Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-2297
The BYOVD Epidemic: Attackers Weaponize Trusted Windows Drivers to Kill Security Software
Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) has evolved from a niche technique into a standard defense-evasion stage of the ransomware playbook: attackers with administrator rights load signed-but-vulnerable kernel drivers (truesight.sys, an outdated Process Explorer driver, Microsoft-signed POORTRY) to terminate or blind AV/EDR agents ahead of encryption. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2297, CVE-2013-3900 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | BYOVD Epidemic, Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2013-3900 (added ) |
| EPSS | CVE-2013-3900: 44.6% (98.7th percentile) |
| Affected products | Adlice Software RogueKiller / TrueSight Anti-Rootkit Driver (truesight.sys); Microsoft Sysinternals Process Explorer Driver (PROCEXP.SYS); Microsoft Windows kernel driver loading / Vulnerable Driver Blocklist |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-347 |
| Malware | AgendaCrypt, AuKill, BlackCat/ALPHV, Ghost RAT, HiddenGh0st, LockBit, MedusaLocker, POORTRY, WarLock |
| Tools | AuKill, GhostDriver, POORTRY |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1014 Rootkit, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1518.001 Security Software Discovery, T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing, T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution, T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool, T1588.003 Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates, T1685 Disable or Modify Tools |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | telecoms, business process outsourcing, managed service providers, financial services, cryptocurrency, entertainment, transport, health |
| Target regions | Asia-Pacific, North America, Europe, Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 10 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-06-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2297 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 29 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: BYOVD Vulnerable Kernel Driver Load — truesight.sys / PROCEXP.SYS / rwdrv.sys / hlpdrv.sys / POORTRY
Detects the load of known vulnerable or maliciously-signed kernel drivers abused across the Silver Fox (truesight.sys), AuKill (PROCEXP.SYS), Qilin (rwdrv.sys/hlpdrv.sys) and STONESTOP/POORTRY BYOVD campaigns to obtain Ring-0 code execution ahead of AV/EDR termination and ransomware deployment.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1543.003, T1569.002, T1014
- Data sources: sysmon
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=6
| eval img=lower(ImageLoaded)
| where match(img, "truesight\.sys$") OR match(img, "procexp\.sys$") OR match(img, "rwdrv\.sys$") OR match(img, "hlpdrv\.sys$") OR match(img, "189atohci\.sys$") OR match(img, "poortry")
| eval sha1=mvindex(split(replace(Hashes,"SHA1=",""),","),0)
| table _time, host, ImageLoaded, sha1, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus, ProcessGuid
| sort - _timeMicrosoft KQL
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "DriverLoad"
| where FileName has_any ("truesight.sys","procexp.sys","rwdrv.sys","hlpdrv.sys","189atohci.sys") or FileName has "poortry"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: BYOVD Vulnerable Kernel Driver Load
id: 1a2b3c4d-1111-4a1a-8a1a-000000000001
status: experimental
description: Detects loading of known vulnerable or malicious kernel drivers abused for BYOVD EDR/AV-killing (truesight.sys, PROCEXP.SYS, rwdrv.sys/hlpdrv.sys, POORTRY) ahead of ransomware deployment.
references:
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/byovd-vulnerable-drivers
- https://thehackernews.com/2025/02/2500-truesightsys-driver-variants.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-02
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.t1543.003
- attack.t1569.002
- attack.t1014
- attack.tool.aukill
- attack.tool.poortry
- cve.2013.3900
logsource:
category: driver_load
product: windows
detection:
selection_names:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\truesight.sys'
- '\procexp.sys'
- '\rwdrv.sys'
- '\hlpdrv.sys'
- '\189atohci.sys'
selection_poortry:
ImageLoaded|contains: 'poortry'
condition: selection_names or selection_poortry
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of patched Adlice RogueKiller/TrueSight (>=3.4.0) or current Sysinternals Process Explorer (PROCEXP152.sys) by authorized IT/security staff
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate re-installation or diagnostic use of the outdated (but not yet uninstalled) Adlice TrueSight/RogueKiller or Sysinternals Process Explorer driver by IT staff who have not yet patched to the fixed versions
Tuning notes: Maintain the driver-filename allowlist against Microsoft's live Vulnerable Driver Blocklist and Adlice's published hash list; add newly reported BYOVD driver names/hashes (e.g. future NSec driver variants) as they are disclosed, and suppress hosts with HVCI/Smart App Control enforced where the blocklist already blocks the load.
- BYOVD Driver Drop into System32\drivers Followed by Kernel Service Install · unlock with TL Creds
- Known BYOVD EDR-Killer Loader Execution (AuKill / TrueSightKiller / GhostDriver / STONESTOP) · unlock with TL Creds
- TightVNC Paired with Vulnerable NSec Kernel Driver (Warlock On-Prem SharePoint BYOVD Chain) · unlock with TL Creds
- sc.exe Kernel-Driver Service Creation Referencing Known BYOVD Driver · unlock with TL Creds
- Security Software Discovery Preceding BYOVD Driver-Based Termination · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] Side-Load Outside System32 Staging [indicator]/[indicator] BYOVD Chain (Qilin) · unlock with TL Creds
- Mass AV/EDR Process-Termination Burst (BYOVD Kill Sweep) · unlock with TL Creds
- HiddenGh0st / Gh0st RAT C2 Beacon to Known BYOVD-Campaign Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-06-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 29 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2297.
Sample indicators (3 of 29)
- IP address:
8.212.102[.]228 - Domain:
bung486[.]com - File hash:
f7b0369169dff3f10e974b9a10ec15f7a81dec54
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 29 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Public tooling (TrueSightKiller, AuKill, GhostDriver, STONESTOP/POORTRY) and 2026 campaigns from Qilin and Warlock show the technique is now commodity-grade and used across multiple ransomware-as-a-service operations.
BYOVD abuses the trust the Windows kernel places in digitally signed drivers: an attacker with local administrator rights loads a legitimate, signed driver that contains an exploitable flaw (arbitrary process termination, arbitrary read/write of kernel memory) instead of writing their own unsigned rootkit. Because the driver's signature validates, the load succeeds even under Driver Signature Enforcement, and the attacker gets Ring 0 code execution to unhook AV/EDR kernel callbacks and force-terminate protected security processes before ransomware deployment.
The technique now spans several distinct lineages of vulnerable/abused drivers. Adlice's RogueKiller anti-rootkit driver, truesight.sys, contains an arbitrary-process-termination flaw in versions below 3.4.0; the legacy 2.0.2 build remains exploitable even after later fixes. Starting mid-2024, a China-nexus cluster tracked as Silver Fox (medium-to-high confidence, per Check Point Research) weaponized this legacy driver at scale, exploiting CVE-2013-3900 (an Authenticode/WinVerifyTrust signature-validation gap) to modify the PE checksum and certificate padding of the driver without invalidating its digital signature. This let them mint over 2,500 distinct signed variants of the same vulnerable driver, defeating hash-based detection while delivering a custom Gh0st RAT variant (HiddenGh0st) from Alibaba Cloud OSS infrastructure. Microsoft's December 17, 2024 Vulnerable Driver Blocklist update targeted this family, but the legacy 2.0.2 build initially evaded it due to certificate-chain differences, and public exploitation tooling (TrueSightKiller) is freely available.
A second lineage abuses an outdated Sysinternals Process Explorer driver (v16.32). The open-source tool AuKill, built on techniques from the 2021 tool Backstab, drops this outdated driver as PROCEXP.SYS into C:\Windows\System32\drivers (alongside the legitimate current PROCEXP152.sys) and uses it to disable EDR/AV processes. At least six AuKill versions have been observed since November 2022; the tool was used ahead of Medusa Locker ransomware deployments in January-February 2023 and a LockBit deployment in February 2023.
A third lineage involves drivers that obtained legitimate Microsoft code-signing rather than exploiting a third-party driver's bug. In December 2022, Mandiant and SentinelOne disclosed the STONESTOP/POORTRY toolkit: POORTRY is a kernel-mode driver that STONESTOP (a user-mode loader) uses to terminate protected security processes and delete files, and it was signed via abuse of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program (WHCP) after malicious actors compromised legitimate Microsoft Partner Center developer accounts. The toolkit has since been used by UNC3944 (aka Scattered Spider) and multiple ransomware operators including LockBit, BlackCat/ALPHV, Cuba, Medusa, and RansomHub, targeting telecommunications, BPO, MSSP, financial services, cryptocurrency, entertainment, and transportation organizations.
Most recently (April 2026), Cisco Talos and Trend Micro documented Qilin and Warlock ransomware building BYOVD directly into their intrusion chains: Qilin side-loads a malicious msimg32.dll that stages rwdrv.sys (a renamed ThrottleStop.sys providing raw physical-memory access) and hlpdrv.sys, which together terminate processes from over 300 different EDR/AV products after first unregistering kernel callbacks so no alert fires. Warlock combined an NSec vulnerable driver with the TightVNC remote-access tool in BYOVD intrusions against vulnerable on-premises Microsoft SharePoint servers. GhostDriver, a further open-source automation tool, similarly drives IOCTLs against a hardcoded, actively maintained list of 300+ targeted security products. Symantec's Threat Hunter Team (June 2026) frames the collective pattern as hundreds of exploitable drivers already in circulation, with publicly known bypasses for kernel hardening features (KASLR, HVCI, KCFG) meaning the mitigations most organizations rely on do not reliably stop it.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1014 Rootkit; T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Execution
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File; T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution
Command and Control
Discovery
T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
Persistence
T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
defense-impairment
T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
Resource Development
T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool; T1588.003 Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates
Remediation
Patches
- Update Adlice TrueSight/RogueKiller driver to 3.4.0 or later.
- Replace outdated Sysinternals Process Explorer driver releases (pre-16.33 successor) with current signed builds.
Immediate actions
- Manually push the latest Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist rather than waiting for the annual Windows feature-update cadence.
- Enable HVCI (Memory Integrity) / Smart App Control so blocklist entries are actually enforced rather than left as advisory.
- Block known malicious driver hashes (AuKill v1-v6, truesight.sys 2.0.2-derived variants) at the EDR/AV layer.
Workarounds
- Restrict local administrator rights required to load arbitrary kernel drivers.
- Use application control to block execution of known BYOVD loader tools (AuKill, GhostDriver, TrueSightKiller, STONESTOP).
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy WDAC driver allowlisting rather than relying solely on the default vulnerable-driver blocklist.
- Monitor kernel driver load events (e.g. Sysmon Event ID 6) for unsigned, rarely-seen, or non-standard-path drivers.
- Alert on anomalous IOCTL calls and kernel-callback removal/unregistration targeting security-product processes.
Affected and fixed versions
- Adlice Software — RogueKiller / TrueSight Anti-Rootkit Driver (truesight.sys)
Vulnerable versions: <=2.0.2; <3.4.0
Fixed in: 3.4.0+ - Microsoft Sysinternals — Process Explorer Driver (PROCEXP.SYS)
Vulnerable versions: 16.32 and earlier (outdated release abused by AuKill)
Fixed in: Current Sysinternals release shipping PROCEXP152.sys - Microsoft — Windows kernel driver loading / Vulnerable Driver Blocklist
Vulnerable versions: Systems without HVCI/Smart App Control enabled or running a stale blocklist
Fixed in: Windows 10 (KB5018482) / Windows 11 (KB5018483, KB5018496) with the current blocklist enforced
Timeline
- Backstab, the open-source EDR-killing tool later adapted into AuKill, is published.
- Earliest known AuKill (v1) sample compiled, abusing the outdated Process Explorer v16.32 driver (locked-ioc-11).
- Mandiant and SentinelOne disclose the STONESTOP/POORTRY BYOVD toolkit and the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program signing loophole abused by UNC3944 to get POORTRY Microsoft-signed.
- AuKill used to disable EDR ahead of Medusa Locker ransomware deployments (January-February 2023 incidents).
- AuKill used to disable EDR immediately prior to a LockBit ransomware deployment.
- Sophos publishes technical research on AuKill, cataloguing six driver-dropper versions observed since November 2022.
- Silver Fox begins large-scale exploitation of the legacy locked-ioc-7 2.0.2 driver to deliver a Gh0st RAT variant (HiddenGh0st), per Check Point telemetry.
- Silver Fox shifts to generating thousands of checksum/signature-preserving locked-ioc-7 variants (ultimately 2,500+ unique hashes) via CVE-2013-3900 to evade hash-based detection.
- Microsoft updates the Vulnerable Driver Blocklist to block the modified locked-ioc-7 variant family.
- Check Point Research and The Hacker News publish findings on the 2,500+ locked-ioc-7 driver-variant campaign, noting the legacy 2.0.2 build initially evaded the December 2024 blocklist update.
- Cisco Talos and Trend Micro document Qilin and Warlock ransomware BYOVD chains: locked-ioc-12/locked-ioc-15/locked-ioc-14 terminating 300+ EDR products, and Warlock's NSec driver + TightVNC intrusion against on-prem SharePoint.
- Symantec/Broadcom Threat Hunter Team publishes 'The BYOVD Epidemic,' documenting BYOVD's evolution into a standard component of the ransomware playbook.
Sources cited
- The BYOVD Epidemic: How Attackers Are Weaponizing Trusted Windows Drivers to Kill Security security.com · Research · 2026-06-30
- Silent Killers: Unmasking a Large-Scale Legacy Driver Exploitation Campaign Check Point Research · Research · 2025-02-01
- Exploiting truesight.sys to kill AVs medium.com · Proof of concept · 2024-08-01
- 'AuKill' EDR killer malware abuses Process Explorer driver Sophos · Blog · 2023-04-19
- 2,500+ Truesight.sys Driver Variants Exploited to Bypass EDR The Hacker News · News · 2025-02-01
- Ransomware Attackers Use Microsoft-Signed Drivers to Gain Access (STONESTOP/POORTRY) The Hacker News · News · 2022-12-14
- Microsoft-signed malicious Windows drivers used in ransomware attacks BleepingComputer · News · 2022-12-14
- Qilin and Warlock Ransomware Use Vulnerable Drivers to Disable 300+ EDR Tools The Hacker News · News · 2026-04-01
- BYOVD technique employed by Qilin, Warlock ransomware gangs scworld.com · News · 2026-04-01
- 'Silver Fox' APT Skirts Windows Blocklist in BYOVD Attack Dark Reading · News · 2026-02-01
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.