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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-3076

ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) Path Traversal Leading to Remote Code Execution (CVE-2021-3199) Exploited in the Wild

highACTIVE

CVE-2021-3199 is a path traversal flaw in the /upload endpoint of ONLYOFFICE Document Server before 5.6.3 (when JWT is used) that allows unauthenticated remote code execution via a /.. sequence in an image upload parameter. CISA added it to the KEV catalog on 2026-10-08 and HKCERT reports active exploitation. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3076, CVE-2021-3199
Also known asONLYOFFICE Docs Server Path Traversal Vulnerability
SeverityHIGH
CVSS9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
First disclosed
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2021-3199 (added )
EPSSCVE-2021-3199: 14.5% (96.5th percentile)
Affected productsONLYOFFICE Document Server (ONLYOFFICE Docs)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-22
Toolspoc_uploadImageFile.py
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell, T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1489 Service Stop, T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell, T1571 Non-Standard Port, T1574 Hijack Execution Flow, T1585.001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts, T1588.005 Exploits, T1595.002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstechnology, government administration, education, professional services
Target regionsGlobal, Asia Pacific
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3076 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 6 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: ONLYOFFICE Document Server Process Spawning Shell or Interpreter — Post-Exploitation

Detects the ONLYOFFICE docservice, converter, x2t or docbuilder processes (or the node runtime under the 'ds' service account) spawning a shell or scripting interpreter. After CVE-2021-3199 triggers the planted file through /docbuilder, command execution occurs in the context of the Document Server process tree; legitimate operation never spawns an interactive shell.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1059.004, T1059.006, T1190
  • Data sources: sysmon:linux, DeviceProcessEvents, linux process_creation
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=linux sourcetype="sysmon:linux" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
```Sysmon for Linux process creation: Document Server parent spawning a shell/interpreter```
| eval parent=lower(ParentImage), child=lower(Image)
| where match(parent, "/(docservice|converter|x2t|docbuilder)$|/onlyoffice/documentserver/") OR (match(parent, "/node$") AND User IN ("ds", "onlyoffice"))
| where match(child, "/(sh|bash|dash|zsh|ash|python[0-9.]*|perl|ruby)$")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen values(CommandLine) as commands values(Image) as children by host, User, ParentImage
| convert ctime(first_seen)
| sort - count

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ('docservice', 'converter', 'x2t', 'docbuilder')
    or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has '/onlyoffice/documentserver/'
    or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'node' and AccountName in~ ('ds', 'onlyoffice'))
| where FileName in~ ('sh', 'bash', 'dash', 'zsh', 'ash', 'python', 'python2', 'python3', 'perl', 'ruby')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: ONLYOFFICE Document Server Process Spawns Shell or Script Interpreter
id: e4c07a93-6b12-4d58-9f3e-81a5d2c7b640
status: experimental
description: Detects ONLYOFFICE Document Server components (docservice, converter, x2t, docbuilder, or node run as the ds service account) spawning a shell or scripting interpreter, indicating command execution following exploitation of CVE-2021-3199.
references:
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3199
  - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-3199
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/09
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.004
  - attack.t1059.006
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1190
  - cve.2021-3199
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/sh'
      - '/bash'
      - '/dash'
      - '/zsh'
      - '/ash'
      - '/python'
      - '/python2'
      - '/python3'
      - '/perl'
      - '/ruby'
  selection_parent_bin:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '/docservice'
      - '/converter'
      - '/x2t'
      - '/docbuilder'
  selection_parent_path:
    ParentImage|contains: '/onlyoffice/documentserver/'
  selection_parent_node:
    ParentImage|endswith: '/node'
    User:
      - 'ds'
      - 'onlyoffice'
  condition: selection_child and 1 of selection_parent_*
falsepositives:
  - Vendor maintenance or upgrade scripts run from the Document Server install tree
  - Administrators running documented generate-allfonts or configuration helper scripts
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Vendor font-generation or maintenance helper scripts launched from the Document Server install tree
  • Administrators debugging as the ds service account

Tuning notes: Requires Linux process telemetry (Sysmon for Linux, auditd execve or MDE for Linux). Baseline legitimate helper scripts (e.g. documentserver-generate-allfonts.sh) for exclusion by CommandLine. Containerized deployments may need the container image or process path adjusted.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • ONLYOFFICE Traversal Upload Followed by /docbuilder Trigger (CVE-2021-3199) — Exploitation Chain · unlock with TL Creds
  • File Write to ONLYOFFICE FileConverter/bin or Web-Executable Content in Install Tree — Persistence/Hijack · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound Connections to Public IPs from ONLYOFFICE Processes on Non-Standard Ports or via Shells — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Scripted/Scanner Client Targeting ONLYOFFICE Upload and docbuilder Endpoints — Recon and Public PoC Use · unlock with TL Creds
  • Download, Transfer or Discovery Commands Run by ONLYOFFICE Service Account — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • ONLYOFFICE Document Server Service Stop or Process Kill — Impact · unlock with TL Creds
  • ONLYOFFICE Document Server Upload Path Traversal (CVE-2021-3199) — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Reverse Shell Command Lines from ONLYOFFICE Service Context — C2 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 6 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3076.

6 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

CVE-2021-3199 is a directory traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in the /upload handler of ONLYOFFICE Document Server (ONLYOFFICE Docs) versions earlier than 5.6.3, reachable when JWT authentication is enabled, via a /.. sequence in an image upload parameter. NVD scores it CVSS v3.1 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) and CVSS v2.0 7.5. The vendor changelog for Document Server 5.6.3 records the fix as 'Fix Path Traversal vulnerability via image upload params (Bug #46113)'. The same changelog shows a recurring class of file-handling path-traversal fixes in preceding releases: 5.6.2 fixed traversal via the savefile parameter (Bug #46037), 5.6.1 fixed traversal via the Convert Service parameter (Bug #45976), and 5.5.3 fixed a JWT-related security problem specifically in the image-upload flow — indicating the upload/convert pipeline has been a recurring weakness area across several consecutive releases.

Publicly available proof-of-concept exploit code (poc_uploadImageFile.py, circulated via GitHub poc_exploits repositories) demonstrates the technique end-to-end for authorized testing/detection-validation purposes: it crafts a JWT-signed request to the Document Server upload endpoint containing an encoded path-traversal sequence in the image-upload parameter so that attacker-supplied file content is written outside the intended upload directory into a server-side location under the application's FileConverter/docbuilder component tree; a subsequent request to the docbuilder conversion endpoint causes the written file to be processed/executed by the server, yielding remote command execution in the context of the Document Server process. Because the flow only requires a validly-structured JWT (which in many real-world deployments is signed with a weak, default, or otherwise obtainable secret) rather than an authenticated user session, the vulnerability is effectively exploitable pre-auth from the attacker's perspective against internet-facing instances.

HKCERT's 2026-10-09 bulletin (High Risk) and the CISA KEV catalog entry added 2026-10-08 both state the flaw is being exploited in the wild, with CISA setting a remediation due date of 2026-10-11 under BOD 26-04 guidance, including an option to discontinue use of the product if vendor mitigation cannot be applied in time. ONLYOFFICE Document Server is widely deployed as a self-hosted or embedded document collaboration/editing backend (standalone installs, Nextcloud/ownCloud integrations, and other platforms that embed it), making internet-exposed instances with JWT enabled but using weak/default signing secrets, or instances still running pre-5.6.3 code, the primary at-risk population. Successful exploitation grants code execution on the document-conversion server, which routinely has access to uploaded/converted business documents and can serve as a pivot point into the hosting environment or into connected platforms (e.g., Nextcloud document-editing integrations).

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Execution

T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell; T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1571 Non-Standard Port

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Impact

T1489 Service Stop

Persistence

T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell

Defense Evasion

T1574 Hijack Execution Flow

Resource Development

T1585.001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts; T1588.005 Exploits

Reconnaissance

T1595.002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning

Remediation

Patches

  • ONLYOFFICE Document Server 5.6.3 (Bug #46113 fix) and later

Immediate actions

  • Upgrade ONLYOFFICE Document Server to version 5.6.3 or later immediately
  • If upgrade is not immediately possible, restrict network access to the Document Server /upload and /docbuilder endpoints to trusted hosts only
  • Rotate and strengthen the JWT secret used for Document Server authentication; verify it is not left at a default/weak value
  • Review Document Server access logs and filesystem under the FileConverter/docbuilder directory tree for unexpected or recently modified files
  • Per CISA BOD 26-04 guidance, apply vendor mitigations by the due date (2026-10-11) or discontinue exposure of the product if mitigation cannot be applied

Workarounds

  • Disable or firewall the image-upload and docbuilder endpoints from untrusted networks until patched
  • Enforce a strong, unique JWT secret and validate JWT signature/expiry strictly at the reverse proxy layer

Longer-term hardening

  • Place ONLYOFFICE Document Server behind a WAF/reverse proxy that blocks path-traversal sequences in upload parameters
  • Run Document Server with least-privilege filesystem permissions so the service account cannot write outside its designated upload/working directories
  • Deploy file-integrity monitoring on the Document Server installation directory, especially the FileConverter/bin/docbuilder path
  • Segment document-conversion infrastructure from sensitive internal networks given its exposure to untrusted user-supplied files
  • Track future ONLYOFFICE security advisories given the recurring history of upload/convert-path traversal CVEs in this component

Affected and fixed versions

  • ONLYOFFICE — Document Server (ONLYOFFICE Docs)
    Vulnerable versions: < 5.6.3
    Fixed in: 5.6.3; later releases

Timeline

  • CVE-2021-3199 published to NVD, describing the ONLYOFFICE Document Server path traversal/RCE flaw.
  • ONLYOFFICE releases Document Server 5.6.3 containing the fix for the path traversal vulnerability via image upload params (Bug #46113).
  • Public proof-of-concept exploit code (poc_uploadImageFile.py) for CVE-2021-3199 circulated via GitHub poc_exploits repositories.
  • NVD record for CVE-2021-3199 last modified, reflecting the renewed exploitation activity and KEV listing.
  • CISA adds CVE-2021-3199 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, setting a remediation due date of 2026-10-11 under BOD 26-04.
  • Threadlinqs hunt pipeline ingests the HKCERT bulletin and opens TL-2026-3076 for research and detection coverage.
  • HKCERT publishes a High Risk security bulletin on the ONLYOFFICE Docs RCE vulnerability, confirming active exploitation in the wild.

Sources cited

Other reports on CVE-2021-3199

Previous and next in vulnerability

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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