Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-3103
Pwn2Own Ireland 2026: Google Pixel 10 Exploit Chains Earn $560,000
Three teams demonstrated exploits against the Google Pixel 10 at Pwn2Own Ireland 2026 (Cork, organized by Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative), earning $560,000 in total. Ikotas Labs received a full $300,000 payout for chaining multiple bugs for remote compromise; two other teams received reduced payouts for exploits that involved a previously known vulnerability.
Key facts for Pwn2Own Pixel 10 exploits
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3103 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Pwn2Own Ireland 2026 Pixel 10 |
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| Exploitation status | No exploitation observed (theoretical) |
| Affected products | Google Pixel 10 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1404 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1587.004 Develop Capabilities: Exploits, T1588.005 Obtain Capabilities: Exploits, T1658 Exploitation for Client Execution, T1664 Exploitation for Initial Access |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | consumer, enterprise-mobility |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 7 cited sources |
Detection coverage for Pwn2Own Pixel 10 exploits
As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3103 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 9 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Pixel 10 Direct-to-IP Egress via Proxy With Beacon Regularity — C2 / Post-Compromise Communication
Detects Pixel 10 clients (by User-Agent) connecting to public raw-IP destinations through the web proxy and scores request-interval regularity, a pattern consistent with implant callback, payload staging or data exfiltration over a C2 channel after a remote compromise, since legitimate Android apps almost always use named hosts. research.json discloses no network IOCs (OSINT scan shows no community-observed or sibling infrastructure), so this is behavioural, not indicator-based.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1437, T1437.001, T1646
- Data sources: web_proxy:zscalernss-web, CommonSecurityLog
- Severity: medium
- Confidence: medium
Splunk SPL
index=web_proxy sourcetype="zscalernss-web" (useragent="*Pixel 10*" OR useragent="*Pixel%2010*")
| rex field=url "^(?:https?://)?(?<url_host>[^/:]+)"
| where match(url_host, "^[0-9]{1,3}([.][0-9]{1,3}){3}$") AND NOT cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", url_host) AND NOT cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12", url_host) AND NOT cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", url_host) AND NOT cidrmatch("100.64.0.0/10", url_host)
| sort 0 user url_host _time
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time BY user url_host
| eval delta=_time-prev_time
| stats count AS requests dc(url) AS distinct_urls sum(requestsize) AS bytes_out avg(delta) AS avg_interval stdev(delta) AS interval_stdev earliest(_time) AS first_seen latest(_time) AS last_seen BY user url_host
| eval beacon_like=if(requests>=10 AND avg_interval>0 AND (interval_stdev/avg_interval)<0.3, "yes", "no")
| eval exfil_like=if(bytes_out>=5242880, "yes", "no")
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestClientApplication has 'Pixel 10'
| where DestinationHostName matches regex @'^[0-9]{1,3}([.][0-9]{1,3}){3}$'
| where not(ipv4_is_private(DestinationHostName)) and DestinationHostName !startswith '100.64.'
| summarize Requests = count(), DistinctUrls = dcount(RequestURL), BytesOut = sum(SentBytes), ActiveBuckets = dcount(bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)), First = min(TimeGenerated), Last = max(TimeGenerated) by SourceUserName, DestinationHostName
| extend BeaconLike = iff(Requests >= 10 and ActiveBuckets >= 6, 'yes', 'no'), ExfilLike = iff(BytesOut >= 5242880, 'yes', 'no')
| project SourceUserName, DestinationHostName, Requests, DistinctUrls, BytesOut, ActiveBuckets, BeaconLike, ExfilLike, First, LastSigma
title: Pixel 10 Proxy Connection to Raw Public IP Address
id: c3e7a9d4-1f58-4b6a-8d02-7e5b4a3c9b03
status: experimental
description: Detects a Pixel 10 client contacting a raw public IP over HTTP(S) through a proxy, possible implant callback or staging after exploitation.
references:
- https://www.securityweek.com/google-pixel-10-exploits-earned-hackers-560000-at-pwn2own/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/mobile/
author: AII-Detector — ThreadLinqs Intelligence
date: 2026-10-09
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1437
- attack.t1437.001
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1646
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection_ua:
c-useragent|contains: 'Pixel 10'
selection_ip:
cs-host|re: '^[0-9]{1,3}([.][0-9]{1,3}){3}$'
filter_private:
cs-host|cidr:
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
- '100.64.0.0/10'
condition: selection_ua and selection_ip and not filter_private
falsepositives:
- Apps or captive-portal/IoT setup flows that use IP literals
- Internal tooling on public IP space
level: medium
Known false positives:
- Captive-portal checks, speed tests, or vendor SDKs using IP literals
- Smart-home/IoT companion apps contacting devices by IP
Tuning notes: Field names follow Zscaler NSS web logs; map for your proxy. Allowlist known corporate public IPs and SDKs; tune beacon_like (>=10 requests, stdev/mean < 0.3) and the 5 MiB exfil threshold per fleet. T1437/T1437.001/T1646 (Mobile C2 / Web Protocols / Exfiltration Over C2) extend the research.json mitre[] list.
- Non-Compliant Pixel 10 With Native Crash or MTE Fault Cluster — Exploitation Exposure · unlock with TL Creds
- Pixel 10 Rooted / Integrity-Compromised or Root-Hiding Indicators — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Mobile Client DNS Queries With Long High-Entropy Labels — C2 / Exfiltration over DNS · unlock with TL Creds
- Defender Exploit/Privilege-Escalation/Phishing Alert on Android Pixel 10 — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Root Tooling, Persistence and Root-Hiding Artifacts in Pixel 10 Logcat — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Pixel 10 Proxy Traffic to Dynamic-DNS and Tunnelling Services — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- Pixel 10 Native Crash / MTE Fault Burst in Remote-Facing Components — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Pixel 10 SELinux Denials From App Domains to Shell/Privileged Targets — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise for Pwn2Own Pixel 10 exploits
As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 9 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3103.
How Pwn2Own Pixel 10 exploits works
No CVEs, patches or technical details have been published.
Pwn2Own Ireland 2026, organized by Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative (ZDI), began on October 6, 2026 in Cork, Ireland. According to SecurityWeek (2026-10-09), three teams successfully demonstrated exploits against the Google Pixel 10, collectively earning $560,000. Ikotas Labs received the full $300,000 payout for chaining multiple bugs to achieve a remote device compromise. Tim Becker and Yves Bieri earned $150,000 for an exploit that involved a previously known flaw (a reduced payout), and Dimitrios Valsamaras and Ken Gannon earned $112,500 for chaining a zero-day with a known vulnerability. The per-team amounts listed ($300,000 + $150,000 + $112,500 = $562,500) do not sum to the $560,000 total stated by the source; the stated total is retained here.
No CVE identifiers, CVSS scores, affected Android/Pixel build numbers, vulnerable components or exploit mechanics have been disclosed. Under Pwn2Own rules, vendors receive 90 days to release security updates before ZDI publicly discloses the flaws, so technical details are expected only after a patch or the disclosure deadline. Separate day-one coverage (BleepingComputer) reports that White Noise Club (Mikhail Evdokimov, Polina Smirnova, Mate Zombor) also targeted the Pixel 10 but could not get their exploit to work within the allotted time. Secondary reporting indicates Ikotas Labs also compromised the Samsung Galaxy S26 with a four-vulnerability chain of which one bug was already known to Samsung, and speculates that a previously unknown flaw may also affect the Pixel 10; this is unconfirmed and no details are published.
This is competition-demonstrated research, not in-the-wild exploitation: no CISA KEV listing, public PoC, or threat-actor activity is reported. The entry is tracked in MONITORING status so that downstream phases can add CVEs, patch information and detection content when Google or ZDI publish details. The wider event reportedly totaled about $1.2 million across phones, printers, smart speakers, smart-home hubs, and AI infrastructure targets (Oracle Autonomous AI Database, OpenAI Codex, Nvidia Dynamo, LiteLLM, Philips Hue Bridge Pro, Samsung Galaxy S26, Sonos Era 300).
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Privilege Escalation
T1404 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Resource Development
T1587.004 Develop Capabilities: Exploits; T1588.005 Obtain Capabilities: Exploits
Execution
T1658 Exploitation for Client Execution
Initial Access
Remediation for Pwn2Own Pixel 10 exploits
Patches
- No patches or CVEs published as of 2026-10-09; apply Pixel security updates as released
Immediate actions
- Keep Pixel 10 devices on the latest Android and Google Pixel security update
- Monitor Google Pixel / Android Security Bulletins for fixes attributed to Pwn2Own Ireland 2026 submissions
Workarounds
- No workaround published; limit exposure of high-risk users to untrusted remote content until fixes ship
Longer-term hardening
- Enforce mobile device management with OS patch-level compliance for Pixel fleets
- Track ZDI advisories for CVE assignment once the 90-day vendor window closes
Affected and fixed versions
- Google — Pixel 10
Vulnerable versions: Unspecified - builds at time of competition (October 2026)
Timeline of Pwn2Own Pixel 10 exploits
- Day one totals 32 unique zero-days and $388,500 in payouts; Samsung Galaxy S26 is compromised twice, including by locked-ioc-5.
- locked-ioc-3 (Mikhail Evdokimov, Polina Smirnova, Mate Zombor) attempt the Pixel 10 but cannot get their exploit working within the allotted time.
- Pwn2Own Ireland 2026 begins in Cork, Ireland, organized by Trend Micro's locked-ioc-2; locked-ioc-4 is among the targets.
- Day two schedules further attempts against the Pixel 10 and Galaxy S26, plus printers, smart-home devices and AI infrastructure.
- No CVEs or technical details published; under Pwn2Own rules Google has 90 days to release fixes before ZDI discloses the flaws.
- SecurityWeek reports three successful Pixel 10 exploits: locked-ioc-5 ($300,000), locked-ioc-6 and locked-ioc-7 ($150,000), locked-ioc-1 and locked-ioc-8 ($112,500), for a stated total of $560,000.
Sources cited for Pwn2Own Pixel 10 exploits
- Zero Day Initiative blog - Pwn2Own thezdi.com · Research · 2026-10-09
- Google Pixel 10 Exploits Earned Hackers $560,000 at Pwn2Own SecurityWeek · News · 2026-10-09
- Hackers exploit 32 zero-days on first day of Pwn2Own Ireland BleepingComputer · News · 2026-10-06
- Hackers crack Samsung Galaxy S26 with single email in zero-day attack cybernews.com · News · 2026-10-07
- Pwn2Own Ireland 2026 Day One: 32 Zero-Days, $388,500 in Payouts dailysecurityreview.com · News · 2026-10-07
- Pwn2Own Ireland 2026 - zero days (SecNews) secnews.gr · News · 2026-10-07
- Pwn2Own Ireland 2026 Samsung Galaxy S26 hacked three times on day one (IT-Connect) it-connect.tech · News · 2026-10-07
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.