Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-3544
Balonx Sistema: Mexican Banking PhaaS with BankProtect Android RAT and CallFlow AI Vishing
Balonx Sistema is a subscription-based Phishing-as-a-Service platform targeting over 20 Mexican financial institutions. It combines WebSocket-controlled real-time credential and OTP interception, the BankProtect Android RAT (Spyroid-based, package sacred.explosion), and CallFlow, an AI-driven voice fraud module. Group-IB reports 1,100+ credentials harvested since October 2025 and live C2 infrastructure at publication. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3544 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Balonx Sistema, BankProtect, CallFlow, Aclaraciones Bancarias |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Mexican financial institutions (20+) Online banking customers (Banamex named specifically); Google Android devices (BankProtect RAT sideloaded APK) |
| Attribution | Balonx (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Mexico |
| Malware | BankProtect, Spyroid, telegram |
| Tools | CallFlow, ElevenLabs, FreePBX |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, T1417.001 Keylogging, T1513 Screen Capture, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link, T1583.001 Domains, T1585.001 Social Media Accounts, T1598.003 Spearphishing Link, T1636.004 SMS Messages and 3 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | finance, banking |
| Target regions | mexico, Latin America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3544 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Balonx Sistema Phishing Portal Access — Exploitation (Delivery)
Web proxy hits to Balonx Sistema PhaaS domains (balonx.online, panelbalonxfs.xyz, callbalonx.info, aclaraciones-digital.online, soporte-aclaracion.xyz), or to Aclaraciones/Balonx look-alike domains that expose the /ws operator-in-the-middle WebSocket or a folio-style path such as /12345. Indicates a user followed a Telegram/WhatsApp bank-clarification lure.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1566.002, T1598.003, T1583.001, T1660, T1557
- Data sources: web_proxy, zscaler_nss_web
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=proxy sourcetype="zscalernss-web" earliest=-24h
```Balonx Sistema phishing portal: IOC domains, or look-alike domains that expose the /ws operator relay or a folio-style path```
| eval dom=lower(coalesce(hostname, url_domain, dest_host)), path=lower(coalesce(urlpath, url_path, "/"))
| eval ioc_domain=if(match(dom, "(^|[.])(balonx[.]online|panelbalonxfs[.]xyz|callbalonx[.]info|aclaraciones-digital[.]online|soporte-aclaracion[.]xyz)$"), 1, 0)
| eval lookalike=if(match(dom, "(aclaracion|balonx).*[.](online|xyz|info|top|site|click)$"), 1, 0)
| eval ws_relay=if(match(path, "^/ws(/|$)"), 1, 0), folio_path=if(match(path, "^/[0-9]{4,8}/?$"), 1, 0)
| where ioc_domain=1 OR (lookalike=1 AND (ws_relay=1 OR folio_path=1))
| stats count as hits dc(path) as distinct_paths values(path) as paths values(dom) as domains max(ws_relay) as ws_relay max(folio_path) as folio_path min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by user, src_ip
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where isnotempty(RemoteUrl)
| extend Host = tolower(tostring(split(replace_regex(RemoteUrl, @"^[a-z]+://", ""), "/")[0]))
| extend Path = extract(@"^(?:[a-z]+://)?[^/]+(/[^?#]*)", 1, RemoteUrl)
| extend IocDomain = Host matches regex @"(^|[.])(balonx[.]online|panelbalonxfs[.]xyz|callbalonx[.]info|aclaraciones-digital[.]online|soporte-aclaracion[.]xyz)$"
| extend Lookalike = Host matches regex @"(aclaracion|balonx).*[.](online|xyz|info|top|site|click)$"
| extend WsRelay = Path matches regex @"^/ws(/|$)", FolioPath = Path matches regex @"^/[0-9]{4,8}/?$"
| where IocDomain or (Lookalike and (WsRelay or FolioPath))
| summarize Hits = count(), Paths = make_set(Path, 20), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, Host, IocDomain, WsRelay, FolioPathSigma
title: Balonx Sistema Phishing Portal Access
id: a3d5e7f1-2b4c-4d68-8a9b-0c1d2e3f4a01
status: experimental
description: Detects web proxy requests to Balonx Sistema PhaaS domains, or to look-alike Aclaraciones/Balonx domains that expose the /ws operator relay or a folio-style path.
references:
- https://www.group-ib.com/blog/balonx-sistema-mexico-phaas/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/14
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.002
- attack.reconnaissance
- attack.t1598.003
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1583.001
- attack.t1660
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
sel_ioc:
cs-host|endswith:
- 'balonx.online'
- 'panelbalonxfs.xyz'
- 'callbalonx.info'
- 'aclaraciones-digital.online'
- 'soporte-aclaracion.xyz'
sel_lookalike:
cs-host|re: '(aclaracion|balonx).*[.](online|xyz|info|top|site|click)$'
sel_ws:
c-uri|re: '^(https?|wss?)://[^/]+/ws(/|[?]|$)'
sel_folio:
c-uri|re: '^https?://[^/]+/[0-9]{4,8}/?$'
condition: sel_ioc or (sel_lookalike and (sel_ws or sel_folio))
falsepositives:
- Brand-protection or takedown teams visiting the phishing domains
- Security researchers sandboxing the URLs
level: high
Known false positives:
- Brand-protection or takedown staff visiting the phishing domains
- Security researchers sandboxing the lure URLs
Tuning notes: Field names (hostname, urlpath, user, src_ip) follow Zscaler NSS web logs; map them to your proxy's CIM fields. Add newly published Balonx domains to the domain regex. Widen the TLD list if look-alike matches are missed. Exclude security-team analyst hosts.
- Balonx Sistema and Aclaraciones Domain Resolution — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- BankProtect Detection via Defender Alerts and Install Trace — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Persistent Raw TCP Beacon and Spyroid Vendor Domain — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- Balonx OITM WebSocket Relay and Admin Panel API — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- BankProtect Android RAT Capability Use — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- CallFlow AI Vishing FreePBX SIP Server Connection — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- BankProtect Android RAT Package in Device Inventory — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- BankProtect Android RAT C2 [indicator]:7771 — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3544.
Sample indicators (3 of 27)
- IP address:
196.251.84[.]11 - Domain:
callbalonx[.]info - IP address:
85.31.235[.]109
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
Balonx Sistema is an industrialized Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) operation aimed at customers of more than 20 Mexican financial institutions (Banamex is the one specifically named in the public reporting). It descends from an earlier 'Aclaraciones Bancarias' campaign whose domain registrations date back to 2019; Group-IB links 350+ domains to the two campaigns. Development activity appears in a GitHub repository from June 2025, a commercial launch date of 4 October 2025 is hardcoded, and Group-IB reports 1,100+ user credentials harvested since October 2025. All phishing domains are backed by a single central Neon PostgreSQL database, so victim data, live sessions and affiliate accounts survive domain takedown and re-registration.
The platform is sold by subscription: an Individual tier (3,000 MXN/week, 2 devices) and an Office tier (6,000 MXN/week, 8 Executive sub-accounts), with payments integrated with the Bitso API. Affiliates register through a Telegram bot, require approval from the SuperAdmin account 'balonx', and Executives authenticate with one-time Telegram passwords; an 'allowedBanks' permission field controls which banks each Executive may target. Group-IB estimated roughly 1,728,000 MXN (about USD 99,385) of observed proceeds across 12 steady users. The service is advertised in Facebook groups such as 'Base de Datos' and 'Bases de datos Negocios Serios'. Victims are lured with phishing links distributed over Telegram and WhatsApp that pose as bank clarification/cancellation/support requests; sessions are hosted at a single domain with folio-style paths (for example /12345).
The phishing portal uses a persistent WebSocket endpoint (/ws, present on all active Balonx phishing domains) that gives the operator live operator-in-the-middle control. The operator watches the victim's input, relays credentials to the genuine banking portal, receives the MFA challenge, and pushes a SCREEN_CHANGE to the victim (for example CODIGO) asking for the same OTP before it expires. Fourteen screen types are used: FOLIO, VALIDANDO, LOGIN, CODIGO (SMS OTP), NIP (ATM PIN), TARJETA (card number/expiry/CVV), SMS_COMPRA (purchase authorization OTP), CANCELACION_RETIRO (cardless withdrawal codes), ESCANEAR_QR (physical card QR scan), PROTECCION_BANCARIA (APK distribution), PROTECCION_SALDO (balance capture), VERIFICACION_ID (ID/selfie capture through the camera to bypass KYC), MENSAJE (custom operator message) and CANCELACION (completion). 'Personal Flows' pre-script per-bank screen sequences that advance on a timer or on data submission. The admin panel exposes GraphQL, REST and token-auth endpoints under panelbalonxfs[.]xyz/admin/api/api/.
The PROTECCION_BANCARIA screen shows a fake bank security alert that pushes victims to install a 'protection' app. This is BankProtect, an Android RAT built on the commercial Spyroid RAT (Spyroid.net), package name sacred.explosion, main class bxelllolzxqfmaszk1049. Its C2 is hardcoded as Base64 strings (ClientHost MTk2LjI1MS44NC4xMQ== = 196.251.84.11, ClientPort Nzc3MQ== = 7771) and it uses a persistent raw TCP socket (setSoTimeout(0)) with a ConnectionKey. Capabilities reported: real-time keylogging and screen capture, SMS interception, social-media account hijacking, full remote device control and monitoring of banking app activity. The C2 at 196.251.84.11:7771/TCP was live at publication.
CallFlow is the third pillar: an automated outbound vishing module (callbalonx[.]info) that impersonates a bank agent named 'Carolina'. It uses OpenAI GPT-4o-mini for dialogue, ElevenLabs (voice 'carolina') as primary TTS with OpenAI voice 'echo' as fallback, and OpenAI Whisper for speech recognition, on a FreePBX (17.0.4.31 / 17.0.28) PBX with 30 default SIP channels. The SIP server was observed at 85.31.235.109:5160/TCP, the FreePBX backend/UCP at panelbalonxfs[.]xyz, and manager accounts can use Asterisk ChanSpy to listen to live calls. Together these remove the need for human call-centre operators and allow large-scale simultaneous vishing. No CVEs are associated; CVSS is not applicable. BeaconBeagle returned no beacon records for the two IPs (404) and no config matches for balonx.online at the time of research.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
Credential Access
T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Collection
T1417.001 Keylogging; T1513 Screen Capture; T1636.004 SMS Messages
Initial Access
T1566.002 Spearphishing Link; T1660 Phishing
Resource Development
T1583.001 Domains; T1585.001 Social Media Accounts
Reconnaissance
Impact
Defense Evasion
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block and monitor 196.251.84.11 (TCP/7771) and 85.31.235.109 (TCP/5160) at the perimeter and mobile threat defense
- Block callbalonx.info, panelbalonxfs.xyz, balonx.online, aclaraciones-digital.online and soporte-aclaracion.xyz
- Hunt for Android package sacred.explosion on managed and BYOD devices
- Add 'Aclaraciones'/'Balonx' keyword watchlists to domain-registration and certificate monitoring
Workarounds
- Verify bank calls by calling back the number printed on the card
- Never install apps prompted by phone calls or unverified banking websites
Longer-term hardening
- Move high-value customers to FIDO2/hardware-bound authentication, which resists WebSocket operator-in-the-middle OTP relay
- Detect abnormal WebSocket (/ws) patterns and redirect chains (Google Translate abuse, open redirects) on email and web gateways
- Educate customers that banks never request ATM PINs, CVVs, card scans or app installs through web forms or phone calls
Affected and fixed versions
- Mexican financial institutions (20+) — Online banking customers (Banamex named specifically)
Vulnerable versions: Customers of targeted banks - Google — Android devices (BankProtect RAT sideloaded APK)
Vulnerable versions: Devices that sideload the sacred.explosion APK
Timeline
Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source
- Earliest domain registrations tied to the predecessor 'Aclaraciones Bancarias' campaign (source gives the year 2019 only)
- Development activity observed in a GitHub repository holding Balonx source code (source gives June 2025 only)
- Hardcoded commercial launch date of the Balonx Sistema PhaaS
- 1,100+ user credentials harvested from October 2025 onward (start date approximate; source says October 2025)
- BankProtect C2 locked-ioc-8:7771 and CallFlow SIP server locked-ioc-9:5160 live at publication; 350+ related domains identified
- Group-IB publishes analysis of Balonx Sistema, BankProtect and CallFlow
- Spanish-language Group-IB article 'El Rostro Detrás del PhaaS que Impacta la Banca Mexicana' dated 2026-08-25 (as recorded in the hunt feed)
- Group-IB English article last modified on 2026-09-08 (per page metadata)
Update history
- 2026-10-19 — Balonx Sistema: Mexico-based PhaaS targeting Mexican banks with real-time WebSocket credential/OTP theft, BankProtect Android RAT and CallFlow AI vishing: What changed No change to severity (HIGH), exploitability (ACTIVE), status (ACTIVE) or attribution confidence (MEDIUM). Additive detail only. New indicators (5) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- Balonx Sistema: The Face Behind the PhaaS Affecting Mexican Banking group-ib.com · Vendor report · 2026-08-19
- MITRE ATT&CK T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception MITRE · Research · 2026-08-19
- MITRE ATT&CK T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle MITRE · Research · 2026-08-19
- MITRE ATT&CK T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link MITRE · Research · 2026-08-19
- MITRE ATT&CK T1656 Impersonation MITRE · Research · 2026-08-19
- MITRE ATT&CK Mobile T1660 Phishing MITRE · Research · 2026-08-19
Previous and next in phishing
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated .