# Infostealer Market Resilience: Law Enforcement Takedowns Displace, Not Eliminate, RedLine/META/LummaC2/Rhadamanthys Activity

> An interrupted-time-series analysis of 44 million infostealer logs (June 2024-June 2026) found that three of four law-enforcement takedowns against RedLine, META, LummaC2, and Rhadamanthys infrastructure produced net-positive displacement rather than suppression, with RedLine volume rising roughly +70-200% in the 14-90 days after Operation Magnus (p<=0.045). Only the coordinated FBI/DOJ/Europol/Microsoft action against LummaC2 in May 2025 - which struck technical infrastructure, distribution, monetization, and criminal trust simultaneously - produced statistically significant, lasting suppression (-46% at 14 days, -39% at 90 days).

- **Published:** 2026-09-27T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-09-27T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2708
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-infostealer-takedown-resilience-study-tl-2026-2708.webp?v=64f252d2 (Threadlinqs threat intel: RedLine Resilience After Takedowns: Analysis & Hunting (TL-2026-2708) — Medium severity, 28 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2708
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Distributed MaaS operator
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Flare Academy's 'Real-World Impact of Takedowns on the Infostealer Market' (25 September 2026) applies an interrupted time series (ITS) design with symmetric +/-14/30/60/90-day windows to a corpus of ~44 million infostealer logs collected June 2024-June 2026, one record per compromised host, attributed via syntactic fingerprinting and telemetry-based classification. The study evaluates four distinct law-enforcement operations against the infostealer malware-as-a-service (MaaS) ecosystem: Operation Magnus (28 October 2024, Dutch National Police/FBI/Eurojust coalition against RedLine and META Stealer infrastructure), the original Operation Endgame (27-29 May 2024, France/Germany/Netherlands-led action against the dropper ecosystem - IcedID, SystemBC, Pikabot, Bumblebee, Smokeloader, Trickbot - that feeds infostealer distribution), Operation Secure (INTERPOL-led, January-April 2025, 26-country Asia-Pacific action against LummaC2 and related stealer infrastructure), and the FBI/DOJ/Europol/Microsoft action against LummaC2 (19-21 May 2025). Three of the four produced net-positive volume changes in the targeted or adjacent families: RedLine rose ~+70% at 14 days and ~+200% at 90 days after Magnus (p=0.032 / p=0.045); total dropper-ecosystem-linked stealer volume rose +41% at 90 days after the original Endgame (p=0.042); LummaC2 volume rose +75% at 90 days despite Operation Secure (p=0.004); and Rhadamanthys showed no measurable statistical response to the later Operation Endgame Phase 3 action because its market share was still negligible at that time. Only the May 2025 FBI/DOJ/Europol/Microsoft LummaC2 action - which seized 2,300+ domains (five core panel domains plus subdomains) and disabled five C2 servers, corroborated by the joint FBI/CISA advisory AA25-141B published the same week - produced a statistically significant and durable drop: -46% at 14 days (p=0.042), -34% at 30 days, and -39% at 90 days (p=0.001/0.011 depending on window). Flare's structural explanation is that the LummaC2 action degraded technical infrastructure, distribution channels, monetization mechanisms, and criminal-forum trust simultaneously, whereas the other three operations struck only a single layer (infrastructure alone) and left distribution/monetization/trust intact, letting affiliates and buyers migrate to the next available family. This is corroborated by independent reporting: ESET's backend analysis of the RedLine/META operation (8 November 2024) found both stealers shared a single creator, a common dead-drop-resolver scheme (GitHub-hosted encrypted server lists), and REST-API backends (fivto[.]online for RedLine, spasshik[.]xyz for META) that were largely intact at seizure time outside the three Dutch servers and two domains actually taken; and the November 2025 Operation Endgame Phase 3/3.0 action against Rhadamanthys, VenomRAT, and the Elysium botnet (1,025 servers, 20 domains, one arrest in Greece) came after Rhadamanthys had already absorbed significant displaced volume from the earlier, less-durable takedowns. For SOC and threat-intel consumers, the operational takeaway is that a single-family takedown announcement should not be scored as an overall reduction in infostealer exposure risk; defenders should expect volume migration to remaining active families (RedLine, META, Rhadamanthys, StealC, Vidar) unless the action visibly targets infrastructure, distribution, and monetization together, as the May 2025 LummaC2 action did.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1027.002 Software Packing
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1497.001 System Checks
- T1055.012 Process Hollowing
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1217 Browser Information Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**LummaC2 dllhost.exe COM-Surrogate Injection, iphlpapi.dll Masquerading & Browser Credential/Session-Cookie Theft** (`TL-2026-2708-SPL-002`)

Detects the LummaC2 post-exploitation pattern documented in CISA/FBI AA25-141B: dllhost.exe (a legitimate COM surrogate) spawning an unexpected child process or opening an outbound network connection, iphlpapi.dll being side-loaded by a non-standard host process (masquerading/hijack execution flow), a new autorun registry key being written, and subsequent access to browser credential-store or session-cookie files — the persistence, defense-evasion, discovery, and credential-theft chain shared across RedLine/META/LummaC2/Rhadamanthys.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1547.001, T1027.002, T1036, T1497.001, T1055.012, T1555.003, T1539, T1217, T1082, T1518.001, T1119
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr_file_events, edr_registry_events, edr_image_load_events
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=3 OR EventCode=7 OR EventCode=13 OR EventCode=11)
| eval indicator=case(
    EventCode=1 AND ParentImage="*\\dllhost.exe" AND NOT match(Image, "(?i)dllhost\.exe$"), "dllhost_unexpected_child",
    EventCode=3 AND Image="*\\dllhost.exe", "dllhost_network_connection",
    EventCode=7 AND ImageLoaded="*\\iphlpapi.dll" AND NOT Image IN ("*\\svchost.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*\\lsass.exe", "*\\services.exe"), "iphlpapi_sideload_masquerade",
    EventCode=13 AND TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*", "registry_run_key_persistence",
    EventCode=11 AND match(TargetFilename, "(?i)(Login Data|Cookies|Web Data|Local State)$") AND match(Image, "(?i)(chrome|msedge|firefox)\.exe$")=0, "browser_credential_store_file_access")
| where isnotnull(indicator)
| stats count values(indicator) as indicators values(CommandLine) as command_lines by ComputerName, User, Image, ParentImage, TargetObject, ImageLoaded, TargetFilename
| where count >= 1
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let dllhostAnomaly = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "dllhost.exe" and FileName !~ "dllhost.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Indicator = "dllhost_unexpected_child", Detail = FileName;
let dllhostNetwork = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "dllhost.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Indicator = "dllhost_network_connection", Detail = RemoteUrl;
let sideload = DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "iphlpapi.dll" and InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("svchost.exe","explorer.exe","lsass.exe","services.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Indicator = "iphlpapi_sideload_masquerade", Detail = InitiatingProcessFileName;
let persistence = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RegistryKey has @"CurrentVersion\Run" and ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Indicator = "registry_run_key_persistence", Detail = RegistryValueData;
let credAccess = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","Web Data","Local State") and InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Indicator = "browser_credential_store_file_access", Detail = InitiatingProcessFileName;
union dllhostAnomaly, dllhostNetwork, sideload, persistence, credAccess
| summarize Indicators = make_set(Indicator), Occurrences = count() by DeviceName, AccountName
| where Occurrences >= 1
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: dllhost.exe COM-Surrogate Spawning Unexpected Child Process (LummaC2 Post-Exploitation)
id: 9f2c6a1e-5d8b-4c3a-9e7f-2a6d4b8c1f55
status: experimental
description: Detects dllhost.exe, a legitimate COM surrogate process, spawning an unexpected child process or making an outbound network connection — a masquerading and defense-evasion pattern documented for LummaC2 in CISA/FBI advisory AA25-141B.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-141b
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-27
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.t1055.012
    - attack.t1497.001
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555.003
    - attack.t1539
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1217
    - attack.t1082
    - attack.t1518.001
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1119
    - attack.tool.lummac2
cve.2025.141b: aa25-141b
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\dllhost.exe'
    filter_expected:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\dllhost.exe'
            - '\WerFault.exe'
    condition: selection_parent and not filter_expected
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate COM+ application activation spawning a documented child process in a hardened enterprise image
    - Third-party COM-based software update mechanisms
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate COM+ application activation spawning a documented child process in a hardened enterprise image
- Endpoint security or backup agents that legitimately enumerate browser profile directories
- IT-managed autorun entries deployed via GPO or software deployment tooling

**Tuning notes:** Build a baseline of legitimate dllhost.exe COM+ child processes per fleet image before enforcing this at high severity; correlate the composite indicator count (dllhost anomaly + iphlpapi sideload + browser file access on the same host/session within a short window) to suppress single-indicator noise while still catching the full LummaC2 chain.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Phishing-Delivered Script Interpreter Spawn — Infostealer Stage-1 Execution (RedLine/META/LummaC2/Rhadamanthys) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- LummaC2 dllhost.exe COM-Surrogate Injection, [indicator] Masquerading & Browser Credential/Session-Cookie Theft (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Infostealer C2 Beaconing to Known RedLine/META/LummaC2 Backend Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Suspicious Script Interpreter Spawned from Office/Browser/Archiver (Infostealer Stage-1) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- dllhost.exe COM-Surrogate Spawning Unexpected Child Process (LummaC2 Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DNS/Proxy Resolution to Known RedLine/META/LummaC2 Backend Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Phishing-Delivered Script Interpreter Spawn — Infostealer Stage-1 Execution (RedLine/META/LummaC2/Rhadamanthys) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Infostealer C2 Beaconing to Known RedLine/META/LummaC2 Backend Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `fivto[.]online`
- File hash: `4AFDC05708B8B39C82E60ABE3ACE55DB`
- Domain: `spasshik[.]xyz`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Real-World Impact of Takedowns on the Infostealer Market](https://flare.io/learn/resources/blog/infostealer-market-takedowns-impact)
- [Threat Actors Deploy LummaC2 Malware to Exfiltrate Sensitive Data from Organizations (AA25-141B)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-141b)
- [Justice Department Seizes Domains Behind Major Information-Stealing Malware Operation](https://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2025/05/sec-250521-doj01.htm)
- [FBI and Europol Disrupt Lumma Stealer Malware Network Linked to 10 Million Infections](https://thehackernews.com/2025/05/fbi-and-europol-disrupt-lumma-stealer.html)
- [Largest ever operation against botnets hits dropper malware ecosystem](https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/largest-ever-operation-against-botnets-hits-dropper-malware-ecosystem)
- [Operation Endgame: Coordinated Worldwide Law Enforcement Action Against Network of Cybercriminals](https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/operation-endgame-coordinated-worldwide-law-enforcement-action-against-network-of-cybercriminals)
- [End of the game for cybercrime infrastructure: 1025 servers taken down](https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/end-of-game-for-cybercrime-infrastructure-1025-servers-taken-down)
- [Operation Endgame Dismantles Rhadamanthys, Venom RAT, and Elysium Botnet in Global Crackdown](https://thehackernews.com/2025/11/operation-endgame-dismantles.html)
- [1,000+ Servers Hit in Law Enforcement Takedown of Rhadamanthys, VenomRAT, Elysium](https://www.securityweek.com/1000-servers-hit-in-law-enforcement-takedown-of-rhadamanthys-venomrat-elysium/)
- [Life on a crooked RedLine: Analyzing the infamous infostealer's backend](https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/life-crooked-redline-analyzing-infamous-infostealers-backend/)
- [Operation Magnus targets Redline, Meta infostealers](https://cyberscoop.com/redline-meta-operation-magnus-infostealers/)
- [20,000 malicious IPs and domains taken down in INTERPOL infostealer crackdown](https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2025/20-000-malicious-IPs-and-domains-taken-down-in-INTERPOL-infostealer-crackdown)
- [Operation Secure: Trend Micro's Threat Intelligence Fuels INTERPOL's Infostealer Infrastructure Takedown](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/f/interpol-operation-secure.html)
- [RedLine Stealer, Software S1240](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1240/)
- [Lumma Stealer, Software S1213](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1213/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2708
