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Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-3086

"Secure Folder" Auth Phishing Campaign Targets Microsoft Accounts via OAuth Device-Code Flow

highACTIVE

MailGuard reported on 2026-10-09 a multi-stage phishing campaign that impersonates Dropbox and DocuSign to trick users into completing a Microsoft OAuth device-code sign-in on the genuine login.microsoftonline.com endpoint, giving the attacker access to the victim's mail, files, contacts and SharePoint data without stealing a password.

Key facts for Secure Folder OAuth phishing

IdentifiersTL-2026-3086
SeverityHIGH
Exploitation statusExploited in the wild
Affected productsMicrosoft Microsoft 365 / Microsoft Entra ID accounts
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1114.002 Remote Email Collection, T1204.001 Malicious Link, T1213.002 Sharepoint, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1550.001 Application Access Token, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link, T1583.001 Domains, T1684.001 Impersonation
MotivationUNKNOWN
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage for Secure Folder OAuth phishing

As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3086 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 13 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Secure Folder Phishing — Lure Email and Stage 1-3 Infrastructure Access (SPL)

Detects the delivery and click-through of the 'Secure Folder' Dropbox/DocuSign-themed device-code phishing lure: email from kensuke.n@nakabayashi-co.com ('RecordsTeam', 'Auto-Receipt || ... READY FOR REVIEW'), and web/endpoint access to artemisabeach.com (fake pki-validation redirect landing), musairkompresor.com/uploads/wilderfrress/ (fake Dropbox shared folder, _Client_Assets_2026.zip lure) and avittti.com/injabazmishelinktoon (spoofed DocuSign portal), including links wrapped in the abused link.edgepilot.com and secure-web.cisco.com redirectors. Any user reaching Stage 3 should be treated as a likely device-code victim.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.002, T1204.001, T1583.001, T1656
  • Data sources: splunk_cim_web_datamodel, splunk_cim_email_datamodel, EmailEvents, UrlClickEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, web_proxy
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

``` TL-2026-3086 stage 1-3 web access plus lure email delivery (CIM Web and Email datamodels) ```
| tstats summariesonly=false count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web.Web where earliest=-24h (Web.url="*artemisabeach.com*" OR Web.url="*musairkompresor.com*" OR Web.url="*avittti.com*" OR Web.url="*/.well-known__e71c118/pki-validation/*" OR Web.url="*/uploads/wilderfrress/*" OR Web.url="*/injabazmishelinktoon*" OR Web.url="*_Client_Assets_2026.zip*") by Web.user Web.src Web.dest Web.url
| rename Web.* as *
| eval stage=case(like(url,"%artemisabeach.com%") OR like(url,"%pki-validation/gqazbvcb%"), "stage1_redirect_landing", like(url,"%musairkompresor.com%") OR like(url,"%wilderfrress%") OR like(url,"%_Client_Assets_2026.zip%"), "stage2_fake_dropbox", like(url,"%avittti.com%") OR like(url,"%injabazmishelinktoon%"), "stage3_fake_docusign_portal", true(), "unknown")
| eval via_wrapper=if(like(url,"%link.edgepilot.com%") OR like(url,"%secure-web.cisco.com%"), "yes", "no")
| append [| tstats summariesonly=false count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email.All_Email where earliest=-24h (All_Email.src_user="kensuke.n@nakabayashi-co.com" OR All_Email.src_user="*@nakabayashi-co.com" OR (All_Email.subject="*requested submittals for this quote*" AND All_Email.subject="*READY FOR REVIEW*")) by All_Email.src_user All_Email.recipient All_Email.subject | rename All_Email.* as * | eval stage="lure_email_delivery"]
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| table stage firstTime lastTime user src dest url via_wrapper src_user recipient subject count
| sort 0 - firstTime

Microsoft KQL

// Defender XDR advanced hunting: lure email, URL click and endpoint network access for TL-2026-3086
let lookback = 24h;
let iocDomains = dynamic(["artemisabeach.com", "musairkompresor.com", "avittti.com"]);
union
(EmailEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
 | where SenderFromAddress =~ "kensuke.n@nakabayashi-co.com"
     or SenderFromDomain =~ "nakabayashi-co.com"
     or (Subject has "submittals" and Subject has "READY FOR REVIEW")
 | project Timestamp, Stage = "lure_email_delivery", Account = RecipientEmailAddress, Indicator = SenderFromAddress, Detail = Subject),
(UrlClickEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
 | where Url has_any (iocDomains)
     or Url contains "/.well-known__e71c118/pki-validation/"
     or Url contains "/uploads/wilderfrress/"
     or Url contains "/injabazmishelinktoon"
     or Url contains "_Client_Assets_2026.zip"
 | project Timestamp, Stage = "url_click", Account = AccountUpn, Indicator = Url, Detail = ActionType),
(DeviceNetworkEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
 | where RemoteUrl has_any (iocDomains)
     or RemoteUrl contains "/.well-known__e71c118/pki-validation/"
     or RemoteUrl contains "/uploads/wilderfrress/"
     or RemoteUrl contains "/injabazmishelinktoon"
 | project Timestamp, Stage = "endpoint_network", Account = InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, Indicator = RemoteUrl, Detail = strcat(DeviceName, " | ", InitiatingProcessFileName))
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Secure Folder Device-Code Phishing - Lure Infrastructure Access (TL-2026-3086)
id: 3f6c2b10-5d7e-4a8b-9e21-6c0d4f8a1b01
status: experimental
description: Detects proxy/web-gateway access to the Stage 1-3 infrastructure of the "Secure Folder" Dropbox/DocuSign-themed device-code phishing campaign, including access wrapped inside the abused link.edgepilot.com and secure-web.cisco.com redirectors.
references:
    - https://www.mailguard.com.au/blog/a-new-secure-folder-auth-phishing-scam-targets-microsoft-accounts
author: AII-Detector — ThreadLinqs Intelligence
date: 2026-10-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.001
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.001
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1656
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_host:
        cs-host:
            - 'artemisabeach.com'
            - 'musairkompresor.com'
            - 'avittti.com'
    selection_host_sub:
        cs-host|endswith:
            - '.artemisabeach.com'
            - '.musairkompresor.com'
            - '.avittti.com'
    selection_path:
        c-uri|contains:
            - '/.well-known__e71c118/pki-validation/gqazbvcb'
            - '/uploads/wilderfrress/'
            - '/injabazmishelinktoon'
            - '_Client_Assets_2026.zip'
    selection_wrapped:
        cs-host:
            - 'link.edgepilot.com'
            - 'secure-web.cisco.com'
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'artemisabeach.com'
            - 'musairkompresor.com'
            - 'avittti.com'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers or mail-security sandboxes detonating the lure links
    - Threat-intel feed ingestion tools that resolve the indicators
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Security researchers or mail-security sandboxes detonating the lure links
  • Threat-intel tooling resolving the published indicators
  • Legitimate mail from nakabayashi-co.com if the domain is a compromised business partner rather than attacker-owned

Tuning notes: Do not block link.edgepilot.com, secure-web.cisco.com or login.microsoftonline.com globally; they are only meaningful in combination with the attacker domains or paths. Sender-domain hits can be a compromised legitimate domain, so verify before blocking all mail. Map the Web/Email datamodel field names (Web.url, All_Email.src_user) to your CIM-compliant sources and extend with new Stage 1-3 domains as they are reported.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Secure Folder Phishing — Lure Email and Stage 1-3 Infrastructure Access (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID OAuth Device Code Flow Sign-In (Token Theft) (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Post-Compromise M365 Mail/OneDrive/SharePoint Collection After Device Code Sign-In (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Secure Folder Phishing — Lure Email and Stage 1-3 Infrastructure Access (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID OAuth Device Code Flow Sign-In (Token Theft) (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Post-Compromise M365 Mail/OneDrive/SharePoint Collection After Device Code Sign-In (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID OAuth Device Code Flow Sign-In (Token Theft) (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Post-Compromise M365 Mail/OneDrive/SharePoint Collection After Device Code Sign-In (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise for Secure Folder OAuth phishing

As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 13 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3086.

Sample indicators (3 of 13)

  • Domain: artemisabeach[.]com
  • Domain: musairkompresor[.]com
  • Domain: avittti[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 13 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

13 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration for Secure Folder OAuth phishing

1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

How Secure Folder OAuth phishing works

No CVE, CVSS or actor attribution is stated in the source.

MailGuard describes a multi-stage OAuth consent/device-code phishing campaign. The lure email is sent under the display name "RecordsTeam" from kensuke.n@nakabayashi-co.com with a subject such as "Auto-Receipt || The requested submittals for this quote Replacements READY FOR REVIEW", a routine business-document pretext.

Stage 1 is a redirect chain that passes through legitimate services (link.edgepilot.com and secure-web.cisco.com) before landing on artemisabeach.com under a path that imitates a certificate-validation directory (/.well-known__e71c118/pki-validation/gqazbvcb). Stage 2 is a fake Dropbox page claiming a secure folder has been shared, listing a file named _Client_Assets_2026.zip, hosted on musairkompresor.com/uploads/wilderfrress/. Stage 3 is a spoofed DocuSign-style secure document portal on avittti.com/injabazmishelinktoon that tells the victim to copy a code, click "Verify & Paste", and sign in.

The victim is then sent to the genuine Microsoft login endpoint (login.microsoftonline.com). Because authentication happens on Microsoft's real infrastructure, the victim's own sign-in (including any MFA) authorizes the attacker's session. MailGuard states this grants access to email, files, contacts and SharePoint data and gives persistent account access, and that the technique sidesteps password-focused awareness training.

Context from corroborating public reporting (not stated in the MailGuard article, and no link to this campaign is asserted): device-code phishing has been documented by Microsoft since August 2024 (Storm-2372), and a Telegram-sold PhaaS kit called EvilTokens was reported in 2026 with Dropbox/DocuSign-style lures, Cloudflare Workers and Vercel redirect layers, and client-side AES-GCM page obfuscation. Those sources describe post-compromise Microsoft Graph mailbox/OneDrive enumeration, internal phishing from compromised accounts, and attacker device registration in Entra ID. Refresh tokens survive password resets, so remediation needs session/token revocation. This record attributes none of the activity to a specific actor or kit.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Persistence

T1078.004 Cloud Accounts

Collection

T1114.002 Remote Email Collection; T1213.002 Sharepoint; T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

Execution

T1204.001 Malicious Link

Credential Access

T1528 Steal Application Access Token

lateral-movement

T1550.001 Application Access Token

Initial Access

T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains

Defense Evasion

T1684.001 Impersonation

Remediation for Secure Folder OAuth phishing

Patches

  • No software patch applies; this is abuse of a legitimate authentication flow

Immediate actions

  • Block or sinkhole artemisabeach.com, musairkompresor.com, avittti.com and the sender domain nakabayashi-co.com at mail and web gateways
  • Search mail logs for messages from kensuke.n@nakabayashi-co.com and the "RecordsTeam" display name, and purge delivered copies
  • Search proxy/DNS logs for visits to the listed domains and URL paths; treat any user who visited as potentially compromised
  • For suspected victims, revoke refresh tokens/sessions (revokeSignInSessions) and force re-authentication
  • Review Entra ID sign-in logs for authenticationProtocol deviceCode / originalTransferMethod deviceCodeFlow from unexpected users, IPs or hosting providers

Workarounds

  • Block the OAuth device code flow with an Entra Conditional Access policy (authentication flows condition) and allow it only for trusted devices or networks where required
  • Audit OAuth application consents and device registrations in the tenant and remove unknown entries

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 / passkeys) for Microsoft 365 users
  • Add sign-in risk policies and continuous access evaluation
  • Train users that a code they are told to copy and paste into a Microsoft sign-in page is a phishing indicator, even when the page is genuinely Microsoft's
  • Inspect and rewrite or distrust links that pass through third-party redirect/URL-protection services in mail filtering

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365 / Microsoft Entra ID accounts
    Vulnerable versions: Tenants that permit OAuth 2.0 device code flow sign-in

Timeline of Secure Folder OAuth phishing

  • Microsoft reports it has observed device code phishing (Storm-2372) since August 2024; context for the technique, not linked to this campaign (month-level date).
  • Microsoft publishes Storm-2372 device code phishing analysis with mitigation guidance, including blocking device code flow via Conditional Access.
  • EvilTokens device-code PhaaS kit launched on Telegram per CSA; no link to this campaign is established.
  • CSA research note reports 340+ Microsoft 365 organizations hit by OAuth device code phishing (Dropbox/DocuSign-style lures among those observed).
  • Mimecast reports first detection of a Mimecast device-enrollment device code lure; over 50,000 such campaigns noted since March 2026.
  • MailGuard publishes analysis of the "Secure Folder" campaign: fake Dropbox shared-folder page, DocuSign-style portal, and device-code sign-in on locked-ioc-6.

Sources cited for Secure Folder OAuth phishing

Previous and next in phishing

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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