", "net group", "domain admins", "systeminfo"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("nltest.exe","net.exe","net1.exe","systeminfo.exe","schtasks.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (recon_cmds) or ProcessCommandLine has "LockScreenContentServer_MuODG5yBM"
| join kind=leftouter (
    DeviceRegistryEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where RegistryKey has @"CurrentVersion\Run" and RegistryValueName == "LockScreenContentServer_MuODG5yBM"
) on DeviceName
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: TerminalFix Dual Persistence and Active Directory Reconnaissance
id: 3c7d9e15-4f2b-4a8c-b6d1-9e0f5a3c7b12
status: experimental
description: Detects the LockScreenContentServer_MuODG5yBM registry Run key/scheduled task persistence pair and the associated nltest/net group/systeminfo Active Directory reconnaissance commands used by the TerminalFix campaign.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/08/28/terminalfix-campaign-deploys-reverse-tunnel-through-multistage-intrusion/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1018
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    sel_persist_name:
        CommandLine|contains: 'LockScreenContentServer_MuODG5yBM'
    sel_nltest:
        Image|endswith: '\nltest.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'domain_trusts'
            - 'dclist'
    sel_netgroup:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'group'
            - 'domain admins'
    sel_sysinfo:
        Image|endswith: '\systeminfo.exe'
    condition: 1 of sel_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate domain administrators auditing trusts or group membership
    - Backup, inventory, or monitoring agents that run systeminfo periodically
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate domain administrators or help-desk staff auditing domain trusts or the Domain Admins group
- Backup, inventory, or monitoring agents that routinely run systeminfo or net group queries

**Tuning notes:** Treat a match on the exact string LockScreenContentServer_MuODG5yBM (registry value or task name) as high confidence standalone; treat generic nltest/net group/systeminfo commands as medium confidence and escalate only when correlated with the same host/session as the persistence artifact or the exploitation-stage detection.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- TerminalFix ClickFix Paste-and-Run to Hidden DLL Sideload Staging (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TerminalFix Dual Persistence and AD Reconnaissance (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TerminalFix Python Reverse-Tunnel WebSocket C2 to [indicator] (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TerminalFix ClickFix Paste-and-Run to Hidden DLL Sideload Staging (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TerminalFix Dual Persistence and AD Reconnaissance (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TerminalFix Python Reverse-Tunnel WebSocket C2 to [indicator] (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TerminalFix ClickFix Paste-and-Run to Hidden DLL Sideload Staging (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TerminalFix Python Reverse-Tunnel WebSocket C2 to [indicator] (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 25)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `bestsocialmedianewspapper[.]com`
- File hash: `18c2090e8a0ae0568af9b87e59eaf8270f23d2909600ed9db91a9444fd8b278f`
- Domain: `offlineupdater[.]com`

Full set of 25 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [TerminalFix campaign deploys a reverse tunnel through multistage intrusion](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/08/28/terminalfix-campaign-deploys-reverse-tunnel-through-multistage-intrusion/)
- [TerminalFix Uses Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA to Deliver DLL Sideloading Malware](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/terminalfix-uses-fake-cloudflare.html)
- [Hackers Use Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA to Deploy TerminalFix Reverse Tunnel](https://gbhackers.com/hackers-use-fake-cloudflare-captcha/)
- [TerminalFix campaign deploys a reverse tunnel through multistage intrusion](https://radar.offseq.com/threat/terminalfix-campaign-deploys-a-reverse-tunnel-through-multistage-intrusion-44b4ed4ec50e4fda)
- [TerminalFix Uses Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHAs to Deploy Reverse-Tunnel Backdoor](https://www.infosectoday.io/terminalfix-uses-fake-cloudflare-captchas-to-deploy-reverse-tunnel-backdoor)
- [TerminalFix Uses Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHAs to Deploy Reverse-Tunnel Backdoor](https://forum.ksec.co.uk/t/terminalfix-uses-fake-cloudflare-captchas-to-deploy-reverse-tunnel-backdoor/18940)
- [TerminalFix Uses Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHAs to Deploy Reverse-Tunnel Backdoor](https://www.guardianmssp.com/2026/08/30/terminalfix-uses-fake-cloudflare-captchas-to-deploy-reverse-tunnel-backdoor/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2237
