# Iranian MOIS-Linked Actor Uses Telegram-Controlled HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK Malware Against Dissidents and Journalists

> The FBI, UK NCSC, and Netherlands' AIVD issued a joint advisory on 15 September 2026 attributing a Windows surveillance-malware campaign to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), tracked as HEAVYGRAM (FBI) or CHOSEN BRICK (NCSC). The malware is controlled through a per-victim Telegram bot and, in newer variants, proxies that Telegram traffic through IPRoyal or Lightning Proxies while exfiltrating data via abused Vultr, Storj, and Backblaze B2 cloud storage.

- **Published:** 2026-09-15T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-09-27T02:51:52.852Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2526
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-heavygram-iranian-telegram-spyware-tl-2026-2526.webp?v=36802399 (Threadlinqs threat intel: HEAVYGRAM Telegram-Controlled Spyware: Analysis & Hunting (TL-2026-2526) — High severity, 28 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2526
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Iran Ministry of Intelligence (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)

## Description

HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK is a two-stage Windows spyware family that Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has used since at least autumn 2023 to surveil dissidents, journalists, and activists opposed to the Iranian government in the UK, US, and Netherlands, and worldwide. On 15 September 2026, the UK National Cyber Security Centre, the FBI, and the Netherlands' AIVD jointly published an advisory naming the malware -- HEAVYGRAM per the FBI, CHOSEN BRICK per the NCSC -- and updating an earlier FBI FLASH alert (FLASH-20260320-001, 20 March 2026) that first described Iranian actors using Telegram as C2 infrastructure against identified targets.

Initial access is social engineering delivered over messaging platforms (WhatsApp, Telegram) and social media: operators impersonate trusted contacts, celebrities, or technical support and persuade targets to download files disguised as legitimate software -- observed lures include Pictory, KeePass, Telegram itself, RunwayML, Norton Antivirus, Adobe Flash Player, and fabricated MRI scan results. A convincing decoy installation screen displays while the malware installs in the background.

The attack chain uses chained loaders: base64-encoded PowerShell one-liners (ps.ps1, cmd.ps1) fetch archives from an abused Vultr Object Storage bucket; a heavily padded VBScript (183,897 bytes across 63,791 lines, with only ~11 lines of functional deobfuscation logic) decodes and runs only when the host disk exceeds 50GB, a sandbox/VM-evasion check. The resulting stage-2 payload (Smqdservice.exe, a 23.1MB ZIP bundling a Python 3.11 runtime) establishes a dedicated per-victim Telegram bot for bidirectional command and control, isolating each victim's traffic from others and blending with legitimate Telegram usage. Newer variants proxy this Telegram traffic through commercial residential/proxy services (IPRoyal, Lightning Proxies) to further obscure C2 communications.

Capabilities include screenshot capture, microphone activation for audio recording, theft of Telegram and WhatsApp data from browsers, saved-password and email theft, process/system enumeration, additional-malware downloads, file deletion, and -- in at least one observed version -- full disk/file wiping. The malware persists via a Registry Run key (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) under the value names SMQDService or winappx, and evades detection by instructing Microsoft Defender to exclude the malware's own working directories from scanning. Data stolen from victims has subsequently appeared on pro-Iranian leak/doxxing sites; the US Department of Justice seized four such sites in March 2026.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.005 Visual Basic
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1123 Audio Capture
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1560.001 Archive via Utility
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication
- T1090.002 External Proxy
- T1485 Data Destruction
- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1585.001 Establish Accounts
- T1566.003 Phishing
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol
- T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1070.004 Indicator Removal
- T1114 Email Collection
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK Telegram Bot-API C2 Proxied via IPRoyal/Lightning Proxies with Cloud-Storage Exfiltration** (`TL-2026-2526-SPL-003`)

Detects the per-victim Telegram Bot API C2 channel used by HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK's Smqdservice.exe (Python 3.11 runtime) for bidirectional command-and-control, including newer variants that proxy this traffic through IPRoyal or Lightning Proxies to obscure it, alongside data staged/exfiltrated to abused Vultr, Storj, or Backblaze B2 cloud storage. This channel also carries the malware's screenshot, microphone-audio, browser-credential, and Telegram/WhatsApp data theft output, and precedes any observed file-deletion/disk-wipe destructive command.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1102.002, T1090.002, T1005, T1560.001, T1555.003, T1113, T1123, T1485
- **Data sources:** dns_logs, proxy_logs, firewall_netflow, edr_network_telemetry
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=network (sourcetype="stream:dns" OR sourcetype="pan:dns" OR sourcetype="proxy")
| eval q=lower(coalesce(query, dest_host, url))
| where match(q, "api\.telegram\.org") OR match(q, "iproyal\.com") OR match(q, "lightningproxies\.net") OR match(q, "storjshare\.io") OR match(q, "backblazeb2\.com") OR match(q, "vultrobjects\.com")
| eval category=case(
    match(q, "telegram"), "c2_channel",
    match(q, "iproyal|lightningproxies"), "c2_proxy",
    match(q, "storjshare|backblazeb2|vultrobjects"), "exfil_storage")
| stats count as query_count dc(q) as distinct_domains values(q) as domains values(category) as categories earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by src_ip, Computer, User
| where distinct_domains >= 2 OR query_count >= 20
| sort -query_count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("api.telegram.org", "iproyal.com", "lightningproxies.net", "storjshare.io", "backblazeb2.com", "vultrobjects.com")
| extend Category = case(
    RemoteUrl has "telegram", "c2_channel",
    RemoteUrl has_any ("iproyal", "lightningproxies"), "c2_proxy",
    "exfil_storage")
| summarize QueryCount = count(), Destinations = make_set(RemoteUrl), Categories = make_set(Category), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| where array_length(Destinations) >= 2 or QueryCount >= 20
| order by QueryCount desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK Telegram Bot-API C2 via Abused Proxy/Cloud-Storage Infrastructure
id: 9e1a4d27-5c8b-4e2f-a3d6-7f8091a2b3c4
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS/network traffic to the Telegram Bot API C2 endpoint used per-victim by Iran MOIS HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK, its IPRoyal/Lightning Proxies relay infrastructure, and the abused Vultr/Storj/Backblaze B2 cloud-storage services used for staging and exfiltration.
references:
  - https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/iranian-cyber-targeting-of-dissidents-activists-and-journalists
  - https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260915.pdf
  - https://blog.pulsedive.com/analyzing-iranian-tradecraft-leveraging-loader-scripts-and-telegram-for-c2/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-15
tags:
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1102.002
  - attack.t1090.002
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1005
  - attack.t1560.001
  - attack.t1113
  - attack.t1123
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1555.003
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1485
logsource:
  category: dns_query
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    QueryName|contains:
      - 'api.telegram.org'
      - 'iproyal.com'
      - 'lightningproxies.net'
      - 'storjshare.io'
      - 'backblazeb2.com'
      - 'vultrobjects.com'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate business use of the Telegram Bot API for notifications/alerting
  - Approved corporate use of the named proxy or cloud-storage providers for sanctioned workflows
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate business use of the Telegram Bot API for notifications/alerting
- Approved corporate use of IPRoyal/Lightning Proxies or Vultr/Storj/Backblaze B2 for sanctioned CDN or backup workflows

**Tuning notes:** Scope the api.telegram.org alert to hosts without a documented business justification for Telegram Bot API traffic; combine with process-lineage context (parent process smqdservice.exe or RuntimeSSH.exe) to sharply cut false positives; treat hits against two or more of the abused proxy/cloud-storage domains from a single host as high-confidence and prioritize for immediate response given the observed disk/file-wipe capability.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK PowerShell Loader Retrieving Encoded Payload (ps.ps1/cmd.ps1) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK Sandbox-Evasion VBScript Loader, Registry Run-Key Persistence & Defender Exclusion (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK Telegram Bot-API C2 Proxied via IPRoyal/Lightning Proxies with Cloud-Storage Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK PowerShell Loader Retrieving Encoded Payload (ps.ps1/cmd.ps1) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK Sandbox-Evasion VBScript Loader, Registry Run-Key Persistence & Defender Exclusion (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK Telegram Bot-API C2 Proxied via IPRoyal/Lightning Proxies with Cloud-Storage Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK PowerShell Loader Retrieving Encoded Payload (ps.ps1/cmd.ps1) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK Sandbox-Evasion VBScript Loader, Registry Run-Key Persistence & Defender Exclusion (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `api[.]telegram[.]org`
- File hash: `4b8297daccf9745b585916ab4466629c645749350563eb9b697326e11f2ae420`
- Domain: `vultrobjects[.]com`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Iranian Hackers Use Telegram-Controlled Malware to Spy on Dissidents, Journalists](https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/iranian-hackers-use-telegram-controlled.html)
- [Iranian cyber targeting of dissidents, activists and journalists](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/iranian-cyber-targeting-of-dissidents-activists-and-journalists)
- [Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Iran MOIS Telegram-Controlled Malware (CSA 260915-2)](https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260915-2.pdf)
- [Cybersecurity Advisory: HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK (CSA 260915)](https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260915.pdf)
- [Government of Iran Cyber Actors Deploy Telegram C2 to Push Malware to Identified Targets](https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/alerts/2026/government-of-iran-cyber-actors-deploy-telegram-c2-to-push-malware-to-identified-targets)
- [FLASH-20260320-001: Government of Iran Cyberactors Deploy Telegram C2 to Push Malware to Identified Targets](https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/government-of-iran-cyberactors-deploy-telegram-c2-to-push-malware-to-identified-targets.pdf)
- [Government of Iran Cyber Actors Deploy Telegram C2 to Push Malware to Identified Targets (CSA 260320)](https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260320.pdf)
- [FBI Releases Cybersecurity Advisory on Previously Undisclosed Iranian Malware Used to Monitor Dissidents and Travel and Telecommunications Companies](https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/boston/news/press-releases/fbi-releases-cybersecurity-advisory-on-previously-undisclosed-iranian-malware-used-to-monitor-dissidents-and-travel-and-telecommunications-companies)
- [US, UK, Netherlands warn of Iranian CHOSEN BRICK spyware targeting press](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-908693)
- [Analyzing Iranian Tradecraft: Leveraging Loader Scripts and Telegram for C2](https://blog.pulsedive.com/analyzing-iranian-tradecraft-leveraging-loader-scripts-and-telegram-for-c2/)
- [Iran-linked actors use Telegram as C2 in malware attacks on dissidents](https://securityaffairs.com/189820/malware/iran-linked-actors-use-telegram-as-c2-in-malware-attacks-on-dissidents.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2526
