# Device Code Phishing Surge: Tycoon2FA, EvilTokens, Kali365, Ghost Hub, and Cyb3r Add MFA-Bypass Capability

> Five commodity phishing-as-a-service kits (Tycoon2FA, EvilTokens, Kali365, Ghost Hub, Cyb3r) have added device code phishing capability, abusing Microsoft's legitimate OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant flow to harvest access and refresh tokens and hijack Microsoft 365 accounts without capturing a password or presenting a fake login page. Tycoon2FA resumed operations within days of a March 4, 2026 Europol/Microsoft takedown by grafting device-code capability onto its existing AiTM infrastructure, while EvilTokens and Kali365 launched in 2026 with AI-augmented post-compromise BEC tooling built in from the start.

- **Published:** 2026-09-12T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-09-12T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2468
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-device-code-phishing-surge-tl-2026-2468.webp?v=19026041 (Threadlinqs threat intel: EvilTokens Device Code Phishing Surge: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2468) — High severity, 24 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2468
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** EvilTokens
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 24 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Device code phishing abuses the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant flow (RFC 8628), a legitimate mechanism Microsoft built for input-constrained devices (smart TVs, CLIs) to authenticate. An attacker initiates a device authorization request against Microsoft's own endpoint, receives a short-lived user code, and social-engineers a victim into visiting the genuine microsoft.com/devicelogin page and entering that code. Because the victim authenticates on real Microsoft infrastructure with their own password and MFA, no credentials are phished and no fake login page is needed — but the resulting access and refresh tokens are issued to the attacker's device, not the victim's. Refresh tokens persist for up to 90 days and can be exchanged for a Primary Refresh Token (PRT), giving silent, MFA-bypassing SSO access across Microsoft 365 that survives password resets and is immune to phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys), since the bypass targets token issuance rather than the credential itself.

Microsoft first attributed this technique in the wild to Storm-2372, an actor Microsoft assesses (moderate confidence) aligns with Russian state interests, active since August 2024 against government, NGO, IT, defense, telecom, health, education, and energy targets across Europe, North America, Africa, and the Middle East. Storm-2372 built rapport via fake WhatsApp/Signal/Teams meeting invites before steering victims to the device-code lure, then used Microsoft Graph API searches (keywords including "password", "admin", "teamviewer", "anydesk", "credentials", "secret", "ministry", "gov") to harvest sensitive mail and registered actor-controlled devices in Entra ID to mint PRTs.

That nation-state technique has now been industrialized into commodity crimeware. Tycoon2FA — an AiTM credential-relay kit that Microsoft/Europol say accounted for roughly 62% of phishing Microsoft blocked by mid-2025 and enabled over 64,000 attacks — was dismantled on March 4, 2026 in a coalition action (Europol Cyber Intelligence Extension Programme, Microsoft, Trend Micro/TrendAI) that seized 330 domains under a SDNY court order and executed infrastructure seizures across Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Poland, Spain, and the UK. Operators resumed within days using the identical 2025 codebase (same hardcoded AES-CBC key/IV, the same performance.now()-based anti-debug timing trap, the same "Check Domain" bot-gate grammar) but shifted hosting to Alibaba Cloud (AS45102) and layered on device-code capability, abusing the Trustifi click-tracking service for link reputation laundering.

EvilTokens, first seen mid-February 2026, is a turnkey device-code PhaaS whose backend the researchers assess with high confidence is AI-generated ("vibe coded"): a single JavaScript service exposing REST endpoints for device-code initiation, Microsoft polling, and PRT conversion, protected by a bot-detection header computed as SHA256(secret + timestamp + "_antibot"). It scaled past 1,000 phishing domains by March 23, 2026, hosted primarily on Cloudflare Workers with a predictable *-s-account.workers.dev naming pattern, and targets finance, HR, logistics, and sales roles across the US, Australia, Canada, France, India, Switzerland, and the UAE for BEC.

Kali365 (also seen rebranded/forked as Octopi365 and Freedom365), first observed April 2026, is the most operationally mature: a three-edition PhaaS with 33 lure templates, 100+ API endpoints, RBAC, a credit-based domain marketplace, and OxaPay crypto billing, hosted heavily on Tencent Cloud (AS132203, concentrated in 43.173.64.0/20) across 240+ IPs. Its Edition 2 integrates Claude Sonnet to triage high-value wire-transfer and invoice email threads and draft BEC replies; its companion Electron desktop apps, OctoLink Live and OctoLink Sender, convert stolen refresh tokens into live browser sessions (via the legitimate Microsoft Office client ID) and mass-send phishing/lateral emails from compromised mailboxes with human-like send cadences designed to evade throttling detection. The FBI issued PSA 2026/PSA260521 warning of Kali365 targeting of US organizations.

Ghost Hub, the admin panel of the Telegram-distributed "Ghost Hacker Operating System" kit, and Cyb3r, which favors funding/investment-themed lures with encrypted PDF attachments, round out the five platforms KnowBe4 and LevelBlue identify as having added device-code capability, part of a broader landscape PushSecurity places at 14+ distinct device-code kits by April 2026 with detections up 37.5x since early March. Across all five kits the end goal is consistent: OAuth token theft leading to mailbox access, business email compromise, and financial fraud, with LLM-driven post-compromise tooling compressing the compromise-to-fraud window from hours to seconds.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1598.003 Spearphishing Link
- T1583.001 Domains
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1187 Forced Authentication
- T1110.004 Credential Stuffing
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1550.001 Application Access Token
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1114.002 Remote Email Collection
- T1137.005 Outlook Rules
- T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Device-Code OAuth Token Theft, Cross-ASN Reuse & OctoLink Mass BEC Sending (SPL)** (`TL-2026-2468-SPL-003`)

Detects the C2/lateral-movement phase: Entra ID sign-ins via the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant (deviceCode protocol) or via the abused Microsoft Authentication Broker / Office client app IDs, where the resulting token is subsequently used from multiple IPs or from the anomalous ASNs hosting Tycoon2FA (AS45102 Alibaba) and Kali365 (AS132203 Tencent) infrastructure, correlated with a burst of outbound Exchange mail sends consistent with Kali365's OctoLink Sender wave-based BEC/lateral-phishing tooling.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1528, T1550.001, T1537, T1110.004, T1187
- **Data sources:** azuread_signin_logs, office365_management_activity, exchange_online_message_trace
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=azuread sourcetype="azure:aad:signin" AuthenticationProtocol="deviceCode" earliest=-24h
| eval asn_flag=case(match(AutonomousSystemNumber,"45102"),"AS45102_Alibaba", match(AutonomousSystemNumber,"132203"),"AS132203_Tencent", 1=1, "other")
| stats count as auth_count values(IPAddress) as auth_ips values(AutonomousSystemNumber) as asns by UserPrincipalName, AppId, asn_flag
| eval ip_count=mvcount(auth_ips)
| where ip_count > 1 OR asn_flag!="other"
| append
    [ search index=o365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload=Exchange Operation="Send" earliest=-24h
      | bin _time span=10m
      | stats count as sent_count values(Subject) as subjects by SenderAddress, _time
      | where sent_count > 20
      | rename SenderAddress as UserPrincipalName ]
| table UserPrincipalName, AppId, auth_count, ip_count, asns, sent_count, subjects
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let SuspiciousASNs = dynamic(["45102","132203"]);
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where AuthenticationProtocol == "deviceCode" or AppId in ("29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e","d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c")
| extend ASN = tostring(parse_json(tostring(LocationDetails)).asn)
| summarize AuthCount = count(), IPs = make_set(IPAddress), ASNs = make_set(ASN) by UserPrincipalName, AppId
| where array_length(IPs) > 1 or ASNs has_any (SuspiciousASNs)
| join kind=leftouter (
    OfficeActivity
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
    | where Operation == "Send" and Workload == "Exchange"
    | summarize SentCount = count() by UserId, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
    | where SentCount > 20
) on $left.UserPrincipalName == $right.UserId
| project UserPrincipalName, AppId, AuthCount, IPs, ASNs, SentCount
| sort by AuthCount desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: OAuth Device-Code Token Theft with Cross-ASN Reuse and Mass BEC Sending (OctoLink Pattern)
id: 4e6a1c8b-7d3f-4b9e-9a5c-2f7d8e1b6c4a
status: experimental
description: Detects OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant sign-ins whose resulting refresh/access tokens are reused from anomalous ASNs (Alibaba AS45102, Tencent AS132203) or multiple IPs, consistent with Kali365 OctoLink Live/Sender or Tycoon2FA post-token-theft BEC.
references:
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/kali365-device-code-phishing-kit
    - https://www.esentire.com/blog/tycoon-2fa-operators-adopt-oauth-device-code-phishing
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-12
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1528
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1550.001
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1537
    - attack.t1110.004
    - attack.t1187
    - attack.tool.kali365
    - attack.tool.tycoon2fa
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: signinlogs
detection:
    selection_devicecode:
        AuthenticationProtocol: 'deviceCode'
    selection_suspicious_asn:
        AutonomousSystemNumber:
            - '45102'
            - '132203'
    selection_office_app_abuse:
        AppId:
            - '29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e'
            - 'd3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c'
    condition: selection_devicecode and (selection_suspicious_asn or selection_office_app_abuse)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate device-code authentications for CLI/IoT tooling hosted on cloud IaaS that happens to fall within a flagged ASN range
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate device-code authentications for CLI/IoT/headless tooling hosted on cloud IaaS that happens to fall within a flagged ASN range
- High-volume legitimate transactional/marketing mail sent through an approved bulk-mail service account

**Tuning notes:** Maintain the suspicious-ASN list against this pipeline's live IOC feed rather than the two ASNs observed to date, since kits rotate hosting (Tycoon2FA moved from generic infra to Alibaba within weeks); exclude approved bulk-mail/marketing service accounts from the sent_count>20 threshold and validate the AppId list against Entra ID's current known-client-ID registry before deploying to production.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Device Code Phishing Lure Delivery & Anti-Bot Gate Access (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Post-Device-Code-Compromise Mailbox Recon & Malicious Inbox Rule Creation (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Device-Code OAuth Token Theft, Cross-ASN Reuse & OctoLink Mass BEC Sending (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Device Code Phishing Lure Domain or Trustifi Click-Redirect Access (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Post-Device-Code-Compromise Mailbox Keyword Recon and Malicious Inbox Rule Creation (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- OAuth Device-Code Token Theft with Cross-ASN Reuse and Mass BEC Sending (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Device Code Phishing Lure Delivery & Anti-Bot Gate Access (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Post-Device-Code-Compromise Mailbox Recon & Malicious Inbox Rule Creation (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 24)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `47.90.180[.]205`
- Domain: `authdocspro[.]com`
- URL: `hxxps://events[.]trustifi[.]com`

Full set of 24 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Report: Device Code Phishing is Surging](https://blog.knowbe4.com/device-code-phishing-tsunami)
- [The Device Code Phishing Tsunami: What We're Seeing in the Wild](https://www.levelblue.com/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/the-device-code-phishing-tsunami-what-were-seeing-in-the-wild)
- [New widespread EvilTokens kit: device code phishing as-a-service](https://www.sekoia.com/blog/new-widespread-eviltokens-kit-device-code-phishing-as-a-service-part-1)
- [Inside Kali365, a Device Code Phishing Ecosystem](https://www.huntress.com/blog/kali365-device-code-phishing-kit)
- [Storm-2372 conducts device code phishing campaign](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/02/13/storm-2372-conducts-device-code-phishing-campaign/)
- [Analyzing the rise in device code phishing attacks in 2026](https://pushsecurity.com/blog/device-code-phishing)
- [Tycoon 2FA Operators Adopt OAuth Device Code Phishing](https://www.esentire.com/blog/tycoon-2fa-operators-adopt-oauth-device-code-phishing)
- [Europol-Led Operation Takes Down Tycoon 2FA Phishing-as-a-Service Linked to 64,000 Attacks](https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/europol-led-operation-takes-down-tycoon.html)
- [Tycoon2FA returns to full activity days after Europol disruption](https://www.paubox.com/blog/tycoon2fa-returns-to-full-activity-days-after-europol-disruption)
- [Threat Spotlight: Tycoon 2FA didn't die — it's scattered everywhere](https://blog.barracuda.com/2026/04/16/threat-spotlight-tycoon-2fa-scattered-everywhere)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2468
