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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-3024

MonsterCloud CEO Zohar Pinhasi charged with wire fraud over secretly paying ransoms while claiming proprietary decryption

mediumTRACKING

A US indictment (EDNY, returned Sept 23, 2026) charges Zohar Pinhasi, aka "Zack Silver"/"Zack Green", CEO of Florida-based ransomware recovery firm MonsterCloud LLC, with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and two counts of wire fraud. Prosecutors allege he told victims the firm used proprietary decryption technology while actually contacting attackers and buying decryption keys, facilitating over $8 million in ransom payments and billing victims over $19 million between June 2018 and June 2023.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3024
Also known asMonsterCloud ransomware recovery fraud, United States v. Zohar Pinhasi
SeverityMEDIUM
Affected productsMonsterCloud LLC Ransomware remediation / data recovery services (customers in the US and Canada)
AttributionMonsterCloud LLC (medium confidence)
MalwareDharma Ransomware, Gotcha, Nozelesn, dharma
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1036 Masquerading, T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1585 Establish Accounts, T1585.001 Social Media Accounts, T1656 Impersonation, T1657 Financial Theft, T1684.001 Impersonation
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsgovernment administration, police - law enforcement, small-business, enterprise
Target regionsNorth America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3024 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Exposed RDP Brute Force Followed by Successful External Logon — Dharma Initial Access

Detects an external source that fails authentication many times against a host and then completes a RemoteInteractive (RDP, logon type 10) logon. Exposed or weakly protected RDP is the long-documented entry point for Dharma-family ransomware, the family cited in the MonsterCloud reporting. A hit means a victim-side intrusion that, in the scenario this case describes, ends with a pressured ransom-payment decision.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1110.001, T1133, T1021.001
  • Data sources: windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: medium

Splunk SPL

index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" (EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624) earliest=-24h
| eval src=coalesce(Source_Network_Address, src_ip)
| where isnotnull(src) AND src!="-" AND src!="::1" AND src!="127.0.0.1" AND NOT cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", src) AND NOT cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12", src) AND NOT cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", src)
| eval outcome=case(EventCode=4625, "fail", EventCode=4624 AND Logon_Type=10, "rdp_success", true(), "other")
| where outcome!="other"
| stats count(eval(outcome="fail")) AS failures count(eval(outcome="rdp_success")) AS rdp_successes dc(Account_Name) AS accounts min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY src, host
| where failures>=20 AND rdp_successes>=1
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - failures

Microsoft KQL

let BruteSources = DeviceLogonEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType == 'LogonFailed'
    | where isnotempty(RemoteIP) and not(ipv4_is_private(RemoteIP))
    | summarize Failures = count(), TargetedAccounts = dcount(AccountName), FirstFail = min(Timestamp) by RemoteIP, DeviceName
    | where Failures >= 20;
DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == 'LogonSuccess' and LogonType == 'RemoteInteractive'
| join kind=inner BruteSources on RemoteIP, DeviceName
| where Timestamp > FirstFail
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RemoteIP, Failures, TargetedAccounts
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: External RDP Logon to Host (Dharma Initial Access Exposure)
id: a1d4e6f2-3b7c-4a58-9e21-6c0f8b3d7a15
status: experimental
description: Detects a successful RemoteInteractive (RDP) logon from a non-private source address. Exposed RDP is the documented initial-access path for Dharma-family ransomware cited in the MonsterCloud reporting. Pair with failed-logon volume (4625) from the same source in the SIEM to separate brute-force success from approved remote access.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/
    - https://features.propublica.org/ransomware/ransomware-attack-data-recovery-firms-paying-hackers
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-08
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1110.001
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1021.001
    - attack.tool.dharma
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 10
    filter_internal:
        IpAddress|cidr:
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
    filter_local:
        IpAddress:
            - '-'
            - '::1'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators or vendors using approved remote access over a VPN-less RDP path
    - Jump hosts and bastions that legitimately accept external RDP
level: medium

Known false positives:

  • Approved vendor or admin RDP from public addresses
  • Bastion or jump hosts that intentionally accept external RDP

Tuning notes: Tune the failure threshold (default 20) and add your VPN egress and approved-vendor ranges to the exclusions. The Sigma form fires on every external RDP success because Sigma has no native thresholds; apply the failed-logon correlation downstream. RDP as the Dharma entry point is family tradecraft from public ransomware reporting, not something the indictment documents.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account)
  • Recovery Inhibition and Defender Tampering Before Encryption · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ransomware Dropper Persistence — Run Key or Startup Folder Write From User-Writable Path · unlock with TL Creds
  • Recovery-Vendor Brand Impersonation — Lookalike Domains and Persona Aliases in Inbound Mail · unlock with TL Creds
  • Pre-Encryption Service and Process Termination With Event Log Clearing · unlock with TL Creds
  • Tor Client Launched on Endpoint — Possible Undisclosed Ransom Negotiation Channel · unlock with TL Creds
  • Dharma Ransom Note Dropped Across Multiple Directories · unlock with TL Creds
  • Dharma/Nozelesn Ransomware Encrypted-File Artifacts — Impact and Ransom Extortion · unlock with TL Creds
  • Contact With Charged Ransomware-Recovery Vendor MonsterCloud — Third-Party Risk · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3024.

Sample indicators (1 of 25)

  • Domain: monstercloud[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

25 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

On September 23, 2026 a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of New York indicted Zohar Pinhasi, 50, a US and Israeli national also known as "Zack Silver" and "Zack Green", owner and CEO of MonsterCloud LLC, a Florida-based ransomware remediation company. He was arraigned on October 7, 2026 and, per BleepingComputer, released on a $2 million bond. The charges are one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and two counts of wire fraud, each carrying a statutory maximum of 20 years. These are allegations; the defendant has not been convicted.

According to the Justice Department, MonsterCloud advertised that it could decrypt ransomware using "proprietary tools" and "advanced decryption techniques" and presented itself as an alternative to paying the attackers. Prosecutors allege that in practice Pinhasi and co-conspirators usually contacted and paid the cybercriminals who had victimized the client in exchange for a decryption key, did not disclose this, and then billed the client far more than the ransom. Between June 2018 and June 2023 the scheme allegedly facilitated more than $8 million in ransom payments while billing hundreds of companies in the United States and Canada more than $19 million. Two examples in the indictment: a ransom of about $8,200 billed to the victim at about $150,000, and a ransom of about $236,000 billed at about $380,000. US Attorney Joseph Nocella Jr. said that by falsely claiming to decrypt ransomware without paying the ransomers, the defendant re-victimized his clients. The FBI investigated; prosecutors are Brian Mund and Vasantha Rao (DOJ CCIPS) and AUSAs Alexander Mindlin and Lindsey Oken.

The conduct was publicly questioned years earlier. A 2019 ProPublica investigation ("The Trade Secret") reported that MonsterCloud and Proven Data Recovery claimed in-house technology but typically obtained decryption tools by paying attackers, and that MonsterCloud refused to explain its methods as "trade secrets". ProPublica documented MonsterCloud's "Don't Pay the Ransom" marketing, the use of the alias "Zack Green" with inflated titles, roughly 58 suspicious five-star Google reviews under celebrity-sounding names, and law-enforcement testimonials (Lauderdale County MS, Trumann AR police, Lamar County TX) for incidents including a Dharma ransomware attack for which researchers Fabian Wosar and Michael Gillespie said no public decryptor existed. A December 2016 sting by Wosar ("Operation Bleeding Cloud") found MonsterCloud claiming it could decrypt families that were undecryptable.

No ransomware groups, CVEs, or technical IOCs are named in the indictment coverage. The intelligence value is third-party and ransomware-ecosystem risk: recovery vendors that silently pay extortionists create undisclosed payment flows, sanctions/OFAC exposure, repeat-targeting risk and inflated costs. Defender takeaways: contractually require disclosure of any contact with or payment to threat actors, verify decryptor claims independently (for example No More Ransom), and keep law enforcement and counsel in the loop on any payment decision.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1036 Masquerading; T1656 Impersonation; T1684.001 Impersonation

Impact

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1657 Financial Theft

Resource Development

T1585 Establish Accounts; T1585.001 Social Media Accounts

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Ask any ransomware recovery or negotiation vendor in writing whether they have contacted, negotiated with or paid threat actors on your behalf
  • Review past incident-response invoices for ransom payments passed through at a markup or without disclosure

Workarounds

  • Independently verify decryptor claims against public resources such as No More Ransom before engaging a vendor
  • Victims who engaged MonsterCloud between June 2018 and June 2023 should preserve invoices and communications and report to the FBI

Longer-term hardening

  • Contract IR and recovery vendors with explicit disclosure, no-payment-without-consent, and audit-right clauses
  • Pre-vet ransomware recovery vendors and route payment decisions through legal counsel, insurers and law enforcement (FBI/IC3)
  • Maintain tested offline backups so vendor claims of proprietary decryption are not the only recovery path

Affected and fixed versions

  • MonsterCloud LLC — Ransomware remediation / data recovery services (customers in the US and Canada)
    Vulnerable versions: Engagements June 2018 - June 2023 (alleged)

Timeline

Last updated · 4 updates · revalidated 4× · latest source

  • Researcher Fabian Wosar's "Operation Bleeding Cloud" sting (December 2016) finds MonsterCloud claiming it can decrypt ransomware families that have no public decryptor (per ProPublica).
  • Lauderdale County (MS) and Lamar County (TX) sheriff's offices become MonsterCloud clients and later give testimonials claiming recovery without ransom payment (ProPublica).
  • Start of the period (June 2018 - June 2023) in which prosecutors allege MonsterCloud secretly paid attackers for decryption keys while advertising proprietary decryption.
  • Wosar's April 2019 GOTCHA sting of recovery firms; MonsterCloud does not respond to the inquiry while Proven Data and Red Mosquito are shown negotiating with the fake attacker.
  • May 2019 (day approximate): in a paid-testimonial exchange Pinhasi allegedly admitted MonsterCloud held no proprietary technology to decrypt ransomware data.
  • ProPublica publishes "The Trade Secret", reporting that MonsterCloud and Proven Data typically pay ransoms despite claiming proprietary technology, and documenting aliases and suspicious Google reviews.
  • October 2021 (day approximate): Pinhasi allegedly paid about $236,000 in ransom and charged the customer about $380,000.
  • End of the alleged scheme period (June 2023); over $8 million in ransoms facilitated and over $19 million billed to hundreds of US and Canadian clients.
  • Example cited by prosecutors: around August 2023 MonsterCloud allegedly paid an attacker about $8,200 and charged the client about $150,000.
  • The DOJ release says the alleged scheme continued through at least August 2023, later than the June 2023 end date reported by BleepingComputer.
  • May 2026 (day approximate): two former Sygnia/DigitalMint employees sentenced to four years each for BlackCat/ALPHV affiliate activity while working in ransomware response; related ecosystem context, not part of this case.
  • Federal grand jury in the Eastern District of New York indicts Zohar Pinhasi on one count of wire fraud conspiracy and two counts of wire fraud.
  • Pinhasi is arraigned; DOJ announces the charges and BleepingComputer reports release on a $2 million bond. Each count carries up to 20 years.
  • The Register reports the case, noting the indictment references unidentified co-conspirators including MonsterCloud employees and contractors, and that Pinhasi pleaded not guilty at arraignment.

Update history

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated .

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