# REVSTEALER Infostealer Campaign: Four C2-Delivered Modules Disable Windows Update & Defender to Deploy XMRig Crypto Miner

> Elastic Security Labs (REF2859) and Morphisec report an emerging commercial infostealer, REVSTEALER, distributed via YouTube game-cheat lures and counterfeit software including a fake 'Claude Opus 5 Free Desktop' Electron app. The core stealer exfiltrates browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets (51+ apps + 225 Chrome extensions), gaming accounts, password managers, and messaging sessions using Chrome App-Bound Encryption bypass and indirect syscalls. Four C2-delivered follow-on modules — ProManager, WinUpdate, SoftManager, and LockAppHost — provide persistent wallet theft, clipboard hijacking, reverse SOCKS5 proxy, and XMRig cryptocurrency mining with defense-evasion capabilities that disable Windows Update services and Microsoft Defender. C2 infrastructure uses Polygon blockchain smart contracts (EtherHiding) for takedown-resistant fallback addressing.

- **Published:** 2026-09-02T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-09-02T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2353
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-revstealer-claude-opus-5-tl-2026-2353.webp?v=5aba648b (Threadlinqs threat intel: REVSTEALER Fake Claude Opus Lure: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2353) — High severity, 23 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2353
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 23 (3 shown free below)

## Description

REVSTEALER is a commercial Windows infostealer first sold on underground forums since at least February 2026, tracked by Elastic Security Labs as REF2859. Over approximately 4,700 samples have been observed on VirusTotal. The malware is distributed primarily through social engineering: at least 17 hijacked YouTube channels post short AI-generated videos advertising free game cheats directing users to cheat websites (elitecheatsx[.]live, resight-cheats[.]net), and a malicious GitHub repository impersonating a 'Claude Opus 5 Free Desktop' application distributed the malware as a trojanized Electron desktop app. Samples are also disguised as legitimate software installers including Slack, qBittorrent, SteelSeries GG, and Blender.

The core REVSTEALER payload is heavily protected with the VMProtect packer and implements extensive anti-analysis measures. A 10-point weighted sandbox-scoring system checks CPU core count, RAM threshold, GPU/PCI vendor, system uptime, process blocklists, username/computer-name blocklists, timing discrepancies, Media Foundation presence, CPUID, and virtualization artifacts; if the total score reaches 7 or higher, the malware self-terminates without executing. It also performs CIS-region language checks on the default system locale and keyboard layout using FNV-1a hashing against a precomputed table of 10 languages (Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Tajik, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Uzbek), terminating if a match is found. All Windows API calls are resolved through custom FNV-1a hash lookups with no import table, and the malware uses 14 indirect syscall wrappers to bypass user-mode security-product hooks. A Vectored Exception Handler (VEH) is installed for additional evasion. Unpacked builds present a verification window requiring a random six-character code before execution, a gate designed to hinder automated sandbox analysis.

Once execution proceeds, REVSTEALER performs extensive victim profiling: it collects system information (OS version, CPU, RAM, GPU, hostname, username, locale, timezone, keyboard layout, screen resolution), dumps all environment variables via GetEnvironmentStringsW, enumerates running processes, reads installed applications from the registry, captures clipboard contents, and takes a full-screen screenshot. It then targets a broad range of data sources including browser credential databases (Chromium Login Data and Cookies SQLite databases plus Firefox), Chrome's App-Bound Encryption (bypass achieved by launching the browser in debugger mode, locating App-Bound decryption code, setting a hardware breakpoint, and reading the decrypted key from memory — a technique adapted from the public ChromeKatz/ElevationKatz project), 51+ standalone cryptocurrency wallet applications and 225 Chrome extension identifiers covering wallets and password managers, Windows Credential Manager via CredEnumerateW, Telegram Desktop by scanning all drives for tdata directories and stealing key files enabling full account takeover, Steam local.vdf and loginusers.vdf, Roblox session cookies decrypted via CryptUnprotectData, Minecraft launcher configurations across 8 paths, Battle.net, EA Desktop, Battlestate Games (Escape from Tarkov), messaging apps (Tox, Psi+, Pidgin, Session, Element, Slack) for private keys and chat history, VPN and FTP client configurations, OBS Studio profiles with stream keys, and user-selected documents. Exfiltrated data is LZ77-compressed, tagged with magic-value identifiers, and streamed directly to the C2 server via HTTPS without writing a single archive file to disk. After reporting completion, the core stealer deletes itself with no persistence.

C2 communication uses AES-256-CBC encryption with embedded 32-byte keys and IV-prefixed blobs. The primary C2 endpoint is a hardcoded hostname validated via a GET request to /ext/status that must return 'active'. If the primary server is unreachable, the malware queries up to five public Polygon JSON-RPC endpoints (polygon-bor-rpc.publicnode.com, poly.api.pocket.network, polygon.lava.build, polygon-public.nodies.app, polygon.drpc.org) to read an encrypted fallback C2 address from a Polygon smart contract via eth_call, decrypting it with the embedded AES key. This EtherHiding technique makes C2 infrastructure takedown extremely difficult as operators can rotate endpoints by updating the blockchain contract without rebuilding the malware. Extracted C2 configurations include monitor5.roast-core85[.]click (primary), polygon.iwmukj[.]xyz, polygon.mnyhgxda[.]xyz, static4.livelab[.]one, and meta7[.]archscreen68[.]one. C2 API routes include /ext/status, /ext/sync/ucluv.wkku, /ext/push/ucluv.wkku, /ext/events/ucluv.wkku, and /ext/ping/ucluv.wkku.

Beyond the core stealer, REVSTEALER's C2 infrastructure can deliver four self-contained follow-on modules, each with its own Polygon smart-contract dead-drop address and independent persistence:

1. ProManager (ProManagerServicedc894.exe): Steals wallet files and browser wallet extensions, displays phishing overlays sized and positioned to match target wallet applications, captures passwords typed or pasted into password/passphrase fields, and can deliver additional payloads. Persists via Registry Run key. C2: config.hubdisplay[.]lol, Polygon contract 0x98FF8e7cdC13AE46b83B7590B986F25f1560DF03.

2. WinUpdate (WinUpdate60e3a3.exe): A cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker that monitors clipboard contents and replaces copied cryptocurrency addresses with the attacker's address. Also collects text resembling wallet recovery phrases (mnemonic seeds). Primary persistence via scheduled task with Registry Run key as fallback. CIS language check terminates on 10 languages. C2: health.journal-metric[.]lol, Polygon contract 0x0cF1Ec8B9551103de729c3b02D77221Da9d81Acc.

3. SoftManager (SoftManager72fb40.exe): Implements a reverse SOCKS5 proxy that routes attacker network traffic through the victim's connection over an encrypted WebSocket protocol, providing backconnect access to the compromised host. Persists via logon script, scheduled task, or Registry Run key. CIS language check terminates on 10 languages. C2: metric.gardenpark[.]click, Polygon contract 0x0E04c59f31E382D2B8A1637f4B9A5f04165EC48d.

4. LockAppHost (LockAppHost14a02b.exe): The most disruptive module, deploying the XMRig Monero cryptocurrency miner. It abuses Windows CMSTP (Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer) to bypass UAC and gain administrative privileges, falling back to a standard UAC prompt if CMSTP is unavailable. It enables SeDebugPrivilege and uses direct syscall stubs for process manipulation. It disables 5 Windows Update services (UsoSvc, WaaSMedicSvc, wuauserv, BITS, dosvc), 11 scheduled Windows Update tasks, and 2 Windows malware-removal tasks. It adds Microsoft Defender exclusions for common folders and file types by modifying registry keys. The XMRig miner is deployed via process hollowing into suspended instances of svchost.exe or nslookup.exe. On Windows 11 24H2, it patches NtManageHotPatch to bypass Memory Integrity (HVCI) protections. The mining configuration is retrieved from a separate Polygon contract (0xC4eC9B7be1c2A0B39Eca678673DcB9164CA5df53, selector 0x11582022), with the mining pool pointing to pool.supportxmr[.]com:443 with TLS. LockAppHost also continuously monitors running processes every second, pausing XMRig when diagnostic or monitoring tools are detected. It persists via Registry Run key or a Windows service. Crucially, the defense-weakening changes (disabled Windows Update, disabled Defender, removed exclusions) persist even after the miner is detected and removed, requiring manual remediation.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1106 Native API
- T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows)
- T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1055.012 Process Injection: Process Hollowing
- T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1622 Debugger Evasion
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1555.004 Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1056.001 Keylogging
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
- T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
- T1090 Proxy
- T1496 Resource Hijacking

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**REVSTEALER LockAppHost Defense Evasion — CMSTP UAC Bypass, Windows Update Disable, and Defender Exclusion** (`TL-2026-2353-SPL-002`)

Detects the LockAppHost module's defense evasion activities: (1) CMSTP.exe abuse for UAC bypass via .inf/.cmp connection profile files, (2) disabling of 5 Windows Update services (UsoSvc, WaaSMedicSvc, wuauserv, BITS, dosvc) and 11 scheduled update tasks via sc.exe/net.exe, (3) Microsoft Defender exclusion additions via Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath registry modifications, and (4) process hollowing into svchost.exe or nslookup.exe for XMRig miner deployment. These defense-weakening changes persist even after the miner is detected and removed, requiring manual remediation.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1548.002, T1562.001, T1562.006, T1055.012, T1496
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_process_creation, windows_registry, windows_security
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
(
  (
    EventCode=1
    AND Image="*\\CMSTP.exe"
    AND CommandLine IN ("*\\*.inf*", "*\\*.cmp*")
  )
  OR (
    EventCode=1
    AND CommandLine IN ("*Add-MpPreference*Exclusion*", "*MpPreference*ExclusionPath*", "*Add-MpPreference*-ExclusionExtension*")
  )
  OR (
    EventCode=1
    AND CommandLine IN (
      "*sc*stop*UsoSvc*", "*sc*stop*WaaSMedicSvc*", "*sc*stop*wuauserv*", "*sc*stop*BITS*", "*sc*stop*dosvc*",
      "*net*stop*UsoSvc*", "*net*stop*WaaSMedicSvc*", "*net*stop*wuauserv*", "*net*stop*BITS*", "*net*stop*dosvc*"
    )
  )
  OR (
    EventCode=13
    AND TargetObject IN (
      "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Paths\\*",
      "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Extensions\\*",
      "*\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes\\*"
    )
  )
  OR (
    EventCode=1
    AND Image IN ("*\\svchost.exe", "*\\nslookup.exe")
    AND ParentImage IN ("*\\LockAppHost*", "*\\SoftManager*", "*\\WinUpdate*", "*\\ProManager*", "*\\AppData\\*\\*")
    AND (CommandLine IN ("*--cpu*", "*--coin*", "*--url*", "*--user*", "*--rig-id*", "*-o*pool*supportxmr*")
      OR CommandLine IN ("*\\xmrig*", "*\\monero*", "*\\minerd*"))
  )
)
| eval threat="REVSTEALER_SPL_002_Defense_Evasion"
| table _time, Computer, User, EventCode, Image, CommandLine, TargetObject, ParentImage, ProcessId
| sort - _time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let targetServices = dynamic(["UsoSvc", "WaaSMedicSvc", "wuauserv", "BITS", "dosvc"]);
let defenderExclusionsPath = @"SoftwareMicrosoftWindows DefenderExclusions";
(union
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(48h)
    | where (ProcessCommandLine has_any ("CMSTP.exe", "CMSTP")
        and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"\.(inf|cmp)\\s")
        or (ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Add-MpPreference", "ExclusionPath", "ExclusionExtension", "ExclusionProcess"))
        or (ProcessCommandLine has_any ("sc stop", "net stop") and ProcessCommandLine has_any (targetServices))
    | extend AlertType = "DefenseEvasion"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, AlertType, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, ProcessId,
        ProcessIntegrityLevel, SHA256,
        AlertDetail = case(
            ProcessCommandLine has "CMSTP", "UAC_Bypass_CMSTP",
            ProcessCommandLine has "Add-MpPreference", "Defender_Exclusion_Add",
            ProcessCommandLine has_any (targetServices), "Windows_Update_Disable",
            "Defense_Evasion_General"
        )
    ,
    DeviceRegistryEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(48h)
    | where RegistryKey has defenderExclusionsPath
    | extend AlertType = "DefenderExclusionModification", AlertDetail = "Defender_Exclusion_Registry_Mod"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, AlertType, AlertDetail, InitiatingProcessFileName
)
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: REVSTEALER LockAppHost Defense Evasion — CMSTP UAC Bypass, Windows Update Disable, and Defender Exclusion
id: 6b9c4d3e-2f5a-7b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
status: experimental
description: Detects defense evasion behaviors associated with the REVSTEALER LockAppHost module. This module abuses CMSTP.exe for UAC bypass, disables 5 Windows Update services (UsoSvc, WaaSMedicSvc, wuauserv, BITS, dosvc) and 11 scheduled update tasks, adds Microsoft Defender exclusions for common folders and file types, and deploys the XMRig miner via process hollowing into svchost.exe or nslookup.exe. On Windows 11 24H2, it patches NtManageHotPatch to bypass Memory Integrity (HVCI).
references:
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/revstealer-credential-harvesting-infostealer
    - https://assets.contentstack.io/v3/assets/bltefdd0b53724fa2ce/blt9cd59668ba5a104d/6a97978bd04dac6f166ca8ce/REVSTEALER_-_White_paper.pdf
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1562.001
    - attack.t1562.006
    - attack.t1055.012
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1496
    - malware.revstealer
    - malware.xmrig
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmstp:
        Image|endswith: '\CMSTP.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.inf'
            - '.cmp'
    selection_defender_exclusion_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Add-MpPreference'
            - 'ExclusionPath'
            - 'ExclusionExtension'
            - 'ExclusionProcess'
    selection_service_disable:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'sc stop'
            - 'net stop'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'UsoSvc'
            - 'WaaSMedicSvc'
            - 'wuauserv'
            - 'BITS'
            - 'dosvc'
    selection_process_hollowing:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\svchost.exe'
            - '\nslookup.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'xmrig'
            - 'monero'
            - 'supportxmr'
            - '--cpu'
            - '--coin'
            - '--url'
            - '--rig-id'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative CMSTP usage for legitimate VPN connection profiles
    - IT administration scripts that modify Windows Defender exclusions for valid software
    - Authorized service management via Group Policy or SCCM during maintenance windows
    - Legitimate XMRig mining in authorized research environments
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrative CMSTP usage for legitimate VPN connection profiles
- IT administration scripts that modify Windows Defender exclusions for valid software
- Authorized Windows Update service management via Group Policy or SCCM during maintenance windows

**Tuning notes:** Correlate CMSTP execution with parent process — legitimate CMSTP is typically launched by SYSTEM or Administrator accounts via Control Panel, not from AppData. For Defender exclusion modifications, baseline by excluding known IT admin accounts and automation tools (SCCM, RMM). Monitor for the specific combination of multiple Windows Update services being disabled within a short time window (60 seconds) as a strong indicator.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- REVSTEALER Initial Access — Chrome Debugger Mode and Browser Credential Database Access (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- REVSTEALER Post-Exploitation — Registry Run Key Persistence, Scheduled Task Creation, and System Discovery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- REVSTEALER C2 — SoftManager Reverse SOCKS5 Proxy and Data Exfiltration Over Encrypted WebSocket (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- REVSTEALER Execution via Game Cheat Lures and Fake Software — Silently Falling Back to Polygon EtherHiding C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- REVSTEALER LockAppHost Defense Evasion — CMSTP UAC Bypass, Windows Service Disable, and Defender Exclusion (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- REVSTEALER C2 and Crypto Mining — EtherHiding Polygon Smart Contract and XMRig Mining Pool (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- REVSTEALER Initial Access via Social Engineering — Fake Software Installer Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- REVSTEALER C2 Communication — EtherHiding Polygon Smart Contract Fallback and HTTPS Beaconing (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 23)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `monitor5[.]roast-core85[.]click`
- URL: `hxxps://github[.]com/claude5opus/Claude-Opus-5-Free-Desktop`
- File hash: `4c897108e8e793d6904110928c996815c302d6975c9bc61162149e855a963d50`

Full set of 23 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Elastic Security Labs — REVSTEALER ramps up: analysis of up-and-coming credential harvesting infostealer](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/revstealer-credential-harvesting-infostealer)
- [Elastic Security Labs — REVSTEALER White Paper (PDF)](https://assets.contentstack.io/v3/assets/bltefdd0b53724fa2ce/blt9cd59668ba5a104d/6a97978bd04dac6f166ca8ce/REVSTEALER_-_White_paper.pdf)
- [Elastic YARA Rules — Windows_Trojan_RevStealer](https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/blob/main/yara/rules/Windows_Trojan_RevStealer.yar)
- [Elastic IDAPython String Decryption Script for REVSTEALER](https://github.com/elastic/labs-releases/blob/main/tools/revstealer/ida_decrypt_strings.py)
- [The Hacker News — Four REVSTEALER-Linked Modules Disable Windows Update and Defender to Run a Crypto Miner](https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/four-revstealer-linked-modules-disable.html)
- [Morphisec — RevStealer: The Infostealer Built to Leave No Trace](https://www.morphisec.com/blog/revstealer-silence-is-its-greatest-weapon/)
- [Help Net Security — Fake Claude Opus 5 app delivers malware and wipes its own tracks](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/09/01/revstealer-malware-claude-opus-5-github/)
- [CyberInsider — New RevStealer malware spreads as fake Claude Opus 5 desktop app](https://cyberinsider.com/revstealer-malware-claude-opus-5/)
- [Cointelegraph — REVSTEALER malware targets crypto wallets via fake AI app](https://cointelegraph.com/news/revstealer-malware-crypto-wallets-fake-ai-app)
- [ChromeKatz / ElevationKatz — public project inspiring REVSTEALER ABE bypass](https://github.com/Meckazin/ChromeKatz)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2353
