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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-3127

Healthcare Sector Ransomware Targeting and Expanding Attack Surface (Qilin, Akira, DragonForce, LockBit, The Gentlemen)

highACTIVE

Flare reports healthcare is consistently among the top five most-targeted sectors in an analysis of 1,700+ ransomware attacks over two months, with roughly 80% of observed attacks against US organizations. Qilin, The Gentlemen, Akira, DragonForce and LockBit are the named operators; vendor and government reporting documents their intrusion tradecraft (edge-device exploitation, stolen credentials, remote-management tooling, Cobalt Strike/Rclone, BYOVD, double extortion).

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3127, CVE-2024-1708, CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-32433, CVE-2025-33073, CVE-2020-3259, CVE-2020-3580, CVE-2023-20269, CVE-2023-28252, CVE-2024-37085, CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711, CVE-2024-40766, CVE-2024-1709
Also known asHealthcare Ransomware Expanding Attack Surface
SeverityHIGH
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2024-1708 (added ), CVE-2024-55591 (added ), CVE-2025-32433 (added ), CVE-2025-33073 (added ), CVE-2020-3259 (added ), CVE-2020-3580 (added ) and 7 more
EPSSCVE-2024-1709: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2025-32433: 97.6% (99.8th percentile); CVE-2024-1708: 95.4% (99.8th percentile)
Affected productsHealthcare sector EHR, imaging, billing, patient portals, telemedicine and IoMT systems; Fortinet FortiGate (CVE-2024-55591); ConnectWise ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1708); SonicWall / Veeam / Cisco / VMware VPN, backup and ESXi CVEs listed in CISA Akira advisory
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-287, CWE-306, CWE-502, CWE-122
AttributionQilin, Akira, DragonForce, The Gentlemen (medium confidence)
MalwareAgendaCrypt, Akira, AnyDesk, Cobalt Strike, DragonForce, G-BOT, LockBit, MimiKatz, SystemBC - S9001, the gentlemen
ToolsAnyDesk, Cobalt Strike
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1133 External Remote Services, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery and 6 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorshealth, manufacturing, business-services, energy, technology
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, Asia-Pacific
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3127 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Cobalt Strike Named Pipes, PsExec and smbexec/NetExec Lateral Movement — C2 / Lateral Movement

Detects Cobalt Strike default named pipes, the PsExec service pipe, and Impacket/NetExec smbexec/wmiexec output redirection. Cobalt Strike, PsExec and NetExec are named across Qilin, Akira, DragonForce and The Gentlemen intrusions.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1021.002, T1569.002, T1047
  • Data sources: sysmon EventCode 17/18, sysmon EventCode 1, DeviceEvents NamedPipeEvent, DeviceProcessEvents, windows pipe_created
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h
((EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName=*) OR (EventCode=1 CommandLine="*\\\\127.0.0.1\\*$\\__*"))
``` Cobalt Strike default named pipes, PsExec service pipe, and Impacket/NetExec smbexec/wmiexec output redirection ```
| where EventCode=1 OR match(PipeName,"(?i)\\\\(MSSE-\d{3,5}-server|postex_[0-9a-f]{4}|postex_ssh_[0-9a-f]{4}|msagent_[0-9a-f]{2}|status_[0-9a-f]{2}|mojo\.5688\.8052\.\d{10,}|ntsvcs_[0-9a-f]{2}|scerpc_[0-9a-f]{2}|PSEXESVC)$")
| eval signal=if(EventCode=1,"smbexec/wmiexec output redirection (Impacket/NetExec)","Cobalt Strike / PsExec named pipe")
| eval obj=coalesce(PipeName,CommandLine), proc=coalesce(Image,"n/a")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(obj) as objects values(proc) as processes by host, signal
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen host signal count processes objects

Microsoft KQL

// Cobalt Strike default named pipes, PsExec service pipe, and Impacket/NetExec smbexec/wmiexec patterns
let lookback = 24h;
let pipes = DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where ActionType == "NamedPipeEvent"
| extend PipeName = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).PipeName)
| where PipeName matches regex @"(?i)\\(MSSE-\d{3,5}-server|postex_[0-9a-f]{4}|postex_ssh_[0-9a-f]{4}|msagent_[0-9a-f]{2}|status_[0-9a-f]{2}|mojo\.5688\.8052\.\d{10,}|ntsvcs_[0-9a-f]{2}|scerpc_[0-9a-f]{2}|PSEXESVC)$"
| extend Signal = "Cobalt Strike / PsExec named pipe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Process = InitiatingProcessFileName, Signal, Object = PipeName;
let smbexec = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\\\127\.0\.0\.1\\(ADMIN\$|[A-Z]\$)\\__"
| extend Signal = "smbexec/wmiexec output redirection (Impacket/NetExec)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Process = FileName, Signal, Object = ProcessCommandLine;
union pipes, smbexec
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Cobalt Strike Default Named Pipes and PsExec Service Pipe
id: b17c3e95-4a0d-4d62-9f8b-e2a6d5c1074f
status: experimental
description: Detects default Cobalt Strike named pipe patterns (MSSE-*-server, postex_*, msagent_*, status_*) and the PsExec service pipe used by Qilin, Akira and DragonForce for C2 and lateral movement.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a
    - https://attack.mitre.org/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/09
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.tool.cobalt-strike
logsource:
    category: pipe_created
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_msse:
        PipeName|startswith: '\MSSE-'
        PipeName|endswith: '-server'
    selection_other:
        PipeName|startswith:
            - '\postex_'
            - '\msagent_'
            - '\status_'
            - '\ntsvcs_'
            - '\scerpc_'
            - '\mojo.5688.8052.'
    selection_psexec:
        PipeName: '\PSEXESVC'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate PsExec use by administrators
    - Chromium-based applications creating mojo pipes (mitigated by the full prefix)
level: high
---
title: Impacket/NetExec smbexec and wmiexec Output Redirection
id: 48d9a6f0-1b3e-4c27-8a5d-f7e2b0c96d13
status: experimental
description: Detects command lines redirecting output to a hidden file on the local ADMIN$ or C$ share via 127.0.0.1, the signature of Impacket smbexec/wmiexec and NetExec remote execution.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a
    - https://attack.mitre.org/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/09
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1569.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\\127.0.0.1\'
            - '$\__'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare administrative scripts mimicking this pattern
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate PsExec use by administrators
  • Admin scripts that resemble smbexec output redirection

Tuning notes: Cobalt Strike pipe names are malleable-profile configurable, so treat as a high-precision but not exhaustive signal. Allow-list approved PsExec admin hosts. Requires Sysmon pipe events (17/18).

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Session Token Replay From Multiple IPs (Infostealer Valid Accounts) — Initial Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • Defender Tamper, Log Clearing, Recovery Inhibition and Ransomware Artifacts — Post-Exploitation / Impact · unlock with TL Creds
  • Remote Access / Tunnelling Tools (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Velociraptor, Ngrok) and Community IOC Infrastructure — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Office Application Spawning Script Interpreter (Phishing) — Initial Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • SystemBC Run Key and Suspicious SYSTEM Scheduled Task Persistence — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Rclone Data Exfiltration to Cloud Storage — Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
  • ScreenConnect SetupWizard Auth Bypass Exploitation (CVE-2024-1708/1709) — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • LSASS Credential Dumping (Mimikatz / MiniDump) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3127.

Sample indicators (3 of 26)

  • IP address: 176.120.22[.]127
  • File hash: d2fd0654710c27dcf37b6c1437880020824e161dd0bf28e3a133ed777242a0ca
  • IP address: 185.73.125[.]8

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

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Technical analysis

Flare's 2026-10-08 analysis (Assaf Morag) frames healthcare as cybercrime's highest-value target: the FBI IC3 reported 460 ransomware attacks and 182 data breaches against US healthcare in 2025, and healthcare ranked in the top five sectors across 1,700+ ransomware attacks observed over a two-month window, with about 80% of them against US organizations. Protected health information is described as the most expensive PII on the dark web because medical identities cannot be reissued and can be monetized for years. The article cites studies of increased in-hospital mortality during ransomware incidents, and notes ENISA figures that ransomware accounted for 54% (2023) and 45% (2024) of European health-sector incidents. The article itself contains no CVEs, IOCs or new TTPs; technical detail below is drawn from the cross-referenced vendor and government reporting on each named group.

Initial access cited by Flare: phishing, infostealer-harvested staff credentials, browser cookies, session tokens and MFA artifacts, exposed RDP, vulnerable VPN and unpatched edge devices, third-party vendor access, and cloud misconfigurations. Structural weaknesses that amplify impact are legacy and unpatchable Windows/medical systems, flat networks, shared clinical accounts, inconsistent MFA, broad contractor access, incomplete asset inventories and poor IoMT telemetry. Emerging concerns include prompt injection against clinical AI tools, shadow AI, and fraud schemes such as NEMT ghost billing. Flare also references APT29 (COVID-19 vaccine research targeting, 2020), APT40 (China MSS, biomedical/virus-research targeting) and APT10 (healthcare and biotechnology) as nation-state context; these are background and not attributed to the ransomware activity.

Group tradecraft from corroborating sources: CISA's #StopRansomware advisory on Akira (published 2024-04-18, updated 2025-11-13) lists exploitation of Cisco, Veeam, SonicWall, VMware and Windows CVEs, VPNs without MFA, tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, AnyDesk, Rclone, WinSCP, Ngrok, AdFind and Impacket, and roughly $244M in proceeds as of late September 2025. The Gentlemen (PRODAFT: Phantom Mantis / LARVA-368; Microsoft: Storm-2697) exploit FortiGate and other edge devices (CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-32433, CVE-2025-33073), use NetExec and related AD tooling, EDR-killer/BYOVD tooling, a modified Velociraptor and G-BOT for C2, GPO-based deployment, and a Go locker (X25519 + XChaCha20) with a --spread worm option for Windows, Linux and ESXi. DragonForce is a RaaS cartel (LockBit 3.0/Conti-derived encryptor) using help-desk social engineering, Cobalt Strike, SystemBC, Mimikatz, AdFind, SoftPerfect and Rclone. Qilin (per Security Arsenal reporting) abuses ConnectWise ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1708), valid credentials from initial access brokers, Cobalt Strike, PsExec and Rclone, exfiltrating before encryption.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie

Lateral Movement

T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol; T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Execution

T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1133 External Remote Services

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1566 Phishing

Command and Control

T1219 Remote Access Tools

Impact

T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools; T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs

Remediation

Patches

  • Apply vendor fixes for CVE-2024-40766 (SonicWall), CVE-2024-40711 (Veeam), CVE-2024-37085 (VMware ESXi), CVE-2023-20269 (Cisco), CVE-2024-55591 (Fortinet), CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect)

Immediate actions

  • Patch internet-facing VPN, firewall, remote-management and mail systems; prioritize CVEs listed in the CISA Akira advisory and CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2024-1708
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all VPN, RDP, email and remote-access paths and review exposed RDP
  • Hunt for Rclone, WinSCP, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Velociraptor and Cobalt Strike activity outside approved use
  • Revoke sessions and reset credentials for staff appearing in infostealer logs

Workarounds

  • Restrict management interfaces to VPN or allow-listed addresses
  • Disable unused remote-access tools and legacy protocols where patching is blocked by vendor certification

Longer-term hardening

  • Segment flat clinical and IoMT networks and monitor east-west traffic
  • Maintain offline, immutable backups of critical data and test restoration
  • Continuously monitor dark-web and stealer-log exposure of staff credentials and PHI
  • Tighten third-party and contractor access and session-token governance
  • Enable EDR tamper protection and block vulnerable signed drivers (BYOVD)

Affected and fixed versions

  • Healthcare sector — EHR, imaging, billing, patient portals, telemedicine and IoMT systems
    Vulnerable versions: Legacy/unpatched Windows and unsupported medical software; Flat networks without segmentation
  • Fortinet — FortiGate (CVE-2024-55591)
    Vulnerable versions: Unpatched FortiOS
    Fixed in: Vendor-patched FortiOS
  • ConnectWise — ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1708)
    Vulnerable versions: Unpatched ScreenConnect
    Fixed in: Vendor-patched ScreenConnect
  • SonicWall / Veeam / Cisco / VMware — VPN, backup and ESXi CVEs listed in CISA Akira advisory
    Vulnerable versions: Unpatched deployments
    Fixed in: Vendor-patched releases

Timeline

  • CISA, FBI and partners publish the original #StopRansomware advisory on Akira ransomware (AA24-109A).
  • The Gentlemen begin activity as an affiliate-driven double-extortion operation (March 2025), previously using other RaaS programs.
  • First The Gentlemen ransomware sample is uploaded to VirusTotal.
  • CISA and partners update the Akira advisory with new IOCs, TTPs and detection methods; Akira proceeds reported at about $244M as of late September 2025.
  • Internal Rocket.Chat infrastructure of The Gentlemen is leaked following a compromise linked to hosting provider 4VPS (May 2026).
  • Qilin posts about 15 victims in roughly five days (June 2-5, 2026), about 20% in healthcare.
  • The Hacker News reports The Gentlemen have claimed 478 victims and account for about 10% of ransomware activity in April 2026.
  • Barracuda publishes analysis of The Gentlemen, confirming active operations as of 2026-08-14.
  • Flare publishes its analysis of healthcare ransomware targeting across 1,700+ attacks, naming Qilin, The Gentlemen, Akira, DragonForce and LockBit.

Sources cited

More from Qilin

Other reports on CVE-2024-1708

Other reports on CVE-2024-55591

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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