Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-2470
Spamhaus H2 2025 Botnet Threat Update: VenomRAT Developer Arrest, Latrodectus Resurgence, and Shift Toward Domain-Based C2 Amid Bulletproof Hosting Crackdowns
Spamhaus's Botnet Spotlight for July-December 2025 documents steep declines in live botnet C2 servers at major cloud providers, driven by Europol's Operation Endgame (1,025 servers and 20 domains seized in November 2025, VenomRAT's principal developer arrested in Greece) and the dismantling of the Netherlands-based bulletproof hoster CrazyRDP.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2470 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Botnet Spotlight: Pressure Rises on Botnets, Operation Endgame (November 2025 phase) |
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| Affected products | Venom RAT (malware family, Quasar RAT derivative) Windows endpoints infected via TA558 phishing delivery; Rhadamanthys (malware family) Windows endpoints infected via infostealer delivery; Latrodectus (malware family, Lunar Spider) Windows endpoints infected via malspam/SEO-poisoning loader delivery; Elysium (proxy botnet) Compromised residential/IoT devices used as proxy exit nodes; Multiple IaaS/hosting providers Cloud/VPS hosting abused for botnet C2 (Huawei Cloud, Tencent Cloud, Alibaba Cloud, AWS, Google Cloud, Contabo, DigitalOcean, ColoCrossing, CrazyRDP) |
| Attribution | LUNAR SPIDER, TA577 - G1037, TA578 - G1038, TA558 (medium confidence) |
| Malware | BackConnect, Brute Ratel C4, Elysium, IcedID, Latrodectus - S1160, Lumma Stealer - S1213, NJRat, Quasar RAT, Remcos, Rhadamanthys, Venom RAT, XWorm |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link, T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, T1555 Credentials from Password Stores, T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link and 3 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | government administration, health, critical-infrastructure, finance, cryptocurrency, cloud-hosting |
| Target regions | Global, North America, Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 12 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-01-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2470 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Persistence + LSASS Credential Access Chain — Rhadamanthys/VenomRAT/Latrodectus (SPL)
Detects the post-exploitation chain observed after VenomRAT/Rhadamanthys/Latrodectus initial compromise: Run-key registry persistence, schtasks.exe /create autostart entries, and LSASS memory access consistent with the credential-store harvesting behind Rhadamanthys' several-million-credential and 100,000+ cryptocurrency-wallet theft, plus sandbox/debugger-evasion checks typical of VenomRAT's anti-analysis routines.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1547.001, T1053.005, T1027, T1497, T1622, T1082, T1555
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_telemetry
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=13 OR EventCode=1 OR EventCode=10)
| eval is_runkey=if(EventCode=13 AND match(TargetObject, "(?i)software\\\\microsoft\\\\windows\\\\currentversion\\\\run"), 1, 0)
| eval is_schtask=if(EventCode=1 AND like(lower(Image), "%schtasks.exe") AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)/create"), 1, 0)
| eval is_credaccess=if(EventCode=10 AND like(lower(TargetImage), "%lsass.exe") AND NOT like(lower(SourceImage), "%mscorsvw.exe"), 1, 0)
| where is_runkey=1 OR is_schtask=1 OR is_credaccess=1
| table _time, ComputerName, User, EventCode, Image, TargetObject, TargetImage, SourceImage, CommandLine
| sort -_timeMicrosoft KQL
let persistence = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RegistryKey has @"Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, RegistryKey, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName;
let schtask = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/create"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName;
let credaccess = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("lsass", "Mimikatz", "sekurlsa") or FileName in~ ("procdump.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName;
union persistence, schtask, credaccess
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Registry Run Key Persistence with Scheduled Task and LSASS Access
id: c48e2f31-9d7a-4b5c-8e1f-2a6b3d9c7e04
status: experimental
description: Detects the persistence and credential-access chain observed after VenomRAT/Rhadamanthys/Latrodectus compromise -- Run key creation, schtasks /create for autostart, and LSASS memory access consistent with credential-store harvesting.
references:
- https://www.spamhaus.org/resource-hub/botnet-c-c/botnet-spotlight-pressure-rises-on-botnets-but-the-fight-is-far-from-over
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-01-27
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
- attack.t1053.005
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1497
- attack.t1622
- attack.tool.rhadamanthys
logsource:
category: registry_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_runkey:
EventType: SetValue
TargetObject|contains: 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
condition: selection_runkey
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software installers registering autostart entries
- IT-managed endpoint agents configuring startup items
level: highKnown false positives:
- Endpoint management agents (SCCM, backup clients) that legitimately access LSASS for credential-caching diagnostics
- IT-approved software creating Run-key entries during installation
Tuning notes: Suppress known EDR/backup-agent LSASS accessors by SourceImage allowlist (Windows Defender, CrowdStrike, Veeam agent); weight is_credaccess events higher when they co-occur within 10 minutes of a Run-key or schtasks event from the same host to reduce standalone LSASS-access noise.
- Phishing-to-PowerShell Delivery Chain — VenomRAT/Latrodectus (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Persistence + LSASS Credential Access Chain — Rhadamanthys/VenomRAT/Latrodectus (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Domain-Based C2 Beaconing to Dynamic-DNS/Bulletproof Infrastructure (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Phishing-to-PowerShell Delivery Chain — VenomRAT/Latrodectus (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Persistence + LSASS Credential Access Chain — Rhadamanthys/VenomRAT/Latrodectus (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Domain-Based C2 Beaconing to Dynamic-DNS/Bulletproof Infrastructure (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Phishing-to-PowerShell Delivery Chain — VenomRAT/Latrodectus (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Domain-Based C2 Beaconing to Dynamic-DNS/Bulletproof Infrastructure (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-01-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2470.
Sample indicators (2 of 25)
- Domain:
remotesystem[.]in - Domain:
venomlicense[.]com
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Despite this pressure, the Latrodectus loader resurfaced after a May 2025 takedown that produced no arrests, and rising botnet-controller counts at Contabo, DigitalOcean, and ColoCrossing show operators shifting toward domain-based C2 and less-cooperative hosting providers.
Spamhaus's semiannual Botnet Spotlight report (published 2026-01-27, authored by Jonas Arnold) tracks live and newly observed botnet command-and-control servers across the internet's largest hosting networks for the July-December 2025 period. It records sharp declines in live C2 counts at Huawei (-76%), Tencent (-54%), Alibaba (-46%), Amazon (-43%), and Google (-41%), attributing the drop primarily to sustained law-enforcement pressure rather than voluntary provider hardening -- Tencent and Alibaba, notably, still showed double-digit increases in newly observed controllers (+16% and +14% respectively), indicating the underlying abuse pipeline persists even as legacy infrastructure is cleaned up.
The dominant driver was Europol and Eurojust's Operation Endgame, whose November 2025 phase (coordinated 10-14 November from The Hague, with searches across 11 locations in Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands, and agencies from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US) took down 1,025 servers and seized 20 domains tied to three malware operations: the Rhadamanthys infostealer, the VenomRAT remote access trojan, and the Elysium proxy botnet. Rhadamanthys had infected hundreds of thousands of systems across 175 countries (per Shadowserver tracking, March-November 2025) and held several million stolen credentials, with its principal operator controlling access to over 100,000 victim cryptocurrency wallets; more than 60% of its C2 servers reportedly went undetected on VirusTotal. VenomRAT -- a Quasar RAT derivative sold for roughly $150/month and distributed chiefly via TA558 phishing campaigns (JavaScript downloader -> PowerShell -> payload, lures in Portuguese/Spanish/English) -- lost its principal developer to arrest in Greece on 2025-11-03, and both its advertising domain (remotesystem.in) and licensing domain (venomlicense.com) were seized; Proofpoint observed no further VenomRAT activity in its telemetry after September 2025. Elysium operated as a rentable proxy botnet, routing criminal traffic through hundreds of thousands of compromised residential devices to mask attacker origin, with observed links to campaigns against critical infrastructure, healthcare, and government targets. This November action followed the May 2025 Operation Endgame 2.0 phase, which took down roughly 300 servers and 650 domains and issued 20 international arrest warrants -- but produced no arrests tied to Latrodectus, whose over 44,000 infected IPs were only partially remediated. Separately, Dutch police dismantled the bulletproof hosting provider CrazyRDP on 2025-11-12, seizing roughly 250 physical servers (supporting thousands of VMs) from datacenters in The Hague and Zoetermeer; the no-KYC, no-logs provider had been implicated in more than 80 law-enforcement investigations spanning ransomware, botnets, phishing, and CSAM distribution.
Despite this pressure, the report's central warning is that takedowns without arrests are self-defeating: Latrodectus -- a loader attributed to the Lunar Spider group (also linked to IcedID) and distributed by TA577/TA578 via hijacked-email-thread malspam and, in tax-season waves, SEO-poisoned fake-IRS sites -- resurfaced after its arrest-less May 2025 takedown, again delivering Lumma Stealer, IcedID, BackConnect C2, and Brute Ratel C4 as follow-on payloads. Spamhaus also flags Contabo, DigitalOcean, and ColoCrossing as hosting providers with rising live and newly observed botnet-controller counts, and names smaller Western bulletproof hosters (virtualine.org, as210558.net, simplecarrier.net) operating on a 'separation of liabilities' model. Together these findings indicate botnet operators are structurally adapting: shifting from easily IP-blocklisted infrastructure toward domain-based C2 and toward hosting providers less willing or able to act on abuse reports, meaning IP-reputation blocking alone is no longer sufficient defense.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion; T1622 Debugger Evasion
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Execution
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript; T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy
Discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery
Credential Access
T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Initial Access
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
Resource Development
T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains; T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Retrospectively hunt for historical connections to the seized VenomRAT infrastructure domains remotesystem.in and venomlicense.com
- Audit outbound network connections to Contabo, DigitalOcean, and ColoCrossing IP ranges for anomalous RAT/loader beaconing given their rising botnet-controller share
- Direct potentially compromised users toward politie.nl/checkyourhack and haveibeenpwned.com to check credential exposure from the Rhadamanthys takedown dataset
Workarounds
- Restrict PowerShell execution policy and script-host (wscript/cscript) execution on endpoints to reduce loader-stage execution success
- Apply email filtering tuned against hijacked-email-thread malspam and SEO-poisoning lures impersonating Microsoft Azure, Cloudflare, and IRS tax-form portals
Longer-term hardening
- Shift botnet/C2 detection strategy from IP-reputation blocklists toward DNS- and domain-reputation-based detection given the industry-wide move to domain-based C2
- Deploy behavioral detection for JavaScript-downloader-to-PowerShell execution chains characteristic of VenomRAT/TA558 delivery
- Monitor for the full Latrodectus follow-on payload set (Lumma Stealer, IcedID, BackConnect, Brute Ratel C4) as a linked cluster rather than isolated single-family alerts
Affected and fixed versions
- Venom RAT (malware family, Quasar RAT derivative) — Windows endpoints infected via TA558 phishing delivery
Vulnerable versions: All builds distributed prior to the November 2025 takedown - Rhadamanthys (malware family) — Windows endpoints infected via infostealer delivery
Vulnerable versions: All builds active March-November 2025 - Latrodectus (malware family, Lunar Spider) — Windows endpoints infected via malspam/SEO-poisoning loader delivery
Vulnerable versions: v1.4 (2024-07) and later, active post-resurgence - Elysium (proxy botnet) — Compromised residential/IoT devices used as proxy exit nodes
Vulnerable versions: All devices enrolled prior to November 2025 takedown - Multiple IaaS/hosting providers — Cloud/VPS hosting abused for botnet C2 (Huawei Cloud, Tencent Cloud, Alibaba Cloud, AWS, Google Cloud, Contabo, DigitalOcean, ColoCrossing, CrazyRDP)
Vulnerable versions: Ongoing abuse as of H2 2025
Fixed in: CrazyRDP dismantled 2025-11-12
Timeline
- Latrodectus loader first observed in the wild, attributed to the Lunar Spider group and linked to prior IcedID operations.
- Latrodectus v1.4 released, adding AES256 encryption, new backdoor commands, and improved obfuscation.
- Latrodectus activity surges through the US tax season, using SEO-poisoned fake-IRS sites to deliver W2-themed lures.
- Operation Endgame 2.0 (coordinated by Europol/Eurojust, 19-22 May) takes down roughly 300 servers and 650 domains and issues 20 international arrest warrants, targeting Latrodectus infrastructure among others, but produces no Latrodectus-linked arrests.
- Proofpoint records the last VenomRAT-associated campaign activity in its telemetry before a months-long lull.
- Rhadamanthys reaches a peak of 535 active command-and-control servers and averages over 4,000 uniquely infected IPs per day, per Black Lotus Labs tracking.
- The principal VenomRAT suspect, a 39-year-old Albanian national, is arrested in Greece.
- Dutch police dismantle the bulletproof hosting provider CrazyRDP, seizing roughly 250 physical servers from datacenters in The Hague and Zoetermeer.
- Europol publicly announces the latest Operation Endgame phase: 1,025 servers and 20 domains seized targeting Rhadamanthys, VenomRAT, and the Elysium proxy botnet, coordinated across 11 countries.
- Close of the July-December 2025 reporting window covered by Spamhaus's Botnet Spotlight, during which live botnet C2 counts fell sharply at Huawei, Tencent, Alibaba, Amazon, and Google while rising at Contabo, DigitalOcean, and ColoCrossing.
- Spamhaus publishes 'Botnet Spotlight: Pressure rises on botnets — but the fight is far from over,' documenting the H2 2025 findings.
Sources cited
- End of the game for cybercrime infrastructure: 1025 servers taken down europol.europa.eu · Advisory · 2025-11-13
- Security brief: VenomRAT is defanged Proofpoint · Vendor report · 2025-11-13
- Analyzing Latrodectus: The New Face of Malware Loaders levelblue.com · Research · 2025-08-01
- Botnet Spotlight: Networks Hosting Botnet C&Cs — Same Players, Same Problems spamhaus.org · Blog · 2025-08-15
- Police disrupts Rhadamanthys, VenomRAT, and Elysium malware operations BleepingComputer · News · 2025-11-13
- Operation Endgame Dismantles Rhadamanthys, Venom RAT, and Elysium Botnet in Global Crackdown The Hacker News · News · 2025-11-13
- Operation Endgame targets malware networks in global crackdown cyberscoop.com · News · 2025-11-13
- Greek Police Arrest Alleged Mastermind of the Venom RAT Malware Network greekreporter.com · News · 2025-11-14
- Dutch police takes down bulletproof hosting hub linked to 80+ cybercrime cases securityaffairs.com · News · 2025-11-13
- Dutch police seizes 250 servers used by "bulletproof hosting" service BleepingComputer · News · 2025-11-13
- Initial access brokers infected over 44 thousand IPs with Latrodectus malware cybernews.com · News · 2025-05-23
- Botnet Spotlight: Pressure rises on botnets — but the fight is far from over spamhaus.org · Report · 2026-01-27
Previous and next in malware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 12 sources; published ; last updated —.