# "Spring Ring" Vishing Campaign Abuses Microsoft Teams, Quick Assist, and PetitPotam for NTLM Relay

> Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) documented a vishing campaign dubbed 'Spring Ring' running January-April 2026, in which 26+ attacker-controlled Microsoft Teams identities posed as IT support to socially engineer 150+ employees across 10+ companies into granting remote access via Quick Assist/RMM tools or executing malicious files, leading to AMSI/Defender bypass and PetitPotam-based NTLM relay attempts against domain controllers.

- **Published:** 2026-09-01T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-09-01T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2276
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-spring-ring-microsoft-teams-vishing-tl-2026-2276.webp?v=9a038fb4 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Spring Ring Teams Vishing to NTLM Relay: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2276) — High severity, 33 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2276
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 33 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2021-36942

## Description

Between January and April 2026, Unit 42 tracked a coordinated voice-phishing (vishing) operation it named 'Spring Ring,' published August 31, 2026 (with Help Net Security, Cyberpress, and other outlets carrying follow-on coverage September 1, 2026). Attackers registered external Microsoft Teams tenants (onmicrosoft.com) with names engineered to impersonate internal IT departments. Unit 42 identified at least 8 generic role-based malicious identities — helpcenter@ithelpcenter365.onmicrosoft.com, helpdesk@itprotectiondepartment.onmicrosoft.com, helpdesk@newsystemmaintenance.onmicrosoft.com, helpdesk@officedesk365.onmicrosoft.com, helpdesk@officesecures.onmicrosoft.com, itadmin@mandatorynetworkmonitoring.onmicrosoft.com, internal@internalusahelpdeskit.onmicrosoft.com, and ithelp@internalsystemsdaily.onmicrosoft.com — plus 17+ additional persona-based identities using personalized (rather than generic help-desk) display names, for a total of 26 distinct attacker identities. Operators initiated unsolicited Teams chats with employees and rapidly escalated to voice calls; unsuccessful attempts lasted seconds to a missed call, while successful engagements typically ran 10-15 minutes, and Unit 42 observed attackers cycling through 5-6 identities within minutes when a target didn't answer, targeting the chat-to-call transition speed as a key behavioral signal.

In the 'remote access' path (Campaign A), the caller talked the victim into launching Quick Assist (QuickAssist.exe) or a third-party RMM tool and granting control of the machine. Once in control, the attacker ran discovery commands (`whoami /groups`, `net group /dom`) to enumerate group membership and domain context, then delivered a heavily obfuscated PowerShell loader (retrieved via `Invoke-WebRequest`) — described by Unit 42 as using variable-manipulation and arithmetic obfuscation plus anti-analysis 'bloat' meant to time out deobfuscation tooling. The script disabled AMSI by forcing the `amsiInitFailed` flag and verified the bypass with a test scan, then encrypted host data and beaconed to the attacker domain `san-sid.com` with a 'tiny, nine-line' C2 stager to pull down further payloads (SHA256 `24ab9fe5d5be62d3bf055a0ca4508e8bca2996b6d78649dce8145d8a27bc1c5b`, fetched from `https://san-sid.com/owners`). Unit 42 reports this campaign was blocked by automated Cortex XDR Agent protections during the malware's execution phase.

In the 'malicious file' path (Campaign B), victims instead received a cloud-storage link — Unit 42 observed AWS S3 objects with URLs templated as `<company_name>-org-filters-update-<victim_name>.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com`, with the delivered executable named identically after the target company and the victim's own username. Running it moved the binary to `%TEMP%` and spawned renamed persistence copies (`vhlp-*.exe`, `scnr-*.exe`). The payload launched a hidden/headless Microsoft Edge instance with a sideloaded browser extension (browser hijacking) and a bundled Python component (observed at path `C:\ProgramData\IntegrityData\python.exe`) that performed internal SMB reconnaissance (TCP/445 port scanning) before invoking PetitPotam to coerce the domain controller into authenticating to an attacker-controlled listener — an NTLM-relay attempt aimed at escalating to domain-level privileges. Community technical write-ups estimate roughly 30 minutes elapsed from the initial Teams chat to the SMB scan/EFSRPC coercion attempt for a given victim. Unit 42 Managed Detection and Response blocked the domain-takeover attempt after PetitPotam's DC-coercion step; no report reviewed confirms a successful domain takeover in any observed instance. PetitPotam abuses the MS-EFSRPC `EfsRpcOpenFileRaw` API and is the technique behind the publicly tracked Windows LSA spoofing weakness CVE-2021-36942 (patched/mitigated by Microsoft in August 2021 via Extended Protection for Authentication / certificate-mapping guidance); Unit 42's write-up does not cite a CVE for the Spring Ring campaign itself since the underlying exposure is a systemic NTLM-relay/coercion design issue rather than a single unpatched flaw, and organizations that have not applied the 2021-era mitigations (EPA, SMB signing, disabling NTLM where feasible) remain relayable regardless of patch level.

Unit 42 published 16 attacker-side VPN/proxy IP addresses used for infrastructure, plus dozens of fraudulent onmicrosoft.com Teams-tenant identities. The report references 'Cloaked Ursa' (associated with APT29/Midnight Blizzard) as having previously run Teams-based credential-harvesting campaigns, explicitly as prior-art context for the collaboration-platform vector rather than as attribution — no specific threat-actor name, nation-state attribution, motivation, or CVE was assigned to Spring Ring itself. Help Net Security's coverage additionally notes that phishing alerts tied to collaboration platforms (Teams, Slack, etc.) rose to 42% of all phishing alerts in the first four months of 2026, up from roughly 30% in the preceding four-month period (approximately September-December 2025) — framing Spring Ring as part of a broader shift toward collaboration-platform vishing. Both Unit 42 and secondary analysis recommend correlating Teams audit logs, endpoint telemetry, authentication events, and network flow data within a single behavioral window (chat → call → RMM/PowerShell → cloud download → SMB scan → EFSRPC/NTLM) to reconstruct and detect the full attack chain, since no single log source captures it end to end.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.006 Web Services
- T1585 Establish Accounts
- T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1176 Software Extensions
- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1187 Forced Authentication
- T1557.001 Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
- T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1069.002 Domain Groups
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**External Teams Vishing-to-Quick-Assist Remote-Control Pivot** (`TL-2026-2276-SPL-001`)

Detects the Spring Ring initial-access pattern: an external, unverified Microsoft Teams tenant with an IT/helpdesk-themed onmicrosoft.com identity (e.g. helpcenter@ithelpcenter365.onmicrosoft.com) initiates a chat/call with an internal user, followed within 15 minutes by that same user launching Quick Assist (QuickAssist.exe) or a common third-party RMM tool — the chat-to-call-to-remote-access transition Unit 42 flagged as the key behavioral signal across 150+ targeted employees.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.004, T1204.002, T1219, T1583.006, T1585
- **Data sources:** o365_management_activity, sysmon, windows_process_creation
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=o365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload=MicrosoftTeams Operation IN ("ChatCreated","MessageSent")
| rex field=UserId "@(?<sender_domain>[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.onmicrosoft\.com)$"
| where isnotnull(sender_domain) AND match(sender_domain, "(?i)(help|it|admin|support|desk|monitoring)")
| eval teams_time=_time
| join type=inner target_user
    [ search index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
      (Image="*\\quickassist.exe" OR Image="*\\AnyDesk.exe" OR Image="*\\TeamViewer*.exe" OR Image="*\\ScreenConnect*.exe")
    | rename User as target_user, _time as rmm_time, Image as rmm_image, ComputerName as host ]
| eval delta_sec=abs(rmm_time-teams_time)
| where delta_sec<=900
| table teams_time, sender_domain, target_user, host, rmm_image, rmm_time, delta_sec
| sort - teams_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let externalTeamsChats = CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Application == "Microsoft Teams"
| where ActionType in ("ChatCreated", "MessageSent")
| extend SenderDomain = tostring(split(AccountObjectId, "@")[1])
| where SenderDomain endswith "onmicrosoft.com" and SenderDomain matches regex @"(?i)(help|it|admin|support|desk|monitoring)"
| project TeamsTime = Timestamp, TargetUser = AccountDisplayName, SenderDomain;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("quickassist.exe","AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","ScreenConnect.exe")
| project RmmTime = Timestamp, TargetUser = AccountName, FileName, DeviceName
| join kind=inner externalTeamsChats on TargetUser
| where abs(datetime_diff('second', RmmTime, TeamsTime)) <= 900
| project TeamsTime, RmmTime, TargetUser, SenderDomain, FileName, DeviceName
| sort by TeamsTime desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Quick Assist Remote-Control Session Initiated (Possible Vishing Pivot)
id: 7f3b9c2e-1a44-4e9d-9c31-2b6a7d4f10a1
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of QuickAssist.exe or common third-party RMM tools; intended to be correlated within 15 minutes of an external Microsoft Teams chat/call from an unverified onmicrosoft.com tenant, as observed in the Spring Ring vishing campaign.
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/spring-ring-voice-phishing-campaigns/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-01
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.004
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.006
    - attack.t1585
    - attack.campaign.spring_ring
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\quickassist.exe'
            - '\AnyDesk.exe'
            - '\TeamViewer.exe'
            - '\ScreenConnect.exe'
    filter_it_staff:
        User|contains:
            - 'IT-Support'
            - 'HelpDesk'
    condition: selection and not filter_it_staff
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate IT helpdesk-initiated remote support sessions
    - Approved third-party RMM usage by authorized administrators
level: medium
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate IT helpdesk-initiated remote support sessions conducted through verified internal Teams tenants
- Approved third-party RMM usage by authorized administrators unrelated to an external chat

**Tuning notes:** Maintain an allowlist of verified internal/approved external Teams tenant domains to suppress known-good helpdesk vendors; tighten the join window from 15 to 5 minutes in high-volume environments to reduce coincidental matches.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Company-Branded S3 Payload Download and Execution (Campaign B Delivery) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Headless Edge with Sideloaded Extension and Bundled Python SMB Recon Component (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PetitPotam-Style Forced NTLM Authentication to Domain Controller (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fraudulent IT-Themed onmicrosoft.com Teams Tenant Contact (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Post-Quick-Assist Domain Discovery Commands (whoami /groups, net group /dom) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- End-to-End Spring Ring Chain: SMB Recon to PetitPotam Coercion within 30 Minutes (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AMSI Bypass, Domain Discovery and Renamed Persistence Drop (Spring Ring Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] C2 Beacon and Internal SMB(445) Reconnaissance (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 33)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `193.32.248[.]251`
- Domain: `san-sid[.]com`
- File hash: `24ab9fe5d5be62d3bf055a0ca4508e8bca2996b6d78649dce8145d8a27bc1c5b`

Full set of 33 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- ["Spring Ring" vishing campaign impersonates IT support over Microsoft Teams](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/09/01/spring-ring-vishing-campaign-microsoft-teams/)
- [Spring Ring: An Inside Look at Voice Phishing Campaigns in Microsoft Teams](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/spring-ring-voice-phishing-campaigns/)
- [Spring Ring: From Microsoft Teams Voice Phishing to RMM, RAT, and NTLM Relay](https://dev.to/anoymask/spring-ring-from-microsoft-teams-voice-phishing-to-rmm-rat-and-ntlm-relay-3k29)
- [Microsoft Teams Vishing Campaign Targets 150+ Employees With RMM Abuse](https://cyberpress.org/teams-vishing-targets-employees/)
- [Spring Ring: An Inside Look at Voice Phishing Campaigns in Microsoft Teams (mirror)](https://radar.offseq.com/threat/spring-ring-an-inside-look-at-voice-phishing-campaigns-in-microsoft-teams-f9f36df911fff48a)
- [PetitPotam Attack Chain Can Compromise Windows Domains Running AD CS](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/08/03/petitpotam-novel-attack-chain-can-fully-compromise-windows-domains-running-ad-cs/)
- [CVE-2021-36942: Windows LSA Spoofing Vulnerability](https://www.sentinelone.com/vulnerability-database/cve-2021-36942/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2276
