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Threat reportData BreachTL-2026-3130

ASOS Data Breach: Credential Phishing of Employee Leads to Third-Party Platform (Simon AI / Snowflake) Access and Customer Data Theft

highACTIVE

Attackers who call themselves the Xuanye Group tricked an ASOS employee into surrendering login credentials and used them to access third-party platforms, including Simon AI (a personalization platform built on Snowflake). Stolen customer data (names, addresses, phone numbers, emails, customer numbers, dates of birth, on-site searches) was used to extort ASOS, with a two-week ransom deadline and samples sent to the BBC.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3130
Also known asASOS breach, ASOS Snowflake incident, Advanced Persistent Teenagers
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsASOS ASOS customer data (app and website customer records); Simon Data (Simon AI) Simon AI customer personalization platform (ASOS tenant); Snowflake Snowflake data platform (ASOS-related instance)
AttributionXuanye Group (low confidence)
Malwaretelegram
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1078 Valid Accounts, T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1213 Data from Information Repositories, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1566 Phishing, T1598 Phishing for Information, T1657 Financial Theft
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsretail, ecommerce, fashion
Target regionsunited kingdom, Europe
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3130 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 7 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Unauthorized Push Notification Send via Braze/Simon With Extortion Content — C2/Impact Phase

Detects customer-facing push or campaign sends in Braze/Simon audit logs that either contain the extortion message markers (xuanye, 'we will leak', 'compromised the Snowflake', 'ASOS HACKED') or occur outside business hours. Matches abuse of the brand app channel to deliver the ransom note to customers.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1657, T1199, T1078.004
  • Data sources: braze:audit (Braze dashboard/API audit export), Braze_AuditLogs_CL, Simon AI audit logs
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=saas sourcetype="braze:audit" earliest=-1h
| eval act=lower(action)
| where match(act,"(campaign|canvas|push|api_message|message).*(launch|send|schedul|trigger)")
| eval content_hit=if(match(lower(coalesce(message_text,"")),"(xuanye|we will leak|compromised the snowflake|asos hacked|engage with us)"),1,0)
| eval off_hours=if(date_hour<6 OR date_hour>=21 OR date_wday="saturday" OR date_wday="sunday",1,0)
| where content_hit=1 OR off_hours=1
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen values(act) as actions values(ip_address) as src_ip max(content_hit) as content_hit max(off_hours) as off_hours by user_email
| eval risk=case(content_hit=1,"critical", off_hours=1,"medium")
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let ContentRegex = @"(?i)(xuanye|we will leak|compromised the snowflake|asos hacked|engage with us)";
let BrazeAudit = Braze_AuditLogs_CL;
BrazeAudit
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1h)
| where action_s matches regex @"(?i)(campaign|canvas|push|api_message|message).*(launch|send|schedul|trigger)"
| extend ContentHit = tostring(message_text_s) matches regex ContentRegex
| extend OffHours = hourofday(TimeGenerated) < 6 or hourofday(TimeGenerated) >= 21 or dayofweek(TimeGenerated) in (time(0.00:00:00), time(6.00:00:00))
| where ContentHit or OffHours
| summarize Sends = count(), SourceIPs = make_set(ip_address_s), Actions = make_set(action_s), ContentHit = max(toint(ContentHit)), OffHours = max(toint(OffHours)), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated) by user_email_s

Sigma

title: Braze or Simon Push Send Containing ASOS Extortion Message Markers
id: 3f1c2a54-7b0e-4d19-9a31-5c8e6d2b1a07
status: experimental
description: Detects push or campaign send events in Braze/Simon audit logs whose message content carries the Xuanye Group extortion text, indicating the brand app notification channel is being abused to deliver the ransom demand. Requires a custom logsource mapping for the Braze audit export.
references:
    - https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/data-breaches/2026/10/asos-breach-update-hackers-stole-customer-details-and-shopping-searches
    - https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2026/10/asos-hackers-send-push-notifications-to-customers
    - https://therecord.media/asos-push-notification-apparently-sent-by-hackers
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1657
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1199
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: braze
    service: audit
detection:
    selection:
        message_text|contains:
            - 'xuanye'
            - 'we will leak'
            - 'compromised the Snowflake'
            - 'ASOS HACKED'
            - 'Engage with us'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Security awareness content quoting the incident
    - Incident-communications test sends referencing the breach
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Incident-communications drafts sent by the comms team
  • Legitimate off-hours campaign schedules

Tuning notes: Field names (action, message_text, ip_address, user_email) assume a normalised Braze audit export; map them to your schema. Allowlist campaign managers and approved send windows. Pair with an approval workflow on sends, as recommended in the remediation guidance.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Sign-In to Data/Marketing Platform From Previously Unseen IP — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Snowflake Login From New IP Followed by Bulk Read/Export — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Extortion Email With Telegram Link or Xuanye Markers to DPO/IT/Security — C2/Impact Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Risky Entra ID Sign-In to Data/Marketing Platform — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Snowflake Password-Only Login Without MFA From Non-Corporate IP — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Access to Xuanye Group Telegram Channel — C2/Impact Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Phishing Link Click Followed by Data-Platform Sign-In — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Snowflake Bulk Export or Large Customer-Table Read — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 7 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3130.

7 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

On 6 October 2026 (around 10 AM, per Malwarebytes) ASOS customers received an in-app push notification headed 'ASOS HACKED' that read: 'Dear Asos DPO and IT, we have fully compromised the Snowflake instance. Engage with us, or we will leak it.' The message was signed 'xuanyewengateway' and linked to a Telegram channel run by a previously unknown group calling itself the Xuanye Group. The channel claimed payment information was not affected and the app was safe to use. Public reporting says ASOS uses Simon AI, a personalization/marketing platform that runs on Snowflake, alongside Braze to personalize and trigger customer communications such as push notifications; the attackers' ability to push messages through the ASOS app channel is consistent with access to this marketing/communications stack, though the exact mechanism has not been published.

According to the Malwarebytes follow-up of 9 October 2026, the attackers tricked an ASOS employee into handing over login credentials and used them to access third-party platforms, including Simon AI. Stolen data includes names, home addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, customer numbers, dates of birth, website search queries (e.g. 'reclaimed vintage', 'glamorous wide fit', 'Asos petite') and account-creation tenure. ASOS states payment card data and customer passwords were not compromised. Snowflake investigated and reported it found no compromise of its own platform, which points to compromised customer-side credentials/third-party tenant access rather than a Snowflake platform vulnerability.

The attackers demanded contact from ASOS within two weeks, threatened to release the data, and contacted the BBC with data samples. Security researcher Kevin Beaumont criticised ASOS's response (roughly five hours elapsed between the attackers' notification and ASOS's official statement) and described the actor as 'Advanced Persistent Teenagers'. ASOS shares reportedly fell about 14%. The number of affected customers has not been disclosed, no CVE is involved, and no network IOCs have been published. Payment of the ransom has not been disclosed.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1566 Phishing

Defense Evasion

T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

Collection

T1213 Data from Information Repositories; T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

Reconnaissance

T1598 Phishing for Information

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

Remediation

Patches

  • No software vulnerability or CVE is involved; no patch applies

Immediate actions

  • Reset credentials and revoke active sessions/API tokens for Simon AI, Snowflake, Braze and other marketing/data platforms accessed by affected staff
  • Audit Simon AI, Snowflake and Braze access logs for unusual logins, bulk queries/exports and push-notification sends
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all third-party SaaS and data-platform accounts
  • Customers: treat unexpected emails, calls and texts referencing ASOS as potential phishing and do not click links in them

Workarounds

  • Rotate third-party platform credentials and enable conditional access until investigation concludes

Longer-term hardening

  • Apply network-policy / IP allow-listing and SSO on Snowflake and connected SaaS tenants
  • Restrict who can send customer-facing push notifications and require approval workflows for sends
  • Run help-desk and employee social-engineering awareness training with verification procedures for credential requests
  • Apply least privilege and data minimisation to customer profile and search-history data held in marketing platforms
  • Maintain a rehearsed incident-communications plan so customers hear of a breach from the company promptly

Affected and fixed versions

  • ASOS — ASOS customer data (app and website customer records)
    Vulnerable versions: Customer records held in Simon AI / Snowflake
  • Simon Data (Simon AI) — Simon AI customer personalization platform (ASOS tenant)
    Vulnerable versions: ASOS tenant accessed with stolen employee credentials
  • Snowflake — Snowflake data platform (ASOS-related instance)
    Fixed in: Snowflake reports no compromise of its platform

Timeline

  • ASOS shares reportedly fall about 14% following the incident.
  • About five hours after the attackers' notification, ASOS confirms unauthorized activity and says basic personal information such as names and contact details may have been accessed, with no payment-card data or passwords affected.
  • Snowflake investigates and reports it found no compromise of its platform.
  • Around 10 AM, ASOS customers receive an app push notification: 'ASOS HACKED... we have fully compromised the Snowflake instance. Engage with us, or we will leak it', signed xuanyewengateway with a link to a Telegram channel of the Xuanye Group.
  • An ASOS employee is tricked into providing login credentials, which the attackers use to access third-party platforms including Simon AI (exact access date not disclosed; occurred on or before 2026-10-06).
  • Malwarebytes reports the employee credential social-engineering vector, the full set of stolen fields (including customer numbers, dates of birth and on-site searches) and that the attackers gave ASOS two weeks to make contact and sent data samples to the BBC.
  • Approximate expiry of the attackers' two-week window for ASOS to make contact (derived from the 'two weeks' deadline reported by 2026-10-09; exact start date not published).

Sources cited

Previous and next in data breach

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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