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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-2893

QuoIntelligence Weekly Snapshot W32 2026: DOUBLECUP ClickFix loader, UTA0533 SonicWall SMA1000 zero-day chain (CVE-2026-15409/15410), Greatness AiTM/device-code PhaaS, EtherRAT blockchain C2

highACTIVE

QuoIntelligence's week 32 2026 snapshot (30 Jul - 5 Aug 2026) groups four active campaigns: the DOUBLECUP loader-as-a-service driving ClickFix lures that deliver CountLoader and DeviceManager RAT, UTA0533 exploiting SonicWall SMA 1000 zero-days CVE-2026-15409 and CVE-2026-15410 for root access, the Greatness PhaaS adding device-code phishing to Microsoft 365 AiTM, and a The Gentlemen ransomware affiliate running EtherRAT with C2 domains rotated through an Ethereum smart contract.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2893, CVE-2026-15409, CVE-2026-15410
Also known asQuoIntelligence Weekly Snapshot W32 2026, Pass-ta-key, Silver Pass-ta-key, Golden Pass-ta-key
SeverityHIGH
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2026-15409 (added ), CVE-2026-15410 (added )
EPSSCVE-2026-15410: 76.3% (99.4th percentile)
Affected productsSonicWall Secure Mobile Access (SMA) 1000 series; Microsoft Microsoft 365 / Entra ID (targeted by Greatness AiTM and device-code phishing); Google Chrome Google Password Manager synced passkeys on Windows with TPM (Pass-ta-key)
AttributionThe Gentlemen, DOUBLECUP operators, Greatness PhaaS Operators (low confidence)
MalwareCountLoader, DOUBLECUP, DeviceManager, EtherRAT, ORANGETAIL
ToolsChisel, Sliver - S0633, Suo5
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, T1027.003 Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography, T1040 Network Sniffing, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1055 Process Injection, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python, T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1090 Proxy, T1098.005 Account Manipulation: Device Registration, T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver and 13 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsenergy, finance, government administration, industrials, information-technology, retail, transport
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources11 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-06, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2893 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 29 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: SonicWall SMA 1000 Post-Exploitation Artifacts - ROOTRUN, KNUCKLEBALL, init.d Tampering, LDAP Capture

Detects UTA0533 post-exploitation on the SMA 1000 Linux appliance: the ROOTRUN setuid binary /usr/bin/xzfind, the KNUCKLEBALL loader deploy_new.py that injects Suo5 and ORANGETAIL Java payloads into a SonicWall process, modification of /etc/init.d/workplace for persistence, setuid bit changes, and tcpdump captures of LDAP traffic used to harvest cleartext credentials.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1548.001, T1059.006, T1055, T1040
  • Data sources: linux_audit, syslog, sonicwall_sma_1000_appliance_audit_logs
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=linux sourcetype IN ("linux_audit","syslog") earliest=-24h ("xzfind" OR "deploy_new.py" OR "/etc/init.d/workplace" OR "tcpdump" OR "chmod")
| eval indicator=case(
    match(_raw,"(?i)xzfind"), "ROOTRUN setuid binary xzfind",
    match(_raw,"(?i)deploy_new\.py"), "KNUCKLEBALL loader deploy_new.py",
    match(_raw,"(?i)/etc/init\.d/workplace") AND match(_raw,"(?i)(sed |tee |chmod| cp | mv |nametype=CREATE)"), "Modification of /etc/init.d/workplace",
    match(_raw,"(?i)tcpdump") AND match(_raw,"(?i)(port 389|port 636|port 3268|ldap)"), "tcpdump capture of LDAP traffic",
    match(_raw,"(?i)chmod\s+(u\+s|[4-7][0-7]{3})\s") AND match(_raw,"(?i)(/usr/bin|/usr/sbin|/tmp|/var/tmp)"), "Setuid bit set on a binary")
| where isnotnull(indicator)
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen values(indicator) as indicators dc(indicator) as distinct_indicators values(user) as users by host
| eval risk=if(distinct_indicators>=2,"critical","high")
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - distinct_indicators - count

Microsoft KQL

// SMA 1000 appliance syslog forwarded via AMA / CEF-Syslog connector
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| extend Msg = tolower(SyslogMessage)
| extend Indicator = case(
    Msg has "xzfind", "ROOTRUN setuid binary xzfind",
    Msg has "deploy_new.py", "KNUCKLEBALL loader deploy_new.py",
    Msg has "/etc/init.d/workplace" and Msg has_any ("sed","tee","chmod","cp","mv"), "Modification of /etc/init.d/workplace",
    Msg has "tcpdump" and Msg has_any ("port 389","port 636","port 3268","ldap"), "tcpdump capture of LDAP traffic",
    Msg has "chmod" and Msg has_any ("u+s","4755","4777","6755"), "Setuid bit set on a binary",
    "")
| where isnotempty(Indicator)
| summarize Events = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Indicators = make_set(Indicator), Samples = make_set(SyslogMessage, 5) by Computer, HostIP
| extend DistinctIndicators = array_length(Indicators)
| order by DistinctIndicators desc, Events desc

Sigma

title: SonicWall SMA 1000 UTA0533 Post-Exploitation Artifacts on Linux
id: b4d2a7e3-9c58-4f2b-8d46-3a8e7f1c2b22
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of the ROOTRUN setuid binary xzfind, the KNUCKLEBALL loader deploy_new.py, edits to /etc/init.d/workplace, and tcpdump capture of LDAP traffic on a compromised SonicWall SMA 1000 appliance.
references:
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2026/07/17/
    - https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-sonicwall-sma1000-uta0533-zeroday-20260725/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/04
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.006
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1040
    - cve.2026-15410
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_rootrun:
        Image|endswith: '/xzfind'
    selection_knuckleball:
        CommandLine|contains: 'deploy_new.py'
    selection_initd:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/sed'
            - '/tee'
            - '/vi'
            - '/vim'
            - '/nano'
            - '/chmod'
            - '/cp'
            - '/mv'
        CommandLine|contains: '/etc/init.d/workplace'
    selection_tcpdump:
        Image|endswith: '/tcpdump'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'port 389'
            - 'port 636'
            - 'port 3268'
            - 'ldap'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Appliance administrators or SonicWall support capturing LDAP traffic for troubleshooting
    - Firmware or hotfix installation scripts rewriting init scripts
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • SonicWall support or an administrator running tcpdump against LDAP ports during troubleshooting
  • Vendor hotfix or firmware installers legitimately editing /etc/init.d/workplace

Tuning notes: The SMA 1000 has no EDR, so coverage depends on forwarding auditd or syslog off the appliance. The compromised appliance was rebooted on 2026-07-02, clearing memory artifacts, so alert on the file and command indicators and keep off-box log history. The xzfind and deploy_new.py indicators have effectively no legitimate baseline and can be alerted on directly.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • ClickFix Run-Dialog Execution - DOUBLECUP Browser-Cache PNG Extraction and Hidden Download-Execute · unlock with TL Creds
  • EtherRAT Installation and Persistence - cons_c1.0.1.msi, MicrosoftSltt, WindowsHost Run Key, Scheduled-Task MSI Deployment · unlock with TL Creds
  • Operator Infrastructure and Tunneling Tools - Sliver, Chisel, Ligolo-ng and Known C2/Staging IPs · unlock with TL Creds
  • Microsoft 365 Device-Code Sign-In and Greatness AiTM Proxy Authentication · unlock with TL Creds
  • LSASS Credential Dumping and ESET Service Disablement by Ransomware Affiliate · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra Device Registration Following Device-Code or AiTM Sign-In - Greatness Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • SonicWall SMA 1000 Exploitation Chain (CVE-2026-15409/15410) and ORANGETAIL Web Shell Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • EtherHiding C2 Resolution - Ethereum RPC and Rotating EtherRAT Domain Lookups from Node.js/Python · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-06, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 29 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2893.

Sample indicators (3 of 29)

  • IP address: 193.233.202[.]17
  • Domain: publisherresolution[.]com
  • File hash: ee6807a8abfabced22ee026e178a28da64d13cc3408e224394ff6e5782fb9e1d

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 29 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

29 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

2 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

The QuoIntelligence snapshot (published 2026-08-06) is headline-only; technical detail below comes from the primary vendor and press reporting behind each headline.

DOUBLECUP: a Russian loader-as-a-service active since early June 2026 that supports ClickFix campaigns. Lure pages impersonating NetSuite, Odoo, HubSpot and Salesforce logins present a fake CAPTCHA/verification and copy a command to the clipboard. The command (findstr or certutil per reporting) extracts hidden code from a steganographic PNG that the victim's browser has cached; the final payload is decrypted in memory using the victim's public IPv4 address as part of the key (environmental keying), with a custom SHA-256 stream cipher, CIS locale checks and self-deletion. Payloads are an updated CountLoader (Windows PowerShell and macOS variants; wallet, extension and Signal Desktop checks; scheduled-task or LaunchAgent persistence; can fetch MSI, PowerShell and DLL payloads) and a previously undocumented Python-based DeviceManager RAT that resolves its C2 through blockchain smart contracts (EtherHiding) and uses DNS for tasking. A licensing panel open directory was seen at 213.139.77.109:9090 and a Telegram bot is used for key distribution.

UTA0533 / SonicWall SMA 1000: Volexity tracks UTA0533 as exploiting two zero-days since at least 2026-06-22, about three weeks before disclosure. CVE-2026-15409 (CVSS 10.0) is a pre-authentication /wsproxy bypass (SSRF) that yields an unauthenticated WebSocket tunnel to localhost services; CVE-2026-15410 (CVSS 7.2) is a path traversal in the ctrl-service remove_hotfix workflow giving root command execution. The actor abused CouchDB on loopback, then deployed ROOTRUN (setuid binary, /usr/bin/xzfind), KNUCKLEBALL (Python loader deploy_new.py that injects Java components into a legitimate SonicWall process), the open-source Suo5 HTTP proxy and ORANGETAIL (custom Behinder-like Java web shell, AES-128, required specific User-Agent 'SMA Connect Agent'). Persistence was via modified /etc/init.d/workplace and NGINX Unit config; tcpdump was used to capture unencrypted LDAP credentials. Attribution is unconfirmed; Volexity describes tradecraft as more consistent with state-sponsored activity. Rapid7 reported significant overlap and a public PoC exists; a secondary source reports INC Ransomware weaponizing the same chain. Fixed firmware: 12.4.3-03453 or 12.5.0-02835.

Greatness: a phishing-as-a-service platform (documented since 2023) now offers both AiTM token/cookie theft and OAuth device-code phishing against Microsoft 365, with iCloud, Yahoo and Google Workspace also targeted. ZeroBEC observed a RingCentral voicemail lure using a five-stage redirect chain with CAPTCHA gating and abuse of safe-sender exclusions; proxy IP 38.248.95.214 authenticated to a victim account more than two weeks after the lure, followed by Graph API enumeration, device registration for persistence and delayed malicious inbox rules.

EtherRAT / The Gentlemen: hunt.io (2026-08-04) documents a The Gentlemen ransomware affiliate deploying EtherRAT (Node.js implant, MSI installer) via ClickFix initial access discovered 2026-06-16. EtherRAT reads its C2 domain from an Ethereum smart contract (checked roughly every 5 minutes) through hardcoded public RPC endpoints, so each domain rotation is permanently recorded on-chain. The operator also used Sliver, Chisel, Ligolo-ng, Mimikatz, LSASS dumping, Potato-family privilege escalation, created accounts, disabled ESET services and moved laterally by SMB/scheduled-task MSI deployment.

Also listed in the snapshot: Pass-ta-key attacks, where malware already on a Windows endpoint abuses Chrome's TPM-backed identity key to hijack Google synced passkeys. The snapshot's item on Claude models attacking real systems during misconfigured evaluations and its geopolitical items are out of scope for this record.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory; T1040 Network Sniffing; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Defense Evasion

T1027.003 Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography; T1055 Process Injection; T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec; T1620 Reflective Code Loading

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1098.005 Account Manipulation: Device Registration; T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell; T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python; T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript; T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy; T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver; T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

Privilege Escalation

T1548.001 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Patches

  • SonicWall SMA 1000 firmware 12.4.3-03453 or 12.5.0-02835

Immediate actions

  • Patch SonicWall SMA 1000 to 12.4.3-03453 or 12.5.0-02835; review /wsproxy log entries and LDAP access between 2026-06-22 and 2026-07-14
  • Reimage compromised SMA appliances from known-clean firmware and rotate all credentials and session secrets associated with them
  • Hunt for xzfind, deploy_new.py, modified /etc/init.d/workplace and /workplace/error.jsp artifacts on SMA 1000 appliances
  • Block the listed IPs and EtherRAT C2 domains; alert on outbound requests to the listed Ethereum RPC endpoints from non-developer hosts
  • Alert on clipboard-pasted findstr/certutil/PowerShell commands launched from Run dialog or terminal following a browser CAPTCHA page

Workarounds

  • Block OAuth device authorization flow with Conditional Access where not required
  • Ensure CouchDB default credentials are changed and loopback services are not reachable from exposed interfaces

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2) and token-protection controls for Microsoft 365
  • Restrict or disable the Windows Run dialog and user-run script interpreters via policy where feasible
  • Audit safe-sender exclusions for vendor domains such as RingCentral
  • Enforce EDR tamper protection to resist security-service disablement

Affected and fixed versions

  • SonicWall — Secure Mobile Access (SMA) 1000 series
    Vulnerable versions: Versions prior to 12.4.3-03453 / 12.5.0-02835
    Fixed in: 12.4.3-03453; 12.5.0-02835
  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365 / Entra ID (targeted by Greatness AiTM and device-code phishing)
  • Google — Chrome Google Password Manager synced passkeys on Windows with TPM (Pass-ta-key)

Timeline

  • Earliest observed EtherRAT C2 domain (locked-ioc-8) written to the Ethereum contract; further rotations on 04-28, 06-12, 06-18 and 07-01 (hunt.io)
  • DOUBLECUP loader-as-a-service reported operating since early June 2026
  • hunt.io dates exposure of the Gentlemen affiliate's ClickFix-led EtherRAT campaign
  • Earliest UTA0533 exploitation of SonicWall SMA 1000 zero-days (ROOTRUN artifact creation), about three weeks pre-disclosure
  • Compromised SMA appliance rebooted, clearing memory artifacts; actor deployed packet capture against LDAP traffic
  • SonicWall publicly discloses CVE-2026-15409 and CVE-2026-15410; CISA adds them to the KEV catalog (per CSA research note)
  • Volexity publishes 'Proxying to Compromise: SonicWall Secure Mobile Access 0-day Exploitation' attributing activity to UTA0533; Rapid7 reports overlap and releases a PoC
  • Second US victim of the EtherRAT/The Gentlemen intrusion disclosed (first disclosed 2026-05-09)
  • hunt.io publishes EtherRAT analysis; THN, BleepingComputer and SOCRadar publish DOUBLECUP analysis
  • QuoIntelligence publishes the Week 32 snapshot covering 30 Jul - 5 Aug 2026; Greatness device-code update and Pass-ta-key reporting circulate the same week

Sources cited

More from The Gentlemen

Other reports on CVE-2026-15409

Previous and next in threat intel

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 11 sources; published ; last updated —.

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