# Revolut Phishing SMS Campaign Follows Social-Engineering Data Breach Exposing 680 Customers' KYC Data

> Revolut disclosed on 2026-09-12 that a threat actor impersonating a government agency used an authenticated email account on that agency's real domain to trick Revolut into disclosing KYC data (passports, selfies, addresses, account statements, crypto transaction history) for roughly 680 customers. Two days later, a targeted SMS phishing campaign began, injecting fraudulent messages into victims' existing Revolut conversation threads and linking to fake identity-verification pages that request camera access to simulate Revolut's liveness check before harvesting passwords.

- **Published:** 2026-09-17T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-09-17T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2550
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-revolut-phishing-sms-campaign-tl-2026-2550.webp?v=b0f658d1 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Revolut Phishing SMS Campaign: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2550) — High severity, 9 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2550
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 9 (3 shown free below)

## Description

On 2026-09-12, Revolut publicly acknowledged what it called 'a sophisticated external impersonation scam': an unauthorized third party submitted fraudulent customer-data requests from an email account operating on a legitimate government agency's domain. Because the requests carried valid domain-authentication signals (the account passed SPF/DKIM/DMARC checks against the genuine agency domain), Revolut's standard lawful-disclosure process treated the requests as authentic and released customer files before any secondary verification occurred. Revolut has not disclosed which government agency's domain or mailbox was involved, but has stated the request was directed at the email address courtorders@revolut.com, its channel for handling law-enforcement and regulatory data demands.

Approximately 680 customers were affected, a small fraction of Revolut's 80M+ user base, and open-source reporting (including analysis by crypto investigator ZachXBT) suggests the targeting was selective rather than mass-scale, focused on high-net-worth individuals with significant crypto holdings. Exposed data included passports and driver's licenses, account-opening/verification selfies, dates of birth, postal and email addresses, phone numbers, account statements with IBANs, and complete fiat and cryptocurrency transaction histories; biometric facial-recognition telemetry was reportedly not included.

On 2026-09-13, a Telegram-based actor operating under the handle 'iamnotavillain' began publishing customer dossiers and threatening daily leaks unless a 10,000 BTC ransom was paid. Independent OSINT analysis (KELA) traced the extortion site to a static page hosted on GitHub Pages (repository btres9kijob[.]github.io) with DNS through GoDaddy, assembled in roughly 6.5 hours from a default Claude-generated HTML template; the public repository exposed commit history and recoverable deleted files. A payment subdomain routed through GoDaddy Payments, a platform that typically requires full KYC and a US bank account to use — a potentially significant operational-security misstep for the extortionist. A second, seemingly competing Telegram channel calling itself 'Revolut Smilik' also claimed responsibility; reporting suggests this second actor may be an opportunistic impersonator who obtained a data sample from the original actor rather than the original breach operator.

Starting 2026-09-14, a separate SMS phishing (smishing) campaign began targeting affected and prospective Revolut customers. Messages were delivered so that they appeared inside the recipient's existing, legitimate Revolut SMS conversation thread — a thread-injection effect enabled by inconsistencies in how legacy email-to-SMS gateways and mobile messaging clients map sender identity, allowing a spoofed message to inherit the trust context of a genuine prior conversation rather than arriving as a new, suspicious sender. The messages link to a fake identity-verification page hosted at 93810[.]app (first observed on VirusTotal 2026-09-14) that requests camera access and simulates Revolut's 'turn your head' liveness-check flow before prompting the victim to enter their account password, harvesting credentials (and potentially biometric video) under the guise of routine re-verification.

As of publication, it remains unconfirmed whether the SMS phishing campaign is being run by the same actor(s) responsible for the breach and extortion using the stolen data to precision-target victims, or by unrelated opportunistic scammers capitalizing on public news of the breach. Either way, the compressed timeline — public breach disclosure to targeted smishing in two days — creates a high-credibility account-takeover path for the affected customer population, who are simultaneously exposed to SIM-swapping and cryptocurrency-focused extortion risk given the leaked transaction and wallet data.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1598 Phishing for Information
- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1586.002 Email Accounts
- T1583.001 Domains
- T1583.006 Web Services
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1660 Phishing
- T1204.001 Malicious Link
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1056.003 Web Portal Capture
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Fraudulent Government-Domain Email Request to Legal/Court-Orders Mailbox** (`TL-2026-2550-SPL-001`)

Detects an inbound email to a legal/compliance/law-enforcement request mailbox (e.g. courtorders@) from a government-domain sender requesting bulk customer KYC/PII, where the sender domain is newly observed or not on a pre-verified allow-list, matching the social-engineering vector that tricked Revolut into releasing KYC data on ~680 customers despite the message passing SPF/DKIM/DMARC.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1598, T1589, T1586.002, T1656, T1660
- **Data sources:** o365_management_activity, proofpoint_email_gateway, email_authentication_logs
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=email sourcetype="o365:management:activity" OR sourcetype="proofpoint:log"
  (recipient="courtorders@*" OR recipient IN ("legal@*","lawenforcement@*","compliance@*"))
| eval sender_domain=lower(mvindex(split(sender,"@"),1))
| lookup government_domains.csv domain AS sender_domain OUTPUT is_gov_domain
| where is_gov_domain=1
| eval body_lower=lower(body)
| where match(body_lower, "(kyc|passport|selfie|account statement|transaction history|customer data|subpoena|court order|law enforcement request)")
| lookup first_seen_senders.csv sender_domain OUTPUT first_seen_date
| eval sender_domain_age_days=round((now()-strptime(first_seen_date,"%Y-%m-%d"))/86400,0)
| where sender_domain_age_days<30 OR isnull(first_seen_date)
| eval spf_pass=if(match(auth_results,"spf=pass"),1,0), dkim_pass=if(match(auth_results,"dkim=pass"),1,0), dmarc_pass=if(match(auth_results,"dmarc=pass"),1,0)
| table _time, sender, recipient, subject, sender_domain, spf_pass, dkim_pass, dmarc_pass, sender_domain_age_days
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
EmailEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RecipientEmailAddress has_any ("courtorders@", "legal@", "lawenforcement@", "compliance@")
| where SenderFromDomain has_any (dynamic(["gov", "gouv", "government"])) // scope to org's maintained government-domain reference list
| where AuthenticationDetails has "SPF pass" and AuthenticationDetails has "DKIM pass" and AuthenticationDetails has "DMARC pass"
| extend RequestKeywordHit = Subject matches regex @"(?i)(kyc|passport|selfie|account statement|transaction history|customer data|subpoena|court order)"
| where RequestKeywordHit == true
| join kind=leftouter (EmailAttachmentInfo | project NetworkMessageId, FileName) on NetworkMessageId
| project Timestamp, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, AuthenticationDetails, FileName
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Fraudulent Government-Domain Data Request to Legal/Court-Orders Mailbox
id: 7c1e2f3a-1b4d-4e6a-9c2f-8a3d5e6f7001
status: experimental
description: Detects an inbound email to a legal/law-enforcement request mailbox from an externally-authenticated government domain requesting bulk KYC/customer PII, matching the social-engineering vector used against Revolut's courtorders@ mailbox.
references:
    - https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/09/revolut-phishing-texts-appear-days-after-data-breach
    - https://cybersecuritynews.com/fintech-revolut-data-breach/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-17
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1598
    - attack.t1589
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1586.002
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1656
logsource:
    category: application
    product: m365
    service: threat_protection
detection:
    selection_recipient:
        RecipientEmailAddress|contains:
            - 'courtorders@'
            - 'legal@'
            - 'lawenforcement@'
            - 'compliance@'
    selection_keywords:
        Subject|contains:
            - 'KYC'
            - 'passport'
            - 'subpoena'
            - 'court order'
            - 'customer data'
    selection_auth:
        AuthenticationDetails|contains|all:
            - 'SPF pass'
            - 'DKIM pass'
            - 'DMARC pass'
    condition: selection_recipient and selection_keywords and selection_auth
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate law-enforcement or regulatory data requests from verified, pre-registered government contacts
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate law-enforcement or regulatory data requests from verified, pre-registered government contacts and mailboxes

**Tuning notes:** Maintain and regularly refresh the government-domain reference lookup; tune the sender-domain-age threshold and keyword list based on the organization's actual lawful-disclosure request volume to reduce noise from legitimate first-time regulator contacts.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Fraudulent Government-Domain Email Request to Legal/Court-Orders Mailbox (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SMS Thread-Injection Smishing to Fake Revolut Liveness-Check Domain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Extortion Data-Leak Site & Crypto-Ransom Infrastructure Access (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fraudulent Government-Domain Email Request to Legal/Court-Orders Mailbox (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SMS Thread-Injection Smishing to Fake Revolut Liveness-Check Domain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Extortion Data-Leak Site & Crypto-Ransom Infrastructure Access (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SMS Thread-Injection Smishing to Fake Revolut Liveness-Check Domain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Extortion Data-Leak Site & Crypto-Ransom Infrastructure Access (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 9)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `93810[.]app`
- Domain: `imnotavillain[.]xyz`
- Domain: `btres9kijob[.]github[.]io`

Full set of 9 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Revolut phishing texts appear days after data breach](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/09/revolut-phishing-texts-appear-days-after-data-breach)
- [Revolut Data Breach: Inside the Extortion Site](https://www.kelacyber.com/blog/revolut-data-breach/)
- [Revolut Data Breach Via Fake Government Requests - What We Know So Far](https://cybersecuritynews.com/fintech-revolut-data-breach/)
- [Revolut Data Breach: Five Days On, What Do We Actually Know?](https://cybelangel.com/blog/revolut-data-breach-what-we-know/)
- [Revolut Customers' Passports, Selfies and Transaction Data Exposed After Fake Government Request](https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/revolut-customer-data-disclosed-fraudulent-government-requests-1819443)
- [Revolut Data Breach 2026: 680 Users Hit by Fake Gov Email](https://tech-insider.org/revolut-data-breach-680-customers-fake-gov-email-2026/)
- [Revolut Reportedly Released Customer Passports And Bitcoin Transaction Logs After Fake Government Email](https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2026/09/309726-revolut-reportedly-released-customer-passports-and-bitcoin-transaction-logs-after-fake-government-email/)
- [SMS Spoofing Via Email: How Thread Injection Works](https://www.jamf.com/blog/sms-spoofing-via-email-thread-injection/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2550
