# Spamhaus H2 2025 Botnet Threat Update: VenomRAT Developer Arrest, Latrodectus Resurgence, and Shift Toward Domain-Based C2 Amid Bulletproof Hosting Crackdowns

> Spamhaus's Botnet Spotlight for July-December 2025 documents steep declines in live botnet C2 servers at major cloud providers, driven by Europol's Operation Endgame (1,025 servers and 20 domains seized in November 2025, VenomRAT's principal developer arrested in Greece) and the dismantling of the Netherlands-based bulletproof hoster CrazyRDP. Despite this pressure, the Latrodectus loader resurfaced after a May 2025 takedown that produced no arrests, and rising botnet-controller counts at Contabo, DigitalOcean, and ColoCrossing show operators shifting toward domain-based C2 and less-cooperative hosting providers.

- **Published:** 2026-01-27T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-01-27T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2470
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-latrodectus-resurgence-post-endgame-tl-2026-2470.webp?v=808973e9 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Spamhaus H2 2025 Latrodectus Botnet: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2470) — Medium severity, 25 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2470
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** LUNAR SPIDER
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 25 (2 shown free below)

## Description

Spamhaus's semiannual Botnet Spotlight report (published 2026-01-27, authored by Jonas Arnold) tracks live and newly observed botnet command-and-control servers across the internet's largest hosting networks for the July-December 2025 period. It records sharp declines in live C2 counts at Huawei (-76%), Tencent (-54%), Alibaba (-46%), Amazon (-43%), and Google (-41%), attributing the drop primarily to sustained law-enforcement pressure rather than voluntary provider hardening -- Tencent and Alibaba, notably, still showed double-digit increases in newly observed controllers (+16% and +14% respectively), indicating the underlying abuse pipeline persists even as legacy infrastructure is cleaned up.

The dominant driver was Europol and Eurojust's Operation Endgame, whose November 2025 phase (coordinated 10-14 November from The Hague, with searches across 11 locations in Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands, and agencies from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US) took down 1,025 servers and seized 20 domains tied to three malware operations: the Rhadamanthys infostealer, the VenomRAT remote access trojan, and the Elysium proxy botnet. Rhadamanthys had infected hundreds of thousands of systems across 175 countries (per Shadowserver tracking, March-November 2025) and held several million stolen credentials, with its principal operator controlling access to over 100,000 victim cryptocurrency wallets; more than 60% of its C2 servers reportedly went undetected on VirusTotal. VenomRAT -- a Quasar RAT derivative sold for roughly $150/month and distributed chiefly via TA558 phishing campaigns (JavaScript downloader -> PowerShell -> payload, lures in Portuguese/Spanish/English) -- lost its principal developer to arrest in Greece on 2025-11-03, and both its advertising domain (remotesystem.in) and licensing domain (venomlicense.com) were seized; Proofpoint observed no further VenomRAT activity in its telemetry after September 2025. Elysium operated as a rentable proxy botnet, routing criminal traffic through hundreds of thousands of compromised residential devices to mask attacker origin, with observed links to campaigns against critical infrastructure, healthcare, and government targets. This November action followed the May 2025 Operation Endgame 2.0 phase, which took down roughly 300 servers and 650 domains and issued 20 international arrest warrants -- but produced no arrests tied to Latrodectus, whose over 44,000 infected IPs were only partially remediated. Separately, Dutch police dismantled the bulletproof hosting provider CrazyRDP on 2025-11-12, seizing roughly 250 physical servers (supporting thousands of VMs) from datacenters in The Hague and Zoetermeer; the no-KYC, no-logs provider had been implicated in more than 80 law-enforcement investigations spanning ransomware, botnets, phishing, and CSAM distribution.

Despite this pressure, the report's central warning is that takedowns without arrests are self-defeating: Latrodectus -- a loader attributed to the Lunar Spider group (also linked to IcedID) and distributed by TA577/TA578 via hijacked-email-thread malspam and, in tax-season waves, SEO-poisoned fake-IRS sites -- resurfaced after its arrest-less May 2025 takedown, again delivering Lumma Stealer, IcedID, BackConnect C2, and Brute Ratel C4 as follow-on payloads. Spamhaus also flags Contabo, DigitalOcean, and ColoCrossing as hosting providers with rising live and newly observed botnet-controller counts, and names smaller Western bulletproof hosters (virtualine.org, as210558.net, simplecarrier.net) operating on a 'separation of liabilities' model. Together these findings indicate botnet operators are structurally adapting: shifting from easily IP-blocklisted infrastructure toward domain-based C2 and toward hosting providers less willing or able to act on abuse reports, meaning IP-reputation blocking alone is no longer sufficient defense.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link
- T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1622 Debugger Evasion
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1090 Proxy
- T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Persistence + LSASS Credential Access Chain — Rhadamanthys/VenomRAT/Latrodectus (SPL)** (`TL-2026-2470-SPL-002`)

Detects the post-exploitation chain observed after VenomRAT/Rhadamanthys/Latrodectus initial compromise: Run-key registry persistence, schtasks.exe /create autostart entries, and LSASS memory access consistent with the credential-store harvesting behind Rhadamanthys' several-million-credential and 100,000+ cryptocurrency-wallet theft, plus sandbox/debugger-evasion checks typical of VenomRAT's anti-analysis routines.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1547.001, T1053.005, T1027, T1497, T1622, T1082, T1555
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_telemetry
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=13 OR EventCode=1 OR EventCode=10)
| eval is_runkey=if(EventCode=13 AND match(TargetObject, "(?i)software\\\\microsoft\\\\windows\\\\currentversion\\\\run"), 1, 0)
| eval is_schtask=if(EventCode=1 AND like(lower(Image), "%schtasks.exe") AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)/create"), 1, 0)
| eval is_credaccess=if(EventCode=10 AND like(lower(TargetImage), "%lsass.exe") AND NOT like(lower(SourceImage), "%mscorsvw.exe"), 1, 0)
| where is_runkey=1 OR is_schtask=1 OR is_credaccess=1
| table _time, ComputerName, User, EventCode, Image, TargetObject, TargetImage, SourceImage, CommandLine
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let persistence = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RegistryKey has @"Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, RegistryKey, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName;
let schtask = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/create"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName;
let credaccess = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("lsass", "Mimikatz", "sekurlsa") or FileName in~ ("procdump.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName;
union persistence, schtask, credaccess
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Registry Run Key Persistence with Scheduled Task and LSASS Access
id: c48e2f31-9d7a-4b5c-8e1f-2a6b3d9c7e04
status: experimental
description: Detects the persistence and credential-access chain observed after VenomRAT/Rhadamanthys/Latrodectus compromise -- Run key creation, schtasks /create for autostart, and LSASS memory access consistent with credential-store harvesting.
references:
  - https://www.spamhaus.org/resource-hub/botnet-c-c/botnet-spotlight-pressure-rises-on-botnets-but-the-fight-is-far-from-over
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-01-27
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1547.001
  - attack.t1053.005
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1555
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1027
  - attack.t1497
  - attack.t1622
  - attack.tool.rhadamanthys
logsource:
  category: registry_event
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_runkey:
    EventType: SetValue
    TargetObject|contains: 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
  condition: selection_runkey
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate software installers registering autostart entries
  - IT-managed endpoint agents configuring startup items
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Endpoint management agents (SCCM, backup clients) that legitimately access LSASS for credential-caching diagnostics
- IT-approved software creating Run-key entries during installation

**Tuning notes:** Suppress known EDR/backup-agent LSASS accessors by SourceImage allowlist (Windows Defender, CrowdStrike, Veeam agent); weight is_credaccess events higher when they co-occur within 10 minutes of a Run-key or schtasks event from the same host to reduce standalone LSASS-access noise.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Phishing-to-PowerShell Delivery Chain — VenomRAT/Latrodectus (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Persistence + LSASS Credential Access Chain — Rhadamanthys/VenomRAT/Latrodectus (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Domain-Based C2 Beaconing to Dynamic-DNS/Bulletproof Infrastructure (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Phishing-to-PowerShell Delivery Chain — VenomRAT/Latrodectus (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Persistence + LSASS Credential Access Chain — Rhadamanthys/VenomRAT/Latrodectus (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Domain-Based C2 Beaconing to Dynamic-DNS/Bulletproof Infrastructure (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Phishing-to-PowerShell Delivery Chain — VenomRAT/Latrodectus (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Domain-Based C2 Beaconing to Dynamic-DNS/Bulletproof Infrastructure (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (2 of 25)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `remotesystem[.]in`
- Domain: `venomlicense[.]com`

Full set of 25 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Botnet Spotlight: Pressure rises on botnets — but the fight is far from over](https://www.spamhaus.org/resource-hub/botnet-c-c/botnet-spotlight-pressure-rises-on-botnets-but-the-fight-is-far-from-over)
- [End of the game for cybercrime infrastructure: 1025 servers taken down](https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/end-of-game-for-cybercrime-infrastructure-1025-servers-taken-down)
- [Police disrupts Rhadamanthys, VenomRAT, and Elysium malware operations](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/police-disrupts-rhadamanthys-venomrat-and-elysium-malware-operations/)
- [Operation Endgame Dismantles Rhadamanthys, Venom RAT, and Elysium Botnet in Global Crackdown](https://thehackernews.com/2025/11/operation-endgame-dismantles.html)
- [Operation Endgame targets malware networks in global crackdown](https://cyberscoop.com/operation-endgame-disrupts-global-malware-networks-rhadamanthys-venomrat-elysium/)
- [Greek Police Arrest Alleged Mastermind of the Venom RAT Malware Network](https://greekreporter.com/2025/11/14/greek-police-arrest-mastermind-venom-rat-malware-network/)
- [Security brief: VenomRAT is defanged](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-venomrat-defanged)
- [Analyzing Latrodectus: The New Face of Malware Loaders](https://www.levelblue.com/blogs/levelblue-blog/analyzing-latrodectus-the-new-face-of-malware-loaders)
- [Dutch police takes down bulletproof hosting hub linked to 80+ cybercrime cases](https://securityaffairs.com/184757/cyber-crime/dutch-police-takes-down-bulletproof-hosting-hub-linked-to-80-cybercrime-cases.html)
- [Dutch police seizes 250 servers used by "bulletproof hosting" service](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dutch-police-seizes-250-servers-used-by-bulletproof-hosting-service/)
- [Initial access brokers infected over 44 thousand IPs with Latrodectus malware](https://cybernews.com/security/latrodectus-malware-detected-on-44k-ip-addresses/)
- [Botnet Spotlight: Networks Hosting Botnet C&Cs — Same Players, Same Problems](https://www.spamhaus.org/resource-hub/botnet-c-c/networks-hosting-botnet-ccs/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2470
