# BlueLocker Ransomware Resurfaces After Three-Year Dormancy, Breaches Pakistan Petroleum Limited

> BlueLocker (Blue Locker) ransomware, dormant since Microsoft's December 2021 signature addition, resurfaced in August 2025 with a confirmed attack on Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) that encrypted servers/VMs, deleted backups via wmic SHADOWCOPY DELETE, and suspended PPL's financial operations for two days. Attribution is contested between an open-source MemeCryptor (Conti-inspired) codebase lineage identified by researcher rivitna and a Resecurity-assessed link to the Iranian-associated Proton ransomware family (Limba/Zola/Shinra/Cipher/Trust), with embedded Chinese-language strings assessed as a likely false flag.

- **Published:** 2026-09-26T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-09-26T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2667
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-bluelocker-ppl-pakistan-breach-tl-2026-2667.webp?v=b17ad3ea (Threadlinqs threat intel: BlueLocker Ransomware Hits PPL: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2667) — High severity, 19 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2667
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Blue Locker ransomware operators
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 19 (3 shown free below)

## Description

BlueLocker first appeared in the wild around November 2021; Microsoft added the detection signature Ransom:Win32/BlueLocker.MK!MTB on December 1, 2021, and the malware then went quiet for roughly three years. It resurfaced dramatically on August 6, 2025 with a confirmed breach of Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), the country's second-largest oil and gas producer, responsible for roughly 20% of national natural gas supply. The operators encrypted servers and virtual machines, ran `wmic SHADOWCOPY DELETE` to destroy shadow-copy backups, and claimed to have exfiltrated approximately 1TB of data — including Petrel Studio exploration files, production databases, operations plans, financial records, and TMC data tied to the Sui and Adhi fields — though PPL publicly denied that sensitive data was compromised. The intrusion suspended PPL's financial operations and meter-reading capability for roughly two days.

Technically, two competing profiles exist. Researcher rivitna classifies the .blue/restore_file.txt artifacts as "BlueLocker (MemeCryptor)", tying them to an open-source, Conti-inspired ransomware project published on GitHub by user DarkFunct. That codebase implements multithreaded ChaCha20 file encryption, an XOR-obfuscated RSA public key used to wrap per-file symmetric keys, and BMP steganography to hide ChaCha20 keys inside meme images; it explicitly credits Conti for its multi-threading approach and its abuse of the Windows Restart Manager API to forcibly terminate processes (including Chrome.exe) that lock target files, such as Chrome's password database. Separately, Resecurity's reverse-engineering of acquired PPL-campaign binaries describes an AES+RSA hybrid scheme and assesses BlueLocker as a recent modification of the Proton ransomware family, which Israel's National Cyber Directorate (INCD) has linked to probable Iranian origins since 2023. Prior Proton-lineage strains cited as related include Limba (which has targeted Chinese victims), Zola, Shinra (detected April 2024, itself carrying suspicious Chinese-language strings such as "ZhuDongFangYu" and references to the Chinese AV vendor Qihoo 360), Cipher, and Trust. Analysts treat the Chinese-language artifacts as a probable false flag rather than evidence of Chinese origin, and note that Pakistan's stable diplomatic relations with both Iran and China make either direct-state explanation awkward, pointing instead to a third-party actor or reused/sold source code. Both explanations may be simultaneously true: Proton's source code has reportedly circulated for sale on the dark web, and MemeCryptor's codebase is public, so the same or different operators could be drawing on either or both lineages, or independently reusing the "Blue Locker" brand and ".blue" extension — a real risk given at least three unrelated malware families (Blue Locker/MemeCryptor, Proton/Shinra V2, and Phobos Blue) currently use ".blue"-style extensions.

Operationally, the malware persists via a Registry Run key (`HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Run`), bypasses UAC through registry manipulation, uses XOR-encoded strings (including Chinese-character encodings of process names such as "Chrome.exe") to frustrate static analysis, performs timestomping and virtualization/sandbox checks, and enumerates the registry, running processes, and the file system before encrypting. It avoids OS-critical paths (Windows, System32, ProgramFiles, System Volume Information, Boot) and skips certain extensions (.cat, .bat, .cmd, .ps1, .vbs) to keep the machine bootable enough to display the ransom note, dropped as `restore_file.txt` (and, per some reporting, `HOW_TO_BACK_FILES.html`). The note is headed "[ Hello! ]", signed "BY BLUE LOCKER", threatens to "report the hack to mainstream media and release your data to social media and competitors", gives no fixed ransom figure, and directs victims to a ProtonMail address and an XMPP/Jabber contact (with a Tox ID also referenced); the group deliberately runs no dedicated Tor leak site. Distribution is via phishing emails with malicious attachments, trojanized downloads, unsecured file-sharing platforms, and compromised websites, with capability to propagate across networks, removable storage, cloud environments, and network-attached storage.

In response, Pakistan's National Cyber Emergency Response Team (NCERT) issued advisory NCA-38.081025 ("Critical Global Ransomware Threat: Blue Locker & Shinra Campaign") on August 10-11, 2025 to 39 government ministries and institutions — including Cabinet, Interior, Foreign Affairs, the Election Commission, the National Assembly, and the FBR — rating the threat "extremely high" severity and confirming its own systems were "detecting and blocking it continuously". No CVE or exploited vulnerability underlies this campaign; initial access is social-engineering-driven, not exploit-driven.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1070.006 Timestomp
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1012 Query Registry
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1489 Service Stop
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**BlueLocker Persistence, UAC Bypass and Timestomp Chain** (`TL-2026-2667-SPL-002`)

Detects the registry Run-key persistence, UAC-bypass registry/binary manipulation (fodhelper, computerdefaults, sdclt, eventvwr), and file timestomping BlueLocker performs after initial execution to survive reboot, escalate privilege silently, and frustrate forensic timeline analysis.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1547.001, T1548.002, T1070.006
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
| eval TargetObject=lower(coalesce(TargetObject,"")), CommandLine=lower(coalesce(CommandLine,""))
| where (EventCode=13 AND like(TargetObject,"%\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\run\\%"))
    OR (EventCode=13 AND (like(TargetObject,"%\\classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command%") OR like(TargetObject,"%\\software\\classes\\folder\\shell\\open\\command%")))
    OR (EventCode=1 AND (like(CommandLine,"%fodhelper%") OR like(CommandLine,"%computerdefaults%") OR like(CommandLine,"%sdclt%") OR like(CommandLine,"%eventvwr%")))
    OR (EventCode=2)
| eval reason=case(EventCode=13,"registry_run_key_or_uac_bypass_key", EventCode=1,"uac_bypass_binary_invocation", EventCode=2,"timestomp_filecreatetime_modified")
| stats count by ComputerName, User, EventCode, reason, TargetObject, CommandLine, Image
| where count > 0
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
union
(
    DeviceRegistryEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where RegistryKey has "Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Run" or RegistryKey has_any ("Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command", "Classes\\Folder\\shell\\open\\command")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueData, EventType="registry_persistence_or_uac_bypass"
),
(
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName in~ ("fodhelper.exe","computerdefaults.exe","sdclt.exe","eventvwr.exe")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RegistryKey=ProcessCommandLine, RegistryValueData="", EventType="uac_bypass_binary_invocation"
)
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: BlueLocker Registry Run-Key Persistence and UAC Bypass Chain
id: 4e5f6071-8293-4a5b-b6c7-d8e9f0a1b2c3
status: experimental
description: Detects registry Run-key persistence and known UAC-bypass binary invocation (fodhelper, computerdefaults, sdclt, eventvwr) consistent with BlueLocker's post-execution persistence and privilege-escalation behavior.
references:
    - https://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-blue-locker-ransomware/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.002
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1070.006
    - attack.tool.bluelocker
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_uac_bypass:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\fodhelper.exe'
            - '\computerdefaults.exe'
            - '\sdclt.exe'
            - '\eventvwr.exe'
    selection_run_key_write:
        CommandLine|contains: 'CurrentVersion\Run'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative deployment tools legitimately writing Run-key entries for approved software
    - Sanctioned red-team/blue-team exercises exercising UAC-bypass binaries for testing
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Administrative deployment tools legitimately writing Run-key entries for approved software
- Sanctioned red-team/blue-team exercises exercising UAC-bypass binaries for testing

**Tuning notes:** Cross-reference the writing process's parent chain against a known-software-deployment allowlist, and prioritize alerts where the Run-key value path points outside Program Files/Windows to cut noise from legitimate installers.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- BlueLocker Initial Access - Encoded/Obfuscated Script Execution from Phishing Attachment (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BlueLocker Sandbox/VM Evasion and Discovery Sweep Pre-Encryption (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BlueLocker Backup/SQL Service Stop and Data-Staging Before Encryption (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BlueLocker Malicious Attachment Drop-and-Execute from User-Writable Path (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BlueLocker Forced Chrome Termination for Credential Access and Security Service Impairment (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BlueLocker Network-Share Propagation - Mass .blue File Writes Across SMB/NAS Paths (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BlueLocker Initial Access - Office Document Spawning Living-off-the-Land Binary (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BlueLocker Shadow Copy Deletion, Mass .blue Encryption and Ransom Note Drop (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 19)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- File hash: `d3cc6cc4538d57f2d1f8a9d46a3e8be73ed849f7fe37d1d969c0377cf1d0fadc`
- File hash: `e6bd4ed287d1336206f5b4b65011e570267418799eb60c2d0d7496d5d9e95a33`
- File hash: `6eeb20cc709a18bf8845f7b678967b7f0ff96475cf51a261da87244886bbfd2e`

Full set of 19 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Dark Web Profile: Blue Locker Ransomware](https://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-blue-locker-ransomware/)
- [Dark Web Profile: Blue Locker Ransomware (syndicated mirror)](https://malware.news/t/dark-web-profile-blue-locker-ransomware/125894)
- ['Blue Locker' Analysis: Ransomware Targeting Oil & Gas Sector in Pakistan](https://www.resecurity.com/blog/article/blue-locker-analysis-ransomware-targeting-oil-gas-sector-in-pakistan)
- [Blue Locker Ransomware Launches Targeted Attacks on the Oil and Gas Sector in Pakistan](https://gbhackers.com/blue-locker-ransomware-launches-targeted-attacks/)
- ['Blue Locker' Ransomware Targeting Oil & Gas Sector in Pakistan](https://securityaffairs.com/181173/malware/blue-locker-ransomware-targeting-oil-gas-sector-in-pakistan.html)
- [New Blue Locker Ransomware Attacking Oil & Gas Sector in Pakistan](https://cybersecuritynews.com/new-blue-locker-ransomware/)
- [Pakistan's Oil and Gas Sector Hit by Blue Locker Ransomware](https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/pakistans-oil-gas-sector-hit-by-blue-locker-ransomware-a-29232)
- [NCA-38.081025 - National CERT Advisory - Critical Global Ransomware Threat: Blue Locker & Shinra Campaign](https://pkcert.gov.pk/advisory/25/38.pdf)
- [This "BlueLocker" Ransomware Attack is On the Rise in Pakistan: NCERT](https://propakistani.pk/2025/08/11/this-bluelocker-ransomware-attack-is-on-the-rise-in-pakistan-ncert/)
- [NCERT Issues Advisory on "Blue Locker" Ransomware Targeting Pakistan's Key Institutions](https://databreaches.net/2025/08/10/ncert-issues-advisory-on-blue-locker-ransomware-targeting-pakistans-key-institutions/)
- [Ransom:Win32/BlueLocker.MK!MTB threat description](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/BlueLocker.MK!MTB&threatId=-2147161442)
- [MemeCryptor (open-source ransomware codebase cited by rivitna as BlueLocker's technical origin)](https://github.com/DarkFunct/MemeCryptor)
- [YARA Rule: BlueLocker.yar](https://www.ransomware.live/yara/BlueLocker/BlueLocker.yar)
- [Cyber Attack Alert: Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) breach](https://x.com/H4ckmanac/status/1954146391644594300)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2667
