# Adform Ad-Tech Platform Compromised: Trojanized Tracking Script Serves Crypto Clipboard Stealer via Supply-Chain Attack

> Adform's widely-embedded JavaScript tracking script trackpoint-async.js, served from s2.adform.net, was trojanized between 2026-07-26 and 2026-07-27 to continuously monitor visitor clipboards and page content for Bitcoin, Ethereum, and TRON wallet addresses and silently replace them with attacker-controlled addresses, while exfiltrating the visiting hostname and URL path to an external server. Discovered by security researcher Kevin Beaumont (DoublePulsar) and disclosed 2026-07-31; Adform detected and removed the malicious code on 2026-07-27, reporting no evidence of installed persistence.

- **Published:** 2026-09-26T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-09-26T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2656
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-adform-cryptocurrency-stealer-tl-2026-2656.webp?v=87a20f8e (Threadlinqs threat intel: Adform Tracking Script Crypto Clipper: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2656) — High severity, 10 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2656
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Status:** MONITORING
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 10 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Adform, an advertising-technology company whose demand-side-platform tag is embedded on an estimated ~14,000 businesses' websites across 180+ countries, had its trackpoint-async.js tracking script trojanized. The legitimate 82,727-byte library had a 6,945-byte malicious suffix appended containing two functional blocks, per byte-level analysis published by independent researcher HECAVEX (corroborating Max Maass's public sample capture): an early block that polled the clipboard on an interval and reported page telemetry over plaintext HTTP, and a more advanced block that additionally walked the rendered DOM with a TreeWalker to rewrite wallet-address strings in text nodes, <input>/<textarea>/contenteditable elements, and hooked the value-setter and copy/cut/paste/input events so that both user-pasted and programmatically-written values were intercepted and replaced while the cursor position was preserved to avoid alerting the visitor.

The replacement logic matched common Bitcoin, Ethereum, and TRON address formats and substituted attacker-controlled strings obfuscated behind a six-byte XOR key. The captured samples show at least three distinct variants of increasing capability, one of which contained a malformed (checksum-invalid) TRON replacement string, suggesting active iteration by the attacker during the exposure window. A hardcoded request to 84.32.102.230:7744 transmitted the visiting page's hostname and URL path on load; the endpoint used plaintext HTTP on a non-standard port, meaning the request was blocked by browser mixed-content policy on any embedding page served over HTTPS. Adform stated it found no evidence of successful data transmission or installed persistent software, and that the code stopped operating once the affected page was closed.

The oldest known evidence is an Archive.org snapshot capturing the malicious code at 2026-07-26 23:29:03 GMT. Adform detected the anomalous activity and removed the malicious code on 2026-07-27, notifying affected clients and reporting the incident to authorities. Kevin Beaumont publicly disclosed the compromise on 2026-07-31, noting he had observed suspicious activity for longer than Adform's stated detection window (a discrepancy that remains unresolved). Independent verification via URLScan.io shows the poisoned script (matching the most advanced payload hash) was also served from a secondary/mirrored hostname (s1.matas.se) using the same script path, indicating exposure was not limited to the primary s2.adform.net host alone. The captured sample ran undetected by every VirusTotal antivirus engine at time of analysis, consistent with browser-only, non-persistent JavaScript payloads generally evading endpoint-focused detection tooling. No threat actor has been publicly attributed, and open questions remain around the full list of affected websites, total visitor exposure, the initial compromise vector into Adform's script pipeline, and whether any cryptocurrency was actually diverted.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1659 Content Injection
- T1059.007 JavaScript
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Browser Process Outbound Connection to Adform Clipper C2 (Clipboard/DOM Collection Callback)** (`TL-2026-2656-SPL-002`)

Detects a browser process (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) establishing an outbound connection to the hardcoded C2 IP:port 84.32.102.230:7744 used by the trojanized trackpoint-async.js payload to exfiltrate the visited hostname/path once the clipboard-polling and DOM/event-hijacking blocks have executed in-page. Endpoint-level evidence that the malicious JavaScript ran and attempted its collection callback.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1059.007, T1027, T1119, T1115
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr_network_telemetry
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=endpoint sourcetype IN ("XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", "crowdstrike:events:sensor", "carbon_black") EventCode=3
| eval browser_proc=if(match(Image, "(?i)(chrome\.exe|msedge\.exe|firefox\.exe|iexplore\.exe|opera\.exe|brave\.exe)$"), 1, 0)
| where browser_proc=1 AND DestinationIp="84.32.102.230" AND DestinationPort=7744
| table _time, host, Image, User, DestinationIp, DestinationPort
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe", "iexplore.exe", "opera.exe", "brave.exe")
| where RemoteIP == "84.32.102.230" and RemotePort == 7744
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Browser Outbound Connection to Adform Clipper C2 Endpoint
id: 4e8a1d2c-9f3b-4a67-b1e0-5c7d3f9a6b21
status: experimental
description: Detects a common browser process connecting to the hardcoded C2 IP and non-standard port used by the trojanized Adform trackpoint-async.js payload to exfiltrate visited hostname/path after clipboard-polling and DOM/event-hijacking blocks execute.
references:
    - https://hecavex.com/en/research/adform-supply-chain-crypto-clipper/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-26
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1059.007
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.t1119
    - attack.t1115
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_process:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\msedge.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\iexplore.exe'
            - '\opera.exe'
            - '\brave.exe'
    selection_dest:
        DestinationIp: '84.32.102.230'
        DestinationPort: 7744
    condition: selection_process and selection_dest
falsepositives:
    - Extremely unlikely; this IP:port pair has no known legitimate service — treat any match as high-fidelity
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- None expected under normal conditions; the destination IP:port is attacker-controlled infrastructure with no legitimate purpose

**Tuning notes:** If EDR network telemetry is unavailable, fall back to DNS/proxy logs for the same IP; note that HTTPS-embedding pages will block this via mixed-content policy client-side, so absence of a hit does not confirm the script was not executed — cross-reference with SPL-001/KQL-001 script-delivery detections.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Trojanized [indicator] Delivery via Proxy Telemetry (Sentinel) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Defender for Endpoint: Browser Callback to Adform Clipper C2 IP (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sentinel: Mass Beacon Pattern to Adform Clipper C2 Across the Estate (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma: Trojanized Adform [indicator] Script Delivery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma: Browser Outbound Connection to Adform Clipper C2 Endpoint (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma: Mass Beacon to Adform Clipper C2 IP Across Multiple Hosts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Trojanized Adform [indicator] Delivery (Supply-Chain Content Injection) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Mass Beacon Pattern to Adform Clipper C2 Across Multiple Internal Hosts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 10)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `84.32.102[.]230`
- Domain: `s2[.]adform[.]net`
- File hash: `0674a58b224cca2ce840153d6c8d474f29f126f7af5054350ba1572c33233aa3`

Full set of 10 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Adform compromised to serve crypto stealer via supply chain attack](https://doublepulsar.com/adform-compromised-to-serve-crypto-stealer-via-supply-chain-attack-2f1ec024f33e)
- [Online ad firm Adform's script compromised to steal cryptocurrency](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/online-ad-firm-adforms-script-compromised-to-steal-cryptocurrency/)
- [Hackers Poison Adform Script to Swap Crypto Wallet Addresses Across Customer Sites](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/hackers-poison-adform-script-to-swap.html)
- [Hackers Turned a Trusted Advertising Platform Into a Crypto-Stealer Delivery Network](https://cybersecuritynews.com/adform-advertising-platform-compromised/)
- [Adform Supply Chain Attack: JavaScript Crypto Clipper Analysis](https://hecavex.com/en/research/adform-supply-chain-crypto-clipper/)
- [Adform Advertising Script Poisoned to Swap Cryptocurrency Wallet Addresses Across Customer Sites](https://www.cirt.gov.jm/advisory/adform-advertising-script-poisoned-swap-cryptocurrency-wallet-addresses-across-customer)
- [Adform Script Swapped Crypto Wallet Addresses](https://blog.gridinsoft.com/adform-script-crypto-wallet-address-swap/)
- [URLScan.io capture of cached-advanced trackpoint-async.js variant](https://urlscan.io/result/019fb249-00f3-713f-910a-bdeaa0747b66/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2656
