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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-2649

Nation-State Intrusions into Telecom Infrastructure via SS7, BGP Hijacking, and Router Compromise (Salt Typhoon)

highACTIVE

PRC state-sponsored actors (Salt Typhoon and related trackers) have compromised large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers since at least 2021, achieving persistent, wiretap-equivalent access via known edge-device vulnerabilities (Cisco IOS XE, Ivanti Connect Secure, Palo Alto PAN-OS), GRE/IPsec tunnel persistence, and credential harvesting from TACACS+/RADIUS traffic. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2649, CVE-2023-20198, CVE-2023-20273, CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, CVE-2024-3400, CVE-2018-0171
SeverityHIGH
CVSS10 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
First disclosed
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2023-20198 (added ), CVE-2023-46805 (added ), CVE-2024-21887 (added ), CVE-2024-3400 (added ), CVE-2018-0171 (added )
EPSSCVE-2024-21887: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2024-3400: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2023-46805: 99.9% (99.9th percentile)
Affected productsCisco IOS XE Software (Web UI feature); Cisco IOS / IOS XE (Smart Install); Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure; Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS (GlobalProtect portal/gateway)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-77, CWE-420, CWE-20
AttributionSalt Typhoon - G1045 (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
Malwarecmd1
ToolsSTOWAWAY
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1021.004 SSH, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1040 Network Sniffing, T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol, T1059.008 Network Device CLI, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys, T1110.002 Password Cracking, T1136.001 Local Account, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorstelecoms, critical infrastructure, government administration
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources14 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-09-25, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2649 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 22 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Backbone Tunnel, Non-Standard SSH, and Adversary Infrastructure — Salt Typhoon C2 and Lateral Movement

Netflow/firewall hunt for the C2 and lateral-movement signals of AA25-239A: GRE/mGRE (protocol 47), IP-in-IP (4) and IPsec/ESP (50) tunnel traffic to peers outside an approved baseline, SSH services on non-standard ports (notably TCP/57722 used by the embedded backdoored sshd_operns on IOS XR, plus 22x-pattern ports such as 2222/8222/12222 that the actors ran), and connections to the advisory's C2/pivoting IPv4 and IPv6 infrastructure indicators supporting STOWAWAY multi-hop SOCKS5 pivoting and SFTP staging.

Splunk SPL

index=netflow | lookup tunnel_peer_baseline.csv dst_ip OUTPUT approved | eval ssh_nonstd = if(dest_port==57722 OR dest_port IN (2222,8222,12222,2022,20222,22722),1,0) | eval proto_tunnel = if(protocol IN (47,50,4) OR dest_port IN (500,4500),1,0) | eval ioc_hit = if(dst_ip IN ("45.61.133.77","167.88.173.252","23.227.202.253","2001:41d0:700:65dc::f656:929f"),1,0) | where (proto_tunnel=1 AND isnull(approved)) OR ssh_nonstd=1 OR ioc_hit=1 | stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen values(dst_ip) as dst_ips values(dest_port) as dest_ports by src_ip protocol | sort - count

Microsoft KQL

let AdversaryIps = dynamic(["45.61.133.77","167.88.173.252","23.227.202.253","2001:41d0:700:65dc::f656:929f"]);
let TunnelProtocols = dynamic(["GRE","ESP","IPIP","AH","47","50","4","51"]);
ASimNetworkSessionLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where NetworkProtocol in (TunnelProtocols)
    or DstPortNumber == 57722
    or DstPortNumber in (2222, 8222, 12222, 2022, 20222, 22722)
    or DstIpAddr in (AdversaryIps)
    or SrcIpAddr in (AdversaryIps)
| summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), SessionCount=count(), Targets=make_set(DstIpAddr,5), Ports=make_set(DstPortNumber,10) by SrcIpAddr, EventProduct
| where SessionCount >= 2
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, SrcIpAddr, SessionCount, Ports, Targets, EventProduct
| order by SessionCount desc

Sigma

title: Telecom Backbone Tunnel and Covert Channel Activity - Salt Typhoon C2 Patterns
id: 5a8f3c2e-7d4b-4f1a-9e6c-2b8d1f4a6c3e
status: experimental
description: Detects network-level C2 and lateral-movement indicators from the PRC state-sponsored telecom router compromise campaign (AA25-239A): GRE/mGRE, IP-in-IP and IPsec/ESP tunnel traffic observed to non-baseline peers, SSH services on non-standard ports (notably TCP/57722 used by the embedded backdoored sshd_operns on IOS XR), and connections to the published C2 and pivoting infrastructure IPv4/IPv6 indicators.
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/25
references:
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-239a
  - https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1572
  - attack.t1571
  - attack.t1095
  - attack.t1090.003
  - attack.lateral_movement
  - attack.t1021.004
  - attack.exfiltration
  - attack.t1048.003
  - attack.t1584.008
  - attack.tool.salt_typhoon
  - attack.tool.stowaway
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  definition: Applies to netflow, firewall session, and packet-capture-derived connection logs.
detection:
  selection_tunnel:
    network.protocol:
      - '47'
      - '50'
      - '4'
  selection_nonstd_ssh:
    destination.port:
      - 57722
      - 2222
      - 8222
      - 12222
      - 2022
  selection_ioc:
    destination.ip:
      - 45.61.133.77
      - 167.88.173.252
      - 23.227.202.253
      - 2001:41d0:700:65dc::f656:929f
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate GRE/IPsec tunnels in service-provider peering and mobile-backhaul environments.
  - Managed-service SSH access on non-standard ports (2222, 8222) on approved devices.
  - Reuse of decommissioned advisory infrastructure IPs by other tenants.
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate GRE/IPsec tunnels standard in service-provider peering and mobile backhaul
  • Approved SSH on non-standard ports (2222/8222) for managed services
  • Advisory IOC IPs possibly reused across shared cloud tenants

Tuning notes: Maintain an approved tunnel-peer baseline (tunnel_peer_baseline.csv) and alert only on non-approved protocol-47/50/4 peers. Treat dest_port=57722 as highest confidence since it is the advisory's backdoored SSH signature. For 22x-pattern ports, require repeat sessions (count>=3) from the same source across different devices. Age out the advisory IOCs per the CISA caveat and prefer a netflow-to-device-inventory join so tunnels are contextualized against managed routers.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Fleet-Wide Edge-Device Web-UI Probing — Salt Typhoon Scan Pattern · unlock with TL Creds
  • Known Salt Typhoon Staging Tooling and Device Guest-Shell Activity · unlock with TL Creds
  • Encrypted-Tunnel, Non-Standard SSH, and Salt Typhoon Infrastructure Sessions · unlock with TL Creds
  • Edge-Device Web-UI Exploit Attempts — Salt Typhoon CVE Fingerprints (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cisco AAA Persistence and Covert Access — Salt Typhoon Command Patterns (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Backbone Tunnel, Non-Standard SSH, and Adversary Infrastructure — Salt Typhoon C2 (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Telecom Edge-Device Web-UI Exploitation — Salt Typhoon CVE Chain Fingerprints · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cisco Device Persistence and Credential-Capture Commands — Salt Typhoon Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-09-25, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 22 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2649.

Sample indicators (3 of 22)

  • IP address: 45.61.133[.]77
  • File hash: 8b448f47e36909f3a921b4ff803cf3a61985d8a10f0fe594b405b92ed0fc21f1
  • IP address: 167.88.173[.]252

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 22 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

22 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The same campaign surface includes decades-old SS7/Diameter signaling weaknesses and BGP route-hijacking techniques (2010 China Telecom incident) that are invisible to endpoint EDR. Joint CISA/NSA/FBI advisory AA25-239A (27 Aug 2025) documents the router-compromise playbook; exploitation uses known CVEs, not zero-days.

This campaign spans three complementary attack surfaces of the global telecommunications infrastructure: SS7/Diameter signaling, BGP route propagation, and the compromise of provider edge and backbone routing devices by PRC state-sponsored actors.

ROUTER COMPROMISE (AA25-239A). The joint advisory co-sealed by NSA, CISA, FBI, DC3, ASD (ACSC), Canadian Cyber Centre, NCSC-NZ and NCSC-UK documents APT actors observed globally since at least 2021 targeting large backbone routers of major telecom providers as well as provider edge and customer edge routers. Initial access was achieved exclusively through known, publicly disclosed vulnerabilities - exploitation of zero-days has not been observed - including CVE-2023-20198/CVE-2023-20273 (Cisco IOS XE Web UI; unauthenticated privilege escalation chained with post-auth root command injection), CVE-2023-46805/CVE-2024-21887 (Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure; authentication bypass chained with command injection), CVE-2024-3400 (Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect; unauthenticated command injection with root-level code execution) and CVE-2018-0171 (Cisco IOS/IOS XE Smart Install). Once on a device, the actors created unauthorized local accounts (including a sudo-privileged user named 'cisco'), inserted SSH keys, deployed Cisco Guest Shell containers to stage tooling, modified ACLs (commonly 'access-list 20'), redirected TACACS+ servers to actor-controlled IPs, and used non-standard ports (SSH on 22x22/xxx22 patterns, HTTP on 18xxx, a backdoored sshd_operns on TCP/57722 on IOS XR) to evade detection. Persistence and covert channels were built with tunnels over GRE, multipoint GRE (mGRE) and IPsec, obscuring source IPs in logs. Collection focused on network-device credentials and traffic: native PCAP capture (including Cisco Embedded Packet Capture) of TACACS+/RADIUS traffic on TCP/49, SPAN/RSPAN/ERSPAN traffic mirroring, MIB/configuration dumping (e.g. T1602.002), and brute-forcing Cisco Type 5 and Type 7 password hashes. Custom Golang SFTP clients (cmd1, cmd3, new2, sft) moved encrypted archives to staging hosts, STOWAWAY provided multi-hop SOCKS5/HTTP proxy pivoting, and data was exfiltrated to China via GRE and MPLS tunnels, including over ISP peering connections.

SS7/DIAMETER SIGNALING. SS7 underpins 2G/3G SMS, phone services and international roaming with no built-in mechanism to verify the origin of signaling requests: any node with signaling access can send Mobile Application Part (MAP) queries to locate a subscriber or redirect SMS. Documented consequences include location tracking, interception of voice traffic and MFA keys, and spies using SS7 as a delivery vector. 4G/5G migration does not eliminate the problem - Diameter has its own location-tracking weaknesses and 4G/5G users can be downgraded to SS7 while roaming. A 2017 DHS assessment reportedly concluded all U.S. carriers are vulnerable to SS7 and Diameter exploits, with Russia, China, Israel and Iran named as primary countries exploiting U.S. subscribers via third-country telecom assets; Cyble's dark-web research confirms SS7/Diameter exploits and services are still routinely traded on underground forums.

BGP ROUTE HIJACKING. BGP offers no intrinsic way to verify route origination: if a network announces a prefix it does not own (or a more specific slice), neighbors often accept it and redirect traffic. On 8 April 2010, China Telecom advertised erroneous routes for roughly 18 minutes, pulling traffic for approximately 15 percent of internet destinations - including U.S. government and military sites - through Chinese servers, per the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission's 2010 report to Congress (FCC DOC-402579A1). In 2024 the FCC proposed requiring broadband providers to build BGP security plans based on RPKI, with the nine largest carriers filing confidential plans and publishing quarterly progress.

WHY DETECTION LAGS. SS7 abuse resembles normal roaming traffic, a hijacked prefix resembles an ordinary route update, and a rogue GRE tunnel resembles legitimate provisioning - none of it runs on an endpoint where EDR can observe it. By the time anomalous activity appears internally, the attacker has usually already mapped the network and begun lateral movement. Mitigation therefore centers on signaling firewalls (SS7/Diameter), routing-origin validation (ROAs + RPKI), patching the listed CVEs, auditing tunnels/mirror sessions/AAA configs against an approved baseline, management-plane isolation, and monitoring activity outside the perimeter.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Lateral Movement

T1021.004 SSH

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1070 Indicator Removal

Credential Access

T1040 Network Sniffing; T1110.002 Password Cracking

Exfiltration

T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol

Execution

T1059.008 Network Device CLI

Command and Control

T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Persistence

T1098.004 SSH Authorized Keys; T1136.001 Local Account; T1543.005 Container Service

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1199 Trusted Relationship

Resource Development

T1584.008 Network Devices

Collection

T1602.002 Network Device Configuration Dump

execution

T1610 Deploy Container

Remediation

Patches

  • Cisco IOS XE Web UI: apply fixed releases 16.12.10a, 17.3.8a, 17.6.6a, 17.9.4a
  • Ivanti Connect Secure/Policy Secure: upgrade to 9.1R18/22.6R2 or later (CVE-2024-21887 chain)
  • PAN-OS: upgrade GlobalProtect-enabled firewalls to 10.2.9-h1, 11.0.4-h1, 11.1.2-h3 or later

Immediate actions

  • Patch all CVE-2023-20198, CVE-2023-20273, CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, CVE-2024-3400 and CVE-2018-0171 exposure, prioritizing the CISA KEV catalog, then audit devices that were exposed for indicators of compromise before patching
  • Pull device configurations and compare against authorized baselines; audit ACLs, local accounts, SSH keys, routing tables, SNMPv3 settings and PCAP/mirror session definitions
  • Block known advisory IOCs at the perimeter and implement egress filtering for unexpected tunnels at peering points

Workarounds

  • Disable the Cisco IOS XE web UI feature where not business-required ('no ip http server')
  • Disable Cisco Smart Install (no vstack / smart-install disable)
  • Delete default IKE policies; use DH Group 16/20 with AES-256 and SHA-384 per CNSSP 15
  • Restrict SNMP writes, monitor SNMP SETs, and enforce strict eBGP filtering with maximum-prefix limits

Longer-term hardening

  • Isolate management planes: dedicated out-of-band management network or management VRF with no data-plane route leakage, CoPP with default-deny management ACLs
  • Deploy SS7 and Diameter firewalls and vet Global Title / roaming partners strictly
  • Publish Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) and enforce RPKI origin validation on eBGP sessions
  • Disable Smart Install, Guest Shell ('guestshell disable', 'no iox') and unused web interfaces; SSHv2 only, SNMPv3 with authPriv and VACM views, AAA command accounting
  • Migrate from Type 5/Type 7 password hashes to Type 8 / Type 6 key encryption
  • Centralized immutable logging off-device; do not rely on device syslog alone

Affected and fixed versions

  • Cisco — IOS XE Software (Web UI feature)
    Vulnerable versions: 16.1.1 through 17.11.99SW
    Fixed in: 16.12.10a; 17.3.8a; 17.6.6a; 17.9.4a
  • Cisco — IOS / IOS XE (Smart Install)
    Vulnerable versions: Smart Install-enabled IOS/IOS XE devices
    Fixed in: Disable protocol or upgrade per vendor advisory
  • Ivanti — Connect Secure and Policy Secure
    Vulnerable versions: 9.x up to 9.1R18; 22.x up to 22.6R2 (ICS) / 22.6R1 (IPS)
    Fixed in: 9.1R18+; 22.6R2+ (ICS); 22.6R1+ (IPS)
  • Palo Alto Networks — PAN-OS (GlobalProtect portal/gateway)
    Vulnerable versions: 10.2.x < 10.2.9-h1; 11.0.x < 11.0.4-h1; 11.1.x < 11.1.2-h3
    Fixed in: 10.2.9-h1; 11.0.4-h1; 11.1.2-h3

Timeline

  • China Telecom advertises erroneous BGP routes for ~18 minutes, pulling traffic for roughly 15 percent of internet destinations - including U.S. government and military sites - through Chinese servers (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2010 report).
  • DHS assessment reported to Congress: all U.S. carriers are vulnerable to SS7 and Diameter exploits; Russia, China, Israel and Iran named as primary countries exploiting U.S. subscribers via third-country telecom assets (year as reported by Cyble).
  • Malicious operations by the PRC-sponsored cluster now tracked as Salt Typhoon / Operator Panda / UNC5807 observed globally 'since at least 2021' per joint advisory AA25-239A.
  • Cisco discloses active in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2023-20198 (IOS XE Web UI privilege escalation, CVSS 10.0) chained with CVE-2023-20273 for root-level code execution; actors create a privilege-15 local account and write an implant to the file system. CISA adds both to KEV.
  • Exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure/Policy Secure CVE-2023-46805 + CVE-2024-21887 (auth bypass chained with command injection) begins; CISA adds CVE-2024-21887 to KEV (due 2024-01-22); NVD publishes 2024-01-12.
  • CVE-2024-3400 (PAN-OS GlobalProtect unauthenticated command injection, CVSS 10.0) disclosed after discovery in production use as a zero-day; CISA adds to KEV same day. Persistence surviving resets/upgrades later publicly demonstrated.
  • WSJ reports China-linked hackers (Salt Typhoon) breached U.S. internet providers in the first major public disclosure of the telecommunications intrusions.
  • CNN reports Chinese government-linked hackers infiltrated AT&T, Verizon and Lumen and may have accessed wiretap warrant requests used for court-approved law-enforcement surveillance.
  • FCC confirms PRC state-sponsored actors infiltrated at least eight U.S. communications companies and proposes a Declaratory Ruling that CALEA Section 105 obligates carriers to secure networks against unlawful interception, plus an NPRM requiring annual cybersecurity certifications.
  • U.S. sanctions a PRC-based individual and cybersecurity company for their alleged role in the Salt Typhoon intrusions.
  • Joint advisory AA25-239A (NSA, CISA, FBI, DC3, ACSC, Canadian Cyber Centre, NCSC-NZ, NCSC-UK and 9 additional international partners) published documenting PRC state-sponsored compromise of telecom backbone routers, tunnels (GRE/mGRE/IPsec), Guest Shell staging, TACACS+/RADIUS credential capture, and IOCs.
  • AA25-239A revised to v1.1 correcting an IP and removing two indicators and a Japan NCO name.
  • Cyble publishes its survey of the telecom attack surface ('Inside the Telecom Attack Surface'), documenting SS7/Diameter abuse, the 2010 China Telecom BGP incident, the AA25-239A router-compromise campaign, underground trading of signaling exploits, and detection gaps.

Sources cited

More from Salt Typhoon - G1045

Other reports on CVE-2023-20198

Previous and next in apt

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 14 sources; published ; last updated —.

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