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Threat reportData BreachTL-2026-2908

Snowflake customer-account extortion campaign (UNC5537): Canadian suspect Connor Riley Moucka pleads guilty

highMONITORING

Connor Riley Moucka (26, Kitchener, Ontario; aliases "Judische", "Waifu") pleaded guilty in August 2026 to computer fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft and conspiracy over the 2024 Snowflake customer-account extortions. Using infostealer-sourced credentials against Snowflake accounts lacking MFA, the group breached at least 165 organizations and received over $2.5 million in ransom; sentencing is set for October 27, 2026.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2908
Also known asSnowflake data theft and extortion campaign, UNC5537 Snowflake campaign
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsSnowflake Snowflake customer accounts (no MFA, no network policy)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-308, CWE-798
AttributionUNC5537 (high confidence)
MalwareLUMMA, MetaStealer, RACOON STEALER, REDLINE, RisePro, Vidar
ToolsDBeaver Ultimate, FROSTBITE
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1074.002 Data Staged: Remote Data Staging, T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts, T1119 Automated Collection, T1213.006 Data from Information Repositories: Databases, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server, T1589.001 Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials, T1650 Acquire Access, T1657 Financial Theft
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstelecoms, entertainment, retail, finance, automotive
Target regionsNorth America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-04, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2908 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Snowflake Login From Known UNC5537 Source IP — Exploitation Phase

Flags Snowflake login events (successful or failed) from the client IPs Mandiant and Snowflake published as UNC5537 infrastructure (45.27.26.205, 37.19.210.21, 104.223.91.28, 198.54.135.99, 184.147.100.29). A successful hit means infostealer-sourced credentials were replayed against the account. These indicators date from 2024, so also run this over the full 365-day LOGIN_HISTORY retention as a retro-hunt. The TL_OSINT_Scan run found no community corroboration for these IPs, so treat them as vendor-tier indicators.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1078.004, T1583.003
  • Data sources: snowflake:login_history, SNOWFLAKE.ACCOUNT_USAGE.LOGIN_HISTORY
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=snowflake sourcetype="snowflake:login_history" (CLIENT_IP IN ("45.27.26.205","37.19.210.21","104.223.91.28","198.54.135.99","184.147.100.29") OR client_ip IN ("45.27.26.205","37.19.210.21","104.223.91.28","198.54.135.99","184.147.100.29"))
| eval src_ip=coalesce(CLIENT_IP, client_ip), user=upper(coalesce(USER_NAME, user_name))
| stats count AS attempts sum(eval(if(upper(IS_SUCCESS)="YES",1,0))) AS successes values(src_ip) AS src_ips values(REPORTED_CLIENT_TYPE) AS client_types values(REPORTED_CLIENT_VERSION) AS client_versions min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY user
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - successes

Microsoft KQL

let IocIps = dynamic(["45.27.26.205","37.19.210.21","104.223.91.28","198.54.135.99","184.147.100.29"]);
Snowflake_LoginHistory_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where tostring(CLIENT_IP) in (IocIps)
| summarize Attempts = count(), Successes = countif(IS_SUCCESS =~ "YES"), ClientTypes = make_set(REPORTED_CLIENT_TYPE), ClientVersions = make_set(REPORTED_CLIENT_VERSION), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by USER_NAME, ClientIp = tostring(CLIENT_IP)
| order by Successes desc

Sigma

title: Snowflake Login From Known UNC5537 Source IP
id: 3f9a6b1e-52c4-4d7a-8e0b-1a2c9d4e6f70
status: experimental
description: Detects Snowflake login events whose client IP matches addresses published by Snowflake and Mandiant as UNC5537 infrastructure.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc5537-snowflake-data-theft-extortion
    - https://www.hunters.security/en/blog/detect-threats-in-snowflake-unc5537
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-04
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.003
logsource:
    product: snowflake
    service: login_history
detection:
    selection:
        client_ip:
            - '45.27.26.205'
            - '37.19.210.21'
            - '104.223.91.28'
            - '198.54.135.99'
            - '184.147.100.29'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Shared VPN or ISP addresses reassigned to legitimate users since 2024
level: high

Known false positives:

  • IP addresses from shared VPN or ISP pools that were reassigned to legitimate users after 2024
  • Security team replaying the published IOC list as a test

Tuning notes: Run once over the full 365-day retention, then keep it scheduled every 15 minutes. Field-name case depends on how login history is ingested (Splunk DB Connect usually keeps upper case); the search coalesces both. Extend the IP list from the Snowflake IOC advisory and your own login baselines. Any successful hit should trigger an immediate credential reset and a review of QUERY_HISTORY for that user.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Single-Factor Snowflake Login From VPN Or Hosting Ranges — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Snowflake Automated Bulk Unload Burst With Reconnaissance — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • MEGA Cloud Storage Traffic From Hosts Running Snowflake Client Tools — Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
  • Snowflake Session From UNC5537-Associated Client Application ID — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Browser Credential Store Access By Non-Browser Process (Infostealer Precursor) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Snowflake Stage Unload Referencing Sensitive Identity Or Financial Fields — Collection And Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
  • Snowflake Temporary Stage Creation And gzip CSV Bulk Unload — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Snowflake Stage Unload Followed By GET Download In One Session — Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-04, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2908.

Sample indicators (3 of 20)

  • IP address: 45.27.26[.]205
  • IP address: 37.19.210[.]21
  • IP address: 104.223.91[.]28

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

20 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

This record tracks the legal resolution of a 2024 data-theft and extortion campaign that Mandiant tracks as UNC5537. Between February and October 2024, the actors logged in to Snowflake customer accounts with valid credentials that had previously been stolen by infostealer malware (Mandiant names VIDAR, RISEPRO, REDLINE, RACOON STEALER, LUMMA and METASTEALER). Victim accounts generally lacked multi-factor authentication, had credentials that were never rotated (some valid since 2020), and had no network allow-list. Mandiant and Snowflake attributed the activity to credential theft on customer-side or contractor systems, not to a breach of Snowflake's own platform; roughly 165 organizations were notified in May-June 2024.

On access, the actors used the Snowflake web UI (SnowSight), SnowSQL, DBeaver Ultimate over JDBC, and an attacker-built reconnaissance utility named "rapeflake" (tracked by Mandiant as FROSTBITE; .NET and Java variants plus Python connector use). Observed SQL included SHOW TABLES, LIST/LS on stages, CREATE TEMPORARY STAGE, COPY INTO a stage as gzip CSV, and GET to download the staged files. Connections were routed through commercial VPNs (Mullvad, Private Internet Access) and a Moldovan VPS provider (ALEXHOST SRL, AS200019), and stolen data was stored on MEGA and advertised for sale on cybercrime forums.

Per the August 2026 plea coverage (Krebs on Security, The Register, Security Affairs, Infosecurity Magazine), the conspirators used automated software to search the compromised cloud environments for banking records, payroll data, passport/driver's licence numbers, Social Security numbers and DEA registration numbers, then threatened to publish the data unless victims paid. Initial demands were at least $6 million; payments totalled roughly 36 Bitcoin (over $2.5 million), of which Moucka personally gained at least $495,000, and the group re-extorted at least one victim months after it paid in May 2024. Reported direct victim losses exceed $9.5 million. Named victims include Ticketmaster (Live Nation), Santander, AT&T (call and text records of 100+ million customers), Lending Tree, Advance Auto Parts and Neiman Marcus. Moucka reportedly also threatened government officials and security researchers using stolen personnel data.

Moucka was arrested in Canada in October 2024 in an investigation involving Canadian, Australian, Spanish, Ukrainian and Turkish authorities. Co-conspirators named in reporting are Cameron Wagenius ("Kiberphant0m", a U.S. Army soldier who pleaded guilty in July 2025; sentencing reported as set for September 3, 2026) and John Erin Binns ("IRDev"/"IntelSecrets", indicted, reported at large in Turkey). Moucka faces a mandatory minimum of two years on the identity-theft count and up to 30 years on the remaining counts. Note: sources differ on the plea date (August 5 vs August 6, 2026) and on the extradition date, so neither is asserted here beyond what each cites. This is a legal development on a 2024 campaign; correlate with any prior Snowflake/UNC5537 coverage.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1074.002 Data Staged: Remote Data Staging; T1119 Automated Collection; T1213.006 Data from Information Repositories: Databases; T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

Initial Access

T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

Credential Access

T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Resource Development

T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server; T1650 Acquire Access

Reconnaissance

T1589.001 Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Run Snowflake's published IOC and login-history hunting queries over the full retention window (365 days) for logins from listed IPs and the client application IDs below
  • Disable and rotate credentials for any Snowflake user showing access from unexpected IPs, VPN/VPS ranges or unapproved client applications
  • Review ACCESS_HISTORY/QUERY_HISTORY for CREATE TEMPORARY STAGE, COPY INTO @stage and GET activity indicating bulk export

Workarounds

  • Use Snowflake account-level policies to require MFA and restrict network access until per-user controls are rolled out

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce MFA for all human Snowflake users and prefer SSO/key-pair auth for service accounts
  • Configure Snowflake network policies (IP allow-lists) at account and user level
  • Rotate credentials on a schedule and monitor for infostealer exposure of employee and contractor credentials
  • Alert on anomalous query volume, new client application IDs and data-egress spikes

Affected and fixed versions

  • Snowflake — Snowflake customer accounts (no MFA, no network policy)
    Vulnerable versions: Customer accounts with single-factor authentication and unrotated credentials
    Fixed in: Accounts enforcing MFA and network policies

Timeline

  • Earliest infostealer infection date Mandiant associated with a credential later used by UNC5537 (month precision).
  • Per the indictment-based reporting, the Snowflake customer-account intrusion and extortion campaign begins (February 2024; month precision).
  • Mandiant's example log shows a DBeaver Ultimate (JDBC 3.13.30) login from locked-ioc-5; Snowflake saw increased threat activity from mid-April 2024.
  • Mandiant contacts Snowflake after receiving intelligence on stolen database records; victim notification begins.
  • Snowflake publishes detection and hardening guidance including IOCs and investigative queries.
  • Mandiant publishes its UNC5537 report: ~165 organizations notified, FROSTBITE tool, infostealer-sourced credentials, no MFA.
  • Connor Riley Moucka arrested in Canada in a multinational investigation (Canada, Australia, Spain, Ukraine, Turkey); month precision.
  • Co-conspirator Cameron Wagenius (Kiberphant0m) pleads guilty (July 2025; month precision).
  • Moucka pleads guilty to computer fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft and conspiracy (sources cite Aug 5 or Aug 6, 2026).
  • Sentencing for Wagenius was reported as scheduled for this date; outcome not confirmed in the sources reviewed.
  • Moucka sentencing scheduled; mandatory minimum 2 years on identity theft count, up to 30 years on remaining counts.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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