# Browser-in-the-Browser Phishing Campaign Abuses ScreenConnect RMM to Gain Remote Access

> Huntress documented two related August 2026 phishing incidents that used Browser-in-the-Browser (BiTB) fake windows spoofing get.adobe.com to trick victims into installing rogue ConnectWise ScreenConnect clients, then ran HideCursor.exe/HideUL.exe defense-evasion binaries to hide attacker activity on screen.

- **Published:** 2026-09-09T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-09-09T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2453
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-fake-adobe-screenconnect-phishing-tl-2026-2453.webp?v=e2a47532 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Rogue ScreenConnect via Fake Adobe Pages: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2453) — High severity, 25 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2453
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 25 (3 shown free below)

## Description

On 2026-08-25 and 2026-08-31, Huntress investigated two related but independently-executed incidents that combined phishing, Browser-in-the-Browser (BiTB) UI spoofing, and abuse of legitimate ConnectWise ScreenConnect remote-monitoring-and-management (RMM) software to establish persistent remote access.

In Incident 1, a victim received a phishing email in Gmail containing a link to a fake 'Safe access browser check' CAPTCHA page at adoube[.]vu (a domain that visually typosquats 'adobe'). The page led to a second lure at adoube[.]vu/filedocacess/file.html displaying a blurred document and prompting the victim to 'download updated Adobe PDF Reader to view the files.' Clicking through rendered a Browser-in-the-Browser (BiTB) window entirely within the webpage's HTML/CSS/JavaScript, spoofing the legitimate get.adobe.com address bar, padlock, and URL to make the fake download prompt appear trustworthy. The victim executed the resulting installer, ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe (SHA256 41d2097e8ac636a478aa011e12128c03b3b9bb3c8efca43d3c4f214ac8b1f07b), served from a ScreenConnect trial-relay subdomain (hosthiifran.screenconnect.com) rather than an organization-approved instance. This installed a first rogue ScreenConnect client (instance ID 9c1aea531ba4c511, SHA256 9f5910d69a4fbc56ff1854e7e0df3199fbfddd7fe6b374f7d816fa6ae70ef991) as a Windows service, relaying through instance-uxh86b-relay.screenconnect.com. From that session, the attacker used cmd.exe with curl to pull down and install a second rogue ScreenConnect client (instance ID 7c1d255d0efefde6, SHA256 f048400c23add8c75abe189393d33c873c02c74eeaf43d47b950c8d643763b35), which communicated with a dedicated C2 endpoint at 144.172.115[.]59:8041. The attacker then executed HideCursor.exe (SHA256 fc96a04c615847f0fb1391f04d9d1aac7f78ddfb7d459168df0a4172b98354e2) from C:\Users\REDACTED\Documents\ScreenConnect\Temp\ to suppress visible cursor movement and conceal hands-on-keyboard activity from the logged-in user.

Incident 2 followed the same tradecraft template a week later via a different initial-access vector: a phishing message delivered through AT&T Office@Hand (a RingCentral-based unified-communications product) linked to a fake PDF-viewer page at selectstructure[.]com[.]au/freedom/adobedocument.html. The BiTB flow again spoofed an Adobe download prompt, leading the victim to run AdbRdBkUpsStUp.msi, staged on a DigitalOcean Spaces bucket (victory.mkc1.digitaloceanspaces.com). This installed a first rogue ScreenConnect client (instance ID d751818fd46e5ca9) as a Windows service relaying through relay.goldenmelon.us. A second rogue client, delivered as patch.msi (instance ID c19e38a20f1ba492) from wir.consultingics.com, communicated with scx.illuminantgroup.net via relay.illuminantgroup.net and was flagged by Microsoft Defender as Trojan:Win32/Commando.A!ml. The attacker executed a second concealment binary, HideUL.exe, to suppress cursor visibility and reduce on-screen indicators of interactive remote control.

Neither incident involves a software vulnerability or CVE: the entire chain relies on social engineering (phishing + BiTB UI deception) and abuse of legitimate ScreenConnect trial/relay infrastructure to obtain hands-on remote access while evading a victim's visual detection and, in at least one case, real-time EDR signature detection. Huntress' 2026 Cyber Threat Report notes RMM abuse rose 277% year-on-year and now features in roughly a quarter of investigated incidents, consistent with a broader industry trend of threat actors preferring 'living off trusted software' (legitimate, code-signed RMM tools reconfigured to attacker-controlled relays) over custom malware to blend into normal IT traffic.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
- T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
- T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1564 Hide Artifacts
- T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Rogue ScreenConnect Installer Execution from Browser-Spawned Adobe-Themed Phishing Lure** (`TL-2026-2453-SPL-001`)

Detects execution of a ScreenConnect (ConnectWise RMM) client installer — ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe, AdbRdBkUpsStUp.msi, or patch.msi — spawned from a browser or mail-client process, or matching a known malicious SHA256. Both Huntress-documented incidents (BiTB fake get.adobe.com update prompts) ended with a victim executing exactly this pattern to install a rogue trial-relay ScreenConnect client.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.002, T1204.001, T1204.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint_deviceprocessevents
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon OR index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| where match(Image, "(?i)(ScreenConnect\.ClientSetup\.exe|AdbRdBkUpsStUp\.msi|patch\.msi)$")
| eval parent_is_browser=if(match(ParentImage, "(?i)(chrome\.exe|msedge\.exe|firefox\.exe|outlook\.exe)$"), 1, 0)
| eval known_bad_hash=if(match(Hashes, "(?i)(41D2097E8AC636A478AA011E12128C03B3B9BB3C8EFCA43D3C4F214AC8B1F07B|9F5910D69A4FBC56FF1854E7E0DF3199FBFDDD7FE6B374F7D816FA6AE70EF991|F048400C23ADD8C75ABE189393D33C873C02C74EEAF43D47B950C8D643763B35)"), 1, 0)
| where parent_is_browser=1 OR known_bad_hash=1
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen count by host, User, Image, ParentImage, Hashes, CommandLine
| where count > 0
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe","AdbRdBkUpsStUp.msi","patch.msi")
    or SHA256 in~ ("41d2097e8ac636a478aa011e12128c03b3b9bb3c8efca43d3c4f214ac8b1f07b","9f5910d69a4fbc56ff1854e7e0df3199fbfddd7fe6b374f7d816fa6ae70ef991","f048400c23add8c75abe189393d33c873c02c74eeaf43d47b950c8d643763b35")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","outlook.exe") or isnotempty(SHA256)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Rogue ScreenConnect Installer Execution via Browser-in-the-Browser Phishing Lure
id: 8f3d1a2e-6b4c-4e11-9a2f-1d6e7c9b4a01
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of a ScreenConnect installer or Adobe-themed masquerading MSI/EXE spawned from a browser or mail client, or matching a known TL-2026-2453 hash.
references:
  - https://www.huntress.com/blog/phishing-bitb-rmm-attacks
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-11
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1566.002
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.001
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.tool.screenconnect
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_image:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe'
      - '\AdbRdBkUpsStUp.msi'
      - '\patch.msi'
  selection_hash:
    Hashes|contains:
      - '41D2097E8AC636A478AA011E12128C03B3B9BB3C8EFCA43D3C4F214AC8B1F07B'
      - '9F5910D69A4FBC56FF1854E7E0DF3199FBFDDD7FE6B374F7D816FA6AE70EF991'
      - 'F048400C23ADD8C75ABE189393D33C873C02C74EEAF43D47B950C8D643763B35'
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\chrome.exe'
      - '\msedge.exe'
      - '\firefox.exe'
      - '\outlook.exe'
  condition: selection_hash or (selection_image and selection_parent)
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate IT-approved ScreenConnect installer deployment initiated by an administrator downloading from the organization's own approved instance URL
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate IT/MSP-approved deployment of a ScreenConnect client from a browser download of the organization's own known-good instance URL

**Tuning notes:** Maintain an allowlist of the organization's approved ScreenConnect instance ID(s)/download URL and suppress alerts where the download source or ParentImage matches that approved instance; alert only on unrecognized instance IDs or hashes.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Rogue ScreenConnect Installer Execution from Browser-Spawned Adobe-Themed Phishing Lure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ScreenConnect Rogue Service Persistence, Curl-Delivered Second-Stage Client, and Cursor-Hiding Defense Evasion (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Outbound Beaconing to Rogue ScreenConnect Relay / RMM-Abuse C2 Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Rogue ScreenConnect Installer Execution from Browser-Spawned Adobe-Themed Phishing Lure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ScreenConnect Rogue Service Persistence, Curl-Delivered Second-Stage Client, and Cursor-Hiding Defense Evasion (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Outbound Beaconing to Rogue ScreenConnect Relay / RMM-Abuse C2 Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ScreenConnect Rogue Service Persistence, Curl-Delivered Second-Stage Client, and Cursor-Hiding Defense Evasion (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Outbound Beaconing to Rogue ScreenConnect Relay / RMM-Abuse C2 Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 25)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `144.172.115[.]59`
- Domain: `adoube[.]vu`
- URL: `hxxps://wir[.]consultingics[.]com/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?e=Access&y=Guest&c=GOODVIBE`

Full set of 25 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Phishing Attacks Serve Browser-in-the-Browser Pages, Rogue RMM Persistence](https://www.huntress.com/blog/phishing-bitb-rmm-attacks)
- [Huntress Uncovers Phishing Attacks Using Fake Browser Pages and Rogue RMM Tools](https://www.itsecurityguru.org/2026/09/09/huntress-uncovers-phishing-attacks-using-fake-browser-pages-and-rogue-rmm-tools/)
- [Beware — these new phishing attacks use a convincing fake Adobe Reader pages to trick victims into installing malware](https://www.techradar.com/pro/security/watch-out-these-new-phishing-attacks-use-a-convincing-fake-adobe-reader-pages-to-trick-victims-into-installing-malware)
- [Browser-in-the-Browser phishing is on the rise: Here's how to spot it](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/01/13/browser-in-the-browser-bitb-phishing/)
- [Phishing Pages Impersonate Adobe to Deploy Rogue ScreenConnect Clients](https://mallory.ai/stories/01a08802-33b5-79ad-b193-b1a53684df9f)
- [Phishing Attacks Serve Browser-in-the-Browser Pages, Rogue RMM Persistence — Threat Radar](https://radar.offseq.com/threat/phishing-attacks-serve-browser-in-the-browser-pages-rogue-rmm-persistence-b4a075ae14a941e4)
- [Huntress Uncovers Phishing Attacks Using Fake Browser Pages and Rogue RMM Tools](https://daily.dev/posts/huntress-uncovers-phishing-attacks-using-fake-browser-pages-and-rogue-rmm-tools-prstsfxve)
- [New Phishing Campaign Abuses ConnectWise ScreenConnect to Take Over Devices (related RMM-abuse trend)](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/phishing-abuses-connectwise-take/)
- [Rogue ScreenConnect Clients Spread Four-Stage VBScript Chain to Newly Connected Hosts (related RMM-abuse trend)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/rogue-screenconnect-clients-spread-four.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2453
