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Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-2556

Fake myGov 'Secure Message' Phishing Scam Targets Australians with Multi-Step Identity Harvesting Flow

mediumACTIVE

A phishing campaign impersonating Australia's myGov portal and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) uses a fake 'secure message' email lure sent from workspace@sasinm.com to drive victims through a seven-step web flow that harvests credentials, three separate SMS one-time codes, security question answers, full name/DOB, and front/back driver's license photos, before redirecting to the real myGov site with a fake tax-statement confirmation.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2556
SeverityMEDIUM
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1036 Masquerading, T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture, T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link, T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains, T1585.002 Establish Accounts: Email Accounts, T1598.003 Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link, T1608.005 Stage Capabilities: Link Target, T1684.001 Impersonation
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsgovernment administration, consumer
Target regionsaustralia, Oceania
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2556 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 3 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: myGov Brand-Impersonation 'Secure Message' Lure Email

Detects inbound email impersonating the Australian myGov/ATO portal via a spoofed 'myGov' display name and/or the known lookalike sender domain sasinm.com, carrying a fake 'You have (1) New Message' / 'secure message' notification lure used to drive victims into a credential-and-PII harvesting flow.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.002, T1598.003, T1585.002, T1036
  • Data sources: email_gateway_logs, proofpoint, mimecast, microsoft_365_defender_emailevents
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=email (sourcetype=proofpoint:log OR sourcetype=mimecast:log OR sourcetype="ms:o365:reporting:messagetrace")
| eval sender_domain=lower(mvindex(split(src_user, "@"), -1))
| eval spoofed_gov_brand=if(match(lower(display_name), "mygov") AND NOT match(sender_domain, "(mygov\.au|servicesaustralia\.gov\.au|ato\.gov\.au)$"), 1, 0)
| where sender_domain="sasinm.com" OR spoofed_gov_brand=1
| regex subject="(?i)(you have\s*\(?\d*\)?\s*new message|new mygov notification|secure message)"
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen values(recipient) as recipients dc(recipient) as recipient_count by src_user sender_domain display_name subject
| where recipient_count >= 1
| sort -recipient_count

Microsoft KQL

EmailEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where SenderFromDomain =~ "sasinm.com"
    or (SenderDisplayName has "myGov" and SenderFromDomain !in ("mygov.au", "servicesaustralia.gov.au", "ato.gov.au"))
| where Subject matches regex @"(?i)(you have\s*\(?\d*\)?\s*new message|new mygov notification|secure message)"
| join kind=leftouter (
    UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
) on NetworkMessageId
| project Timestamp, SenderFromAddress, SenderDisplayName, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, Url, ActionType
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: myGov Brand-Impersonation 'Secure Message' Phishing Lure Email
id: 7a1e2c34-9f21-4c3a-8b6e-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects inbound email spoofing the Australian myGov/ATO brand via a fake 'secure message' notification lure, sent from a lookalike sender domain (e.g. sasinm.com) rather than a genuine gov.au domain.
references:
    - https://www.mailguard.com.au/blog/fake-mygov-secure-message-phishing-scam-targets-australians-with-multi-step-identity-harvesting-flow
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-18
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1598.003
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1585.002
logsource:
    product: m365
    service: threat_management
detection:
    selection_domain:
        SenderFromDomain: 'sasinm.com'
    selection_spoof_display:
        SenderDisplayName|contains: 'myGov'
    filter_legit_domain:
        SenderFromDomain:
            - 'mygov.au'
            - 'servicesaustralia.gov.au'
            - 'ato.gov.au'
    selection_subject:
        Subject|re: '(?i)(you have\s*\(?\d*\)?\s*new message|new mygov notification|secure message)'
    condition: (selection_domain or (selection_spoof_display and not filter_legit_domain)) and selection_subject
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate newsletter or notification service that happens to reference 'myGov' in marketing copy (rare)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate government-affiliated third-party sender that references 'myGov' or 'secure message' in a genuine, unrelated notification

Tuning notes: Maintain an allowlist of confirmed legitimate government sender domains (mygov.au, servicesaustralia.gov.au, ato.gov.au) and expand the sender-domain IOC list as new lookalike domains for this campaign family are identified; tune the subject regex if the actor rotates lure wording.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • User Click-Through from myGov Phishing Lure to Staged Landing Page · unlock with TL Creds
  • Repeated SMS One-Time-Code Entry Prompts Within a Single Phishing Session · unlock with TL Creds
  • Anomalous Sign-In Properties Following Phishing Lure Click (Token/Session Theft Indicator) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DNS/Proxy Resolution of myGov-Themed Lookalike Domain · unlock with TL Creds
  • Driver's-License Image Upload to Non-Government Domain Following myGov Lure · unlock with TL Creds
  • Impossible-Travel Sign-In Immediately Following myGov OTP-Harvesting Session · unlock with TL Creds
  • Multi-Step myGov Credential, Security-Question and PII Harvesting Page Traversal · unlock with TL Creds
  • Successful Account Sign-In Shortly After myGov Phishing Lure Click (Credential-Relay/AitM Session Capture) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 3 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2556.

Sample indicators (1 of 3)

  • Domain: sasinm[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 3 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

3 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

MailGuard identified and analyzed a phishing campaign that spoofs Australia's myGov citizen-services portal and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The lure is an email with the display name 'myGov' sent from the address workspace@sasinm.com, subject 'You have (1) New Message', claiming the recipient has '1 New MyGov Notification' and '1 new secure message(s)' waiting, styled with Australian Government/ATO branding and language about a secure link.

Clicking through leads to a fake myGov website that runs the victim through a seven-stage progressive data-harvesting flow rather than a single credential form: (1) username/email and password, on a page mimicking the genuine myGov login complete with 'Forgot username'/'Forgot password' links; (2) a first SMS one-time verification code via a labeled 'Code' field; (3) answers to three user-selected security questions via dropdown selections; (4) full name and date of birth (dd/mm/yyyy); (5) a second SMS code via a repeat 'Enter Code' page; (6) front and back photos of the victim's driver's license via a 'Drivers License' upload interface with separate 'Browse' buttons; (7) a third SMS code via a final 'Enter Code' page. Prompting for three separate SMS codes at different points in the flow, interleaved with credential and PII collection, is consistent with a real-time credential-relay/adversary-in-the-middle kit that forwards stolen username/password and OTP to the genuine myGov login in order to capture an authenticated session, a pattern documented across the broader 2026 Australian myGov phishing wave and explicitly described by independent researchers as a 'reverse-proxy or credential-relay [that] forwards both factors to the real my.gov.au and captures the authenticated session' (credential-relay kits observed by other researchers achieving account takeover within 5-30 minutes of harvest).

After the seventh step, the page displays a fake confirmation reading 'Your details has successfully been submitted, please wait 21 days for your income statement to be tax ready' and redirects the victim to the legitimate my.gov.au site, a technique designed to suppress suspicion by ending the interaction on a real, trusted domain.

The combination of full credentials, live MFA/OTP interception, security-question answers, DOB/PII, and government photo-ID capture goes beyond simple account takeover: it supplies everything needed for synthetic-identity fraud, fraudulent tax-return filing, and redirection of Centrelink/ATO payments. This matches the 'Identity re-verification' template documented as one of four rotating myGov-impersonation templates driving the highest-volume government-impersonation phishing wave hitting Australian inboxes in 2026, per independent 2026 reporting. It also continues a documented lineage of MailGuard-tracked multi-stage myGov/ATO credential-harvesting kits: a May 2025 MailGuard campaign ('Multi-Stage Super Scam Mimics myGov to Harvest Credentials') used a 10-stage flow from a different sender (mnadeau@pshift.com, subject 'Action Required Under Section 12B – Personal Records Audit') landing on pazenesaction.org.es, harvesting myGov credentials, 2FA SMS codes, name/DOB/driver's-license/Medicare/TFN details, an ID-document selfie, and superannuation-fund login credentials, before also redirecting to the genuine myGov site — the same operational template (progressive multi-step harvest ending in a real-domain redirect) as this campaign, differing mainly in step count and the addition of the driver's-license-photo-upload step in this variant. The MailGuard source article for this specific threat discloses no threat-actor attribution and no additional infrastructure beyond the sasinm.com sending domain, and BeaconBeagle returned no C2 infrastructure correlation for that domain.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1036 Masquerading; T1684.001 Impersonation

Collection

T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture

Credential Access

T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Execution

T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

Initial Access

T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

Resource Development

T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains; T1585.002 Establish Accounts: Email Accounts; T1608.005 Stage Capabilities: Link Target

Reconnaissance

T1598.003 Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Do not click links in unsolicited 'myGov secure message' emails; navigate directly to my.gov.au or use the official myGovID app instead
  • Delete and report suspicious myGov/ATO-branded emails via Scamwatch (scamwatch.gov.au) and the ATO scam line (1800 008 540)
  • If credentials, SMS codes, security answers, PII, or driver's license images were already submitted, immediately reset the myGov password, notify Services Australia/ATO to flag the account for fraud monitoring, and engage IDCARE for identity-theft remediation
  • Block or quarantine mail from the sending domain sasinm.com and flag the 'You have (1) New Message' / 'myGov' display-name pattern at the secure email gateway

Workarounds

  • Always reach myGov services by typing my.gov.au directly into the browser or opening the official myGovID app rather than following a link in an email or SMS

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce DMARC/DKIM/SPF and brand-impersonation/display-name-spoofing detection at the email gateway to catch spoofed 'myGov' senders
  • Run user awareness training covering multi-step phishing flows and real-time OTP-relay/adversary-in-the-middle kits that defeat SMS-based MFA
  • Where supported, migrate from SMS OTP to phishing-resistant authenticators (passkeys/FIDO2) for myGov and other sensitive government accounts
  • Monitor for and request takedown of newly registered myGov/ATO lookalike domains via Services Australia's scam-reporting channel

Timeline

  • ATO and Services Australia first publicly warn of a myGov/myGovID impersonation email scam requesting identity verification via a fake login page, establishing this as a recurring threat pattern.
  • MailGuard reports a prior multi-stage myGov/ATO impersonation campaign ('Action Required Under Section 12B – Personal Records Audit', sender mnadeau@pshift.com, landing page pazenesaction.org.es) using a 10-step flow that harvests myGov credentials, 2FA SMS codes, name/DOB/driver's-license/Medicare/TFN details, an ID-document selfie, and superannuation login credentials before redirecting to the genuine myGov site — the same progressive-harvest-then-redirect template as this campaign.
  • Independent research documents an escalating 2025-2026 wave of AI-generated myGov phishing emails 'virtually indistinguishable' from genuine communications, with myGov impersonation described as Australia's most-reported scam category.
  • Researchers document four rotating myGov-impersonation phishing templates active in 2026, including an 'Identity re-verification' template requesting scanned Medicare cards and driver's licences for synthetic-identity fraud, matching this campaign's document-harvesting step.
  • Scamwatch and the ATO issue a joint public alert on ongoing ATO/myGov impersonation scams, warning that the ATO never sends emails or SMS with hyperlinks to a login page.
  • MailGuard identifies and publishes technical analysis of the fake myGov 'Secure Message' phishing campaign, detailing the seven-step credential/PII/SMS-code/driver's-license harvesting flow sent from workspace@locked-ioc-1.

Sources cited

Previous and next in phishing

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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