Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-3504
Grandoreiro Banking Trojan Targets Mexico via Duplicate Files Finder DLL Sideloading (mingwm10.dll)
Acronis TRU reports a May 2026 Grandoreiro (Delphi-based banking trojan) campaign that sideloads a malicious mingwm10.dll through a renamed, legitimate Duplicate Files Finder executable. June 2026 telemetry shows activity concentrated in Mexico, followed by Spain and other Latin American countries; delivery is assessed with moderate confidence to be spam carrying ZIP archives. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3504 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows |
| Malware | Grandoreiro - S0531 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1057 Process Discovery, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204 User Execution, T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks, T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window, T1566 Phishing, T1571 Non-Standard Port, T1574 Hijack Execution Flow and 2 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | finance, banking, general-enterprise |
| Target regions | mexico, spain, Latin America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3504 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 29 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Grandoreiro DLL Side-Loading — mingwm10.dll/dupfdll.dll Loaded from User-Writable Path (Duplicate Files Finder Chain)
Detects Sysmon image-load events for mingwm10.dll or dupfdll.dll outside Windows and Program Files, the side-loading chain Grandoreiro uses through a renamed Duplicate Files Finder executable (Acronis TRU, May 2026). Known malicious MD5 hashes are flagged in ioc_md5_match.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1574.002, T1574, T1036.005
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_event_log_sysmon_eventcode_7, DeviceImageLoadEvents
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7 earliest=-24h (ImageLoaded="*\\mingwm10.dll" OR ImageLoaded="*\\dupfdll.dll") NOT (ImageLoaded="C:\\Windows\\*" OR ImageLoaded="C:\\Program Files*") | eval ioc_md5_match=if(match(Hashes,"(?i)(f1aed8cf2adafa86927fc58d5f24073e|e882ee4a643b00871c98bcfe4b4d7cd1)"),"yes","no") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(ImageLoaded) as dlls values(ioc_md5_match) as ioc_md5_match values(Signed) as signed by host, Image, User | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("mingwm10.dll", "dupfdll.dll") or MD5 in~ ("f1aed8cf2adafa86927fc58d5f24073e", "e882ee4a643b00871c98bcfe4b4d7cd1")
| where not(FolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows\" or FolderPath startswith @"C:\Program Files")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, LoaderProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName, LoaderPath = InitiatingProcessFolderPath, LoadedDll = FolderPath, MD5, SHA256Sigma
title: Grandoreiro mingwm10.dll / dupfdll.dll DLL Side-Loading from User-Writable Path
id: 3f1c2a7e-5b0d-4c6a-9e11-7a3b8d2c4e01
status: experimental
description: Detects loading of mingwm10.dll or dupfdll.dll from outside system directories, the DLL side-loading chain used by the May 2026 Grandoreiro campaign via a renamed Duplicate Files Finder executable.
references:
- https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/grandoreiro-goes-north-from-brazil-to-mexico-with-a-new-dll-sideloading-campaign/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/14
tags:
- attack.s0531
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1574
- attack.t1574.002
- attack.t1036.005
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\mingwm10.dll'
- '\dupfdll.dll'
filter_system:
ImageLoaded|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\'
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
condition: selection and not filter_system
falsepositives:
- Legitimate MinGW/MSYS2 toolchains or portable apps shipping mingwm10.dll in user directories
- Developers building Delphi/MinGW software
level: high
Known false positives:
- Legitimate MinGW/MSYS2 toolchains or portable apps shipping mingwm10.dll in user directories
- Developers building Delphi/MinGW software
Tuning notes: Allow-list known-good developer hosts and signed vendor paths. Raise to critical when ioc_md5_match=yes. Ensure Sysmon ImageLoad (EventCode 7) is enabled for user-writable paths.
- Grandoreiro Campaign File Artifacts Created — Lure ZIP, Renamed EXE, [indicator]/[indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- Grandoreiro DoH C2 Resolution — Non-Browser Process Contacting dns.google · unlock with TL Creds
- Grandoreiro Published C2 Domain Contact — DNS and Network Telemetry · unlock with TL Creds
- Grandoreiro Anti-Analysis Geolocation — Non-Browser Process Resolving ip-api.com · unlock with TL Creds
- Grandoreiro Known-Hash Module Load — [indicator], [indicator] and Campaign Samples · unlock with TL Creds
- DLL Side-Loading from ZIP Extraction Folder — Grandoreiro [indicator]/[indicator] Chain · unlock with TL Creds
- Grandoreiro Lure Executable Launched from ZIP Extraction Folder (Renamed Duplicate Files Finder) · unlock with TL Creds
- Grandoreiro C2 — Outbound HTTP over TCP/6432 and Published C2 Domains · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 29 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3504.
Sample indicators (3 of 29)
- Domain:
445675885304004[.]pointto[.]us - File hash:
f1aed8cf2adafa86927fc58d5f24073e - Domain:
b744156103040828396040[.]nhlfan[.]net
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 29 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Grandoreiro is a Delphi-based banking trojan active since 2016 and historically associated with Brazilian operators targeting Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries. After the January 2024 INTERPOL/Brazilian Federal Police disruption, Acronis TRU observed a renewed campaign in May 2026 with a new loader technique and heavier anti-analysis.
Infection chain: a ZIP archive (example: Fac-BH22DC0608_RevMQKSAC.zip) contains decoy PDFs and a legitimate Duplicate Files Finder executable renamed to a lure-style name (e.g. _2IH4ENJIRRNCobran_03732qyykae214BKXXN6180-Dt.exe). When run, the executable loads dupfdll.dll, which in turn loads the malicious mingwm10.dll (DLL side-loading, masquerading as the MinGW runtime library). On failure or analysis detection the malware shows a Spanish-language-themed document error message and asks the user to restart. Delivery is assessed with moderate confidence to be spam with ZIP attachments.
Anti-analysis: the loader requires system uptime of at least 180,000 ms; checks for desktop shortcuts of common applications (Chrome, CCleaner, Firefox, FileZilla, Acrobat Reader DC, Edge, Skype); evaluates physical memory, processor count, disk space and screen resolution; looks for VirtualBox/VMware drivers, BIOS registry values containing VBOX/VMWARE/VIRTUAL/QEMU/XEN/INNOTEK and VMware Tools registry keys; blocks execution when 49 analysis-tool processes are running (Procmon, Wireshark, x64dbg, Ghidra, Frida, Fiddler, etc.); blacklists known sandbox usernames/hostnames and analyst directories (e.g. C:\TOOLS\ProcessInvestigator\); and queries ip-api.com to exclude victims in CZ, RU and NL. Strings are protected with a Base64 (no padding) plus XOR scheme using an embedded key and salt.
Command and control: C2 hostnames are resolved via DNS-over-HTTPS (dns.google/resolve), after which the bot issues encrypted HTTP GET requests over TCP/6432. The protocol uses Portuguese-language tokens such as CLIENT_SOLICITA_DDS_MDL, CLIENT_ENVIA_STATUS, SOLICITADO, RECUPERADO, INFECTADO, AV_COMEU_MODULO, ERRO_EXECUCAO, ERRO_FALHA_DOWNLOAD and ERRO_EXTRACAO. The decrypted check-in carries country, city, hostname, username, OS version, installed security product, a bot identifier and date/time fields. Acronis published 6 C2 domains and 17 SHA256 hashes. No CVE is involved; severity is analyst-assigned.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks; T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window; T1574.001 DLL
Discovery
T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1614 System Location Discovery
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS; T1571 Non-Standard Port
Execution
Initial Access
stealth
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block the six published C2 domains at DNS, proxy and firewall
- Block or alert on outbound HTTP over TCP/6432 from workstations
- Hunt for mingwm10.dll and dupfdll.dll loaded from user-writable or archive-extracted paths
- Quarantine ZIP attachments containing executables alongside decoy PDFs
Workarounds
- Block execution from user temp/download/archive extraction directories via application control
Longer-term hardening
- Restrict or monitor DNS-over-HTTPS to dns.google from non-browser processes
- Deploy EDR with DLL side-loading and unsigned-DLL-load detection
- Train users in Mexico/LATAM business units on invoice/collection-notice lures
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints (user-executed malware; no vulnerability exploited)
Timeline
- Grandoreiro Delphi banking trojan active since 2016 (year-level precision per Acronis).
- INTERPOL, Brazilian Federal Police and Spanish National Police disrupt Grandoreiro operation; five arrests and 13 search warrants in Brazil (late January 2024).
- Renewed Grandoreiro campaign using Duplicate Files Finder DLL side-loading observed (May 2026).
- Sample C2 check-in recorded in Acronis analysis carries date 18-05-2026, showing the campaign was live by this date.
- June 2026 30-day telemetry shows concentration in Mexico, with clusters in Spain and other Latin American countries.
- Acronis Threat Research Unit publishes analysis and IOCs for the campaign.
Sources cited
- Disrupting a Grandoreiro malware operation (INTERPOL) interpol.int · Advisory · 2024-01-30
- Grandoreiro goes north: from Brazil to Mexico with a new DLL sideloading campaign acronis.com · Research · 2026-08-19
- MITRE ATT&CK T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading MITRE · Research
- Brazilian Feds Dismantle Grandoreiro Banking Trojan, Arresting Top Operatives (The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News · 2024-01-30
- Brazilian police arrest Grandoreiro gang (Risky Business) risky.biz · News · 2024-01-30
- Grandoreiro malware revives following police action (TechRadar) techradar.com · News
Previous and next in malware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.