Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-3127
Healthcare Sector Ransomware Targeting and Expanding Attack Surface (Qilin, Akira, DragonForce, LockBit, The Gentlemen)
Flare reports healthcare is consistently among the top five most-targeted sectors in an analysis of 1,700+ ransomware attacks over two months, with roughly 80% of observed attacks against US organizations. Qilin, The Gentlemen, Akira, DragonForce and LockBit are the named operators; vendor and government reporting documents their intrusion tradecraft (edge-device exploitation, stolen credentials, remote-management tooling, Cobalt Strike/Rclone, BYOVD, double extortion).
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3127, CVE-2024-1708, CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-32433, CVE-2025-33073, CVE-2020-3259, CVE-2020-3580, CVE-2023-20269, CVE-2023-28252, CVE-2024-37085, CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711, CVE-2024-40766, CVE-2024-1709 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Healthcare Ransomware Expanding Attack Surface |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2024-1708 (added ), CVE-2024-55591 (added ), CVE-2025-32433 (added ), CVE-2025-33073 (added ), CVE-2020-3259 (added ), CVE-2020-3580 (added ) and 7 more |
| EPSS | CVE-2024-1709: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2025-32433: 97.6% (99.8th percentile); CVE-2024-1708: 95.4% (99.8th percentile) |
| Affected products | Healthcare sector EHR, imaging, billing, patient portals, telemedicine and IoMT systems; Fortinet FortiGate (CVE-2024-55591); ConnectWise ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1708); SonicWall / Veeam / Cisco / VMware VPN, backup and ESXi CVEs listed in CISA Akira advisory |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-287, CWE-306, CWE-502, CWE-122 |
| Attribution | Qilin, Akira, DragonForce, The Gentlemen (medium confidence) |
| Malware | AgendaCrypt, Akira, AnyDesk, Cobalt Strike, DragonForce, G-BOT, LockBit, MimiKatz, SystemBC - S9001, the gentlemen |
| Tools | AnyDesk, Cobalt Strike |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1133 External Remote Services, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery and 6 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | health, manufacturing, business-services, energy, technology |
| Target regions | North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3127 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Cobalt Strike Named Pipes, PsExec and smbexec/NetExec Lateral Movement — C2 / Lateral Movement
Detects Cobalt Strike default named pipes, the PsExec service pipe, and Impacket/NetExec smbexec/wmiexec output redirection. Cobalt Strike, PsExec and NetExec are named across Qilin, Akira, DragonForce and The Gentlemen intrusions.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1021.002, T1569.002, T1047
- Data sources: sysmon EventCode 17/18, sysmon EventCode 1, DeviceEvents NamedPipeEvent, DeviceProcessEvents, windows pipe_created
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h
((EventCode IN (17,18) PipeName=*) OR (EventCode=1 CommandLine="*\\\\127.0.0.1\\*$\\__*"))
``` Cobalt Strike default named pipes, PsExec service pipe, and Impacket/NetExec smbexec/wmiexec output redirection ```
| where EventCode=1 OR match(PipeName,"(?i)\\\\(MSSE-\d{3,5}-server|postex_[0-9a-f]{4}|postex_ssh_[0-9a-f]{4}|msagent_[0-9a-f]{2}|status_[0-9a-f]{2}|mojo\.5688\.8052\.\d{10,}|ntsvcs_[0-9a-f]{2}|scerpc_[0-9a-f]{2}|PSEXESVC)$")
| eval signal=if(EventCode=1,"smbexec/wmiexec output redirection (Impacket/NetExec)","Cobalt Strike / PsExec named pipe")
| eval obj=coalesce(PipeName,CommandLine), proc=coalesce(Image,"n/a")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(obj) as objects values(proc) as processes by host, signal
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen host signal count processes objectsMicrosoft KQL
// Cobalt Strike default named pipes, PsExec service pipe, and Impacket/NetExec smbexec/wmiexec patterns
let lookback = 24h;
let pipes = DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where ActionType == "NamedPipeEvent"
| extend PipeName = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).PipeName)
| where PipeName matches regex @"(?i)\\(MSSE-\d{3,5}-server|postex_[0-9a-f]{4}|postex_ssh_[0-9a-f]{4}|msagent_[0-9a-f]{2}|status_[0-9a-f]{2}|mojo\.5688\.8052\.\d{10,}|ntsvcs_[0-9a-f]{2}|scerpc_[0-9a-f]{2}|PSEXESVC)$"
| extend Signal = "Cobalt Strike / PsExec named pipe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Process = InitiatingProcessFileName, Signal, Object = PipeName;
let smbexec = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\\\127\.0\.0\.1\\(ADMIN\$|[A-Z]\$)\\__"
| extend Signal = "smbexec/wmiexec output redirection (Impacket/NetExec)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Process = FileName, Signal, Object = ProcessCommandLine;
union pipes, smbexec
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Cobalt Strike Default Named Pipes and PsExec Service Pipe
id: b17c3e95-4a0d-4d62-9f8b-e2a6d5c1074f
status: experimental
description: Detects default Cobalt Strike named pipe patterns (MSSE-*-server, postex_*, msagent_*, status_*) and the PsExec service pipe used by Qilin, Akira and DragonForce for C2 and lateral movement.
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a
- https://attack.mitre.org/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/09
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.execution
- attack.t1569.002
- attack.tool.cobalt-strike
logsource:
category: pipe_created
product: windows
detection:
selection_msse:
PipeName|startswith: '\MSSE-'
PipeName|endswith: '-server'
selection_other:
PipeName|startswith:
- '\postex_'
- '\msagent_'
- '\status_'
- '\ntsvcs_'
- '\scerpc_'
- '\mojo.5688.8052.'
selection_psexec:
PipeName: '\PSEXESVC'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PsExec use by administrators
- Chromium-based applications creating mojo pipes (mitigated by the full prefix)
level: high
---
title: Impacket/NetExec smbexec and wmiexec Output Redirection
id: 48d9a6f0-1b3e-4c27-8a5d-f7e2b0c96d13
status: experimental
description: Detects command lines redirecting output to a hidden file on the local ADMIN$ or C$ share via 127.0.0.1, the signature of Impacket smbexec/wmiexec and NetExec remote execution.
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a
- https://attack.mitre.org/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/09
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1569.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '\\127.0.0.1\'
- '$\__'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Rare administrative scripts mimicking this pattern
level: high
Known false positives:
- Legitimate PsExec use by administrators
- Admin scripts that resemble smbexec output redirection
Tuning notes: Cobalt Strike pipe names are malleable-profile configurable, so treat as a high-precision but not exhaustive signal. Allow-list approved PsExec admin hosts. Requires Sysmon pipe events (17/18).
- Session Token Replay From Multiple IPs (Infostealer Valid Accounts) — Initial Access · unlock with TL Creds
- Defender Tamper, Log Clearing, Recovery Inhibition and Ransomware Artifacts — Post-Exploitation / Impact · unlock with TL Creds
- Remote Access / Tunnelling Tools (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Velociraptor, Ngrok) and Community IOC Infrastructure — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- Office Application Spawning Script Interpreter (Phishing) — Initial Access · unlock with TL Creds
- SystemBC Run Key and Suspicious SYSTEM Scheduled Task Persistence — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Rclone Data Exfiltration to Cloud Storage — Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
- ScreenConnect SetupWizard Auth Bypass Exploitation (CVE-2024-1708/1709) — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- LSASS Credential Dumping (Mimikatz / MiniDump) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3127.
Sample indicators (3 of 26)
- IP address:
176.120.22[.]127 - File hash:
d2fd0654710c27dcf37b6c1437880020824e161dd0bf28e3a133ed777242a0ca - IP address:
185.73.125[.]8
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Flare's 2026-10-08 analysis (Assaf Morag) frames healthcare as cybercrime's highest-value target: the FBI IC3 reported 460 ransomware attacks and 182 data breaches against US healthcare in 2025, and healthcare ranked in the top five sectors across 1,700+ ransomware attacks observed over a two-month window, with about 80% of them against US organizations. Protected health information is described as the most expensive PII on the dark web because medical identities cannot be reissued and can be monetized for years. The article cites studies of increased in-hospital mortality during ransomware incidents, and notes ENISA figures that ransomware accounted for 54% (2023) and 45% (2024) of European health-sector incidents. The article itself contains no CVEs, IOCs or new TTPs; technical detail below is drawn from the cross-referenced vendor and government reporting on each named group.
Initial access cited by Flare: phishing, infostealer-harvested staff credentials, browser cookies, session tokens and MFA artifacts, exposed RDP, vulnerable VPN and unpatched edge devices, third-party vendor access, and cloud misconfigurations. Structural weaknesses that amplify impact are legacy and unpatchable Windows/medical systems, flat networks, shared clinical accounts, inconsistent MFA, broad contractor access, incomplete asset inventories and poor IoMT telemetry. Emerging concerns include prompt injection against clinical AI tools, shadow AI, and fraud schemes such as NEMT ghost billing. Flare also references APT29 (COVID-19 vaccine research targeting, 2020), APT40 (China MSS, biomedical/virus-research targeting) and APT10 (healthcare and biotechnology) as nation-state context; these are background and not attributed to the ransomware activity.
Group tradecraft from corroborating sources: CISA's #StopRansomware advisory on Akira (published 2024-04-18, updated 2025-11-13) lists exploitation of Cisco, Veeam, SonicWall, VMware and Windows CVEs, VPNs without MFA, tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, AnyDesk, Rclone, WinSCP, Ngrok, AdFind and Impacket, and roughly $244M in proceeds as of late September 2025. The Gentlemen (PRODAFT: Phantom Mantis / LARVA-368; Microsoft: Storm-2697) exploit FortiGate and other edge devices (CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-32433, CVE-2025-33073), use NetExec and related AD tooling, EDR-killer/BYOVD tooling, a modified Velociraptor and G-BOT for C2, GPO-based deployment, and a Go locker (X25519 + XChaCha20) with a --spread worm option for Windows, Linux and ESXi. DragonForce is a RaaS cartel (LockBit 3.0/Conti-derived encryptor) using help-desk social engineering, Cobalt Strike, SystemBC, Mimikatz, AdFind, SoftPerfect and Rclone. Qilin (per Security Arsenal reporting) abuses ConnectWise ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1708), valid credentials from initial access brokers, Cobalt Strike, PsExec and Rclone, exfiltrating before encryption.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
Lateral Movement
T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol; T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1133 External Remote Services
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1566 Phishing
Command and Control
Impact
T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft
Exfiltration
T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
defense-impairment
T1685 Disable or Modify Tools; T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs
Remediation
Patches
- Apply vendor fixes for CVE-2024-40766 (SonicWall), CVE-2024-40711 (Veeam), CVE-2024-37085 (VMware ESXi), CVE-2023-20269 (Cisco), CVE-2024-55591 (Fortinet), CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect)
Immediate actions
- Patch internet-facing VPN, firewall, remote-management and mail systems; prioritize CVEs listed in the CISA Akira advisory and CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2024-1708
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all VPN, RDP, email and remote-access paths and review exposed RDP
- Hunt for Rclone, WinSCP, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Velociraptor and Cobalt Strike activity outside approved use
- Revoke sessions and reset credentials for staff appearing in infostealer logs
Workarounds
- Restrict management interfaces to VPN or allow-listed addresses
- Disable unused remote-access tools and legacy protocols where patching is blocked by vendor certification
Longer-term hardening
- Segment flat clinical and IoMT networks and monitor east-west traffic
- Maintain offline, immutable backups of critical data and test restoration
- Continuously monitor dark-web and stealer-log exposure of staff credentials and PHI
- Tighten third-party and contractor access and session-token governance
- Enable EDR tamper protection and block vulnerable signed drivers (BYOVD)
Affected and fixed versions
- Healthcare sector — EHR, imaging, billing, patient portals, telemedicine and IoMT systems
Vulnerable versions: Legacy/unpatched Windows and unsupported medical software; Flat networks without segmentation - Fortinet — FortiGate (CVE-2024-55591)
Vulnerable versions: Unpatched FortiOS
Fixed in: Vendor-patched FortiOS - ConnectWise — ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1708)
Vulnerable versions: Unpatched ScreenConnect
Fixed in: Vendor-patched ScreenConnect - SonicWall / Veeam / Cisco / VMware — VPN, backup and ESXi CVEs listed in CISA Akira advisory
Vulnerable versions: Unpatched deployments
Fixed in: Vendor-patched releases
Timeline
- CISA, FBI and partners publish the original #StopRansomware advisory on Akira ransomware (AA24-109A).
- The Gentlemen begin activity as an affiliate-driven double-extortion operation (March 2025), previously using other RaaS programs.
- First The Gentlemen ransomware sample is uploaded to VirusTotal.
- CISA and partners update the Akira advisory with new IOCs, TTPs and detection methods; Akira proceeds reported at about $244M as of late September 2025.
- Internal Rocket.Chat infrastructure of The Gentlemen is leaked following a compromise linked to hosting provider 4VPS (May 2026).
- Qilin posts about 15 victims in roughly five days (June 2-5, 2026), about 20% in healthcare.
- The Hacker News reports The Gentlemen have claimed 478 victims and account for about 10% of ransomware activity in April 2026.
- Barracuda publishes analysis of The Gentlemen, confirming active operations as of 2026-08-14.
- Flare publishes its analysis of healthcare ransomware targeting across 1,700+ attacks, naming Qilin, The Gentlemen, Akira, DragonForce and LockBit.
Sources cited
- CISA #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware (AA24-109A) CISA · Government advisory · 2025-11-13
- CISA and Partners Release Advisory Update on Akira Ransomware content.govdelivery.com · Advisory · 2025-11-13
- Threat Intelligence Report: DragonForce (Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium) ccb.belgium.be · Advisory · 2025-01-01
- The Gentlemen ransomware: Inside one of the fastest-growing extortion operations (Barracuda) blog.barracuda.com · Vendor report · 2026-08-17
- DragonForce Ransomware attacks on retail giants (Picus Security) picussecurity.com · Research · 2025-05-01
- Healthcare Is Cybercrime's Highest-Value Target: Ransomware, Exposure, and the Expanding Attack Surface (Flare) flare.io · Blog · 2026-10-08
- Qilin Ransomware global surge in healthcare and energy sectors (Security Arsenal) securityarsenal.com · Blog · 2026-06-05
- The Gentlemen Ransomware Claims 478 Victims, Can Spread Like a Worm (The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News · 2026-06-01
- Agencies warn healthcare sector to bolster defenses against Akira ransomware (This Week Health) thisweekhealth.com · News · 2025-11-14
More from Qilin
- Cisco Secure FMC Exploitation (CVE-2026-20079, CVE-2026-20316) by Qilin Affiliate UAT-11988 and Sandworm-Linked UAT-11823, with ScreenConnect (CVE-2026-84869) and PaperCut (CVE-2026-81578/82078) Management-Layer Exploitation
- Qilin Ransomware-as-a-Service Group: Leadership Attribution (Haise / Rjun / Alexbigboss44) and Most Active Affiliate Program
- Kaspersky Q3 2026 Non-Mobile Threat Landscape: Qilin Ransomware via CVE-2026-0257, INC Ransom via SonicWall SMA1000 CVE-2026-15409/15410, macOS Stealers (PamStealer, MacSync, Overlord) and npm/PyPI/crates.io Supply-Chain Backdoors
- Top 10 Critical Threat Actors to Watch in 2026: Akira, DragonForce, Qilin, LockBit, Scattered Spider, Cl0p, Lazarus, Volt Typhoon, APT29, OilRig (CVE-2024-40766, CVE-2025-61882, CVE-2023-34362, CVE-2024-39717, CVE-2024-30088)
- France Cyber Threat Outlook: Dark Web Credential Trade, Ransomware (Qilin/MedusaLocker/LockBit) and NoName057(16) Hacktivism
- October 2026 CVE Landscape: PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619) + Fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) chain, Longlegs/Storm-2603 SharePoint exploitation, and other actively exploited CVEs
Other reports on CVE-2024-1708
- Emperador Ransomware Group Claims 3.9GB Data Theft from AB InBev (Budweiser, Corona Maker) - Unverified $1M Bitcoin Extortion
- Q3 2026 Record Ransomware Surge: 2,627 Claimed Attacks, Qilin and The Gentlemen Lead, Clop Resurgence via PTC Windchill CVE-2026-12569
- Multi-Stage Abuse of Legitimate Remote Access Tools (ConnectWise, N-Able, SimpleHelp, Datto RMM, GoTo) by Initial Access Brokers
- The Remote Access Blind Spot: Acronis TRU Analysis of RMM Tool Proliferation and Abuse Risk in SMB Environments
- ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal (CVE-2024-1708) Added to CISA KEV — Storm-1175 / Medusa Ransomware Active Exploitation
- Kyber Ransomware: Post-Quantum Hybrid Encryption Operation Targeting Windows & VMware ESXi
Other reports on CVE-2024-55591
- Ransomware Surge in Q3 2026: The Gentlemen Overtakes Qilin as Rival Gangs Compete for Market Share
- Rapid7 Q3 2026 Threat Landscape: High-Severity Flaws Exploited in 3 Days as The Gentlemen and Qilin Ransomware Dominate
- Japan October 2026 Data Breach Surge: Web/API Compromises, Supplier Breaches, IDC Frontier Ransomware and AI-Assisted Probing (ARTEX)
- Gentlemen Ransomware (Storm-2697): Double-Extortion RaaS with Fortinet Exploitation, BYOVD EDR Killers and GPO-Based Mass Deployment
- Qilin Ransomware Suspect Arrested in Japan, Extradited to Germany; Qilin Affiliate Exploited Check Point VPN Zero-Day CVE-2026-50751
- Rehub: Russian-Language Ransomware-as-a-Service Marketplace Absorbing RAMP's Displaced Operators
Previous and next in ransomware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.