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Threat reportCloud SecurityTL-2026-2263

Password Spraying Campaign Targets AWS Root User Accounts Across 150+ Organizations

mediumACTIVE

Datadog Security Labs identified a password-spraying campaign that made repeated failed ConsoleLogin attempts against AWS account root-user credentials at 150+ organizations between July 24 and August 23, 2026. The activity required the target's root-user email address, was routed through distributed proxy/hosting infrastructure, and produced no successful authentications or discernible victimology pattern.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2263
SeverityMEDIUM
Affected productsAmazon Web Services AWS Account Root User Console Sign-In (IAM ConsoleLogin / AwsConsoleSignIn)
ToolsDatadog Cloud SIEM — 'AWS root account activity' default detection rule, Datadog Cloud SIEM — 'Potential brute force attack on AWS ConsoleLogin' default detection rule, Elastic Security — 'AWS Management Console Brute Force of Root User Identity' prebuilt rule
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts, T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy, T1110 Brute Force, T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing, T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying, T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server, T1583.005 Acquire Infrastructure: Botnet, T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool, T1589.002 Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses, T1665 Hide Infrastructure
MotivationUNKNOWN
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-31, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2263 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 7 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: AWS Root ConsoleLogin Failed Brute Force / Password Spray

Detects repeated failed CloudTrail ConsoleLogin events against userIdentity.type=Root within a 5-minute window, matching the low-and-slow password-spraying pattern (median 2, up to 8 attempts per organization) used by the 150+-org root brute-force campaign disclosed by Datadog Security Labs. Generating a failed root ConsoleLogin event requires the caller already know the account's registered root-user email, so any occurrence indicates the attacker has that address and is actively probing root authentication.

Splunk SPL

index=aws_cloudtrail sourcetype="aws:cloudtrail" eventName=ConsoleLogin
| spath output=user_identity_type path=userIdentity.type
| spath output=console_login_result path=responseElements.ConsoleLogin
| where user_identity_type="Root" AND console_login_result="Failure"
| bin _time span=5m
| stats count as failed_attempts, dc(sourceIPAddress) as distinct_source_ips, values(sourceIPAddress) as source_ips, values(userAgent) as user_agents by recipientAccountId, _time
| where failed_attempts >= 2
| sort - failed_attempts

Microsoft KQL

AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventName == "ConsoleLogin" and EventSource == "signin.amazonaws.com"
| where UserIdentityType == "Root"
| extend LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)
| where LoginResult == "Failure"
| summarize FailedAttempts = count(), DistinctIPs = dcount(SourceIpAddress), IPs = make_set(SourceIpAddress), UserAgents = make_set(UserAgent) by RecipientAccountId, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)
| where FailedAttempts >= 2
| project TimeGenerated, RecipientAccountId, FailedAttempts, DistinctIPs, IPs, UserAgents
| sort by FailedAttempts desc

Sigma

title: AWS Root Account ConsoleLogin Brute Force / Password Spray
id: 7a2c4e10-3f5b-4c8a-9d1e-6b0f2a7c5e11
status: experimental
description: Detects repeated failed CloudTrail ConsoleLogin events against the AWS root user, consistent with the 2026 password-spraying campaign that targeted root-user email addresses at 150+ organizations.
references:
    - https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/aws-root-user-bruteforce-campaign/
    - https://docs.datadoghq.com/security/default_rules/aws-iam-brute-force-consolelogin/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-31
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1110.003
    - attack.t1110.001
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1589.002
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: signin.amazonaws.com
        eventName: ConsoleLogin
        userIdentity.type: Root
        responseElements.ConsoleLogin: Failure
    condition: selection | count() by recipientAccountId > 1
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrator repeatedly mistyping the root password
    - Password manager or browser autofill retry storms
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate administrator repeatedly mistyping the root password
  • Internal credential-testing/audit tooling run by the org's own security team against its own root account
  • Password manager or browser autofill retry storms triggering multiple failed submissions in quick succession

Tuning notes: Baseline the failed_attempts threshold (default >=2) against the organization's own historical false-login rate before alerting; exclude known internal/VPN egress IP ranges used for legitimate break-glass testing; extend the bin window to 24h to catch the campaign's slower, multi-day cadence rather than only rapid bursts.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • AWS Root ConsoleLogin Failed Brute Force / Password Spray · unlock with TL Creds
  • Successful Root ConsoleLogin With Sensitive Follow-On Root API Activity · unlock with TL Creds
  • Root ConsoleLogin Attempts From Proxy/Hosting Infrastructure With Shared Campaign Tooling Fingerprint · unlock with TL Creds
  • AWS Root Account ConsoleLogin Brute Force / Password Spray · unlock with TL Creds
  • Successful AWS Root ConsoleLogin · unlock with TL Creds
  • AWS Root ConsoleLogin Attempt Matching Known Campaign User-Agent Fingerprint · unlock with TL Creds
  • Successful Root ConsoleLogin With Sensitive Follow-On Root API Activity · unlock with TL Creds
  • Root ConsoleLogin Attempts From Proxy/Hosting Infrastructure With Shared Campaign Tooling Fingerprint · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-31, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 7 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2263.

7 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Between July 24 and August 23, 2026, Datadog Security Labs observed a password-spraying campaign against the AWS account root-user console sign-in flow at more than 150 organizations. The campaign exploited a structural quirk of AWS's authentication API: generating a failed `ConsoleLogin` event (CloudTrail event name `ConsoleLogin`, provider `signin.amazonaws.com`, event type `AwsConsoleSignIn`) for the root user requires the caller to already know the account's registered root-user email address. Attackers either worked from a pre-compiled list of root-user emails or ran enumeration attacks to validate which addresses corresponded to real root accounts, then repeatedly submitted authentication attempts against each. Attempt volume per organization was low and slow — a median of two attempts, with some organizations seeing up to eight — consistent with a password-spraying (low-and-slow, many-targets) pattern rather than a high-volume brute-force against a single account.

Requests were routed through third-party proxy infrastructure; source IPs were flagged by threat intelligence as hosting infrastructure, residential proxies, or similar, and spanned a wide range of countries and ASNs with no single dominant origin. Only two distinct browser user-agent strings were logged across the failed attempts (a Chrome/Edge-on-Windows string and a Firefox-on-Windows string), suggesting a constrained, possibly scripted or shared tooling set behind the requests despite the distributed source infrastructure.

No successful root-user authentication was observed at any of the 150+ affected organizations across the full campaign window, and Datadog found no clear victimology: targets varied widely by country and industry with no discernible sector or geographic concentration. Datadog explicitly states it cannot conclusively determine the actor's motive, and no attribution to a known threat actor, group, or toolset is offered.

Datadog's own detection guidance for this exact activity is a Cloud SIEM query — `source:cloudtrail @userIdentity.type:Root @eventName:ConsoleLogin @responseElements.ConsoleLogin:(Failure OR Success)` — layered across two existing default detection rules: 'AWS root account activity' (tiers Critical for TI-flagged malicious IPs, High for a successful root console login, Medium for sensitive-service writes or suspicious-IP activity, Low for ≥5 failed logins within 5 minutes; mapped to TA0001/T1078) and 'Potential brute force attack on AWS ConsoleLogin' (group-by correlation of failed `ConsoleLogin` attempts, mapped to TA0006/T1110, last revised 2023-07-10). Elastic Security ships an equivalent prebuilt rule, 'AWS Management Console Brute Force of Root User Identity' (KQL: `data_stream.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:signin.amazonaws.com and event.action:ConsoleLogin and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type:Root and event.outcome:failure`; High severity, risk score 73, 6-minute threshold window, capped at 100 alerts per execution, mapped to TA0006/T1110/T1110.001), which independently corroborates that root-ConsoleLogin brute-forcing is a recognized, pre-existing detection use case this campaign fell squarely into.

The campaign lands against a backdrop of AWS's multi-year push to lock down root-user authentication: staged MFA enforcement for root users (standalone accounts from mid-2024, AWS Organizations management accounts from May 2024, and member accounts from June 2025 with a 35-day registration grace period) and the November 2024 launch of Centralized Root Access Management (STS `AssumeRoot`), which lets organizations strip long-term root credentials entirely and broker short-lived, task-scoped root sessions (e.g. `IAMCreateRootUserPassword`, `IAMDeleteRootUserCredentials`, `IAMAuditRootUserCredentials`, `S3UnlockBucketPolicy`, `SQSUnlockQueuePolicy`) instead. Because root retains unrestricted, unrestrictable access to every AWS service in the account — including billing, GovCloud sign-up, KMS key recovery, and clearing misconfigured S3/SQS resource policies that deny all principals — any organization that had not yet migrated off long-lived root credentials and hardware/FIDO2 MFA remained a viable target for this style of attack even though no compromise was confirmed in this campaign.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Initial Access

T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

command-and-control

T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy; T1665 Hide Infrastructure

Credential Access

T1110 Brute Force; T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing; T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying

Resource Development

T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server; T1583.005 Acquire Infrastructure: Botnet; T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool

Reconnaissance

T1589.002 Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Alert on any CloudTrail ConsoleLogin event (success or failure) where userIdentity.type = Root, using Datadog's query source:cloudtrail @userIdentity.type:Root @eventName:ConsoleLogin @responseElements.ConsoleLogin:(Failure OR Success), or the equivalent Elastic KQL rule (data_stream.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:signin.amazonaws.com and event.action:ConsoleLogin and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type:Root and event.outcome:failure).
  • Review CloudTrail for existing failed root ConsoleLogin attempts across all accounts in the AWS Organization to determine if the organization was already targeted; Datadog's default rule flags Low severity at >=5 failures within 5 minutes and Critical when the source IP is threat-intel-flagged.
  • Confirm hardware or FIDO2-based MFA is enrolled and enforced on every root user, including newly created member accounts still inside the 35-day grace period.

Workarounds

  • Where AssumeRoot migration is not yet complete, enforce hardware MFA on root and monitor ConsoleLogin failures as a compensating control.

Longer-term hardening

  • Adopt AWS Centralized Root Access Management (STS AssumeRoot) to remove long-lived root credentials and root password/MFA setup from member accounts entirely, replacing direct root sign-in with short-lived, task-policy-scoped AssumeRoot sessions.
  • Deploy AWS Organizations service control policies that deny direct root-user activity in member accounts except through the centralized/AssumeRoot path.
  • Establish continuous monitoring and alerting on all root activity — sign-ins, credential changes, and API calls — not just failed logins, and extend the same monitoring to sts:AssumeRoot events once centralized root access is adopted.
  • Restrict knowledge/discoverability of root-user email addresses where feasible (dedicated, non-guessable mailbox aliases; avoid reuse of predictable corporate email patterns for the root account).

Affected and fixed versions

  • Amazon Web Services — AWS Account Root User Console Sign-In (IAM ConsoleLogin / AwsConsoleSignIn)
    Vulnerable versions: All AWS accounts (standalone, AWS Organizations management, and member accounts) that retain a directly usable root-user email/password and have not migrated to Centralized Root Access Management
    Fixed in: Not a patchable vulnerability — mitigated operationally via hardware/FIDO2 MFA enrollment on root, AWS Centralized Root Access Management (STS AssumeRoot), and service control policies restricting direct root activity

Timeline

  • Datadog updates the group-by fields on its 'Potential brute force attack on AWS ConsoleLogin' default detection rule, the same rule class later used to detect this 2026 campaign's failed root-login pattern.
  • AWS publicly announces plans to require MFA for AWS account root users, the first step in a multi-year root-security hardening effort.
  • AWS begins enforcing MFA for root users of AWS Organizations management accounts, starting with larger environments.
  • MFA enforcement extends to root users of standalone AWS accounts not managed via AWS Organizations.
  • AWS launches Centralized Root Access Management (STS AssumeRoot), allowing organizations to remove long-term root credentials and broker short-lived, task-policy-scoped root sessions instead of direct root sign-in.
  • AWS extends root-user MFA enforcement to member accounts within AWS Organizations, with a 35-day grace period for MFA registration after first console sign-in.
  • Earliest failed root-user ConsoleLogin attempts attributed to the campaign begin appearing in Datadog customer CloudTrail telemetry.
  • Last observed failed root-user ConsoleLogin attempt tied to the campaign; no successful authentication was recorded across the entire window at any of the 150+ affected organizations.
  • Datadog Security Labs publishes 'Password spraying campaign targets AWS root user accounts across 150+ organizations,' disclosing the campaign, its telemetry, and detection/mitigation guidance.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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