Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-3024
MonsterCloud CEO Zohar Pinhasi charged with wire fraud over secretly paying ransoms while claiming proprietary decryption
A US indictment (EDNY, returned Sept 23, 2026) charges Zohar Pinhasi, aka "Zack Silver"/"Zack Green", CEO of Florida-based ransomware recovery firm MonsterCloud LLC, with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and two counts of wire fraud. Prosecutors allege he told victims the firm used proprietary decryption technology while actually contacting attackers and buying decryption keys, facilitating over $8 million in ransom payments and billing victims over $19 million between June 2018 and June 2023.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3024 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | MonsterCloud ransomware recovery fraud, United States v. Zohar Pinhasi |
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| Affected products | MonsterCloud LLC Ransomware remediation / data recovery services (customers in the US and Canada) |
| Attribution | MonsterCloud LLC (medium confidence) |
| Malware | Dharma Ransomware, Gotcha, Nozelesn, dharma |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1036 Masquerading, T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1585 Establish Accounts, T1585.001 Social Media Accounts, T1656 Impersonation, T1657 Financial Theft, T1684.001 Impersonation |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | government administration, police - law enforcement, small-business, enterprise |
| Target regions | North America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 7 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3024 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Exposed RDP Brute Force Followed by Successful External Logon — Dharma Initial Access
Detects an external source that fails authentication many times against a host and then completes a RemoteInteractive (RDP, logon type 10) logon. Exposed or weakly protected RDP is the long-documented entry point for Dharma-family ransomware, the family cited in the MonsterCloud reporting. A hit means a victim-side intrusion that, in the scenario this case describes, ends with a pressured ransom-payment decision.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1110.001, T1133, T1021.001
- Data sources: windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: medium
Splunk SPL
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" (EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624) earliest=-24h
| eval src=coalesce(Source_Network_Address, src_ip)
| where isnotnull(src) AND src!="-" AND src!="::1" AND src!="127.0.0.1" AND NOT cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", src) AND NOT cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12", src) AND NOT cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", src)
| eval outcome=case(EventCode=4625, "fail", EventCode=4624 AND Logon_Type=10, "rdp_success", true(), "other")
| where outcome!="other"
| stats count(eval(outcome="fail")) AS failures count(eval(outcome="rdp_success")) AS rdp_successes dc(Account_Name) AS accounts min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY src, host
| where failures>=20 AND rdp_successes>=1
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - failuresMicrosoft KQL
let BruteSources = DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == 'LogonFailed'
| where isnotempty(RemoteIP) and not(ipv4_is_private(RemoteIP))
| summarize Failures = count(), TargetedAccounts = dcount(AccountName), FirstFail = min(Timestamp) by RemoteIP, DeviceName
| where Failures >= 20;
DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == 'LogonSuccess' and LogonType == 'RemoteInteractive'
| join kind=inner BruteSources on RemoteIP, DeviceName
| where Timestamp > FirstFail
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RemoteIP, Failures, TargetedAccounts
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: External RDP Logon to Host (Dharma Initial Access Exposure)
id: a1d4e6f2-3b7c-4a58-9e21-6c0f8b3d7a15
status: experimental
description: Detects a successful RemoteInteractive (RDP) logon from a non-private source address. Exposed RDP is the documented initial-access path for Dharma-family ransomware cited in the MonsterCloud reporting. Pair with failed-logon volume (4625) from the same source in the SIEM to separate brute-force success from approved remote access.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/
- https://features.propublica.org/ransomware/ransomware-attack-data-recovery-firms-paying-hackers
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-08
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1133
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1110.001
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.001
- attack.tool.dharma
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 10
filter_internal:
IpAddress|cidr:
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
- '127.0.0.0/8'
filter_local:
IpAddress:
- '-'
- '::1'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Administrators or vendors using approved remote access over a VPN-less RDP path
- Jump hosts and bastions that legitimately accept external RDP
level: mediumKnown false positives:
- Approved vendor or admin RDP from public addresses
- Bastion or jump hosts that intentionally accept external RDP
Tuning notes: Tune the failure threshold (default 20) and add your VPN egress and approved-vendor ranges to the exclusions. The Sigma form fires on every external RDP success because Sigma has no native thresholds; apply the failed-logon correlation downstream. RDP as the Dharma entry point is family tradecraft from public ransomware reporting, not something the indictment documents.
- Recovery Inhibition and Defender Tampering Before Encryption · unlock with TL Creds
- Ransomware Dropper Persistence — Run Key or Startup Folder Write From User-Writable Path · unlock with TL Creds
- Recovery-Vendor Brand Impersonation — Lookalike Domains and Persona Aliases in Inbound Mail · unlock with TL Creds
- Pre-Encryption Service and Process Termination With Event Log Clearing · unlock with TL Creds
- Tor Client Launched on Endpoint — Possible Undisclosed Ransom Negotiation Channel · unlock with TL Creds
- Dharma Ransom Note Dropped Across Multiple Directories · unlock with TL Creds
- Dharma/Nozelesn Ransomware Encrypted-File Artifacts — Impact and Ransom Extortion · unlock with TL Creds
- Contact With Charged Ransomware-Recovery Vendor MonsterCloud — Third-Party Risk · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3024.
Sample indicators (1 of 25)
- Domain:
monstercloud[.]com
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
On September 23, 2026 a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of New York indicted Zohar Pinhasi, 50, a US and Israeli national also known as "Zack Silver" and "Zack Green", owner and CEO of MonsterCloud LLC, a Florida-based ransomware remediation company. He was arraigned on October 7, 2026 and, per BleepingComputer, released on a $2 million bond. The charges are one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and two counts of wire fraud, each carrying a statutory maximum of 20 years. These are allegations; the defendant has not been convicted.
According to the Justice Department, MonsterCloud advertised that it could decrypt ransomware using "proprietary tools" and "advanced decryption techniques" and presented itself as an alternative to paying the attackers. Prosecutors allege that in practice Pinhasi and co-conspirators usually contacted and paid the cybercriminals who had victimized the client in exchange for a decryption key, did not disclose this, and then billed the client far more than the ransom. Between June 2018 and June 2023 the scheme allegedly facilitated more than $8 million in ransom payments while billing hundreds of companies in the United States and Canada more than $19 million. Two examples in the indictment: a ransom of about $8,200 billed to the victim at about $150,000, and a ransom of about $236,000 billed at about $380,000. US Attorney Joseph Nocella Jr. said that by falsely claiming to decrypt ransomware without paying the ransomers, the defendant re-victimized his clients. The FBI investigated; prosecutors are Brian Mund and Vasantha Rao (DOJ CCIPS) and AUSAs Alexander Mindlin and Lindsey Oken.
The conduct was publicly questioned years earlier. A 2019 ProPublica investigation ("The Trade Secret") reported that MonsterCloud and Proven Data Recovery claimed in-house technology but typically obtained decryption tools by paying attackers, and that MonsterCloud refused to explain its methods as "trade secrets". ProPublica documented MonsterCloud's "Don't Pay the Ransom" marketing, the use of the alias "Zack Green" with inflated titles, roughly 58 suspicious five-star Google reviews under celebrity-sounding names, and law-enforcement testimonials (Lauderdale County MS, Trumann AR police, Lamar County TX) for incidents including a Dharma ransomware attack for which researchers Fabian Wosar and Michael Gillespie said no public decryptor existed. A December 2016 sting by Wosar ("Operation Bleeding Cloud") found MonsterCloud claiming it could decrypt families that were undecryptable.
No ransomware groups, CVEs, or technical IOCs are named in the indictment coverage. The intelligence value is third-party and ransomware-ecosystem risk: recovery vendors that silently pay extortionists create undisclosed payment flows, sanctions/OFAC exposure, repeat-targeting risk and inflated costs. Defender takeaways: contractually require disclosure of any contact with or payment to threat actors, verify decryptor claims independently (for example No More Ransom), and keep law enforcement and counsel in the loop on any payment decision.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1036 Masquerading; T1656 Impersonation; T1684.001 Impersonation
Impact
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1657 Financial Theft
Resource Development
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Ask any ransomware recovery or negotiation vendor in writing whether they have contacted, negotiated with or paid threat actors on your behalf
- Review past incident-response invoices for ransom payments passed through at a markup or without disclosure
Workarounds
- Independently verify decryptor claims against public resources such as No More Ransom before engaging a vendor
- Victims who engaged MonsterCloud between June 2018 and June 2023 should preserve invoices and communications and report to the FBI
Longer-term hardening
- Contract IR and recovery vendors with explicit disclosure, no-payment-without-consent, and audit-right clauses
- Pre-vet ransomware recovery vendors and route payment decisions through legal counsel, insurers and law enforcement (FBI/IC3)
- Maintain tested offline backups so vendor claims of proprietary decryption are not the only recovery path
Affected and fixed versions
- MonsterCloud LLC — Ransomware remediation / data recovery services (customers in the US and Canada)
Vulnerable versions: Engagements June 2018 - June 2023 (alleged)
Timeline
Last updated · 4 updates · revalidated 4× · latest source
- Researcher Fabian Wosar's "Operation Bleeding Cloud" sting (December 2016) finds MonsterCloud claiming it can decrypt ransomware families that have no public decryptor (per ProPublica).
- Lauderdale County (MS) and Lamar County (TX) sheriff's offices become MonsterCloud clients and later give testimonials claiming recovery without ransom payment (ProPublica).
- Start of the period (June 2018 - June 2023) in which prosecutors allege MonsterCloud secretly paid attackers for decryption keys while advertising proprietary decryption.
- Wosar's April 2019 GOTCHA sting of recovery firms; MonsterCloud does not respond to the inquiry while Proven Data and Red Mosquito are shown negotiating with the fake attacker.
- May 2019 (day approximate): in a paid-testimonial exchange Pinhasi allegedly admitted MonsterCloud held no proprietary technology to decrypt ransomware data.
- ProPublica publishes "The Trade Secret", reporting that MonsterCloud and Proven Data typically pay ransoms despite claiming proprietary technology, and documenting aliases and suspicious Google reviews.
- October 2021 (day approximate): Pinhasi allegedly paid about $236,000 in ransom and charged the customer about $380,000.
- End of the alleged scheme period (June 2023); over $8 million in ransoms facilitated and over $19 million billed to hundreds of US and Canadian clients.
- Example cited by prosecutors: around August 2023 MonsterCloud allegedly paid an attacker about $8,200 and charged the client about $150,000.
- The DOJ release says the alleged scheme continued through at least August 2023, later than the June 2023 end date reported by BleepingComputer.
- May 2026 (day approximate): two former Sygnia/DigitalMint employees sentenced to four years each for BlackCat/ALPHV affiliate activity while working in ransomware response; related ecosystem context, not part of this case.
- Federal grand jury in the Eastern District of New York indicts Zohar Pinhasi on one count of wire fraud conspiracy and two counts of wire fraud.
- Pinhasi is arraigned; DOJ announces the charges and BleepingComputer reports release on a $2 million bond. Each count carries up to 20 years.
- The Register reports the case, noting the indictment references unidentified co-conspirators including MonsterCloud employees and contractors, and that Pinhasi pleaded not guilty at arraignment.
Update history
- 2026-10-09 — MonsterCloud Owner Zohar Pinhasi Charged With Wire Fraud for Secretly Paying Ransoms While Billing Clients for 'Proprietary' Decryption: What changed No field escalation. Severity (MEDIUM), exploitability (NONE) and status are left as is, because the newer report adds no evidence that supports changing them.
- 2026-10-09 — DOJ Charges MonsterCloud Ransomware Recovery CEO Zohar Pinhasi with Wire Fraud for Secretly Paying Ransoms: What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution change. This update is purely additive context. New indicators (3) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-10-09 — MonsterCloud CEO Zohar Pinhasi Indicted for Ransomware Recovery Fraud Scheme (Undisclosed Ransom Payments Billed as Proprietary Decryption): What changed No field escalations. Severity MEDIUM, exploitability NONE and status are unchanged; the newer report's MONITORING status is not an escalation over TRACKING.
- 2026-10-08 — MonsterCloud ransomware recovery fraud: CEO Zohar Pinhasi charged with secretly paying ransoms while claiming proprietary decryption: What changed No severity/exploitability change. Alleged scheme window extended from June 2023 to at least August 2023 per the DOJ release; Pinhasi pleaded not guilty at arraignment.
Sources cited
- Known Cybersecurity Expert and Owner of Florida Ransomware Remediation Company Charged (DOJ Office of Public Affairs) justice.gov · Advisory · 2026-10-07
- Owner of Florida Ransomware Remediation Company Charged with Defrauding Clients (USAO EDNY) justice.gov · Advisory · 2026-10-07
- The Trade Secret: Firms That Promised High-Tech Ransomware Solutions Almost Always Just Pay the Hackers (ProPublica) features.propublica.org · Research · 2019-05-07
- Sting Catches Another Ransomware Firm, Red Mosquito, Negotiating With "Hackers" (ProPublica) propublica.org · Research · 2019-07-03
- THE TRADE SECRET (Emsisoft mirror) emsisoft.com · Blog · 2019-05-08
- Ransomware recovery CEO charged over secret ransom payments (BleepingComputer) BleepingComputer · News · 2026-10-07
- Grifty "information security" companies promised they could decrypt ransomware-locked computers (Boing Boing) boingboing.net · News · 2019-05-16
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated .