Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-2816
CVE-2026-74864 / CVE-2026-74865: Authentication bypass in YunoHost-Apps sogo_yhn (SOGo proxy-auth trust)
Two CWE-639 authentication-bypass flaws in the YunoHost-Apps sogo_yhn package (SOGo groupware for YunoHost) let an unauthenticated network attacker log in as any existing user, including administrators, either by sending a forged x-webobjects-remote-user header or by supplying any password over HTTP Basic auth.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2816, CVE-2026-74864, CVE-2026-74865 |
|---|---|
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| CVSS | 9.3 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | YunoHost-Apps sogo_yhn (sogo_ynh SOGo package for YunoHost) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-639 |
| Malware | CALENDAR - S0025 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1078 Valid Accounts, T1114 Email Collection, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1213 Data from Information Repositories, T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | technology, government administration, education, non-profit organisation |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-09-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2816 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 10 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: SOGo Forged x-webobjects-remote-user Header at Edge Proxy — CVE-2026-74864 Exploitation
Detects inbound requests to the SOGo/YunoHost edge Nginx that carry a client-supplied x-webobjects-remote-user header. The vulnerable sogo_ynh package (< 5.8.0~ynh9) trusts this header as a verified username and Nginx does not strip it, so any external client that sets it is logged in as that user, including administrators, with no password (CVE-2026-74864). The header is an internal proxy-to-SOGo header and should never appear on client requests. Requires the header to be captured in the Nginx log_format ($http_x_webobjects_remote_user) or by the WAF.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1190, T1550, T1078.003
- Data sources: nginx_access_log, web_application_firewall
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
```Comment: x-webobjects-remote-user must never arrive from a client; requires $http_x_webobjects_remote_user in the nginx log_format```
index=web (sourcetype="nginx:plus:kv" OR sourcetype="nginx:access" OR sourcetype="access_combined" OR source="/var/log/nginx/*access.log") earliest=-24h (http_x_webobjects_remote_user=* OR x_webobjects_remote_user=* OR "x-webobjects-remote-user")
| rex field=_raw "(?i)x[-_]webobjects[-_]remote[-_]user[^A-Za-z0-9@]{1,4}(?<raw_hdr_user>[A-Za-z0-9._@+-]+)"
| eval hdr_user=lower(coalesce(http_x_webobjects_remote_user, x_webobjects_remote_user, raw_hdr_user)), src_ip=coalesce(clientip, src_ip, src, remote_addr), uri=coalesce(uri_path, uri), ua=coalesce(http_user_agent, useragent), code=tonumber(status)
| where isnotnull(hdr_user) AND hdr_user!="-" AND (isnull(src_ip) OR NOT cidrmatch("127.0.0.0/8", src_ip))
| stats count AS requests min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen dc(hdr_user) AS identities values(hdr_user) AS claimed_users values(uri) AS uris values(code) AS status_codes values(ua) AS user_agents by src_ip, host
| eval likely_accepted=if(isnotnull(mvfind(status_codes, "^[23][0-9][0-9]$")), "yes", "no")
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - requestsMicrosoft KQL
// CVE-2026-74864: client-supplied x-webobjects-remote-user reaching the SOGo edge proxy
let lookback = 24h;
let hdrRegex = @'(?i)x[-_]webobjects[-_]remote[-_]user[^A-Za-z0-9@]{1,4}([A-Za-z0-9._@+-]+)';
let fromSyslog = Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where SyslogMessage has "x-webobjects-remote-user" or SyslogMessage has "x_webobjects_remote_user"
| extend ClientIP = extract(@'([0-9]{1,3}[.][0-9]{1,3}[.][0-9]{1,3}[.][0-9]{1,3}) [^ ]+ [^ ]+ [[]', 1, SyslogMessage), RawEvent = SyslogMessage, Source = "nginx-syslog"
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ClientIP, RawEvent, Source;
let fromWaf = CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where AdditionalExtensions has "x-webobjects-remote-user" or RequestContext has "x-webobjects-remote-user" or Message has "x-webobjects-remote-user"
| project TimeGenerated, Computer = DeviceName, ClientIP = SourceIP, RawEvent = strcat(RequestURL, " ", RequestContext, " ", AdditionalExtensions, " ", Message), Source = "waf-cef";
union fromSyslog, fromWaf
| extend ClaimedUser = tolower(extract(hdrRegex, 1, RawEvent))
| where isempty(ClientIP) or ipv4_is_in_range(ClientIP, "127.0.0.0/8") == false
| summarize Requests = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), ClaimedUsers = make_set(ClaimedUser, 25), IdentityCount = dcount(ClaimedUser), SampleEvent = take_any(RawEvent) by ClientIP, Computer, Source
| order by Requests descSigma
title: SOGo Client-Supplied x-webobjects-remote-user Header in Inbound Web Request
id: 1c9e5a37-8d24-4b6f-a3e1-52f0b7d94c18
status: experimental
description: 'Detects a web request logged with an x-webobjects-remote-user header from a non-loopback client. SOGo deployed by the YunoHost-Apps sogo_ynh package before 5.8.0~ynh9 treats this header as a verified user, so an external client that sets it authenticates as any account without a password (CVE-2026-74864). Requires the edge web server to log request headers.'
references:
- https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/CVE-2026-74864/
- https://forum.yunohost.org/t/sogo-critical-vulnerability-fixed-in-5-8-0-ynh9/42699
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-09-30
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1550
- attack.t1078.003
- cve.2026-74864
logsource:
category: webserver
product: nginx
detection:
keywords:
- 'x-webobjects-remote-user'
- 'x_webobjects_remote_user'
filter_loopback:
c-ip|cidr: '127.0.0.0/8'
condition: keywords and not filter_loopback
falsepositives:
- Edge proxy or SSO layer that legitimately sets the header before the access log is written
- Security scanners replaying the header during authorized vulnerability assessment
level: criticalKnown false positives:
- Edge Nginx/SSOwat legitimately injecting the header before the access log is written (it then appears on every request)
- Authorized vulnerability scans or red-team tests replaying the header
Tuning notes: Add $http_x_webobjects_remote_user to the Nginx log_format of the SOGo vhost first; without it the rule is blind. If your stack sets the header itself, allow-list by the internal proxy source IPs. Alert on any hit with 2xx/3xx status as probable account takeover and pivot to the claimed user's mailbox activity.
- SOGo Successful Basic-Auth Logins for Multiple Users from One Public IP — CVE-2026-74865 · unlock with TL Creds
- SOGo Basic-Auth Success from Previously Unseen Public Source for Existing User · unlock with TL Creds
- SOGo Preference, Filter, Forward, Vacation or Folder-Sharing Change from Public Source — Mailbox Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
- SOGo Forged x-webobjects-remote-user Header Impersonating a Privileged Account · unlock with TL Creds
- SOGo Repeated or Multi-Identity x-webobjects-remote-user Header Abuse from One Source · unlock with TL Creds
- SOGo / Nginx Trust-Proxy Configuration Tampering on YunoHost Host · unlock with TL Creds
- SOGo Session Identity Differs from Mailbox Owner Path — Post-Auth Account Impersonation · unlock with TL Creds
- SOGo Bulk Mail, Calendar and Contact Collection from Public Source · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-09-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 10 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2816.
Technical analysis
All versions before 5.8.0~ynh9 are affected; NVD scores them CVSS 4.0 9.3 and 9.2 (CRITICAL).
CERT Polska (published 2026-09-30, credit Przemysław Knycz / WeKrwi.IT) disclosed two authorization-bypass vulnerabilities (CWE-639, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key) in sogo_yhn, the YunoHost-Apps (sogo_ynh) package that deploys the SOGo groupware (mail, calendars, address books) on YunoHost self-hosted servers.
CVE-2026-74864: the package configures SOGo so that a request carrying the HTTP header x-webobjects-remote-user is treated as sent by a verified user, with no password validation. Because the Nginx front end does not strip this header from client requests, a remote attacker can supply it directly and access any account, including administrative accounts, without authenticating. NVD scores this CVSS 4.0 9.3 CRITICAL (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H).
CVE-2026-74865: the package enables SOGo with SOGoTrustProxyAuthentication=YES, which bypasses password verification during HTTP Basic authentication. An unauthenticated attacker who knows the username of an existing user can log in with any arbitrary password. NVD scores this CVSS 4.0 9.2 CRITICAL (AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H).
Background: SOGo's own documentation states SOGoTrustProxyAuthentication defaults to NO and warns that enabling it lets a misconfigured proxy or network weakness allow user impersonation through injected authentication headers; the setting should only be used where the proxy layer is fully controlled. In the YunoHost package the untrusted client-facing Nginx did not remove the trusted header, which is the root cause. The package's public nginx.conf proxies to 127.0.0.1 and sets other x-webobjects-* headers (server-protocol, remote-host, server-name, server-url, server-port) itself.
The YunoHost forum announced a critical SOGo package fix on 2026-07-29 with technical details embargoed for roughly one month; the fix is SOGo package 5.8.0~ynh9, which requires YunoHost >= 12.1.38 (YunoHost 11 users must upgrade YunoHost first). SSO integration is disabled until migration to SOGo 6. Users who could not upgrade at once were given temporary manual configuration workarounds. No in-the-wild exploitation, public PoC, or network IOCs are stated in any source; CERT Polska gives no CVSS, but NVD lists CVSS 4.0 scores for both CVEs. Impact is full read/write access to a victim mailbox, calendar and contacts, and possibly SOGo administrative functions.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Privilege Escalation
Collection
T1114 Email Collection; T1213 Data from Information Repositories
Initial Access
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
lateral-movement
Remediation
Patches
- YunoHost-Apps sogo_ynh 5.8.0~ynh9 (requires YunoHost >= 12.1.38)
Immediate actions
- Upgrade the YunoHost SOGo package (sogo_ynh) to 5.8.0~ynh9 or later and restart the server after the update
- If YunoHost is v11, first upgrade YunoHost to >= 12.1.38, which the fixed package requires
- If patching is delayed, apply the temporary manual configuration workaround from the YunoHost forum notice
- Hunt web/Nginx logs for external requests carrying an x-webobjects-remote-user header and for SOGo Basic-auth logins that succeeded with a wrong password (analyst recommendation)
Workarounds
- Temporary manual configuration workaround published in the YunoHost forum announcement; SSO is disabled until migration to SOGo 6
Longer-term hardening
- Ensure any reverse proxy strips client-supplied x-webobjects-* authentication headers before forwarding to SOGo
- Keep SOGoTrustProxyAuthentication at its default NO unless the proxy layer is fully controlled
- Review mailboxes, forwarding rules and calendar/contact access for accounts that may have been accessed unauthenticated (analyst recommendation)
Affected and fixed versions
- YunoHost-Apps — sogo_yhn (sogo_ynh SOGo package for YunoHost)
Vulnerable versions: all versions before 5.8.0~ynh9
Fixed in: 5.8.0~ynh9
Timeline
- Fixed package sogo_ynh 5.8.0~ynh9 available (requires YunoHost >= 12.1.38); SSO disabled until migration to SOGo 6; temporary manual workarounds offered
- YunoHost forum announces a critical SOGo package vulnerability, urging upgrade to 5.8.0~ynh9; technical details withheld under an embargo planned for about one month
- Approximate end of the one-month disclosure embargo planned in the forum notice (planned date, not a confirmed publication)
- CVE-2026-74865 published with CVSS 4.0 base score 9.2 CRITICAL: SOGoTrustProxyAuthentication=YES lets any password pass HTTP Basic auth for an existing username
- CVE-2026-74864 published with CVSS 4.0 base score 9.3 CRITICAL: forged x-webobjects-remote-user header accepted as a verified user
- CERT Polska publishes the advisory for CVE-2026-74864 and CVE-2026-74865 (CWE-639), crediting Przemysław Knycz of WeKrwi.IT
Sources cited
- Vulnerabilities in YunoHost-Apps sogo_yhn software (CERT Polska) cert.pl · Advisory · 2026-09-30
- NVD - CVE-2026-74864 NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2026-09-30
- NVD - CVE-2026-74865 NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2026-09-30
- CVE Record CVE-2026-74864 (cve.org) CVE Program · Advisory · 2026-09-30
- CVE Record CVE-2026-74865 (cve.org) CVE Program · Advisory · 2026-09-30
- SOGo critical vulnerability fixed in 5.8.0~ynh9 (YunoHost forum) forum.yunohost.org · Vendor report · 2026-07-29
- SOGo Installation Guide - SOGoTrustProxyAuthentication sogo.nu · Vendor report · 2026-09-30
- CERT Polska coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy cert.pl · Research · 2026-09-30
- YunoHost-Apps/sogo_ynh package repository GitHub · Code repository · 2026-09-30
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.