# CSuite Phishing Operation Steals Microsoft 365 Sessions via Device-Code Phishing and Deploys ScreenConnect/Action1 RMM Tools Against US and EU Organizations

> ANY.RUN documented CSuite, a phishing-and-remote-access operation using Adobe, DocuSign, Zoom, Google Meet, Dropbox and Microsoft 365 lures that either steals Microsoft 365 credentials/sessions (including device-code OAuth phishing) or drops BAT/VBS/MSI installers for legitimate RMM agents (ScreenConnect, Action1, Atera, Syncro, PDQ Connect). 351 sandbox analyses across 170 hosts; 51% of submissions from the US, 18% from India.

- **Published:** 2026-09-30T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-09-30T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2802
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-csuite-m365-phishing-tl-2026-2802.webp?v=7db5a4b8 (Threadlinqs threat intel: CSuite Microsoft 365 Session Theft: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2802) — High severity, 31 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2802
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 31 (3 shown free below)

## Description

CSuite is a multi-path phishing operation reported by ANY.RUN (22 Sep 2026) and covered by The Hacker News on 30 Sep 2026. Victims receive document-themed lures (Adobe Document Cloud share invitations from hijacked Adobe tenants, DocuSign envelopes, Zoom/Google Meet invites, Dropbox documents, Microsoft 365 voicemail, SharePoint, Teams, WeTransfer, DocSend), delivered either through hijacked Adobe tenants or dedicated SMTP relays (PowerMTA on port 2525, DKIM published). Landing pages sit on operator domains and on compromised legitimate websites (e.g. an Australian escrow site) behind a shared anti-analysis gate, /m/js/utils.js (66 KB, header 'Enhanced CAPTCHA Protection Utilities'), reused across 170 hosts over roughly seven months. The gate filters on user-agent (crawler/automation and security-vendor signatures), IP blocklists and geolocation, browser fingerprinting, reCAPTCHA v3 score and human-interaction telemetry, and adds honeypot fields, suppressed dev-tools shortcuts and a resource-exhaustion trap.

Path 1 (endpoint): a counterfeit Adobe Reader/DocuSign viewer auto-triggers a synthetic download click and serves an archive (e.g. AdobePdf_Reader.zip containing ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi), a direct MSI, or a BAT/VBS dropper. The 324-byte batch dropper tests for admin rights, self-elevates through PowerShell Start-Process -Verb RunAs, and runs msiexec /i against a raw GitHub URL with /quiet /norestart. Other droppers write the installer to a temp directory and show a fake 'Application Error' popup. Installed agents register to operator-controlled tenants: ScreenConnect with a hardcoded relay, a credential-provider CLSID and an LSA authentication package (ScreenConnect.WindowsAuthenticationPackage.dll) that loads at boot and survives safe mode with networking; Action1, Atera, Syncro and PDQ Connect agents are staged under Adobe/Dotloop/Zoom names. One observed loader used a signed Adobe binary (SSAStatement.exe) that side-loads a substituted msvcp140.dll.

Path 2 (identity): traffic is routed by email provider. Microsoft accounts go to device-code OAuth pages (Next.js frontend calling /api/lure/config, /api/initiate and /api/status; the victim is sent to the real Microsoft device-login page and the operator receives access and refresh tokens without capturing a password), Google accounts go to a separate capture flow, and others go to a 'Chameleon' credential harvester (providers/chameleon.php) that impersonates the victim's organization with logos and screenshots. The 'CSuite v1.1' admin panel (host maillive.sbs) has Sessions, Adobe Sender, Offline File Generator, DocForge, Auto Redirect and Worker Links modules; Cloudflare workers.dev reverse proxies hide origin domains and a Telegram bot API reports each visitor. The panel showed 29 captured Microsoft 365 sessions, 1,593 documents sent through hijacked Adobe tenants, and 15,955 harvested email addresses; 216 unique Chameleon victims were seen. Captured mailboxes were worked by hand over a remote-desktop host, creating invoice-fraud and payment-redirection risk. ANY.RUN reports the operator accidentally sent hosting-panel and remote-desktop credentials to the same recipient on 7 Aug 2026, tying delivery and capture infrastructure together. No named threat actor is attributed in the sources. Targeted sectors: technology, manufacturing, government/administration, consulting, education and mortgage licensees.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
- T1547.002 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Authentication Package
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
- T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1556 Modify Authentication Process
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
- T1056.003 Input Capture: Web Portal Capture
- T1114.002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**CSuite — Endpoint Connections to Operator ScreenConnect Relays and Infrastructure** (`TL-2026-2802-SPL-003`)

Detects outbound connections to CSuite operator-controlled ScreenConnect servers/relays (ports 8040/8041), the hardcoded cloud relay instance-t7o41i-relay.screenconnect.com, and related panel, kit-origin and PowerMTA sending infrastructure, indicating an installed RMM agent is checking in to the operator.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1219, T1090.003
- **Data sources:** sysmon (EventCode 3), DeviceNetworkEvents
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=3 (DestinationIp IN ("207.189.19.40","91.92.41.114","212.189.40.73","155.254.26.180","64.204.180.203","185.174.102.34","190.123.46.122","188.127.227.18","141.133.174.208") OR DestinationHostname="*instance-t7o41i-relay.screenconnect.com" OR (Image="*ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe" DestinationPort IN (8040,8041))) ```ScreenConnect client beaconing to operator relay/infra``` | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(DestinationIp) as dest_ips values(DestinationPort) as ports values(DestinationHostname) as dest_hosts by host Image User | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let csuite_ips = dynamic(["207.189.19.40","91.92.41.114","212.189.40.73","155.254.26.180","64.204.180.203","185.174.102.34","190.123.46.122","188.127.227.18","141.133.174.208"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("ConnectionSuccess", "ConnectionAttempt")
| where RemoteIP in (csuite_ips)
    or RemoteUrl endswith "instance-t7o41i-relay.screenconnect.com"
    or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe" and RemotePort in (8040, 8041))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Connection to CSuite ScreenConnect Relay or Operator Infrastructure
id: 9c3f6b21-8e04-4d75-b1a9-5a7e2c4d8f03
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound connections to CSuite operator IPs, the hardcoded ScreenConnect cloud relay, or ScreenConnect client traffic on ports 8040/8041.
references:
    - https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/csuite-attack-analysis/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/09/30
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219
    - attack.t1090.003
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_ip:
        DestinationIp:
            - '207.189.19.40'
            - '91.92.41.114'
            - '212.189.40.73'
            - '155.254.26.180'
            - '64.204.180.203'
            - '185.174.102.34'
            - '190.123.46.122'
            - '188.127.227.18'
            - '141.133.174.208'
    selection_relay:
        DestinationHostname|endswith: 'instance-t7o41i-relay.screenconnect.com'
    selection_sc:
        Image|endswith: '\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe'
        DestinationPort:
            - 8040
            - 8041
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Your own sanctioned ScreenConnect instance if it listens on 8040/8041
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Sanctioned corporate ScreenConnect instance hosted on ports 8040/8041 (port-only branch)
- IP reuse if operator infrastructure is later reassigned

**Tuning notes:** IP/relay matches are high fidelity; the port-8040/8041 branch should be scoped to exclude your own ScreenConnect server. Refresh the IP list against updated ANY.RUN/TL indicators and pivot on the source host for msiexec/dropper activity.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- CSuite — Shared Anti-Analysis Gate [indicator] and Operator Lure Domains (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CSuite — LSA Authentication Package / Credential Provider Persistence via ScreenConnect (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CSuite — Unsanctioned RMM Agent Execution (ScreenConnect, Action1, Atera, Syncro, PDQ Connect) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CSuite — Lure Installer/Dropper File Creation (Fake Adobe/DocuSign Viewers, BAT/VBS) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CSuite — Signed Adobe Loader SSAStatement.exe Side-Loading Substituted msvcp140.dll (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CSuite — DNS Resolution of Operator Lure, Panel and ScreenConnect Relay Domains (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CSuite — Successful Entra ID Device-Code Sign-In (Token Theft Path) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CSuite — Silent msiexec Install From Remote/GitHub URL and PowerShell RunAs Self-Elevation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 31)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `207.189.19[.]40`
- Domain: `maillive[.]sbs`
- File hash: `c0eb04dcfa745653c466c34978a1f3b4e5041f526be8c2e46b8c722498ca746a`

Full set of 31 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [US-Focused CSuite Phishing Steals Microsoft 365 Sessions and Deploys RMM Tools for Remote Access](https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/us-focused-csuite-phishing-steals.html)
- [ANY.RUN: CSuite attack analysis](https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/csuite-attack-analysis/)
- [CSuite Targets US and EU with Session Theft and RMM Abuse, Expanding Fraud and Access Risk](https://cyberpress.org/csuite-targets-us-and-eu-with-session-theft-and-rmm-abuse-expanding-fraud-and-access-risk/)
- [CSuite Targets US and EU Organizations with Device-Code Phishing and Remote Access](https://www.hendryadrian.com/csuite-targets-us-and-eu-organizations-with-device-code-phishing-and-remote-access/)
- [RST Cloud threat report summary: CSuite Targets US and EU Organizations](https://x.com/rst_cloud/status/2102706937640939911)
- [Device code phishing hits 340+ Microsoft 365 organizations (background on the technique)](https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/device-code-phishing-hits-340-microsoft.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2802
