# Iran Exploits SS7 Roaming Infrastructure and Commercial Ad-Tech to Track US Military Smartphones During Operation Epic Fury

> Iranian state-aligned actors exploited Signaling System 7 (SS7) roaming-protocol weaknesses and commercial advertising-technology (ad-tech) data to obtain real-time, continuous location information on US military personnel and defense contractors deployed to Iraq, Bahrain, and the wider Gulf during Operation Epic Fury (the 2026 US-Iran war). The Mobile Surveillance Monitor (MSM) research project flagged a surge of targeted SS7 location queries bearing a technical fingerprint tied to MTN Irancell — Iran's second-largest mobile operator, majority-controlled by state defense-linked stakeholders — combined with advertising-ID harvesting through the programmatic ad supply chain to identify hotels and bases housing US personnel. CENTCOM confirmed to Congress that adversaries exploited commercial location data to target or surveil US personnel in theater; the campaign coincided with kinetic strikes that killed and injured US service members.

- **Published:** 2026-09-09T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-09-09T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2411
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-operation-epic-fury-ss7-tracking-tl-2026-2411.webp?v=f7b99d85 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Operation Epic Fury Iran SS7 Targeting: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2411) — Critical severity, 7 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2411
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 7

## Description

From the buildup to Operation Epic Fury (the joint US-Israeli air campaign against Iran that opened February 28, 2026), Middle Eastern telecom operators observed and blocked a surge of SS7 (Signaling System 7) 'pings' — protocol requests, invisible to the targeted user, that reveal the approximate location of phones roaming outside their home networks. The requests, analyzed by the Mobile Surveillance Monitor (MSM) research project founded by Citizen Lab senior research fellow Gary Miller, exhibited a distinct technical fingerprint linking at least some of the tracking to an Iranian mobile operator. A shared fingerprint and MSM's traffic-log analysis point to MTN Irancell: Iran's second-largest mobile network operator, 51% held by a state-linked consortium dominated by Sairan (Iran Electronics Industries, a defense-ministry subsidiary under US/EU sanctions), with its subscriber data centre (Arya Hamrah) reportedly run in practice by the military and intelligence services. SS7, a 1970s-era telecom protocol with no built-in authentication or encryption, allows any interconnect partner holding a valid Global Title to issue MAP/TCAP queries such as SendRoutingInformation (SRI) and ProvideSubscriberInfo (PSI) that return the cell tower a device is attached to — accurate to within a few hundred meters in urban areas — and the same signaling plane can redirect SMS, including one-time passcodes used for two-factor authentication on military email and admin systems.

In parallel, Iran exploited advertising technology and the commercial data-broker economy for the same ends. Programmatic advertising real-time bidding (RTB) traffic broadcasts device advertising identifiers (IDFA on iOS, AAID on Android) together with high-resolution GPS coordinates from millions of apps; commercial data brokers aggregate and resell this data, and both can be purchased or obtained by adversaries. MSM and the Financial Times reported that Iran used ad-tech identifiers to identify hotels housing US government staff and defense contractors in Iraq's Kurdistan region and to track specific devices or device clusters. The DoD has known the advertising ID is enabled and leaking on government-issued phones: NSA and CISA both recommend disabling it, the Pentagon OIG found in a 2024 review that DoD had failed to close the vulnerability, DISA was only testing a disablement capability as of May 2026, and CENTCOM confirmed the advertising ID was still not disabled on government-issued smartphones.

The operational impact was kinetic. During the war's first hours and weeks, Iranian strikes hit at least seven US-linked installations, including Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar), Camp Arifjan (Kuwait), and the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, where a missile strike damaged the Manama Crowne Plaza hotel that housed DoD contractor staff. CENTCOM dispersed personnel to commercial hotels across Iraq, Bahrain, and the Gulf to mitigate risk, and Iranian forces and regional proxies subsequently targeted several of those civilian lodgings. CENTCOM data showed 13 US service members killed and 381 wounded in the first 40 days of the operation, with the cumulative toll climbing to roughly 794 wounded in action by September 2026 across the war and follow-on operations. On April 14, 2026, CENTCOM told Congress it had received 'multiple threat reports concerning adversary exploitation of commercial location data to target or surveil U.S. personnel in theater' and acknowledged it took 'unprecedented force-protection measures.' Investigators have not established a direct causal link between the surveillance campaign and specific missile or drone strikes, and an unnamed US official disputed that the data was 'significant' in targeting — but the tracking of individual devices, the sectoral targeting of hotels holding US contractors, and the observed SS7 and ad-tech activity together constitute the first known instance of a US adversary using commercial location data against American forces in an active war zone, per Senator Ron Wyden.

The threat is a double-pronged targeting apparatus rather than a classic malware campaign: (1) SS7 signaling-plane exploitation operating across the trusted roaming-interconnect relationships between an Iranian operator and Gulf carriers (Batelco Bahrain, Zain, STC, Etisalat, du, Ooredoo, Vodafone Qatar, Omantel), and (2) the legal-but-hostile purchase and harvest of commercial advertising and broker location data. Attribution to Iran is supported by the SS7 technical fingerprint, the state-controlled operator infrastructure and its documented intelligence access, and the wartime motive; CSIS researcher Nikita Shah called the development 'a step up in sophistication' for Iran. Precedent for Iranian SS7 use exists — MOIS-linked Charming Kitten/APT35 (Mint Sandstorm) used SS7/SMS interception and 2FA bypass since at least 2015 — and other Iranian cyber actors such as Handala escalated disruptive operations against the US during the same conflict. Mitigation centers on disabling advertising IDs on in-theater devices, enforcing the 2018 geolocation ban, migrating away from vulnerable SS7 roaming toward modern encrypted signaling (GSMA roaming security guidelines), and regulating data-broker sale of location data linked to government personnel.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1591 Gather Victim Org Information
- T1592 Gather Victim Host Information
- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- T1020 Automated Exfiltration
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
- T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**SS7 IMSI-Sweep Exfiltration — Broad Subscriber Enumeration over Signaling Plane** (`TL-2026-2411-SPL-003`)

Detects wide IMSI/MSISDN enumeration from a single originator against a destination network: hundreds of distinct IMSIs (or sequential probing of an IMSI prefix) collected via SRI/PRN/PSI/ATI — the automated bulk dialing-out of the targeting chain. This is data exfiltration over an alternative (non-IP) protocol (T1048) in automated fashion (T1020) using the legacy signaling C2 channel (T1095), consistent with an actor inventorying subscribers attached to VLRs near US bases and hotels; also reflects abuse of compromised/controlled signaling nodes (T1584).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1048, T1020, T1095, T1584
- **Data sources:** telecom_signaling, ss7_firewall, mobile_core_hlr_vlr
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
/* SS7 IMSI-sweep exfiltration: broad subscriber enumeration by one originator (T1048/T1020/T1095/T1584). */
index=telecom sourcetype=ss7_firewall earliest=-24h
  (map_op="sendRoutingInfo" OR map_op="provideRoamingNumber" OR map_op="provideSubscriberInfo" OR map_op="anyTimeInterrogation") isnotnull(target_imsi)
| eval imsi_prefix = substr(target_imsi, 1, 6)
| stats count AS q, dc(target_imsi) AS distinct_imsi, dc(target_msisdn) AS distinct_msisdn, values(serving_vlr) AS vlrs BY orig_gt, dest_gt, imsi_prefix
| where distinct_imsi > 100 OR (q > 500 AND distinct_msisdn > 50)
| sort - distinct_imsi
| table orig_gt, dest_gt, imsi_prefix, q, distinct_imsi, distinct_msisdn
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where DeviceEventClassID in~ ("MAP_SEND_ROUTING_INFO","MAP_PROVIDE_ROAMING_NUMBER","MAP_PROVIDE_SUBSCRIBER_INFO","MAP_ANY_TIME_INTERROGATION")
| extend TargetImsi = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalExtensions)["targetImsi"])
| where isnotempty(TargetImsi)
| extend ImsiPrefix = substring(TargetImsi, 0, 6)
| summarize QueryCount = count(), DistinctImsi = dcount(TargetImsi), DistinctNetworks = dcount(DestinationHostName) by SourceIP, ImsiPrefix
| where DistinctImsi > 100
| project SourceIP, ImsiPrefix, QueryCount, DistinctImsi, DistinctNetworks
| order by DistinctImsi desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: SS7 Subscriber Enumeration Sweep (Bulk IMSI Exfiltration)
id: c9d2a4b7-3e1f-4c8a-9b6d-2f5a7e0d1c55
status: experimental
description: Detects enumeration-level SS7/MAP query volumes spanning more than 100 distinct IMSIs from a single originator in a day, matching the automated subscriber inventory the Iranian operation ran against Gulf networks around US bases and contractor hotels — automated exfiltration of subscriber routing data over an alternative signaling protocol.
references:
    - https://citizenlab.ca/us-military-smartphones-targeted-through-roaming-and-ad-tech/
    - https://citizenlab.ca/how-iran-uses-cellular-infrastructure-to-target-us-military-phones/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/09
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.t1020
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1095
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1584
logsource:
    category: network
    product: ss7
detection:
    selection_sweep_ops:
        map_op|startswith:
            - sendRoutingInfo
            - provideRoamingNumber
            - provideSubscriberInfo
            - anyTimeInterrogation
    condition: selection_sweep_ops | count() by orig_gt > 100
falsepositives:
    - Number-portability database synchronization and routine HLR audits sweeping range-segments
    - Legal compliance reporting enumerating subscriber rosters on a network
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Number-portability/system-audit sweeps by approved OSS tools
- New interconnect-partner validation testing enumerating roamers during cutover

**Tuning notes:** Group by originating operator SPID first and compare to historical per-SPID sweep volumes; sequential IMSI-prefix probing (dense ranges) is a stronger indicator than dispersed IMSIs — weight dense-range enumeration higher.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- DoD-Managed Device Advertising-ID Leakage to Ad Exchanges (RTB) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SMS 2FA Interception — Signaling-Plane Routing Change on High-Value Subscriber (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Theater Device Broadcasting Location to Programmatic Ad Network (RTB Supply-Chain Exposure) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Foreign Operator Roaming-Interconnect Signaling Abuse (SS7 Initial Access) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SS7 Subscriber-Data Collection via Location Primitives (Bulk Polling) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Automated Location Exfiltration over SS7 Signaling Plane (C2-Style Bot Polling) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SS7 MAP Location-Query Surge from Iranian Operator GTs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Persistent SS7 Location Polling of Single Subscriber (Continuous Tracking) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [US Military Smartphones Targeted Through Roaming and Ad Tech (Citizen Lab / Financial Times)](https://citizenlab.ca/us-military-smartphones-targeted-through-roaming-and-ad-tech/)
- [How Iran Uses Cellular Infrastructure to Target US Military Phones (Citizen Lab)](https://citizenlab.ca/how-iran-uses-cellular-infrastructure-to-target-us-military-phones/)
- [Financial Times: US military smartphones targeted through roaming and ad tech](https://www.ft.com/content/44351c74-03c8-45ab-823b-5805c0daca5f)
- [Iran abused mobile networks' vulnerabilities to locate US military in the Middle East, report says](https://techcrunch.com/2026/07/14/iran-abused-mobile-networks-vulnerabilities-to-locate-u-s-military-in-the-middle-east-report-says/)
- [Boosting cyber skills, Iran apparently tried to track US military personnel via phones](https://www.timesofisrael.com/boosting-cyber-skills-iran-apparently-tried-to-track-us-military-personnel-via-phones-report/)
- [Iran spied on US troops via mobile networks to track exact location during war](https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/iran-spied-on-us-troops-mobile-networks-during-middle-east-war-to-track-exact-location-2947776-2026-07-14)
- [Middle Eastern telecom networks targeted in cyber campaign to track US personnel during war (FT)](https://www.outlookindia.com/international/middle-eastern-telecom-networks-targeted-in-cyber-campaign-to-track-us-personnel-during-war-ft)
- [Commercial location data being used to target US servicemembers, lawmakers warn](https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2026/05/commercial-location-data-being-used-target-us-servicemembers-lawmakers-warn/413851/)
- [Iran War Shows Adversaries Can Exploit Big Data, Too](https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/iran-war-shows-adversaries-can-exploit-big-data--too)
- [Military targeted for first time in war zones by enemies using location tech](https://www.military.com/military-targeted-for-first-time-war-zones-enemies-location-tech)
- [Pentagon says US military personnel are reportedly being targeted using location data, Pentagon letter shows](https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/pentagon-says-us-military-personnel-are-reportedly-being-targeted-using-location-2026-05-28/)
- [In letter to DoD, Heinrich reveals foreign adversaries are using commercial location data to target US servicemembers in the Middle East](https://www.heinrich.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/in-letter-to-dod-heinrich-reveals-that-foreign-adversaries-are-using-commercial-location-data-to-target-us-servicemembers-in-the-middle-east-calls-on-dod-to-adopt-commonsense-safeguards-to-protect-us-troops)
- [The targeting chain: how the IRGC exploits MTN Irancell's Gulf telecom connections to guide its missiles](https://nationalsecurity.news/the-targeting-chain-how-the-irgc-exploits-mtn-iran-cells-gulf-telecom-connections-to-guide-its-missiles/)
- [CENTCOM: Operation Epic Fury](https://www.centcom.mil/OPERATIONS-AND-EXERCISES/EPIC-FURY/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2411
