# Password Spraying Campaign Targets AWS Root User Accounts Across 150+ Organizations

> Datadog Security Labs identified a password-spraying campaign that made repeated failed ConsoleLogin attempts against AWS account root-user credentials at 150+ organizations between July 24 and August 23, 2026. The activity required the target's root-user email address, was routed through distributed proxy/hosting infrastructure, and produced no successful authentications or discernible victimology pattern.

- **Published:** 2026-08-31T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-31T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2263
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-aws-root-account-brute-force-tl-2026-2263.webp?v=15808774 (Threadlinqs threat intel: AWS Root Account Password Spraying: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2263) — Medium severity, 7 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2263
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** CLOUD
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 7

## Description

Between July 24 and August 23, 2026, Datadog Security Labs observed a password-spraying campaign against the AWS account root-user console sign-in flow at more than 150 organizations. The campaign exploited a structural quirk of AWS's authentication API: generating a failed `ConsoleLogin` event (CloudTrail event name `ConsoleLogin`, provider `signin.amazonaws.com`, event type `AwsConsoleSignIn`) for the root user requires the caller to already know the account's registered root-user email address. Attackers either worked from a pre-compiled list of root-user emails or ran enumeration attacks to validate which addresses corresponded to real root accounts, then repeatedly submitted authentication attempts against each. Attempt volume per organization was low and slow — a median of two attempts, with some organizations seeing up to eight — consistent with a password-spraying (low-and-slow, many-targets) pattern rather than a high-volume brute-force against a single account.

Requests were routed through third-party proxy infrastructure; source IPs were flagged by threat intelligence as hosting infrastructure, residential proxies, or similar, and spanned a wide range of countries and ASNs with no single dominant origin. Only two distinct browser user-agent strings were logged across the failed attempts (a Chrome/Edge-on-Windows string and a Firefox-on-Windows string), suggesting a constrained, possibly scripted or shared tooling set behind the requests despite the distributed source infrastructure.

No successful root-user authentication was observed at any of the 150+ affected organizations across the full campaign window, and Datadog found no clear victimology: targets varied widely by country and industry with no discernible sector or geographic concentration. Datadog explicitly states it cannot conclusively determine the actor's motive, and no attribution to a known threat actor, group, or toolset is offered.

Datadog's own detection guidance for this exact activity is a Cloud SIEM query — `source:cloudtrail @userIdentity.type:Root @eventName:ConsoleLogin @responseElements.ConsoleLogin:(Failure OR Success)` — layered across two existing default detection rules: 'AWS root account activity' (tiers Critical for TI-flagged malicious IPs, High for a successful root console login, Medium for sensitive-service writes or suspicious-IP activity, Low for ≥5 failed logins within 5 minutes; mapped to TA0001/T1078) and 'Potential brute force attack on AWS ConsoleLogin' (group-by correlation of failed `ConsoleLogin` attempts, mapped to TA0006/T1110, last revised 2023-07-10). Elastic Security ships an equivalent prebuilt rule, 'AWS Management Console Brute Force of Root User Identity' (KQL: `data_stream.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:signin.amazonaws.com and event.action:ConsoleLogin and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type:Root and event.outcome:failure`; High severity, risk score 73, 6-minute threshold window, capped at 100 alerts per execution, mapped to TA0006/T1110/T1110.001), which independently corroborates that root-ConsoleLogin brute-forcing is a recognized, pre-existing detection use case this campaign fell squarely into.

The campaign lands against a backdrop of AWS's multi-year push to lock down root-user authentication: staged MFA enforcement for root users (standalone accounts from mid-2024, AWS Organizations management accounts from May 2024, and member accounts from June 2025 with a 35-day registration grace period) and the November 2024 launch of Centralized Root Access Management (STS `AssumeRoot`), which lets organizations strip long-term root credentials entirely and broker short-lived, task-scoped root sessions (e.g. `IAMCreateRootUserPassword`, `IAMDeleteRootUserCredentials`, `IAMAuditRootUserCredentials`, `S3UnlockBucketPolicy`, `SQSUnlockQueuePolicy`) instead. Because root retains unrestricted, unrestrictable access to every AWS service in the account — including billing, GovCloud sign-up, KMS key recovery, and clearing misconfigured S3/SQS resource policies that deny all principals — any organization that had not yet migrated off long-lived root credentials and hardware/FIDO2 MFA remained a viable target for this style of attack even though no compromise was confirmed in this campaign.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589.002 Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses
- T1583.005 Acquire Infrastructure: Botnet
- T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server
- T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying
- T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing
- T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy
- T1665 Hide Infrastructure
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**AWS Root ConsoleLogin Failed Brute Force / Password Spray** (`TL-2026-2263-SPL-001`)

Detects repeated failed CloudTrail ConsoleLogin events against userIdentity.type=Root within a 5-minute window, matching the low-and-slow password-spraying pattern (median 2, up to 8 attempts per organization) used by the 150+-org root brute-force campaign disclosed by Datadog Security Labs. Generating a failed root ConsoleLogin event requires the caller already know the account's registered root-user email, so any occurrence indicates the attacker has that address and is actively probing root authentication.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1110, T1110.003, T1110.001, T1078.004, T1589.002
- **Data sources:** aws_cloudtrail, aws_iam
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=aws_cloudtrail sourcetype="aws:cloudtrail" eventName=ConsoleLogin
| spath output=user_identity_type path=userIdentity.type
| spath output=console_login_result path=responseElements.ConsoleLogin
| where user_identity_type="Root" AND console_login_result="Failure"
| bin _time span=5m
| stats count as failed_attempts, dc(sourceIPAddress) as distinct_source_ips, values(sourceIPAddress) as source_ips, values(userAgent) as user_agents by recipientAccountId, _time
| where failed_attempts >= 2
| sort - failed_attempts
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventName == "ConsoleLogin" and EventSource == "signin.amazonaws.com"
| where UserIdentityType == "Root"
| extend LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)
| where LoginResult == "Failure"
| summarize FailedAttempts = count(), DistinctIPs = dcount(SourceIpAddress), IPs = make_set(SourceIpAddress), UserAgents = make_set(UserAgent) by RecipientAccountId, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)
| where FailedAttempts >= 2
| project TimeGenerated, RecipientAccountId, FailedAttempts, DistinctIPs, IPs, UserAgents
| sort by FailedAttempts desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: AWS Root Account ConsoleLogin Brute Force / Password Spray
id: 7a2c4e10-3f5b-4c8a-9d1e-6b0f2a7c5e11
status: experimental
description: Detects repeated failed CloudTrail ConsoleLogin events against the AWS root user, consistent with the 2026 password-spraying campaign that targeted root-user email addresses at 150+ organizations.
references:
    - https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/aws-root-user-bruteforce-campaign/
    - https://docs.datadoghq.com/security/default_rules/aws-iam-brute-force-consolelogin/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-31
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1110.003
    - attack.t1110.001
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1589.002
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: signin.amazonaws.com
        eventName: ConsoleLogin
        userIdentity.type: Root
        responseElements.ConsoleLogin: Failure
    condition: selection | count() by recipientAccountId > 1
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrator repeatedly mistyping the root password
    - Password manager or browser autofill retry storms
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate administrator repeatedly mistyping the root password
- Internal credential-testing/audit tooling run by the org's own security team against its own root account
- Password manager or browser autofill retry storms triggering multiple failed submissions in quick succession

**Tuning notes:** Baseline the failed_attempts threshold (default >=2) against the organization's own historical false-login rate before alerting; exclude known internal/VPN egress IP ranges used for legitimate break-glass testing; extend the bin window to 24h to catch the campaign's slower, multi-day cadence rather than only rapid bursts.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- AWS Root ConsoleLogin Failed Brute Force / Password Spray (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Successful Root ConsoleLogin With Sensitive Follow-On Root API Activity (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Root ConsoleLogin Attempts From Proxy/Hosting Infrastructure With Shared Campaign Tooling Fingerprint (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AWS Root Account ConsoleLogin Brute Force / Password Spray (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Successful AWS Root ConsoleLogin (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AWS Root ConsoleLogin Attempt Matching Known Campaign User-Agent Fingerprint (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Successful Root ConsoleLogin With Sensitive Follow-On Root API Activity (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Root ConsoleLogin Attempts From Proxy/Hosting Infrastructure With Shared Campaign Tooling Fingerprint (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [Password spraying campaign targets AWS root user accounts across 150+ organizations](https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/aws-root-user-bruteforce-campaign/)
- [AWS root account activity (default detection rule)](https://docs.datadoghq.com/security/default_rules/aws-cloudtrail-root-account-activity/)
- [Potential brute force attack on AWS ConsoleLogin (default detection rule)](https://docs.datadoghq.com/security/default_rules/aws-iam-brute-force-consolelogin/)
- [AWS Management Console Brute Force of Root User Identity](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/aws-management-console-brute-force-of-root-user-identity.html)
- [Exploring AWS STS AssumeRoot](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-aws-sts-assumeroot)
- [Multi-factor authentication for AWS account root user](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/enable-mfa-for-root.html)
- [AWS account root user](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html)
- [Centralized Root Access in AWS Organizations: Benefits, Considerations, and Best Practices](https://repost.aws/articles/AR0YHZ3VskTzqhJKyEDPnSPQ/centralized-root-access-in-aws-organizations-benefits-considerations-and-best-practices)
- [Amazon to make MFA mandatory for 'root' AWS accounts by mid-2024](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/amazon-to-make-mfa-mandatory-for-root-aws-accounts-by-mid-2024/)
- [Amazon: AWS root accounts must have MFA enabled](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2023/10/04/aws-root-mfa/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2263
