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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-2396

Ivanti September 2026 Patch Batch: 10 CVEs Across EPMM, Neurons for ITSM, and Sentry (CVE-2026-12744/12745 Unauthenticated Deserialization RCE, CVE-2026-12645-12647 Missing Authorization RCE, CVE-2026-18851 EPMM Privilege Escalation, CVE-2026-83527 Sentry Auth Bypass)

criticalACTIVE

Ivanti disclosed 10 vulnerabilities across three enterprise products in its September 2026 security update: EPMM (1), Neurons for ITSM (8), and Sentry (1). The most critical findings include two unauthenticated deserialization remote code execution flaws in Neurons for ITSM (CVE-2026-12744, CVE-2026-12745, CVSS 9.8 each), three authenticated missing-authorization RCE flaws enabling arbitrary code execution (CVE-2026-12645-12647, CVSS 9.9 each), and an authentication bypass granting unauthenticated administrative-level access to Sentry gateway appliances (CVE-2026-83527, CVSS 8.1).

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2396, CVE-2026-18851, CVE-2026-12744, CVE-2026-12745, CVE-2026-12645, CVE-2026-12646, CVE-2026-12647, CVE-2026-12648, CVE-2026-12650, CVE-2026-12651, CVE-2026-83527
SeverityCRITICAL
CVSS9.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
First disclosed
EPSSCVE-2026-12744: 2.2% (82.4th percentile); CVE-2026-12745: 2.1% (81.8th percentile); CVE-2026-83527: 1.8% (77.9th percentile)
Affected productsIvanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM); Ivanti Neurons for ITSM (on-premises); Ivanti Sentry
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-502, CWE-862, CWE-288
MalwareSPAWN ecosystem
ToolsCobalt Strike
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003 OS Credential Dumping, T1021 Remote Services, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1087 Account Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1133 External Remote Services, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1505 Server Software Component, T1552 Unsecured Credentials, T1573 Encrypted Channel
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsgovernment administration, finance, health, technology, telecoms, defense, education
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, Asia Pacific, Middle East, Latin America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources14 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2396 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 11 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Ivanti Infrastructure — Cobalt Strike C2 Beaconing and Reverse Shell from Compromised Appliances

Detects Cobalt Strike C2 beaconing patterns and reverse shell connections originating from compromised Ivanti EPMM, Sentry, or Neurons for ITSM appliances. Monitors for outbound connections from Ivanti infrastructure to known Cobalt Strike C2 infrastructure (including community-observed IPs: 169.58.82.229, 8.137.23.180, 154.94.224.35, 49.51.230.17, 101.42.136.73, 124.223.221.83), HTTP beaconing patterns (JARM/JA3 fingerprints, periodic HTTP GETs to same URI, specific User-Agent patterns), and reverse shell indicators (long-running outbound connections, non-standard port usage, PowerShell/Netcat reverse shells). Also covers lateral movement via RDP (T1021.001) from Ivanti appliances to internal network targets.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1573.001, T1090, T1021.001, T1046
  • Data sources: network_traffic, zeek_conn, fortigate, pan_traffic, sysmon, windows_firewall
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=* (sourcetype=*network_traffic* OR sourcetype=*bro_conn* OR sourcetype=*zeek_conn* OR sourcetype=*fortigate* OR sourcetype=*pan_traffic*)
  (
    (dest_ip="169.58.82.229" OR dest_ip="8.137.23.180" OR dest_ip="154.94.224.35" 
      OR dest_ip="49.51.230.17" OR dest_ip="101.42.136.73" OR dest_ip="124.223.221.83")
    OR
    (src_category="ivanti*" OR src_category="epmm*" OR src_category="sentry*" OR src_category="*itsm*")
      (dest_port=443 OR dest_port=80 OR dest_port=8080 OR dest_port=8443 OR dest_port=8888 OR dest_port=54321 OR dest_port=9999)
      (duration>=300 OR bytes_out>=100000)
    OR
    (src_category="ivanti*" OR src_category="epmm*")
      dest_port=3389 
  )
  | eval c2_indicator=case(
      dest_ip="169.58.82.229" OR dest_ip="8.137.23.180" OR dest_ip="154.94.224.35" OR dest_ip="49.51.230.17" OR dest_ip="101.42.136.73" OR dest_ip="124.223.221.83","Known community C2 IP",
      dest_port=3389,"RDP lateral movement (T1021.001)",
      duration>=300 AND bytes_out>=100000,"Long-lived outbound connection (C2 beacon)",
      1=1,"Suspicious outbound connection"
    )
  | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by src_ip dest_ip dest_port bytes_out bytes_in duration c2_indicator
  | eval threat_id="TL-2026-2396", mitre_ref="T1071.001, T1573.001, T1090, T1021.001"
  | table src_ip dest_ip dest_port bytes_out duration c2_indicator count first_seen last_seen threat_id mitre_ref
  | sort - count

Microsoft KQL

let CommunityC2IPs = dynamic(["169.58.82.229", "8.137.23.180", "154.94.224.35", "49.51.230.17", "101.42.136.73", "124.223.221.83"]);
let IvantiCategories = dynamic(["ivanti", "epmm", "sentry", "itsm"]);
// Outbound connections to known C2 IPs
union DeviceNetworkEvents, CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIP has_any (CommunityC2IPs)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer = DeviceName, SourceIP = SourceIP, RemoteIP, RemotePort,
    C2Indicator = "Known community C2 IP", Protocol = Protocol
| union
  // Long-lived or high-volume outbound connections from Ivanti hosts
  (DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
  | where DeviceName has_any (IvantiCategories)
     or InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("java", "javaw", "tomcat.exe")
  | where RemotePort in (80, 443, 8080, 8443, 8888, 54321, 9999)
  | extend ConnectionDuration = TimeGenerated - bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
  | where SentBytes > 100000 or (RemotePort !in (80, 443) and RemotePort !in (1024, 2048, 3072, 4096, 5120, 6144, 7168, 8192, 9216, 10240))
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer = DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, SentBytes, ReceivedBytes,
    C2Indicator = iif(RemotePort !in (80, 443), "Non-standard port C2 beacon", "High-volume outbound connection"),
    Protocol = Protocol)
| union
  // RDP from Ivanti devices indicating lateral movement
  (DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
  | where DeviceName has_any (IvantiCategories)
  | where RemotePort == 3389
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer = DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort,
    C2Indicator = "RDP lateral movement (T1021.001)", Protocol = "TCP")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, RemoteIP, RemotePort, C2Indicator, SentBytes, ReceivedBytes
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Sigma

title: Ivanti Device Cobalt Strike C2 Beaconing and Lateral Movement
id: c9d3e4f5-6a7b-4c8d-9e0f-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects Cobalt Strike C2 beaconing patterns, reverse shell connections, and RDP lateral movement originating from Ivanti EPMM, Sentry, or Neurons for ITSM appliances. Covers outbound connections to known community-observed C2 infrastructure, long-lived encrypted beacons, and lateral movement via RDP to internal network targets.
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-08
references:
  - https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2026-07/AR25-261A_MAR_Malicious_Listener_for_Ivanti_EPMM_Systems_2.pdf
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001/
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1071.001
  - attack.t1573.001
  - attack.t1090
  - attack.lateral_movement
  - attack.t1021.001
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1046
  - cobalt_strike
  - c2
  - beacon
  - ivanti
  - epmm
  - sentry
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows
  service: sysmon
  definition: Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network connection) from compromised Ivanti appliance hosts
detection:
  selection_c2_ips:
    DestinationIp|contains:
      - '169.58.82.229'
      - '8.137.23.180'
      - '154.94.224.35'
      - '49.51.230.17'
      - '101.42.136.73'
      - '124.223.221.83'
  selection_ivanti_source:
    Image|contains:
      - 'java'
      - 'tomcat'
      - 'apache'
      - 'catalina'
    DestinationPort:
      - 80
      - 443
      - 8080
      - 8443
      - 8888
  selection_rdp:
    Image|contains:
      - 'java'
      - 'tomcat'
      - 'mstsc'
    DestinationPort: 3389
  condition: selection_c2_ips or (selection_ivanti_source and selection_rdp)
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate outbound software updates from Ivanti appliances to vendor update servers
  - Authorized remote administration via RDP from management servers
  - Normal Java application server outbound connections for license validation
  - CDN and cloud service connections from Ivanti cloud-managed instances
level: critical
output:
  display_name: Ivanti C2 Beacon or Lateral Movement
  group: ivanti-c2
  description: Potential C2 beaconing from compromised Ivanti device %src_ip% to %dest_ip%:%dest_port%
  mitre_technique: T1071.001, T1021.001

Known false positives:

  • Ivanti appliances pulling software updates from vendor CDNs
  • Legitimate cloud management connectivity from cloud-managed Ivanti instances
  • Authorized outbound connections for license validation and telemetry
  • IT administrative RDP access from centralized management jump boxes

Tuning notes: Baseline legitimate outbound Ivanti appliance connections (vendor update servers, cloud management endpoints). Incorporate organizational Ivanti management IP ranges to reduce false positives. Monitor for beacon timing patterns (periodic connections at regular intervals with minimal jitter as strong C2 indicator). Community-observed C2 IPs should be monitored as high-priority alerts. Correlate with EPMM exploitation detection for chain-of-compromise visibility.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Ivanti Sentry Authentication Bypass and Unauthorized Administrative Access (CVE-2026-83527) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ivanti Infrastructure — Credential Dumping and Credential Chaining Across Ivanti Products · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ivanti Infrastructure — Network Service Discovery and Internal Reconnaissance · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ivanti Neurons for ITSM — Missing Authorization Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-12645/12646/12647) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ivanti EPMM — Webshell Persistence via [indicator] Modification and Malicious JSP Deployment · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ivanti Appliance — Reverse Shell via Java Runtime.exec() and Encrypted C2 Channel · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ivanti Neurons for ITSM — Java Deserialization RCE Attempt via HTTP POST · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ivanti EPMM — Malicious Tomcat Listener Deployment and Command Execution via [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 11 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2396.

Sample indicators (3 of 11)

  • File hash: c1f60ca5a5f7b94ab7122718a44b46de16c69d22c2eb62ce2948cab14bc78d50
  • File hash: 065c1c2fb17ba1c3f882bead409215df612673cd455698768ed71412f9190ba3
  • File hash: b1b1cf33b8d3da35293d6b74c378f0cd9452a4351e26d07c896c4d9a8257ef89

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 11 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

11 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

While Ivanti reports no confirmed active exploitation prior to disclosure, its edge and mobile management infrastructure has been aggressively targeted by state-sponsored threat actors throughout 2026 — including three prior disclosure batches (January, May, June) with direct CISA KEV additions. Cloud/SaaS Neurons for ITSM instances were remediated on August 9, 2026; on-premises customers must apply the September 2026 patches urgently.

On September 8, 2026, Ivanti publicly disclosed 10 distinct security vulnerabilities spanning three enterprise infrastructure products as part of its September 2026 security update. The vulnerabilities range from CVSS 8.1 to 9.9 and include multiple classes of remotely exploitable flaws affecting the Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM), Neurons for ITSM (on-premises), and Sentry gateway products. Ivanti's security advisory states there is 'no evidence of active exploitation' prior to disclosure, though the company warns that its products have been under sustained threat-actor targeting throughout 2026.

CVE-2026-18851 (CVSS 8.8, HIGH) affects Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM), the enterprise mobile device management platform formerly known as MobileIron Core. The vulnerability is a missing authorization flaw (CWE-862) that allows a remote authenticated attacker to escalate their privileges to full administrative access. Affected versions include EPMM 12.9.0.1 and earlier, and 12.8.0.3 and earlier. Fixed versions are 12.10.0.0, 12.9.0.2, and 12.8.0.4. EPMM sits at the network perimeter managing every enrolled mobile device, making administrative compromise particularly dangerous — an attacker with admin access can push malicious policy, certificates, and configuration to the entire mobile fleet, effectively achieving an MDM takeover.

The Neurons for ITSM product received the largest share of fixes with 8 CVEs, all affecting the on-premises deployment (cloud/SaaS instances were silently patched on August 9, 2026). These break into three categories: (1) two unauthenticated deserialization remote code execution flaws, CVE-2026-12744 and CVE-2026-12745 (CVSS 9.8, CRITICAL, CWE-502), enabling a remote attacker with no authentication to execute arbitrary code on the ITSM application server by sending crafted serialized data; (2) three authenticated remote code execution flaws via missing authorization, CVE-2026-12645, CVE-2026-12646, and CVE-2026-12647 (CVSS 9.9, CRITICAL, CWE-862), where a low-privilege authenticated user can escalate to execute arbitrary code on the server with a scope-changed impact affecting connected systems; and (3) three authenticated deserialization remote code execution flaws, CVE-2026-12648 (CVSS 8.8, HIGH), CVE-2026-12650 (CVSS 9.9, CRITICAL), and CVE-2026-12651 (CVSS 8.8, HIGH), all CWE-502 deserialization vulnerabilities requiring authentication. Notably, CVE-2026-12650 carries a scope-changed (S:C) modifier, indicating the deserialization can impact resources beyond the vulnerable component. Ivanti disclosed that these eight ITSM vulnerabilities were identified using 'advanced large language models integrated into its product security' — representing a novel AI-assisted vulnerability discovery methodology in enterprise software security.

The final vulnerability, CVE-2026-83527 (CVSS 8.1, HIGH), affects Ivanti Sentry, the secure gateway appliance that manages connections between Ivanti products and backend infrastructure. It is an authentication bypass (CWE-288) enabling a remote unauthenticated attacker to gain administrative-level access to the Sentry appliance. The vulnerability was discovered by security researcher btaol of Aquila Sec Lab and is fixed in Sentry versions R10.8.2, R10.7.3, and R10.6.4. Sentry appliances that are managed through EPMM or Neurons for MDM may have restricted network access that reduces the practical attack surface.

The broader context for this disclosure is critical for SOC analysis: Ivanti products have been under sustained, sophisticated attack throughout 2026. In January 2026, UNC5221 (a suspected China-nexus APT) exploited CVE-2026-1281 and CVE-2026-1340 as zero-days against EPMM, achieving pre-auth RCE. The May 2026 advisory explicitly warned that attackers were chaining credentials harvested from those January breaches to compromise additional appliances — a credential chain that makes credential rotation as important as patching. In June 2026, CVE-2026-10520 (Sentry pre-auth root RCE, CVSS 10.0) and CVE-2026-10523 (Sentry auth bypass, CVSS 9.9) were disclosed and CVE-2026-10520 was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog within 48 hours of disclosure. Across this period, Mandiant documented 15+ malware families (SPAWNANT, SPAWNMOLE, SPAWNSNAIL, SPAWNSLOTH, TRAILBLAZE, BRUSHFIRE, ZIPLINE, LIGHTWIRE, WARPWIRE, DRYHOOK, PHASEJAM) deployed against Ivanti appliances, including malware that survived factory resets and firmware upgrades.

SOC teams should treat these vulnerabilities with elevated urgency even absent confirmed exploitation, based on: (1) Ivanti's repeated targeting by state-sponsored actors in 2026, (2) the availability of mature public exploit frameworks for Java/.NET deserialization (CWE-502), (3) the direct applicability of credential-chaining techniques documented in prior Ivanti campaigns, and (4) the criticality of the affected products — MDM infrastructure, IT service management backends, and secure gateway appliances — as enterprise trust anchors. Defenders should immediately inventory all Ivanti EPMM, Sentry, and Neurons for ITSM deployments, apply available patches, and audit for signs of prior compromise using established CISA and Mandiant detection guidance.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003 OS Credential Dumping; T1552 Unsecured Credentials

Lateral Movement

T1021 Remote Services

Discovery

T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1087 Account Discovery

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Initial Access

T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Persistence

T1505 Server Software Component

Remediation

Patches

  • EPMM: Upgrade to version 12.10.0.0 (or 12.9.0.2 / 12.8.0.4 for legacy deployments)
  • Sentry: Upgrade to version R10.8.2 (or R10.7.3 / R10.6.4)
  • Neurons for ITSM on-premises: Upgrade to version 2026.2 (available September 21, 2026)

Immediate actions

  • Identify and patch all internet-exposed Ivanti EPMM instances to version 12.10.0.0, 12.9.0.2, or 12.8.0.4
  • Update Ivanti Sentry to R10.8.2, R10.7.3, or R10.6.4
  • Apply Ivanti Neurons for ITSM on-premises 2026.2 patch when released (September 21, 2026)
  • Audit all Ivanti products for indicators of compromise from prior exploitation campaigns using CISA AR25-261A detection guidance
  • Restrict network access to all Ivanti management interfaces to trusted IP ranges only

Workarounds

  • Restrict access to Ivanti management web interfaces via perimeter firewall rules and VPN-only access
  • Disable unnecessary API endpoints on EPMM and Sentry where possible
  • Implement multi-factor authentication for all administrative access to all Ivanti products
  • Monitor for malicious HTTP requests targeting /mifs/rs/api/v2/ and similar reconnaissance endpoints
  • Disable deserialization interfaces on Neurons for ITSM where not required by business function

Longer-term hardening

  • Rotate all administrative credentials for Ivanti products (credential chaining between products documented in prior incidents)
  • Implement network segmentation isolating Ivanti management products from general enterprise networks
  • Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) with behavioral detection on Ivanti appliance servers
  • Enable comprehensive logging on all Ivanti appliances and forward to SIEM/SOAR platform
  • Establish Ivanti-specific threat monitoring feed and automated alerting for anomalous administrative actions
  • Review and restrict API access to Ivanti management endpoints to least-privilege model

Affected and fixed versions

  • Ivanti — Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM)
    Vulnerable versions: 12.9.0.1 and earlier; 12.8.0.3 and earlier
    Fixed in: 12.10.0.0; 12.9.0.2; 12.8.0.4
  • Ivanti — Neurons for ITSM (on-premises)
    Vulnerable versions: 2025.2; 2025.3; 2025.4; 2026.0; 2026.1
    Fixed in: 2026.2 (on-premises, shipping September 21, 2026); Cloud/SaaS patched August 9, 2026
  • Ivanti — Sentry
    Vulnerable versions: R10.8.1 and earlier; R10.7.2 and earlier; R10.6.3 and earlier
    Fixed in: R10.8.2; R10.7.3; R10.6.4

Timeline

  • UNC5221 China-nexus APT exploited CVE-2026-1281/CVE-2026-1340 as zero-days against Ivanti EPMM (CVSS 9.8 pre-auth RCE), initiating an extended credential-harvesting campaign across Ivanti infrastructure
  • Ivanti May 2026 security update warns of credential chaining: attackers using admin credentials harvested from January zero-day breaches to compromise additional Ivanti appliances with high confidence
  • Ivanti June 2026 security update: CVE-2026-10520 (Sentry pre-auth RCE as root, CVSS 10.0) added to CISA KEV on June 11; CVE-2026-10523 (Sentry authentication bypass, CVSS 9.9) also disclosed — mass scanning observed within days of PoC publication
  • Ivanti silently patches Neurons for ITSM cloud/SaaS instances against the 8 CVEs later disclosed in September; no customer action required for SaaS tenants
  • Ivanti releases patches: EPMM 12.10.0.0, 12.9.0.2, 12.8.0.4; Sentry R10.8.2, R10.7.3, R10.6.4; Neurons for ITSM on-premises 2026.2 scheduled for September 21, 2026
  • CISA KEV review finds no confirmed active exploitation of the 10 disclosed CVEs prior to public disclosure; historical pattern suggests attackers may weaponize within days to weeks
  • Ivanti reports that the eight ITSM vulnerabilities were discovered using advanced large language models integrated into its product security process, marking a novel AI-assisted vulnerability discovery methodology
  • Ivanti publicly discloses 10 vulnerabilities across EPMM (1), Neurons for ITSM (8), and Sentry (1) in its September 2026 security update

Sources cited

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Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 14 sources; published ; last updated —.

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