Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-2892
Forgeable Session Cookie (Hard-Coded HMAC Secret) in Yard Management System Bypasses Entra ID MFA and Enables User and Admin Impersonation
Resecurity found that a supply-chain yard management system (YMS) signed its custom session cookie with a hard-coded HMAC secret identical to the cookie name, and the signed value was a user's publicly exposed database identifier (CUID). An unauthenticated attacker could forge sessions for arbitrary users, including administrators, without a password, fresh MFA approval, or Entra ID token; 95 of 241 tested accounts were impersonated during an authorized assessment.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2892 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Unnamed (not disclosed) Supply-chain Yard Management System (YMS) platform with custom signed-session-cookie auth and Entra ID SSO |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-798, CWE-327, CWE-287 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts, T1087 Account Discovery, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1550.004 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie, T1565.001 Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information, T1606.001 Forge Web Credentials: Web Cookies |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | logistics, supply-chain, transport, manufacturing |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2892 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 15 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: YMS Forged Session Cookie Enumeration - Many Distinct Signed Payloads From One Client
Detects a single client presenting many distinct session_secret_example signed cookie values in a short window. The YMS cookie (s:<CUID>.<HMAC-SHA256>) was signed with a hard-coded secret equal to the cookie name, so an attacker who harvests user CUIDs can mint cookies for arbitrary users; Resecurity cycled 241 user IDs and 95 were accepted. One source cycling cookies across many identities is the exploitation and enumeration signature of the forgery.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1606.001, T1550.004, T1190
- Data sources: web_access_logs (nginx:plus:kv, ms:iis:auto, access_combined), AppServiceHTTPLogs, sigma:webserver
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
```YMS forged session cookie enumeration - many distinct signed payloads from one client```
index=web sourcetype IN ("nginx:plus:kv","ms:iis:auto","access_combined") http_cookie="*session_secret_example=*" earliest=-24h
| rex field=http_cookie "session_secret_example=s(?:%3A|:)(?<cookie_payload>[^.;]+)[.](?<cookie_sig>[^;]+)"
| where isnotnull(cookie_payload)
| bin _time span=10m
| stats dc(cookie_payload) as distinct_identities count as requests count(eval(status=200)) as accepted count(eval(status=401 OR status=403)) as rejected values(uri_path) as paths by _time, src
| where distinct_identities>=20
| sort - distinct_identitiesMicrosoft KQL
AppServiceHTTPLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Cookie has 'session_secret_example='
| extend CookiePayload = extract(@'session_secret_example=s(?:%3A|:)([^.;]+)[.]', 1, Cookie)
| where isnotempty(CookiePayload)
| summarize DistinctIdentities = dcount(CookiePayload), Requests = count(), Accepted = countif(ScStatus == 200), Rejected = countif(ScStatus in (401, 403)), Paths = make_set(CsUriStem, 20) by CIp, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
| where DistinctIdentities >= 20
| project TimeGenerated, CIp, DistinctIdentities, Requests, Accepted, Rejected, PathsSigma
title: YMS Session Cookie Request - Base For Enumeration Correlation
id: 6b1f3c52-8d4a-4e0b-9a77-2c5d1e8f3a10
name: yms_session_cookie_request
status: experimental
description: Base rule matching web requests that carry the YMS session_secret_example signed session cookie. Consumed by the correlation rule below and not intended to alert on its own.
references:
- https://www.resecurity.com/blog/article/session-cookie-authentication-bypass-predictable-signing-secret-enableds-account-impersonations
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-04
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
cs-cookie|contains: 'session_secret_example='
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate users of the application
level: informational
---
title: YMS Forged Session Cookie Enumeration - Many Distinct Cookie Values From One Client
id: 0c7a9e14-3b52-4f68-b1d0-9e4a6c2f7b31
status: experimental
description: Detects one client IP presenting 20 or more distinct session_secret_example cookie values within 10 minutes, consistent with cookie forgery across harvested user CUIDs against a yard management system signing sessions with a hard-coded HMAC secret.
references:
- https://www.resecurity.com/blog/article/session-cookie-authentication-bypass-predictable-signing-secret-enableds-account-impersonations
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-04
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1606.001
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1550.004
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
correlation:
type: value_count
rules:
- yms_session_cookie_request
group-by:
- c-ip
timespan: 10m
condition:
gte: 20
field: cs-cookie
falsepositives:
- Large corporate NAT or proxy egress where many real users share one source IP
- Authorized penetration tests or security assessments of the application
level: highKnown false positives:
- Shared NAT/proxy egress with many real users behind one IP
- Authorized penetration test or vulnerability assessment
Tuning notes: Requires the Cookie request header to be logged (nginx $http_cookie, IIS cs(Cookie), App Service Cookie column) and the cookie value is sensitive, so hash or truncate it at ingest. Raise or lower the 20-identity threshold per tenant size, allowlist known NAT egress IPs, and adjust the index/sourcetype names to your environment.
- YMS Unauthenticated Swagger [indicator] Access Followed By API Route Enumeration · unlock with TL Creds
- YMS Application Session Without Corresponding Entra ID Sign-In (MFA Bypass) · unlock with TL Creds
- YMS Entra Refresh Token Exposure Followed By Non-Interactive Sign-In From New IP · unlock with TL Creds
- YMS Session Cookie Bearing Known Hard-Coded Secret Observed (Vulnerable App Fingerprint) · unlock with TL Creds
- YMS Admin Directory Lookup Endpoints Accessed (CUID Disclosure) · unlock with TL Creds
- YMS Multiple Identities Accepted On [indicator] From One Client · unlock with TL Creds
- YMS Forged Session State-Changing Admin/API Requests From Multi-Identity Client · unlock with TL Creds
- YMS User CUID Harvesting Via User Detail Endpoint Enumeration · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 15 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2892.
Technical analysis
Resecurity identified the weakness during authorized testing of a staging deployment of a yard management system (YMS) platform used to coordinate supply-chain and yard operations. The application used Microsoft Entra ID (MSAL) single sign-on with MFA for login, but after authentication it relied on a custom signed-session cookie named session_secret_example. The cookie has the form s:<payload>.<signature> (URL-encoded), with an HMAC-SHA256 signature produced via the Node.js cookie-signature library. The signing secret was the literal string session_secret_example, identical to the cookie name, and was recovered by an offline search of roughly 110 candidate values against known payload/signature pairs.
The signed payload was not a random server-side session identifier but the user's database identifier (CUID), which the application exposed publicly. CUIDs were obtainable from the authenticated-user endpoint /api/v1/auth/me, user list/detail endpoints, createdBy/updatedBy fields in API responses, the /admin/lookups/app-users and /admin/lookups/employee-users directory endpoints, and the login role/type selection flow. Knowing a target CUID and the secret, an attacker could mint a valid cookie for that user; neither value should have been sufficient to establish an authenticated session. Both the API and the Next.js administrative SPA accepted the forged sessions, so the Entra ID SSO/MFA step was never enforced on the forged path. The flaw is in the custom application session layer, not in Microsoft Entra ID itself.
Impact was demonstrated by impersonating 95 of 241 tested user IDs, including elevated accounts (a Yard Marshall, a Technician and a SUPER_USER were shown returning HTTP 200), and by a forged administrator session performing a state-changing API request whose changes persisted in staging (test records were restored afterward). Additional exposure: the /api/v1/auth/me response returned the authenticated user's Entra refresh token, and an unauthenticated Swagger UI at /api-docs/ exposed the full 251-route API surface. Reported stack: Node.js/Express, express-openapi-validator, Next.js, Prisma/PostgreSQL, MSAL. No CVE, CVSS score, vendor name, or in-the-wild exploitation was reported; severity is analyst-assigned.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Initial Access
T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Discovery
Credential Access
T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1606.001 Forge Web Credentials: Web Cookies
lateral-movement
T1550.004 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie
Impact
T1565.001 Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation
Reconnaissance
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Rotate the session-signing secret immediately (e.g. openssl rand -base64 48)
- Invalidate all active sessions and refresh tokens
- Remove Entra refresh tokens from /api/v1/auth/me and other API responses
- Review authentication logs for unauthorized session creation, impersonation, token exposure and administrative activity
Workarounds
- Block or alert on requests presenting the session_secret_example cookie until the secret is rotated
Longer-term hardening
- Replace self-contained identity-bearing cookies with random server-side session identifiers (e.g. Redis-backed session store)
- Use separate high-entropy secrets for each environment
- Enforce short session lifetimes
- Bind sensitive actions to step-up authentication
- Restrict or authenticate the Swagger/OpenAPI interface at /api-docs/
Affected and fixed versions
- Unnamed (not disclosed) — Supply-chain Yard Management System (YMS) platform with custom signed-session-cookie auth and Entra ID SSO
Vulnerable versions: Assessed staging deployment (version not disclosed)
Timeline
Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source
- Varonis publishes Cookie-Bite research on session-cookie theft bypassing Entra ID MFA (related, distinct technique: cookie theft rather than forgery)
- Resecurity describes the finding as a coordinated vulnerability disclosure to the vendor; a Python proof-of-concept that forges the cookie for a target CUID is published. No CVE or public vendor advisory identified.
- Resecurity publishes 'Session Cookie Authentication Bypass: Predictable Signing Secret Enables Account Impersonation' on its blog
- Findings also show /api/v1/auth/me returning the user's Entra refresh token and an unauthenticated Swagger UI at /api-docs/ exposing 251 routes
- Forged cookies impersonate 95 of 241 tested user IDs, including a Yard Marshall, Technician and SUPER_USER; forged admin session performs a persisted state-changing API request (test records restored)
- Resecurity identifies the forgeable session cookie flaw during authorized testing of a YMS staging environment; HMAC secret recovered by offline search of ~110 candidates
- Cyber Security News, GBHackers and Cryptika publish coverage; no CVE, vendor name, patch or in-the-wild exploitation reported
Update history
- 2026-10-05 — Authentication Bypass in Yard Management System (YMS) Platform Allows Impersonation of 95 Users Without Passwords or MFA via Forged Session Cookies (Hard-Coded HMAC Secret): What changed No severity, exploitability or status change; the newer report's CRITICAL/ACTIVE labels are restatements of identical facts with no new evidence (no in-the-wild exploitation, no CVSS), so existing values are kept.
Sources cited
- MITRE ATT&CK T1550.004 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie MITRE · Advisory · 2026-10-02
- MITRE ATT&CK T1606.001 Forge Web Credentials: Web Cookies MITRE · Advisory · 2026-10-02
- Session Cookie Authentication Bypass: Predictable Signing Secret Enables Account Impersonation (Resecurity) resecurity.com · Research · 2026-10-01
- Cookie-Bite: How Your Digital Crumbs Let Threat Actors Bypass MFA (Varonis, related session-cookie MFA bypass) varonis.com · Research · 2025-05-19
- Session Cookie Vulnerability Lets Attackers Bypass Entra ID MFA and Impersonate Users (Cyber Security News) cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-10-02
- Authentication Bypass Successfully Impersonated 95 Users Without Passwords or MFA (GBHackers) gbhackers.com · News · 2026-10-02
- Session Cookie Vulnerability Lets Attackers Bypass Entra ID MFA and Impersonate Users (Cryptika) cryptika.com · News · 2026-10-02
- Predictable Session Cookie Secret Enabled Entra MFA Bypass and Account Impersonation (Mallory) mallory.ai · News · 2026-10-02
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated .