Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-3487
KGB RAT: NjRAT-based Windows Trojan sold as MaaS with FUD crypter
KGB RAT is a Windows remote access trojan derived from NjRAT (Bladabindi) and marketed on underground forums as a fully undetectable (FUD) Malware-as-a-Service with a free tier and paid subscriptions. It offers Hidden VNC, keylogging, browser credential theft, ransomware and a crypto-clipboard hijacker, and Group-IB observed multiple operators sharing the same builder.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3487 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | KGB RAT, KGB RAT FUD |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows |
| Malware | Crypter, KGB RAT, NJRat |
| Tools | njRAT |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing, T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1055.012 Process Injection: Process Hollowing, T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1112 Modify Registry and 13 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | general, individuals, cryptocurrency users |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3487 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 36 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: KGB RAT Dropper — svchost.exe Masquerade, Process-Hollowing Parent Anomaly and TEMP Artifacts
Behaviour-first detection of the KGB RAT (NjRAT/Bladabindi-based MaaS, TL-2026-3487) stub: self-copy to %TEMP%\svchost.exe or C:\ProgramData\svchost.exe, a System32 svchost.exe not parented by services.exe (process-hollowing target), and the dropped TEMP artifacts obito.txt, sys_config2.ps1, select.dat, sand.dat and scream.wav. Initial execution and defence-evasion stage of the infection chain.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1036.005, T1055.012, T1204.002, T1027
- Data sources: sysmon:operational EventCode 1 (process creation), sysmon:operational EventCode 11 (file create), DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h
( (EventCode=1 Image="*\\svchost.exe" NOT Image IN ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe","C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe"))
OR (EventCode=1 Image IN ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe","C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe") NOT ParentImage="C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe")
OR (EventCode=11 (TargetFilename="*\\Temp\\obito.txt" OR TargetFilename="*\\Temp\\sys_config2.ps1" OR TargetFilename="*\\Temp\\select.dat" OR TargetFilename="*\\Temp\\sand.dat" OR TargetFilename="*\\Temp\\scream.wav" OR TargetFilename="*\\Temp\\svchost.exe" OR TargetFilename="C:\\ProgramData\\svchost.exe")) )
| eval signal=case(EventCode=="11","kgbrat_temp_artifact", like(Image,"%Windows%"),"svchost_wrong_parent", true(),"svchost_outside_system_dir")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(Image) as images values(ParentImage) as parent_images values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(TargetFilename) as dropped_files by host, User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
union
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "svchost.exe"
| where not(FolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows\System32\" or FolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\")
or InitiatingProcessFileName !~ "services.exe"
| extend Signal = iff(FolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows\", "svchost_wrong_parent", "svchost_outside_system_dir")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Signal, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, SHA256
),
(
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where (FolderPath has @"\Temp\" and FileName in~ ("obito.txt", "sys_config2.ps1", "select.dat", "sand.dat", "scream.wav", "svchost.exe"))
or FolderPath =~ @"C:\ProgramData\svchost.exe"
| extend Signal = "kgbrat_temp_artifact", AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Signal, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, SHA256
)
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: KGB RAT Dropper Masquerading as svchost.exe Outside System Directory
id: 5d3a9b21-8c4e-4a17-9f60-1b7e2c4d8a01
status: experimental
description: Detects a svchost.exe launched from a path other than System32 or SysWOW64, or a System32 svchost.exe not spawned by services.exe (process hollowing target). KGB RAT (NjRAT-based) copies itself to %TEMP%\svchost.exe or %AllUsersProfile%\svchost.exe and hollows svchost.exe.
references:
- https://www.group-ib.com/blog/kgb-rat-windows-fud-trojan/
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-14
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.t1036.005
- attack.t1055.012
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.s0385
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_outside:
Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
filter_system_dirs:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
selection_system:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
filter_services_parent:
ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\services.exe'
condition: (selection_outside and not filter_system_dirs) or (selection_system and not filter_services_parent)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software that ships its own binary named svchost.exe (very rare)
- Security or forensic tooling that spawns svchost.exe for testing
level: high
Known false positives:
- Legitimate software or installers that place a binary named svchost.exe outside System32 (rare, usually testing tools)
- Short-lived svchost.exe launched by troubleshooting or recovery tooling rather than services.exe
- Sandbox or detonation hosts intentionally running KGB RAT samples
Tuning notes: Exclude known recovery/imaging hosts via a host or ParentImage allowlist. The wrong-parent branch is the noisiest: restrict it to hosts with full Sysmon EventCode 1 coverage that includes services.exe children. Raise priority when obito.txt or a svchost.exe copy is written under %TEMP% in the same session. Scheduling every 15 minutes over a 24h window is sufficient.
- KGB RAT Stub Process Chain — TEMP svchost.exe Spawning Shell, reg, schtasks and wmic · unlock with TL Creds
- KGB RAT Persistence — ChromeUpdate Scheduled Task (ONLOGON, HIGHEST) · unlock with TL Creds
- KGB RAT C2/Exfil — Telegram Bot API and ip-api.com Egress From Non-Browser Processes · unlock with TL Creds
- KGB RAT Hidden PowerShell From User-Writable Parent / sys_config2.ps1 · unlock with TL Creds
- KGB RAT UAC Bypass — Unexpected Child of ComputerDefaults.exe / eventvwr.exe · unlock with TL Creds
- KGB RAT Behavioural C2 — Non-Standard Ports 7489/7490/7492 From User-Writable Path or svchost.exe · unlock with TL Creds
- KGB RAT Post-Exploitation — UAC Bypass Handler Hijack, Run-Key Persistence and Clipper Registry Artifacts · unlock with TL Creds
- KGB RAT C2 — Connections to Known Infrastructure ([indicator], [indicator], [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 36 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3487.
Sample indicators (3 of 36)
- IP address:
104.248.130[.]195 - Domain:
kgbrat[.]org - File hash:
559df774411724520865fa15aa8b7e209d0ee133db4dc3d3cd180e895d597a36
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 36 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
KGB RAT is a VB.NET Windows RAT (x86 PE) built on the NjRAT 0.7D Lime Edition/Bladabindi codebase and promoted as 'administration software' under a subscription MaaS model. Group-IB reports underground-forum promotion from late 2025, with infrastructure evidence for an early version (v0.1) dating to late January 2022. A free tier provides basic remote desktop, file management, camera/microphone access, keylogging, password recovery, persistence and anti-detection; paid plans are priced from $150/month to $800/year, with a $500 'Network Spreading' add-on for automated LAN lateral movement. A daily-updated crypter and a Unique Stub Generator (USG) produce distinct stubs to keep samples undetectable by signature AV. The builder emits EXE, BAT, REG and HTA payloads and a binder that attaches the stub to legitimate executables. Group-IB analyzed unobfuscated, obfuscated and encrypted-dropper variants.
Capabilities include Hidden VNC (HVNC), live webcam and microphone capture, file management (upload, download, delete, modify), keystroke logging (polling and hooks), screen capture (CopyFromScreen), browser, Windows Credential Manager and application password recovery, ransomware, USB propagation, LAN spreading, a BotKiller class that removes rival malware (observed in one sample), and a CryptoClipper module that swaps clipboard wallet addresses (BTC, ETH, TRC-20) with operator-controlled ones, storing values under HKCU\Software\Clipper. A 'Fun Settings' set of harassment features adds screamer audio playback (%TEMP%\scream.wav), jump scares, fake error dialogs and forced blue screens via the ProcessBreakOnTermination (Critical Process, flag 29) setting.
Execution and evasion: the stub uses runtime deobfuscation and reflective code loading, process hollowing with suspended creation, a 600-second delayed-execution routine, a 4-second C2 polling loop (4,412 iterations, about 4.9 hours, observed), mouse-click monitoring via GetAsyncKeyState to detect sandboxes, motherboard-string checks (VGNZPL985D, Test, Sandbox, Temp, Debug, Default, Trial, Virtual Machine/VM, Hyper, D1120, 700-210xt) and VM-service checks (VGAuthService, VBoxService), and it terminates analysis tools (procexp, SbieCtrl, SpyTheSpy, wireshark, apateDNS, IPBlocker, TiGeR-Firewall, smsniff, exeinfoPE, NetSnifferCs, processhacker, dnSpy, CodeReflect, Reflector, ILSpy). UAC is bypassed through HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command (Default and DelegateExecute) with ComputerDefaults.exe, and also mscfile. The sample copies itself to %TEMP%\svchost.exe (two samples use %AllUsersProfile%), spawns cmd.exe, powershell.exe, reg.exe and schtasks.exe, and creates a scheduled task named 'ChromeUpdate' (ONLOGON, HIGHEST run level; name configurable via OK.SCHEDNAME). Persistence also uses HKCU\...\Policies\Explorer\Run (value 'Loader'), Startup-folder files and .url shortcuts, and default file association hijacking; WMI queries support discovery and execution. Hardcoded configuration values across samples include injection target svchost.exe, bypass process MoUsoCoreWorker.exe, command delimiter '|Ghost|', Base64 victim separators (Victim, King, KING), the guard file %TEMP%\obito.txt and the developer string 'WhyYouReverseMe..ImInnocent..LoveYouu..'. It sets HKCU\Environment\SEE_MASK_NOZONECHECKS=1 (an NjRAT trait) and ShowSuperHidden=0. The initial beacon carries hostname, username, date, OS version, admin status and installed AV products.
Command and control: samples beacon to 104.248.130.195 (TCP 7489, 7490, 7492; six samples, a single operator) and 2.59.134.215 (TCP 443, one sample, blending with HTTPS); kgbrat.org is the malware website. Some operators use the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org/bot*/sendMessage) for notification or exfiltration (two distinct bot tokens observed; one shared across two samples with different chat IDs) and victim geolocation via ip-api.com/json/. Shared infrastructure suggests a primary actor with a reseller network. Only one sample enabled the CryptoClipper for direct financial gain. Group-IB states that developers are identifiable via nicknames and social media profiles; no nation-state attribution is stated. Severity is analyst-assigned (not stated in the source), and no CVEs or CVSS apply.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing; T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1134 Access Token Manipulation; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks; T1497.002 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: User Activity Based Checks; T1497.003 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks; T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1546.001 Event Triggered Execution: Change Default File Association; T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Privilege Escalation
T1055.012 Process Injection: Process Hollowing; T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
Credential Access
T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging; T1555.004 Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager
Discovery
T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery
defense-impairment
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block 104.248.130.195 (TCP 7489/7490/7492), 2.59.134.215 (TCP 443) and kgbrat.org at the perimeter
- Hunt for scheduled task 'ChromeUpdate' created with /sc ONLOGON /rl HIGHEST from %TEMP%
- Hunt for HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command and mscfile\shell\open\command modifications and %TEMP%\obito.txt, %TEMP%\svchost.exe
- Alert on unexpected egress to api.telegram.org and ip-api.com from non-browser processes
- Search endpoints for the listed SHA-256 hashes
- Report observed Telegram bot tokens to Telegram abuse for deactivation
Workarounds
- Set UAC to always notify and restrict standard users from writing HKCU shell-handler keys via EDR policy
- Restrict egress to Telegram API and geolocation services where not business-required
- Audit scheduled tasks periodically for 'ChromeUpdate' and dismiss unexpected UAC prompts after running downloaded files
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy behavioral EDR rather than relying on signature AV, since the crypter is updated daily
- Enforce application allow-listing that blocks unsigned binaries running from user-writable paths
- Monitor WMI queries and process-creation chains (dropper -> svchost.exe in %TEMP% -> cmd/powershell/reg/schtasks)
- Detonate suspicious binaries in a sandbox before endpoint deployment and consume continuous threat-intel feeds
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints (no specific versions stated)
Timeline
- Parent NjRAT (Bladabindi) first observed in 2012 per MITRE ATT&CK S0385 (month/day approximated); KGB RAT derives from the NjRAT 0.7D Lime Edition codebase.
- MITRE ATT&CK creates the njRAT (S0385) software entry used as the reference baseline for the parent family's techniques.
- Infrastructure evidence for an early KGB RAT version (v0.1) dating to late January 2022 (day approximated from 'late January').
- Public breach-alert reporting related to KGB RAT noted by Group-IB in September 2025 (day approximated).
- Late 2025: active underground-forum campaign promoting KGB RAT as a FUD MaaS with free and paid tiers ($150/month, $800/year, $500 Network Spreading add-on; day approximated).
- Threat ingested by Threadlinqs hunt pipeline as a new MaaS RAT family (NjRAT-based) with active operators.
- Group-IB (Alpomish Asadov, Razvan Raducu) publishes technical analysis of KGB RAT, documenting multiple operators, C2 infrastructure, 39 mapped ATT&CK techniques and a CryptoClipper module.
Sources cited
- KGB RAT: A Fully Undetectable Windows Trojan Built to Spy, Steal, and Terrorize group-ib.com · Research · 2026-10-14
- MITRE ATT&CK: njRAT (S0385) MITRE · Research
- NjRAT - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org · Research
- Splunk: More Than Just a RAT - Unveiling NjRAT's MBR Wiping Capabilities splunk.com · Vendor report
- Cyble: Trojanized Application Preying on TeamViewer Users (NjRAT) cyble.com · Blog
- Rewterz Threat Alert: NjRAT Active IOCs rewterz.com · Blog
Previous and next in malware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.