# The BYOVD Epidemic: Attackers Weaponize Trusted Windows Drivers to Kill Security Software

> Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) has evolved from a niche technique into a standard defense-evasion stage of the ransomware playbook: attackers with administrator rights load signed-but-vulnerable kernel drivers (truesight.sys, an outdated Process Explorer driver, Microsoft-signed POORTRY) to terminate or blind AV/EDR agents ahead of encryption. Public tooling (TrueSightKiller, AuKill, GhostDriver, STONESTOP/POORTRY) and 2026 campaigns from Qilin and Warlock show the technique is now commodity-grade and used across multiple ransomware-as-a-service operations.

- **Published:** 2026-06-30T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-06-30T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2297
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-byovd-ransomware-edr-bypass-tl-2026-2297.webp?v=a70baf71 (Threadlinqs threat intel: BYOVD Ransomware EDR Bypass Epidemic: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2297) — High severity, 29 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2297
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 29 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2013-3900

## Description

BYOVD abuses the trust the Windows kernel places in digitally signed drivers: an attacker with local administrator rights loads a legitimate, signed driver that contains an exploitable flaw (arbitrary process termination, arbitrary read/write of kernel memory) instead of writing their own unsigned rootkit. Because the driver's signature validates, the load succeeds even under Driver Signature Enforcement, and the attacker gets Ring 0 code execution to unhook AV/EDR kernel callbacks and force-terminate protected security processes before ransomware deployment.

The technique now spans several distinct lineages of vulnerable/abused drivers. Adlice's RogueKiller anti-rootkit driver, truesight.sys, contains an arbitrary-process-termination flaw in versions below 3.4.0; the legacy 2.0.2 build remains exploitable even after later fixes. Starting mid-2024, a China-nexus cluster tracked as Silver Fox (medium-to-high confidence, per Check Point Research) weaponized this legacy driver at scale, exploiting CVE-2013-3900 (an Authenticode/WinVerifyTrust signature-validation gap) to modify the PE checksum and certificate padding of the driver without invalidating its digital signature. This let them mint over 2,500 distinct signed variants of the same vulnerable driver, defeating hash-based detection while delivering a custom Gh0st RAT variant (HiddenGh0st) from Alibaba Cloud OSS infrastructure. Microsoft's December 17, 2024 Vulnerable Driver Blocklist update targeted this family, but the legacy 2.0.2 build initially evaded it due to certificate-chain differences, and public exploitation tooling (TrueSightKiller) is freely available.

A second lineage abuses an outdated Sysinternals Process Explorer driver (v16.32). The open-source tool AuKill, built on techniques from the 2021 tool Backstab, drops this outdated driver as PROCEXP.SYS into C:\Windows\System32\drivers (alongside the legitimate current PROCEXP152.sys) and uses it to disable EDR/AV processes. At least six AuKill versions have been observed since November 2022; the tool was used ahead of Medusa Locker ransomware deployments in January-February 2023 and a LockBit deployment in February 2023.

A third lineage involves drivers that obtained legitimate Microsoft code-signing rather than exploiting a third-party driver's bug. In December 2022, Mandiant and SentinelOne disclosed the STONESTOP/POORTRY toolkit: POORTRY is a kernel-mode driver that STONESTOP (a user-mode loader) uses to terminate protected security processes and delete files, and it was signed via abuse of the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program (WHCP) after malicious actors compromised legitimate Microsoft Partner Center developer accounts. The toolkit has since been used by UNC3944 (aka Scattered Spider) and multiple ransomware operators including LockBit, BlackCat/ALPHV, Cuba, Medusa, and RansomHub, targeting telecommunications, BPO, MSSP, financial services, cryptocurrency, entertainment, and transportation organizations.

Most recently (April 2026), Cisco Talos and Trend Micro documented Qilin and Warlock ransomware building BYOVD directly into their intrusion chains: Qilin side-loads a malicious msimg32.dll that stages rwdrv.sys (a renamed ThrottleStop.sys providing raw physical-memory access) and hlpdrv.sys, which together terminate processes from over 300 different EDR/AV products after first unregistering kernel callbacks so no alert fires. Warlock combined an NSec vulnerable driver with the TightVNC remote-access tool in BYOVD intrusions against vulnerable on-premises Microsoft SharePoint servers. GhostDriver, a further open-source automation tool, similarly drives IOCTLs against a hardcoded, actively maintained list of 300+ targeted security products. Symantec's Threat Hunter Team (June 2026) frames the collective pattern as hundreds of exploitable drivers already in circulation, with publicly known bypasses for kernel hardening features (KASLR, HVCI, KCFG) meaning the mitigations most organizations rely on do not reliably stop it.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool
- T1588.003 Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution
- T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1014 Rootkit
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
- T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
- T1219 Remote Access Tools

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**BYOVD Vulnerable Kernel Driver Load — truesight.sys / PROCEXP.SYS / rwdrv.sys / hlpdrv.sys / POORTRY** (`TL-2026-2297-SPL-001`)

Detects the load of known vulnerable or maliciously-signed kernel drivers abused across the Silver Fox (truesight.sys), AuKill (PROCEXP.SYS), Qilin (rwdrv.sys/hlpdrv.sys) and STONESTOP/POORTRY BYOVD campaigns to obtain Ring-0 code execution ahead of AV/EDR termination and ransomware deployment.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1543.003, T1569.002, T1014
- **Data sources:** sysmon
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=6
| eval img=lower(ImageLoaded)
| where match(img, "truesight\.sys$") OR match(img, "procexp\.sys$") OR match(img, "rwdrv\.sys$") OR match(img, "hlpdrv\.sys$") OR match(img, "189atohci\.sys$") OR match(img, "poortry")
| eval sha1=mvindex(split(replace(Hashes,"SHA1=",""),","),0)
| table _time, host, ImageLoaded, sha1, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus, ProcessGuid
| sort - _time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "DriverLoad"
| where FileName has_any ("truesight.sys","procexp.sys","rwdrv.sys","hlpdrv.sys","189atohci.sys") or FileName has "poortry"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: BYOVD Vulnerable Kernel Driver Load
id: 1a2b3c4d-1111-4a1a-8a1a-000000000001
status: experimental
description: Detects loading of known vulnerable or malicious kernel drivers abused for BYOVD EDR/AV-killing (truesight.sys, PROCEXP.SYS, rwdrv.sys/hlpdrv.sys, POORTRY) ahead of ransomware deployment.
references:
    - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/byovd-vulnerable-drivers
    - https://thehackernews.com/2025/02/2500-truesightsys-driver-variants.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-02
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.t1014
    - attack.tool.aukill
    - attack.tool.poortry
    - cve.2013.3900
logsource:
    category: driver_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_names:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\truesight.sys'
            - '\procexp.sys'
            - '\rwdrv.sys'
            - '\hlpdrv.sys'
            - '\189atohci.sys'
    selection_poortry:
        ImageLoaded|contains: 'poortry'
    condition: selection_names or selection_poortry
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of patched Adlice RogueKiller/TrueSight (>=3.4.0) or current Sysinternals Process Explorer (PROCEXP152.sys) by authorized IT/security staff
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate re-installation or diagnostic use of the outdated (but not yet uninstalled) Adlice TrueSight/RogueKiller or Sysinternals Process Explorer driver by IT staff who have not yet patched to the fixed versions

**Tuning notes:** Maintain the driver-filename allowlist against Microsoft's live Vulnerable Driver Blocklist and Adlice's published hash list; add newly reported BYOVD driver names/hashes (e.g. future NSec driver variants) as they are disclosed, and suppress hosts with HVCI/Smart App Control enforced where the blocklist already blocks the load.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- BYOVD Driver Drop into System32\drivers Followed by Kernel Service Install (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Known BYOVD EDR-Killer Loader Execution (AuKill / TrueSightKiller / GhostDriver / STONESTOP) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TightVNC Paired with Vulnerable NSec Kernel Driver (Warlock On-Prem SharePoint BYOVD Chain) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- sc.exe Kernel-Driver Service Creation Referencing Known BYOVD Driver (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Security Software Discovery Preceding BYOVD Driver-Based Termination (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] Side-Load Outside System32 Staging [indicator]/[indicator] BYOVD Chain (Qilin) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Mass AV/EDR Process-Termination Burst (BYOVD Kill Sweep) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HiddenGh0st / Gh0st RAT C2 Beacon to Known BYOVD-Campaign Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 29)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `8.212.102[.]228`
- Domain: `bung486[.]com`
- File hash: `f7b0369169dff3f10e974b9a10ec15f7a81dec54`

Full set of 29 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [The BYOVD Epidemic: How Attackers Are Weaponizing Trusted Windows Drivers to Kill Security](https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/byovd-vulnerable-drivers)
- [2,500+ Truesight.sys Driver Variants Exploited to Bypass EDR](https://thehackernews.com/2025/02/2500-truesightsys-driver-variants.html)
- [Silent Killers: Unmasking a Large-Scale Legacy Driver Exploitation Campaign](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/large-scale-exploitation-of-legacy-driver/)
- ['AuKill' EDR killer malware abuses Process Explorer driver](https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/aukill-edr-killer-malware-abuses-process-explorer-driver/)
- [Ransomware Attackers Use Microsoft-Signed Drivers to Gain Access (STONESTOP/POORTRY)](https://thehackernews.com/2022/12/ransomware-attackers-use-microsoft.html)
- [Microsoft-signed malicious Windows drivers used in ransomware attacks](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-signed-malicious-windows-drivers-used-in-ransomware-attacks/)
- [Qilin and Warlock Ransomware Use Vulnerable Drivers to Disable 300+ EDR Tools](https://thehackernews.com/2026/04/qilin-and-warlock-ransomware-use.html)
- [BYOVD technique employed by Qilin, Warlock ransomware gangs](https://www.scworld.com/brief/byovd-technique-employed-by-qilin-warlock-ransomware-gangs)
- ['Silver Fox' APT Skirts Windows Blocklist in BYOVD Attack](https://www.darkreading.com/cyber-risk/silver-fox-byovd-attack-windows-blocklist)
- [Exploiting truesight.sys to kill AVs](https://medium.com/@diegotellaroli05/exploiting-truesight-sys-to-kill-avs-c34398d7f820)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2297
