# Platform-Aware Phishing Kits Fingerprint Devices to Deliver OS-Specific RATs and Credential Harvesters

> Cofense Intelligence documents phishing kits that fingerprint a victim's browser/OS/language/timezone/screen/geolocation from a single landing page and branch the payload: Windows victims receive an installer (e.g. GoogleMeet_Ti.msi) that deploys the legitimate remote-management tools ConnectWise RAT (ScreenConnect) or Itarian RAT (Comodo), sometimes via a Ninite Loader staging step, while macOS and Android victims are redirected to credential-harvesting pages spoofing Google, DocuSign, Microsoft Teams, Adobe, and Zoom.

- **Published:** 2026-09-11T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-09-11T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2452
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-os-aware-phishing-rat-delivery-tl-2026-2452.webp?v=e7888f72 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Platform-Aware Phishing Kits Deploy OS-Specific RATs (TL-2026-2452) — High severity, 13 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2452
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 13

## Description

Cofense Intelligence's 2026-07-01 report "The Platform You Trust Is the Platform They Target" (authored by Max Gannon) describes an evolution from one-size-fits-all phishing toward platform-aware kits that adapt payload delivery to the victim's device. A single spearphishing link (or, in a simpler baseline variant, a malicious script archive attachment) leads to a landing page that runs a client-side fingerprinting script collecting browser User-Agent, operating system, browser type, language, local time and timezone, screen/window dimensions, and geolocation. Some operators additionally use Cloudflare User-Agent edge rules to redirect traffic by perceived OS before the victim ever reaches the malicious page.

Based on the fingerprint, the kit branches: Windows victims are served an MSI-based installer (Cofense's example: GoogleMeet_Ti.msi, masquerading as a Google Meet client) that deploys a legitimate remote-monitoring-and-management (RMM) tool repurposed as a remote access trojan -- ConnectWise RAT (ScreenConnect) or Itarian RAT (Comodo). In one documented case (a veterinary-sector target), the chain runs two fingerprinting stages before resolving to either credential phishing or a loader Cofense calls Ninite Loader, which then stages ConnectWise RAT onto the Windows host. macOS and Android victims -- platforms where the same RAT installers do not apply -- are instead redirected to simplified credential-harvesting pages impersonating Google, DocuSign, Microsoft Teams, Adobe, or Zoom login flows to capture email/password pairs directly.

The report contrasts this with a simpler, traditional infection chain (Cofense ATR 389255) that used inconsistent narratives and a malicious script archive attachment to deliver Ave Maria Stealer (aka WarzoneRAT), a commodity credential-stealing RAT with keylogging, browser-credential-store harvesting, and webcam-capture capabilities. Ave Maria/WarzoneRAT was previously disrupted by an FBI/DOJ law-enforcement action in February 2024 (IC3 CSA 240215) but continues to circulate as malware-as-a-service.

Abuse of legitimate RMM software as a post-phish remote access channel is a broader, independently corroborated trend: Cofense's own May 2025 report "New Weapon of Choice" and Red Canary's June 2026 "dual-use dilemma" post both document threat actors increasingly weaponizing signed, trusted tools such as ConnectWise ScreenConnect, NetSupport Manager, and SimpleHelp because their legitimacy and vendor-domain traffic evade both signature-based detection and platform-specific security assumptions. No CVE, exploited vulnerability, or attributed threat actor/group is identified in any of the source reporting; this is a social-engineering and living-off-the-land RMM-abuse operation, not a software vulnerability.

Cofense's stated defensive takeaway is that organizations can no longer assume a given OS or device type is inherently safer, and that campaign-level, AI-clustered detection (the article cites Cofense Vision 3.2) is needed to connect the Windows-RAT and macOS/Android-credential-phishing variants as one operation rather than triaging them as unrelated, platform-siloed emails.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1592 Gather Victim Host Information
- T1566 Phishing
- T1204 User Execution
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1125 Video Capture

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Brand-Impersonating MSI Installer Launched via msiexec from Browser/Mail Client** (`TL-2026-2452-SPL-001`)

Detects msiexec.exe installing an MSI package whose filename impersonates a trusted collaboration brand (Cofense's documented example: GoogleMeet_Ti.msi) where the parent process is a web browser or mail client. This is the Windows-branch resolution of the platform-aware phishing kit: a client-side fingerprinting landing page (browser UA/OS/language/timezone/screen/geolocation) routes Windows victims to a brand-impersonating installer that deploys ConnectWise RAT or Itarian RAT.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1592, T1566, T1204, T1218, T1036
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_telemetry
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon OR index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| eval parent_proc=lower(ParentImage), proc=lower(Image), cl=lower(CommandLine)
| where (proc="c:\\windows\\system32\\msiexec.exe" OR proc="c:\\windows\\syswow64\\msiexec.exe")
| where match(parent_proc, "(chrome|firefox|msedge|iexplore|outlook|thunderbird)\.exe$")
| where match(cl, "(googlemeet|google_meet|gmeet|docusign|msteams|zoomapp|adobereader)[a-z0-9_\-]*\.msi")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(cl) as command_lines by host, user, parent_proc
| where count > 0
| sort -last_seen
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "msiexec.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","iexplore.exe","outlook.exe","thunderbird.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(googlemeet|google_meet|gmeet|docusign|msteams|zoomapp|adobereader)[a-z0-9_\-]*\.msi"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Brand-Impersonating MSI Installer Launched via msiexec from Browser or Mail Client
id: 7f2b6e1a-4c3d-4a2f-9e51-2a6b8f0c1d01
status: experimental
description: Detects msiexec.exe installing an MSI package whose filename impersonates a trusted collaboration brand (e.g. GoogleMeet_Ti.msi) launched by a browser or mail client, consistent with platform-aware phishing kits that fingerprint victims before serving a Windows RAT installer.
references:
    - https://cofense.com/blog/the-platform-you-trust-is-the-platform-they-target
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/11
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1592
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1218.007
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_proc:
        Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\iexplore.exe'
            - '\outlook.exe'
            - '\thunderbird.exe'
    selection_brand:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'googlemeet'
            - 'google_meet'
            - 'gmeet'
            - 'docusign'
            - 'msteams'
            - 'zoomapp'
            - 'adobereader'
    filter_msi:
        CommandLine|endswith: '.msi'
    condition: selection_proc and selection_parent and selection_brand and filter_msi
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate branded MSI packages pushed through approved software deployment tooling (rare when launched directly from a browser download to msiexec)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate brand-named MSI packages distributed via approved software deployment/patch-management tooling rather than a direct browser download

**Tuning notes:** Extend the brand-keyword list as new lure themes are observed (this campaign family rotates Google/Zoom/DocuSign/Teams/Adobe branding); add a hash/publisher-mismatch check (Authenticode subject not matching the claimed vendor) to cut false positives from legitimately branded installers.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Brand-Impersonating MSI Installer Launched via msiexec from Browser/Mail Client (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unauthorized ConnectWise ScreenConnect / Itarian (Comodo) RMM Install via Staged Loader (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RMM C2 Beacon to Non-Allowlisted ScreenConnect/Itarian Relay + Cross-Platform Credential/Webcam Collection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Brand-Impersonating MSI Installer Launched via msiexec from Browser/Mail Client (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unauthorized ConnectWise ScreenConnect / Itarian (Comodo) RMM Install via Staged Loader (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RMM C2 Beacon to Non-Allowlisted ScreenConnect/Itarian Relay + Cross-Platform Credential/Webcam Collection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unauthorized ConnectWise ScreenConnect / Itarian (Comodo) RMM Install via Staged Loader (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RMM C2 Beacon to Non-Allowlisted ScreenConnect/Itarian Relay + Cross-Platform Credential/Webcam Collection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [The Platform You Trust Is the Platform They Target](https://cofense.com/blog/the-platform-you-trust-is-the-platform-they-target)
- [The Platform You Trust Is the Platform They Target (Security Boulevard syndication)](https://securityboulevard.com/2026/07/the-platform-you-trust-is-the-platform-they-target/)
- [New Weapon of Choice: How Threat Actors Hijack Legitimate Remote Access Tools](https://cofense.com/blog/new-weapon-of-choice-how-threat-actors-hijack-legitimate-remote-access-tools)
- [WarzoneRAT, Software S0670](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0670/)
- [Defending the Gates: Understanding and Detecting Ave Maria (Warzone) RAT](https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/defending-the-gates-understanding-and-detecting-ave-maria-warzone-rat.html)
- [The dual-use dilemma: Rethinking detection for remote access tool abuse](https://redcanary.com/blog/security-operations/rmm-detection/)
- [Identification and Disruption of the Warzone Remote Access Trojan](https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2024/240215.pdf)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2452
