Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-2480
CVE-2025-59201: Windows Network Connection Status Indicator (NCSI) Elevation of Privilege via Registry Symbolic Link Abuse
A weak DACL on the NlaSvc\Parameters registry key let a local low-privileged Windows attacker chain the Customer Experience Improvement Program "Consolidator" scheduled task, registry symbolic links, and an ETW-triggered write in ncsi.dll to force NETWORK SERVICE to write attacker-controlled registry values. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2480, CVE-2025-59201, CVE-2025-59512 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| CVSS | 7.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
| First disclosed | |
| Exploitation status | Public proof-of-concept exploit for a linked CVE |
| EPSS | CVE-2025-59512: 2.9% (86.6th percentile); CVE-2025-59201: 0.4% (37.4th percentile) |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows 10; Microsoft Windows 11; Microsoft Windows Server |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-284 |
| Malware | Windows10 |
| Tools | BinDiff, EtwExplorer, System Informer, Winbindex |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, T1106 Native API, T1112 Modify Registry, T1134.001 Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft, T1574.011 Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 11 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-09-13, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2480 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 16 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: CVE-2025-59201 — Local/RDP-Authenticated Account Manually Triggers CEIP Consolidator Scheduled Task
Detects the stage-one trigger of the CVE-2025-59201 NCSI registry-symlink EoP chain: an interactively- or RDP-authenticated LOCAL (non-domain) account — the PR:L precondition the CVSS vector and MSRC advisory both require ('an authorized attacker' who is already locally authenticated) — manually invoking the built-in \Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improvement Program\Consolidator scheduled task via schtasks.exe or the Task Scheduler COM API, spawning wsqmcons.exe as SYSTEM outside its normal unattended trigger window. This is also the shared first-stage primitive of the related CVE-2025-59512 (CEIP Consolidator arbitrary registry-key delete), so a hit here should be triaged against both CVEs. The task is not designed to be user-triggerable in a security-relevant sense; any non-SYSTEM, non-scheduled invocation on an unpatched host is the earliest observable step of either exploit chain.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1053.005, T1059.003, T1574.011, T1078.003
- Data sources: windows_security_4624, sysmon_process_creation, windows_taskscheduler_operational_log
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
`comment("Stage 1: local/RDP-authenticated non-SYSTEM account manually runs the Consolidator task, correlated to the antecedent local logon that satisfies CVE-2025-59201's PR:L precondition")`
index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image="*\\schtasks.exe" CommandLine="*Consolidator*" CommandLine="*run*"
NOT User IN ("NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM", "NT AUTHORITY\\LOCAL SERVICE", "NT AUTHORITY\\NETWORK SERVICE")
| rename ComputerName as host, User as trigger_user, _time as trigger_time
| join type=left host [
search index=windows sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 (Logon_Type=2 OR Logon_Type=10)
| eval is_local_account=if(match(Account_Domain, "(?i)^".+.\\1$") OR Account_Domain=ComputerName, 1, 0)
| rename ComputerName as host, TargetUserName as logon_user, _time as logon_time
| table host logon_user logon_time Logon_Type is_local_account
]
| eval logon_delta=trigger_time - logon_time
| where logon_delta >= 0 AND logon_delta < 1800
| join type=left host [
search index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
ParentImage="*\\svchost.exe" Image="*\\wsqmcons.exe"
| rename _time as wsqmcons_time
| table host wsqmcons_time Image ParentImage
]
| eval wsqmcons_delta=wsqmcons_time - trigger_time
| where isnull(wsqmcons_time) OR (wsqmcons_delta >= 0 AND wsqmcons_delta < 60)
| stats count min(trigger_time) as first_seen max(trigger_time) as last_seen values(logon_user) as antecedent_logon values(Logon_Type) as logon_type values(wsqmcons_time) as consolidator_spawn by host, trigger_user, CommandLine
| where count > 0Microsoft KQL
let localLogon = DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where LogonType in ("Interactive", "RemoteInteractive")
| where isnotempty(AccountName) and AccountDomain =~ DeviceName
| project LogonTime=Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, LogonUser=AccountName, LogonType;
let manualTrigger = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "Consolidator" and ProcessCommandLine has "run"
| where AccountName !has "SYSTEM"
| project TriggerTime=Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, TriggerUser=AccountName, ProcessCommandLine;
let wsqmconsSpawn = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "wsqmcons.exe"
| project SpawnTime=Timestamp, DeviceId;
manualTrigger
| join kind=leftouter (localLogon) on DeviceId
| where LogonTime between ((TriggerTime - 30m) .. TriggerTime)
| join kind=leftouter (wsqmconsSpawn) on DeviceId
| where isnull(SpawnTime) or SpawnTime between (TriggerTime .. TriggerTime + 1m)
| project TriggerTime, DeviceId, DeviceName, TriggerUser, LogonUser, LogonType, ProcessCommandLine, SpawnTimeSigma
title: Manual Trigger of CEIP Consolidator Scheduled Task by Non-SYSTEM Local/RDP-Authenticated Account
id: 7e3a1c2d-4f5b-4e91-9a2d-1b6c8e0f3a11
status: experimental
description: Detects a non-SYSTEM local user manually invoking the built-in Consolidator scheduled task via schtasks.exe, the stage-one primitive abused in CVE-2025-59201 (NCSI registry-symlink EoP) and the related CVE-2025-59512 (CEIP arbitrary registry-key delete). The task's designed trigger is unattended SYSTEM scheduling; a locally/RDP-authenticated account manually forcing it satisfies the CVSS PR:L precondition documented in the MSRC advisory.
references:
- https://itm4n.github.io/cve-2025-59201-ncsi-eop/
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-59201
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2025-59512
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-13
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1053.005
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1574.011
- attack.t1078.003
- cve.2025.59201
- cve.2025.59512
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_proc:
Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'Consolidator'
- '/run'
filter_system:
User|contains:
- 'SYSTEM'
- 'LOCAL SERVICE'
- 'NETWORK SERVICE'
condition: selection_proc and not filter_system
falsepositives:
- Administrative or troubleshooting scripts that intentionally force-run the CEIP Consolidator task for telemetry testing
- Group Policy or SCCM maintenance scripts invoking schtasks under an admin service account
- Authorized red-team/detection-validation exercises exercising this exact CVE-2025-59201 proof-of-concept
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate admin/SCCM/GPO maintenance scripts that manually force-run the CEIP Consolidator task for telemetry diagnostics
- Help-desk troubleshooting of network profile/CEIP issues using schtasks under an elevated service account
- Authorized detection-engineering or red-team validation of this specific CVE-2025-59201/CVE-2025-59512 exploit chain
Tuning notes: Baseline known SCCM/GPO maintenance windows and service accounts that legitimately run this task, then exclude them by account SID; weight confidence up when the antecedent logon (within 30 minutes) is Logon Type 2/10 for a local (non-domain) account, since that is precisely the PR:L 'authorized local attacker' precondition MSRC documents — domain-joined admin accounts performing routine maintenance should be a lower-priority bucket than genuinely local accounts on jump boxes/terminal servers.
- CVE-2025-59201 — Registry Enumeration of NlaSvc/SQMClient Trees Followed by Symlink Staging and Consolidator Task Trigger · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2025-59201 — NlaSvc Parameters\Internet Subkey Deleted and Recreated With Modified DACL · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2025-59201 — NETWORK SERVICE to RPCSS Named-Pipe Token Impersonation Following Registry Write Primitive · unlock with TL Creds
- Sigma: Consolidator Scheduled Task Manually Run via schtasks.exe by Non-SYSTEM Account · unlock with TL Creds
- Sigma: [indicator] Registry Value Written Under Services\*\Parameters Namespace · unlock with TL Creds
- Sigma: svchost.exe (NETWORK SERVICE) Registry Write Outside NlaSvc Parameters Namespace · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2025-59201 — Registry Symbolic Link Planted Under NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet\ManualProxies · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2025-59201 — WinINet-Config ETW Trigger Followed by NETWORK SERVICE Redirected Registry Write / SYSTEM Token Theft Chain · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-09-13, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 16 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2480.
Technical analysis
Microsoft fixed the path-traversal and tightened the key's ACL in KB5066835 (October 14, 2025); no public exploit code or in-the-wild exploitation has been reported.
CVE-2025-59201 is a local elevation-of-privilege vulnerability (CWE-284, Improper Access Control) in the Network Connection Status Indicator (NCSI) component of the Windows Network List Service (netprofm, hosted in ncsi.dll). Prior to the October 2025 patch, the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters granted the INTERACTIVE identity the "Create Subkeys" permission. Security researcher itm4n (Clément Labro) published a full technical reconstruction of the exploit chain reported to Microsoft by researcher Tianlin Zhang (@t0zhang), built by binary-diffing the October 2025 patch against the prior ncsi.dll with BinDiff (pulling historical builds from Winbindex), and tracing behavior with Process Monitor, EtwExplorer, and System Informer.
The exploitation chain works in three stages. First, the attacker abuses the built-in "Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improvement Program\Consolidator" scheduled task (which runs as SYSTEM via wsqmcons.exe and is user-triggerable via `schtasks /run`) to recursively delete registry keys the attacker previously staged under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SQMClient\CommonUploader\Paths; this SYSTEM-context delete is repurposed — by planting a registry symbolic link (a SymbolicLinkValue value on a staged "to_delete" subkey) — to also remove the NlaSvc\Parameters\Internet subkey, which the attacker then recreates with a permissive, self-controlled DACL. Second, the attacker creates a registry symbolic link (via `RegCreateKeyExW` with the `REG_OPTION_CREATE_LINK` flag) named ManualProxies under the recreated Internet key, redirecting it to an arbitrary target registry location. Third, the attacker calls `InternetSetOptionA/W` with `INTERNET_OPTION_SETTINGS_CHANGED` and `INTERNET_OPTION_REFRESH` (or directly fires the event with `EventRegister`/`EventWrite`/`EventUnregister`), which raises the Microsoft-Windows-WinINet-Config ETW provider (GUID `5402e5ea-1bdd-4390-82be-e108f1e634f5`); ncsi.dll's `EtwListener::ProcessEvent` handler consumes this event and calls `StoreNcsiIEProxyString`, which performs a privileged `RegSetValueExW` write in the NETWORK SERVICE service context — but because ManualProxies is now a symbolic link, the write lands at the attacker's redirected registry location instead of the intended key.
Microsoft's own advisory characterizes the vulnerability as allowing an authorized (i.e., already locally authenticated, low-privileged) attacker to elevate privileges locally; itm4n notes the researcher's proof of concept demonstrates the ability to write an arbitrary value (e.g., a DLL path such as `\..\..\..\..\C:\foo.dll` written to the `(Default)` value of `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\TPM\WMI`) to an arbitrary registry location rather than achieving direct code execution as SYSTEM or NETWORK SERVICE outright — the PoC exists and works but was not publicly released, only the methodology and API-level walkthrough were published. A March 14, 2026 update to the article explicitly clarifies the PoC "was never meant to result in true code execution as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, or even NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE"; the path-traversal write was only meant to showcase the primitive in case some privileged service later loads a DLL from that writable key. itm4n separately notes that once an attacker holds a NETWORK SERVICE-context write primitive, escalation to full SYSTEM is a solved problem via the shared-logon-session token-impersonation technique James Forshaw published in 2020 ("Sharing a Logon Session a Little Too Much": NETWORK SERVICE loopback-authenticates over a named pipe to obtain and impersonate RPCSS's token, the first token created in that logon session, which can be leveraged to reopen RPCSS with SYSTEM-level access).
The underlying Consolidator-scheduled-task registry-delete primitive is not unique to NCSI: it is the generic root cause of the separate, related CVE-2025-59512 (CEIP Elevation of Privilege), which Microsoft patched on November 11, 2025 and which 0patch subsequently micropatched (March 30, 2026) for 13 legacy/EOL Windows builds — 0patch's write-up explicitly credits itm4n's CVE-2025-59201 reverse-engineering as what let them reproduce and patch the companion flaw. Microsoft's fix for CVE-2025-59201, shipped in KB5066835 (October 14, 2025) and the corresponding October 2025 cumulative updates for all other supported Windows 10/11/Server branches, adds a `ContainsRelativePathDoubleDot`-style path-traversal validation to `StoreNcsiIEProxyString` and removes the "Create Subkeys" ACE from INTERACTIVE on the affected Services\Parameters registry keys, closing both the symlink-planting and the redirect-write primitives. No CISA KEV listing or in-the-wild exploitation has been reported, and EPSS scoring places 30-day exploitation probability at 0.40% (32.3rd percentile).
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Execution
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell; T1106 Native API
Privilege Escalation
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1134.001 Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft
defense-impairment
Defense Evasion
T1134.001 Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft; T1574.011 Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness
stealth
T1574.011 Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness
Remediation
Patches
- KB5066835 — Windows 11 24H2/25H2, OS builds 26100.6899 / 26200.6899, released 2025-10-14
- Matching October 14, 2025 cumulative updates for Windows 10 1507 (KB5066837, build 10.0.10240.21161), 1607, 1809, 21H2, 22H2, Windows 11 22H2/23H2, and Windows Server 2008–2025
- November 11, 2025 cumulative updates addressing the related CVE-2025-59512 (CEIP Consolidator arbitrary registry-delete)
Immediate actions
- Apply KB5066835 (Windows 11 24H2/25H2) or the matching October 14, 2025 cumulative update for every other supported Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server branch
- Also confirm the November 11, 2025 patch for the related CVE-2025-59512 (CEIP Consolidator arbitrary registry-delete) is deployed, since both flaws share the same Consolidator scheduled-task abuse primitive
- Verify the ACL on HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NlaSvc\Parameters no longer grants the INTERACTIVE identity the Create Subkeys permission after patching
- Audit Task Scheduler logs for unexpected manual invocation (schtasks /run) of \Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improvement Program\Consolidator by non-SYSTEM-initiated processes
Workarounds
- No workaround exists short of patching; the fix requires both the code-level path-traversal check in StoreNcsiIEProxyString and the tightened DACL on the NlaSvc\Parameters key
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy registry-integrity / EDR monitoring on Services\*\Parameters keys that back SYSTEM or NETWORK SERVICE service processes, alerting on subkey creation by non-privileged tokens
- Restrict local interactive and RDP logon rights for low-privilege accounts on hosts where a local EoP chain carries outsized blast radius (jump boxes, terminal servers, shared workstations)
- Track future Patch Tuesday advisories for related NLA/NCSI/WinINet/CEIP registry-permission issues and confirm patch compliance via WSUS/Intune/ConfigMgr reporting rather than assuming deployment
- For legacy/EOL Windows builds no longer receiving vendor patches, evaluate third-party micropatching (e.g., 0patch) for the Consolidator scheduled-task family of issues
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows 10
Vulnerable versions: 1507: 10.0.10240.0 - 10.0.10240.21161; 1607: 10.0.14393.0 - 10.0.14393.8519; 1809: 10.0.17763.0 - 10.0.17763.7919; 21H2: 10.0.19044.0 - 10.0.19044.6456; 22H2: 10.0.19045.0 - 10.0.19045.6456
Fixed in: 1507: KB5066837 (10.0.10240.21161); 1607/1809/21H2/22H2: October 14, 2025 cumulative update - Microsoft — Windows 11
Vulnerable versions: 22H2: 10.0.22621.0 - 10.0.22621.6060; 23H2: 10.0.22631.0 - 10.0.22631.6060; 24H2: 10.0.26100.0 - 10.0.26100.6899; 25H2: 10.0.26200.0 - 10.0.26200.6899
Fixed in: 24H2/25H2: KB5066835 (10.0.26100.6899 / 10.0.26200.6899); 22H2/23H2: October 14, 2025 cumulative update - Microsoft — Windows Server
Vulnerable versions: 2008 SP2: 6.0.6003.0 - 6.0.6003.23571; 2008 R2 SP1: 6.1.7601.0 - 6.1.7601.27974; 2012: 6.2.9200.0 - 6.2.9200.25722; 2012 R2: 6.3.9600.0 - 6.3.9600.22824; 2016: 10.0.14393.0 - 10.0.14393.8519; 2019: 10.0.17763.0 - 10.0.17763.7919; 2022: 10.0.20348.0 - 10.0.20348.4294; 2025: 10.0.26100.0 - 10.0.26100.6899
Fixed in: respective October 14, 2025 (October 2025 Patch Tuesday) security update per product
Timeline
- CVE-2025-59201 is publicly assigned and published via the Microsoft Security Response Center advisory with CVSS 3.1 base score 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), crediting researcher Tianlin Zhang (@t0zhang) for the report.
- Microsoft ships KB5066835 (Windows 11 24H2/25H2, builds 26100.6899/26200.6899) plus the matching October 2025 cumulative updates for all other supported Windows 10/11/Server branches, adding path-traversal validation to StoreNcsiIEProxyString and tightening the NlaSvc\Parameters registry ACL.
- Trade press (WindowsForum) reports on the October 2025 Patch Tuesday fix for the NCSI local privilege escalation issue.
- Microsoft patches the related CVE-2025-59512 (Customer Experience Improvement Program arbitrary registry-key delete via the same Consolidator scheduled task), the generic delete primitive that CVE-2025-59201 repurposes for its NCSI-specific redirected write.
- The Threadlinqs Intelligence HUNT phase ingests itm4n's write-up from the itm4n's blog RSS feed and opens threat skeleton TL-2026-2480.
- itm4n (Clément Labro) publishes a full technical reconstruction of the exploit chain — patch binary diffing with BinDiff against historical builds pulled from Winbindex, ETW provider enumeration with EtwExplorer, and Process Monitor/System Informer tracing — reproducing the registry-symlink and scheduled-task-abuse mechanics without releasing exploit code.
- itm4n updates the CVE-2025-59201 write-up to explicitly clarify the published proof-of-concept was never intended to demonstrate true code execution as SYSTEM or NETWORK SERVICE, only to showcase the arbitrary registry-write primitive.
- 0patch publishes micropatches for the related CVE-2025-59512 covering 13 legacy/EOL Windows versions/editions, explicitly crediting itm4n's CVE-2025-59201 reverse-engineering work for helping reproduce and patch the companion Consolidator-task flaw.
- The NVD CVE-2025-59201 record is last modified, refreshing metadata against the published advisory.
Sources cited
- NVD - CVE-2025-59201 NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2025-10-14
- CVE-2025-59201 - Network Connection Status Indicator (NCSI) EoP itm4n.github.io · Research · 2026-02-24
- CVE-2025-59201 Security Update Guide Microsoft Security Response Center · Vendor report · 2025-10-14
- October 14, 2025—KB5066835 (OS Builds 26200.6899 and 26100.6899) Microsoft · Vendor report · 2025-10-14
- CVE-2025-59201 - Vulnerability Details app.opencve.io · Research · 2026-06-17
- CVE-2025-59201: Windows Improper Access Control strix.ai · Research · 2026-02-24
- CVE-2025-59512 - Customer Experience Improvement Program (CEIP) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability Microsoft Security Response Center · Vendor report · 2025-11-11
- CVE-2025-59512: Windows 10 1607 Privilege Escalation Flaw SentinelOne · Research · 2026-06-17
- Sharing a Logon Session a Little Too Much tiraniddo.dev · Research · 2020-04-25
- Micropatches released for Arbitrary Registry Key Delete As Local System With Consolidator Scheduled Task (CVE-2025-59512) 0patch.com · Blog · 2026-03-30
- Microsoft Patch Fixes CVE-2025-59201 NCSI Local Privilege Escalation windowsforum.com · News · 2025-10-15
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 11 sources; published ; last updated —.