Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-2393
UAC-0145 (Sandworm sub-cluster) ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA campaign against Ukrainian devices with EtherHiding C2 resolution
CERT-UA attributes active multi-vector campaign activity to UAC-0145, a sub-cluster of the GRU-linked Sandworm (APT44/Seashell Blizzard). Since June 2026, the group compromised at least 10 legitimate Ukrainian websites to serve fake CAPTCHAs that trick users into running malicious PowerShell commands (ClickFix technique), delivering a Windows malware chain (GHETTOVIBE, SCOUTCURL, FLUIDLEECH, LOADLOOP, FREAKYPOLL) and an Android backdoor (COWARDDUCK) via Signal messaging.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2393 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | UAC-0145 ClickFix Campaign, SMARTAXE Operation, COWARDDUCK Campaign |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows; Google Android; WordPress CMS (compromised instances); Dropbox API (abused legitimate service); Signal Messenger (abused delivery channel) |
| Attribution | UAC-0145 (high confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Russia |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1021 Remote Services, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1119 Automated Collection, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, T1204 User Execution and 9 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government administration, military, defense, telecoms, energy |
| Target regions | ukraine, 151 - Eastern Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 11 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-07-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2393 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 24 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: UAC-0145 GHETTOVIBE VBS Persistence and SCOUTCURL Reconnaissance
Detects the post-exploitation phase of UAC-0145's ClickFix campaign. After initial PowerShell execution, GHETTOVIBE VBS script (masquerading as 'Copilot Agent.vbs' or 'Work Copilot.vbs') is written to the Windows Startup folder for persistence. On reboot, GHETTOVIBE executes SCOUTCURL (reshV1_2.ps1) — a PowerShell reconnaissance script that collects OS details, installed applications, files, and browser credential stores for victim profiling and targeting assessment.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1547.001, T1036.005, T1059.001, T1082, T1005, T1555
- Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, windows_security
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=11 OR EventCode=1) (TargetFilename="*\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*" OR Image="*\\wscript.exe" OR Image="*\\cscript.exe")
| eval IOC=case(
EventCode=11 AND (lower(TargetFilename) LIKE "%copilot%.vbs%" OR lower(TargetFilename) LIKE "%work copilot%.vbs%" OR lower(TargetFilename) LIKE "%reshV1_2%" OR lower(TargetFilename) LIKE "%.ps1"), "persistence_startup_vbs",
EventCode=1 AND Image="*\\wscript.exe" AND CommandLine LIKE "%Start Menu%Startup%", "vbs_persistence_execution",
EventCode=1 AND CommandLine LIKE "%reshV1_2%" OR CommandLine LIKE "%SCOUTCURL%" OR (CommandLine LIKE "%systeminfo%" AND CommandLine LIKE "%Get-ChildItem%") OR CommandLine LIKE "%browser_data%" OR CommandLine LIKE "%credential%", "scoutcurl_recon",
1=1, "other"
)
| eval UserPath = if(EventCode=11, TargetFilename, CommandLine)
| table _time, ComputerName, User, Image, TargetFilename, CommandLine, IOC
| sort - _timeMicrosoft KQL
let StartupFolderPatterns = dynamic(['%\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\%', '%.vbs', '%.ps1', '%reshV1_2%', '%Copilot%', '%Work Copilot%']);
let ReconIndicators = dynamic(['systeminfo', 'Get-ChildItem', 'Get-WmiObject', 'browser_data', 'credential', 'chrome\\Login Data', 'edge\\Login Data', 'Get-ScheduledTask']);
(union isfuzzy=true
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where (FileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has "Startup")
or (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine has_any ("reshV1_2", "systeminfo", "browser_data", "Login Data", "credential"))) | extend EventType = "Process" , Path = ProcessCommandLine,
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FolderPath contains "Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup"
and FileName endswith ".vbs"
| extend EventType = "FileCreate", Path = strcat(FolderPath, FileName)
)
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, EventType, FileName, Path, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated descSigma
title: UAC-0145 GHETTOVIBE VBS Persistence via Windows Startup Folder
description: Detects VBScript files being written to the Windows Startup folder with names masquerading as Microsoft Copilot ('Copilot Agent.vbs', 'Work Copilot.vbs'), indicative of UAC-0145 GHETTOVIBE persistence mechanism. Also detects associated SCOUTCURL PowerShell reconnaissance execution.
id: d9f4a3c5-6b0e-4c3d-1f5a-7b8c9d0e1f2a
status: experimental
references:
- https://cert.gov.ua/article/6318437
- https://threat.wiki/ops/uac-0145-clickfix-smartaxe-cowardduck/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-08
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1036.005
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1082
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1555
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection_persistence:
EventID: 11
TargetFilename|contains|all:
- 'Start Menu\Programs\Startup'
- '.vbs'
selection_masquerading:
TargetFilename|contains:
- 'Copilot'
- 'Work Copilot'
condition: selection_persistence or (selection_persistence and selection_masquerading)
falsepositives:
- Users manually copying legitimate VBS scripts to Startup folder
- Enterprise software deployment tools installing VBS-based autorun entries
- Microsoft Office or third-party tools creating .vbs helper scripts in user directories
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate Microsoft Copilot VBS scripts deployed by IT
- Enterprise software deployment pushing VBS autorun scripts
- Security software creating VBS startup entries
Tuning notes: Immediately escalate any VBS file named 'Copilot Agent.vbs' or 'Work Copilot.vbs' in Windows Startup — these are specific known UAC-0145 IOCs. For general VBS-in-Startup detection, exclude paths from known enterprise software deployment agents and security products. Correlate with subsequent network connections to static.diagnostics-monitoring[.]com or static.opennetworkconnect[.]com for confirmation.
- UAC-0145 SMARTAXE ClickFix — Browser to PowerShell Process Chain (KQL Primary) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAC-0145 GHETTOVIBE Autorun and SCOUTCURL Credential Reconnaissance (KQL Primary) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAC-0145 FREAKYPOLL Python Backdoor and OpenSSH/Tor Lateral Movement (KQL Primary) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAC-0145 SMARTAXE ClickFix — Fake CAPTCHA Initial Access (Sigma Primary) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAC-0145 Copilot Masquerading and FLUIDLEECH Loader Execution (Sigma Primary) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAC-0145 COWARDDUCK Android Backdoor and Multi-Vector Data Exfiltration (Sigma Primary) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAC-0145 SMARTAXE ClickFix — Browser Spawning Obfuscated PowerShell (ClickFix Delivery) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAC-0145 EtherHiding — Ethereum JSON-RPC C2 Resolution and FREAKYPOLL Backdoor · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-07-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 24 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2393.
Sample indicators (3 of 24)
- Domain:
update-requirements[.]com - File hash:
0abaae3054d6dc5bee1f17684df98bf427e5c73eb3a0febb123f9ce670dbde78 - Domain:
entouchnetworks[.]com
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 24 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The CAPTCHA payload resolves C2 infrastructure domains from Ethereum smart contracts via eth_call (EtherHiding), making takedown of C2 domains significantly more difficult as the resolution layer lives on an immutable blockchain.
UAC-0145 is a sub-cluster within UAC-0002/Sandworm (also tracked as APT44, Seashell Blizzard), the Russian GRU Main Intelligence Directorate's most destructive advanced persistent threat group. CERT-UA documented a marked expansion in UAC-0145's initial-access tradecraft during spring and summer 2026, identifying three concurrent vectors targeting Ukrainian military, government, and civilian infrastructure.
The primary new vector is a ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA campaign. Since June 2026, UAC-0145 compromised at least 10 legitimate Ukrainian websites, injecting them with SMARTAXE — a bespoke JavaScript tool layered on the Cloaking.House commercial traffic-filtering service. SMARTAXE dynamically alters webpage content based on visitor characteristics (IP geolocation, browser fingerprint, VPN/proxy status), serving a convincing Google-branded reCAPTCHA lookalike only to targeted Ukrainian visitors. The fake CAPTCHA instructs victims to press Windows+R, paste a clipboard-hijacked PowerShell command, and press Enter. The PowerShell one-liner downloads and saves a VBS persistence stub (GHETTOVIBE) to the Windows Startup autorun directory. GHETTOVIBE executes a PowerShell reconnaissance script (SCOUTCURL) that profiles the compromised host, collecting OS details, installed applications, files, and browser data to assess the target's value. On high-value systems, loaders FLUIDLEECH (masquerading as ESET AV Remover software) and/or LOADLOOP deploy the final-stage payload — FREAKYPOLL, a Python backdoor distributed as compiled .pyc bytecode that provides persistent remote access.
Critically, SMARTAXE's injected CAPTCHA content retrieves its remote C2 domain via EtherHiding — an Ethereum JSON-RPC eth_call to a specific smart contract address and function selector hardcoded in the script. The smart contract stores the current C2 domain on-chain, queryable by any victim's browser through public RPC nodes. Because blockchain data is immutable and replicated across thousands of independent nodes, this C2 resolution layer cannot be sinkholed, seized, or deleted. Operators rotate C2 addresses by issuing a single low-cost on-chain transaction, immediately redirecting all active infections to new infrastructure.
The second vector targets mobile devices: COWARDDUCK, a full-featured Android backdoor, is distributed as fake security/antivirus APK files via the Signal messaging app. COWARDDUCK collects device contacts, real-time geolocation, and files with specific extensions (.conf, .json, .ovpn, .txt, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .pptx, .zip, .rar) from user directories (DCIM, Documents, Downloads, Pictures, Alarms). Exfiltration occurs via the Dropbox cloud API, while C2 tasking is retrieved through content hosted on legitimate services including Steam Community, proxied through DuckDuckGo's public proxy to blend into normal traffic.
The third continuing vector involves trojanized software installers (Windows, Microsoft Office) distributed via torrent trackers, carrying embedded backdoors. At least one infection chain from this vector led to lateral movement using OpenSSH and Tor (exposing local ports 445, 3389, and 22), data exfiltration via rsync, and culminated in a destructive cyberattack against the infrastructure of a Ukrainian central executive authority.
This campaign marks a significant tactical departure for Sandworm, which previously relied primarily on trojanized software installers and bogus antivirus distributions through messaging apps. The adoption of ClickFix social engineering combined with blockchain-based C2 resolution (EtherHiding) represents a sophisticated evolution in initial-access tradecraft for a state-sponsored APT group. The integration of both Windows and Android targeting in a single concurrent campaign also demonstrates broadening operational scope.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1119 Automated Collection
Lateral Movement
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
Exfiltration
T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1568 Dynamic Resolution; T1572 Protocol Tunneling
Discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery
Initial Access
T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1566 Phishing
Impact
T1485 Data Destruction; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
Persistence
T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Credential Access
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block known C2 domains at network perimeter: update-requirements[.]com, entouchnetworks[.]com, static[.]diagnostics-monitoring[.]com, static[.]opennetworkconnect[.]com, softupdater[.]org, soft[.]softchecker[.]org, pack[.]softpacker[.]org, smartlinkupload[.]com, delta[.]smartlinkupload[.]com, offlce366[.]com, 365softupdate[.]com
- Scan all endpoints for VBS files in Startup folder, particularly Copilot Agent.vbs and Work Copilot.vbs
- Check for Python bytecode (update.cpython-314.pyc) in %LOCALAPPDATA%\SystemHelper\python\
- Investigate web servers for unauthorized JavaScript, specifically wp-header.js and any eth_call RPC calls
- Review PowerShell execution logs for unusual browser-to-PowerShell process chains
Workarounds
- Conduct user awareness training specifically focused on fake CAPTCHA/ClickFix social engineering techniques
- Restrict PowerShell execution for non-administrative users via Windows AppLocker or WDAC policies where operationally feasible
- Block outbound JSON-RPC calls to public Ethereum RPC nodes from non-Web3 developer workstations
- Enforce application control measures for Python bytecode execution in user-writable directories
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection rules for the browser-to-PowerShell-to-VBS process chain (Sysmon EID 1/EDR parent-child tracking)
- Monitor for eth_call JSON-RPC traffic to public Ethereum RPC endpoints from non-Web3 development endpoints
- Implement Android sideloading restrictions on BYOD devices and monitor for unusual Dropbox API + Steam Community C2 patterns
- Deploy website integrity monitoring (CMS file hash verification, unauthorized script injection detection) for public-facing WordPress sites
- Establish threat-hunting queries for EtherHiding dead-drop resolver patterns across the environment
Affected and fixed versions
Timeline
- UAC-0145 registers malicious domains and deploys Ethereum smart contracts for EtherHiding C2 resolution infrastructure, establishing blockchain-based dead-drop resolvers for the campaign.
- UAC-0145 begins compromising legitimate Ukrainian websites, injecting SMARTAXE JavaScript and configuring Cloaking.House traffic filtering to serve fake CAPTCHA overlays to targeted visitors.
- First ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA attacks observed in the wild against Ukrainian targets. Victims are tricked into running PowerShell commands that deliver GHETTOVIBE VBS persistence stub followed by SCOUTCURL reconnaissance script.
- COWARDDUCK Android backdoor first distributed via Signal messaging app, disguised as ESET antivirus/security APK files. Targets Ukrainian military personnel through social engineering on messaging platforms.
- UAC-0145 infrastructure reaches peak operational scale with at least 10 compromised Ukrainian websites actively serving SMARTAXE-injected fake CAPTCHAs. FLUIDLEECH, LOADLOOP loaders and FREAKYPOLL Python backdoor deployed on high-value targets.
- At least one infection chain originating from torrent-based trojanized software installers leads to lateral movement via OpenSSH and Tor, data exfiltration via rsync, and a destructive cyberattack against the infrastructure of a Ukrainian central executive authority.
- CERT-UA publishes advisory #6318437 detailing the UAC-0145 campaign, documenting all three initial-access vectors (ClickFix, torrent trojanized installers, Signal APK delivery) and the full malware toolchain including EtherHiding technique.
- The Hacker News and other security outlets publish public coverage of the UAC-0145 campaign, bringing broader awareness to the ClickFix + EtherHiding technique combination being deployed by a GRU-linked APT group.
- Campaign remains active. Security researchers and threat intelligence platforms (CTIPilot, Threat.wiki, CraftedSignal) publish detailed technical analyses with full IOCs, behavioral detection guidance, and defensive recommendations.
Sources cited
- CERT-UA: Primary compromise vectors used by UAC-0145 as of July 2026 CERT-UA · Advisory · 2026-07-15
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog CISA · Government advisory · 2026-07-15
- CTIPilot: UAC-0145 Sandworm ClickFix EtherHiding Android Backdoor ctipilot.ch · Research · 2026-07-20
- Threat.wiki: UAC-0145 ClickFix SMARTAXE COWARDDUCK Campaign Analysis threat.wiki · Research · 2026-07-20
- Trend Micro: Smart Contracts for Command and Control — EtherHiding Technical Analysis Trend Micro · Research · 2026-02-15
- CraftedSignal Threat Feed: July 2026 UAC-0145 ClickFix CAPTCHA Campaign feed.craftedsignal.io · Research · 2026-07-20
- eSentire: EtherRAT — Node.js RAT Using EtherHiding on Ethereum esentire.com · Research · 2026-01-12
- Guardz Research: EtherHiding Technique First Documentation (October 2023) guardz.com · Research · 2023-10-18
- Hexnode Blog: ClickFix Malware — UAC-0145 Sandworm Campaign Analysis hexnode.com · Blog · 2026-07-21
- UAC-0145 Uses ClickFix CAPTCHAs to Infect Ukrainian Devices with Malware The Hacker News · News · 2026-07-19
- Dark Reading: ClickFix Campaign Compromises 31 Organizations, Abuses Polygon Blockchain Dark Reading · News · 2026-07-22
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 11 sources; published ; last updated —.