Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-2651
Malicious Google Ads campaign delivers browser-locking fake tech support scareware to Windows and Mac users
Active malvertising campaign (observed Aug 31 - Sep 14, 2026) uses paid Google ads on at least 284 legitimate publisher sites to steer victims to cloud-hosted tech-support-scam pages that lock the browser with a fake security alert and force a call to a bogus support line.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2651 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Malware | Fake 'Microsoft Defender Security Center' scan (Windows variant), ShopEase decoy storefront, Tech Support Scam (TSS) kit |
| Tools | browser-locking scareware kit, hidden C2 server for encrypted locker retrieval |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204.001 Malicious Link, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1583.001 Domains, T1583.006 Web Services, T1608.005 Link Target |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target regions | united states of america, japan, australia |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 5 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-09-25, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2651 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 7 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Browser-Locker Scareware Kit — Fullscreen, Keyboard-Lock and Fake-Alert Markers in Web Traffic
Detects the post-exploitation/browser-lockout stage: web traffic whose payload or URL carries the JavaScript and content markers of the TSS browser-locker kit — forced fullscreen via requestFullscreen(), Keyboard Lock API (navigator.keyboard.lock, which swallows the Escape key), in-memory construction of a fake Microsoft Defender Security Center / Apple-style security alert, and the 'Do not restart' lockout text. Because the fake warning is assembled entirely in browser memory, these markers are the primary network-visible fingerprints of the kit's deceptive layer (Masquerading of legitimate security products plus JavaScript execution).
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1036, T1059.007, T1027, T1140
- Data sources: stream_http, browser_telemetry, netskope_webtx
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=proxy sourcetype="stream:http" earliest=-7d
| search "requestFullscreen" OR "keyboard.lock" OR "Do not restart" OR "Microsoft Defender Security Center" OR "Apple Security" OR "secure-scan" OR "alert-sound"
| eval client=coalesce(src_ip, src)
| eval domain=lower(coalesce(dest_host, dst_host, dest))
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by client, domain, uri_path
| where count>1
| table first_seen, last_seen, client, domain, uri_path, countMicrosoft KQL
let tss_tabs = BrowserTabEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl matches regex @"(?i)(defender|apple|security-center|windows-security|mac-security)"
| where RemoteUrl matches regex @"(?i)(lock|alert|scan|support|infected|call)"
| summarize FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Hits = count() by DeviceId, RemoteUrl;
tss_tabs
| join kind = leftouter (DeviceInfo | summarize DeviceName = min(DeviceName) by DeviceId) on DeviceId
| where Hits >= 2
| project LastSeen, DeviceName, DeviceId, RemoteUrl, Hits, FirstSeen
| sort by LastSeen descSigma
title: Browser Locker Fake Security Alert - Fullscreen and Keyboard Lock JavaScript Markers
date: 2026-09-25
id: 3a7b91d4-2e6c-4f8a-b5d1-9c0e8f7a6b2d
status: experimental
description: Detects enterprise browser-security telemetry entries in which a tab invoked the Fullscreen API and/or Keyboard Lock API while displaying text consistent with a fake Microsoft Defender or Apple security alert, matching the browser-locking tech-support-scam kit behavior (Netskope, TL-2026-2651).
references:
- https://www.netskope.com/blog/a-fake-security-locker-delivered-by-google-ads
- https://undercodenews.com/fake-microsoft-defender-alerts-spread-through-google-ads-in-browser-hijacking-tech-support-scam-video/
author: Threadlinqs Team
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.execution
- attack.t1036
- attack.t1059.007
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1140
- attack.tool.browser_locker
logsource:
category: browser
product: browser
definition: Enterprise browser security / extension telemetry that records JavaScript API invocations (fullscreen, keyboard lock) and visible page text on browser tabs.
detection:
selection_fullscreen:
fullscreen_api: 'requestFullscreen'
selection_keylock:
keyboard_lock_api|contains:
- 'navigator.keyboard.lock'
- 'keyboard.lock('
selection_impersonation:
page_text|contains:
- 'Microsoft Defender Security Center'
- 'Apple Security'
- 'Do not restart'
- 'scan complete'
- 'call the number'
condition: (selection_fullscreen or selection_keylock) and selection_impersonation
falsepositives:
- Kiosk or fullscreen web apps legitimately using requestFullscreen and Keyboard Lock (tune by URL allowlist)
- Internal security-testing or vendor demo pages replicating the fake alert
level: highKnown false positives:
- Kiosk/fullscreen web applications legitimately calling requestFullscreen and Keyboard Lock
- Vendor security demos or phishing-simulation tooling replicating fake alerts
Tuning notes: Stream:http payload capture may truncate large responses; if markers are missed, enable payload limiters or surface the equivalent event types from an enterprise browser-security product (fullscreen API, keyboard lock API). Correlate 'Microsoft Defender Security Center' / 'Apple Security' text hits with a support telephone number (regex for toll-free 1-8xx patterns) to confirm the vishing end-state. Treat repeated alert sounds and busy-loop page lag as corroborating behavioral signals. A community-reported sibling-campaign payload hash (sha256 7c32720376f976885d825711f3c03397074d755ae78900ca5c70c9121271175a) can be added to download-scanning rules to catch the same operator infrastructure.
- Malvertising Click Funnel to TSS Locker Landing — UrlClickEvents with Google Ads Markers · unlock with TL Creds
- Fake Defender/Apple Security-Alert Pages Visited in Browser — BrowserTabEvents Masquerade Detection · unlock with TL Creds
- Outbound HTTPS to Tech-Support-Scam and Sibling Malvertising Domains — DeviceNetworkEvents · unlock with TL Creds
- Malvertising Click to TSS Staging Domain — Ad Click Markers on Scam Landing · unlock with TL Creds
- Browser Locker Fake Security Alert — Fullscreen and Keyboard Lock JavaScript Markers · unlock with TL Creds
- Tech Support Scam Locker Infrastructure DNS Queries · unlock with TL Creds
- Paid-Search Malvertising to Tech-Support-Scam Staging — Ad Click Markers on Scam Landing Pages · unlock with TL Creds
- DNS Beaconing to Short-Lived TSS Locker Infrastructure — High-Churn Scam Host Queries · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-09-25, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 7 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2651.
Technical analysis
The kit waits for mouse movement, decrypts a hidden C2 address with a hardcoded AES key in-browser, and assembles an OS-tailored locker entirely in memory; victims are pressured into paying for nonexistent repairs, disclosing financial details, or installing remote-access software. Reached at least 619 organizations via 457 scam hosts across 250+ ad campaigns; no confirmed infections, payments, or losses.
DRIVE-BY MALVERTISING CHAIN. Netskope Threat Labs observed a cloud-hosted tech-support-scam (TSS) kit delivered via paid Google Ads inventory on popular maps, weather, property, document-hosting and sports publisher sites (at least 284 legitimate publisher domains; publishers were not compromised). Traffic records carried ad-click markers (gclid, gad_source, gad_campaignid) on nearly all visits, confirming paid placements, with clicks flowing through Google's own click-redirect (googleads.g.doubleclick.net). Victims land on a loading spinner page presenting Cancel/Continue buttons, then an ordinary-looking online storefront branded ShopEase with no obvious malicious content; the malicious code waits for a single mouse movement - a bot filter that stalls automated scanners that do not move a cursor - before proceeding to the next stage.
RUNTIME C2 AND IN-MEMORY LOCKER. The kit decrypts a hardcoded AES key-signed hidden server address at runtime, retrieves an encrypted locker payload tailored to the visitor's operating system, and decrypts it with a second cryptographic key. The fake warning is constructed directly in browser memory rather than delivered as an inspectable standalone page, so no separate locker file crosses the network for scanners to inspect; if the remote server cannot be contacted or decryption fails, the victim simply remains on the ShopEase storefront.
BROWSER LOCKOUT MECHANICS. On the first click the page forces fullscreen via the requestFullscreen() API, hiding the browser tabs, address bar and UI; conceals the mouse cursor; calls the browser's Keyboard Lock API to swallow the Escape key and exit shortcuts; plays repeated alert sounds; deliberately runs busy loops to lag and stutter the browser; and flashes a black warning screen with text urging the user not to restart or operate the computer, alongside a tab-close confirmation dialog with additional scam messaging. The computer itself is not actually locked - the disruptive behavior is confined to the browser - but the experience is engineered to pressure the victim into calling the repeatedly displayed support number as the supposed only fix.
OS-TAILORED IMPERSONATION AND FRAUD END-STATE. On Windows the kit impersonates a convincing Microsoft Defender Security Center scan with layered infection warnings; on macOS, a similar fake security warning styled around Apple's ecosystem. Callers reached by the displayed telephone number could be pressured to pay for nonexistent repairs, disclose sensitive personal and financial information, install remote-access software, or hand control of their computers to the criminals. No actual malware installation from the malicious page was observed and the report does not establish that opening the page installs malware.
SCALE AND ASSESSMENT. During the campaign window (Aug 31 - Sep 14, 2026) at least 619 organizations were reached via 457 scam hosts across more than 250 Google Ads campaign IDs; by ad-click geography the split was approximately 62% United States, 16% Japan, and 14% Australia. Netskope's inline protection detects the kit under the signature Generic.Phishing Tech Support Scam Kit Detected. The figures show exposure, not confirmed infections or losses. Infrastructure rotation across many short-lived hosts makes simple domain-based blocking less reliable, and prior iterations of the same tradecraft (Netskope's Feb 2026 Bing Ads cluster hosted in Azure Blob Storage redirecting via highswit[.]space, BleepingComputer's Aug 2023 Amazon-impersonation ad leading to a fake Defender alert with a fullscreen lock and session-restore trap) show the pattern is recurring. Defenders should combine browser telemetry, DNS monitoring, URL reputation and advertising-related indicators, and should treat an unexpected security warning combined with extreme urgency and a telephone number as a scam signal.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Stealth
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript; T1204.001 Malicious Link
Command and Control
T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1219 Remote Access Tools
Resource Development
T1583.001 Domains; T1583.006 Web Services; T1608.005 Link Target
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Do not call the telephone number displayed by any security alert that locks the browser - it is the scam endpoint
- If trapped on a fullscreen scam page, hold the Escape key for a few seconds to exit fullscreen, then close the tab
- If Escape fails, force-close the browser via Task Manager (Windows) or Force Quit (macOS) and reopen WITHOUT restoring the previous session, which otherwise returns to the scam page
- Never grant remote access, install software requested by the caller, enter payment details, or disclose passwords to an inbound 'support' caller
Workarounds
- Browse with a purpose-built low-privilege profile and disable automatic session restore to prevent the session-restore trap
- Gate outbound web traffic from users to new or low-reputation domains during active campaigns
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy browser isolation for high-risk browsing to contain browser-based scareware and phishing
- Enforce ad-blocking and anti-tracking at the edge; filter ads network-wide during active malvertising campaigns
- Use URL reputation, DNS filtering and newly-registered/lookalike domain blocklists; expect infrastructure rotation across many short-lived scam hosts
- Correlate browser telemetry (forced fullscreen, Keyboard Lock API usage, cursor concealment), URL reputation and endpoint telemetry to detect the kit's behavior cluster
- Deliver security-awareness training: an unexpected security warning combined with extreme urgency and a phone number should always be treated as a scam
- Report malicious ad creatives and associated advertiser accounts to Google to accelerate account takedowns
Timeline
- BleepingComputer documented an earlier iteration of the same pattern: a Google ad impersonating Amazon led to a fake Microsoft Defender alert (claiming ads(exe).finacetrack(2).dll infection) with a fullscreen lock and a session-restore trap that reopened the scam page.
- Companion campaign observed: from ~16:00 UTC a spike of users across 48 organizations clicked tech-support-scam links in Azure Blob Storage reached via malicious Bing ads for innocuous queries; all victims in the US across healthcare, manufacturing and technology.
- Netskope Threat Labs published 'Malicious Bing Ads Lead to Widespread Azure Tech Support Scams' documenting a companion TSS cluster (Feb 2, 2026, 48 US organizations) hosted in Azure Blob Storage and redirected via highswit[.]space.
- First observed by Netskope Threat Labs: malicious Google Ads on legitimate publisher inventory began steering victims to cloud-hosted browser-locking tech-support-scam pages.
- Last day of the campaign's observed activity window; the kit had reached at least 619 organizations via 457 scam hosts across 250+ Google Ads campaign IDs.
- Netskope Threat Labs published 'A Fake Security Locker, Delivered by Google Ads', documenting the cloud-hosted tech-support-scam kit delivered via paid Google Ads.
- Cyber Security News published coverage of the Netskope Threat Labs research on the Google Ads browser-locking scareware campaign.
Sources cited
- A Fake Security Locker, Delivered by Google Ads netskope.com · Research · 2026-09-24
- Malicious Bing Ads Lead to Widespread Azure Tech Support Scams netskope.com · Research · 2026-02-05
- Malicious Google Ads Campaign Delivers Browser Locking Scareware to Over 600 Organizations cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-09-25
- Fake Microsoft Defender Alerts Spread Through Google Ads in Browser-Hijacking Tech Support Scam + Video undercodenews.com · News
- Sneaky Amazon Google ad leads to Microsoft support scam BleepingComputer · News · 2023-08-21
Previous and next in threat intel
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 5 sources; published ; last updated —.