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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-3678

Vexy Ransomware claims Enchanted Fine Jewellery (India, Retail & E-Commerce) - 34.88 GB exfiltrated

mediumACTIVE

Ransomware.live lists Enchanted Fine Jewellery (enchantedfinejewellery.in), an Indian retail and e-commerce business, as a victim on the Vexy Ransomware leak site, discovered 2026-10-15 11:22 UTC, with 34.88 GB listed as exfiltrated. The listing indexes operator-posted claims; the breach has not been independently confirmed by the victim.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3678
Also known asVexy Ransomware Enchanted Fine Jewellery leak
SeverityMEDIUM
First disclosed
Affected productsEnchanted Fine Jewellery Corporate IT environment and e-commerce operations (enchantedfinejewellery.in)
AttributionVexy Ransomware (medium confidence)
MalwareRust cross-platform encryptor, Vexy Ransomware
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1021 Remote Services, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery, T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution, T1657 Financial Theft, T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsretail, ecommerce, technology, manufacturing
Target regionsindia, brazil, Latin America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3678 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 11 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Vexy Ransomware Precursor - Shadow Copy and Recovery Inhibition (T1490)

Behaviour-first detection of shadow copy deletion (vssadmin, wmic, PowerShell Win32_ShadowCopy), bcdedit recovery disablement and wbadmin catalog deletion. These are the recovery-inhibition steps ransomware operators such as Vexy Ransomware (TL-2026-3678) run before or during encryption. Vexy tooling is not publicly analysed, so detection is behavioural rather than IOC-based.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1490, T1059
  • Data sources: sysmon (index=windows, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode 1), Microsoft Defender DeviceProcessEvents
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h@h
    ( ((Image="*\\vssadmin.exe" OR OriginalFileName="VSSADMIN.EXE") CommandLine="*delete*" CommandLine="*shadows*")
    OR (Image="*\\wmic.exe" CommandLine="*shadowcopy*" CommandLine="*delete*")
    OR (Image="*\\bcdedit.exe" CommandLine="*recoveryenabled*" CommandLine="*no*")
    OR (Image="*\\bcdedit.exe" CommandLine="*bootstatuspolicy*" CommandLine="*ignoreallfailures*")
    OR (Image="*\\wbadmin.exe" CommandLine="*delete*" (CommandLine="*catalog*" OR CommandLine="*systemstatebackup*"))
    OR ((Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe") CommandLine="*Win32_ShadowCopy*" (CommandLine="*Delete*" OR CommandLine="*Remove-WmiObject*" OR CommandLine="*Remove-CimInstance*")) )
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as commands values(ParentImage) as parent_processes by Computer, User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("delete", "shadows"))
    or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("shadowcopy", "delete"))
    or (FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine has_all ("recoveryenabled", "no") or ProcessCommandLine has_all ("bootstatuspolicy", "ignoreallfailures")))
    or (FileName =~ "wbadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("catalog", "systemstatebackup"))
    or (FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has "Win32_ShadowCopy" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Delete", "Remove-WmiObject", "Remove-CimInstance"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Sigma

title: Vexy Ransomware Precursor - Shadow Copy and Recovery Inhibition (T1490)
id: 3f6a1c52-8b47-4d0e-9a21-5c7e0b8d4f11
status: experimental
description: Detects deletion of Volume Shadow Copies, backup catalogs and Windows recovery settings, the recovery-inhibition behaviour that precedes ransomware encryption. Relevant to Vexy Ransomware (TL-2026-3678), whose encryption stage is unconfirmed.
references:
    - https://www.ransomware.live/group/vexy
    - https://noransom.net/en/ransomware/new-vexy/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-15
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_vss:
        Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'delete'
            - 'shadows'
    selection_wmic:
        Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'shadowcopy'
            - 'delete'
    selection_bcdedit_recovery:
        Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'recoveryenabled'
            - 'no'
    selection_bcdedit_boot:
        Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'bootstatuspolicy'
            - 'ignoreallfailures'
    selection_wbadmin_catalog:
        Image|endswith: '\wbadmin.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'delete'
            - 'catalog'
    selection_wbadmin_state:
        Image|endswith: '\wbadmin.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'delete'
            - 'systemstatebackup'
    selection_powershell:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Win32_ShadowCopy'
            - 'Delete'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Backup or storage administrators pruning shadow copies
    - Disk-cleanup or imaging scripts run by IT
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Backup/storage admins deliberately deleting shadow copies or backup catalogs
  • Disk imaging or decommissioning scripts that run vssadmin delete shadows

Tuning notes: Allowlist known backup server hostnames and service accounts via Computer/User; alert on any hit from a workstation. Field names assume the Splunk Add-on for Sysmon; adjust index=windows to your Sysmon index.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Run Key Persistence Launching From User-Writable Path or Script Host · unlock with TL Creds
  • Security Tool Tampering - Defender Disable, Exclusions and Service Stop · unlock with TL Creds
  • Exfiltration Tooling Execution - Rclone, MEGA, SFTP Clients and Anonymous Upload Services · unlock with TL Creds
  • Remote Service Lateral Movement - PsExec, Remote WMI and PowerShell Remoting · unlock with TL Creds
  • Scheduled Task Persistence Executing Script Host or User-Writable Payload · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ransom Note Creation Across Multiple Directories (Encryption Impact) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Valid Account RDP Logon from External IP with Host Fan-out or Off-hours Use · unlock with TL Creds
  • Tor Onion Access, Vexy Leak Site Lookup and Tox Client Execution · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-15, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 11 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3678.

Sample indicators (2 of 11)

  • Domain: enchantedfinejewellery[.]in
  • Domain: vexytsr3chimdz6siwaqi2lvxxwfkxvffkpwyanr2llequ2hkm56jvqd[.]onion

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 11 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

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Technical analysis

On 2026-10-15 the ransomware tracker Ransomware.live indexed a new Vexy Ransomware leak-site post naming Enchanted Fine Jewellery (domain enchantedfinejewellery.in, India, sector Retail & E-Commerce) and listing 34.88 GB of data as exfiltrated. The listing carries no narrative, ransom demand, proof pack, onion link or deadline. The estimated attack date is the same day as discovery (2026-10-15). Tracker DNS enrichment shows MX records at mail.enchantedfinejewellery.in and enchantedfinejewellery.in, no TXT records, and a GoDaddy abuse WHOIS contact. A ParanoidLab exposure query run 2026-10-15 reported zero exposed passwords and zero exposed cookies, so there is no credential-exposure lead for initial access. No cloud/SaaS compromise was reported. All details are operator claims aggregated by a single tracker and are unverified.

Vexy Ransomware is a newly observed extortion operation. Trackers differ on first-seen dates: noransom.net cites the earliest claimed victim on 2026-09-02, Breachsense and others give 2026-09-04 as the first posting, and Ransomware.live lists an estimated first attack of 2026-07-06 with leak-site discovery on 2026-09-03. Ransomware.live (as of 2026-10-15) counts 21 victims and 787.6 GB claimed exfiltrated across 13 countries; India is the most frequent country (6 victims on Ransomware.live, 8 on Breachsense), followed by Brazil, with Retail & E-Commerce, Technology and Manufacturing among the top sectors. Victim counts differ between trackers (20-21). The group operates a Tor leak site titled 'Vexy Ransomware | Blog' running Apache 2.4.68 (Debian), and Ransomware.live lists two Bitcoin wallets associated with the group.

Technical visibility is very limited. As of 2026-09-11 noransom.net reported no vendor or CERT sample analysis, no confirmed encrypted-file extension, ransom note name or decryptor, and described the model as steal-first, extort-second with full-publication threats; a Tox messenger ID is described as the primary contact channel. A 'Rust cross-platform encryptor' is mentioned only in unverified secondary sources, and whether encryption actually occurs is unconfirmed. Initial access vectors listed by noransom.net (exposed remote access without MFA, unpatched edge appliances, managed-service pivots, infostealer-sourced credentials) are derived from victim profiles, not observed for this incident. ATT&CK techniques mapped here come from tracker-reported group techniques and the claimed extortion behavior, and should be treated as low-confidence. No CVE is associated with this listing. Severity is set to MEDIUM pending corroboration.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Lateral Movement

T1021 Remote Services

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

Persistence

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Impact

T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Patches

  • No CVE is associated with this listing; keep internet-facing VPN, remote access and edge appliances patched to current vendor releases

Immediate actions

  • Treat the claim as unverified: Enchanted Fine Jewellery should check for unauthorized access, data staging and large outbound transfers around 2026-10-15 and earlier
  • Rotate credentials for VPN, RDP, e-commerce admin, email and cloud accounts and enforce MFA on all remote access
  • Review mail.enchantedfinejewellery.in mail logs and e-commerce platform admin audit logs for anomalous access
  • Block the Vexy leak-site onion service from corporate egress and monitor for the victim domain on the leak site

Workarounds

  • Restrict internet exposure of RDP and VPN endpoints and require MFA
  • Limit administrative access to retail, ERP and e-commerce back-office systems to named hosts

Longer-term hardening

  • Maintain offline, immutable, tested backups and protect backup consoles with separate credentials
  • Deploy EDR with ransomware behavioral detection and alert on shadow copy deletion and recovery inhibition
  • Monitor outbound data volume and restrict bulk egress to uncommon destinations
  • Subscribe to ransomware leak-site monitoring for owned domains and supplier domains

Affected and fixed versions

  • Enchanted Fine Jewellery — Corporate IT environment and e-commerce operations (enchantedfinejewellery.in)

Timeline

  • Ransomware.live lists 2026-07-06 as the estimated attack date of the earliest Vexy victim
  • noransom.net reports the earliest claimed Vexy victim on 2026-09-02
  • Vexy Ransomware leak site first indexed by Ransomware.live
  • Breachsense records the first Vexy victim posting on its leak site
  • noransom.net notes no vendor or CERT sample analysis, IOC set, extension, ransom note or decryptor is public; 10-12 victims counted
  • Breachsense lists 2026-10-14 as the most recent attack before the Enchanted Fine Jewellery listing
  • ParanoidLab exposure query reports zero passwords and zero cookies for the victim domain
  • Enchanted Fine Jewellery (locked-ioc-6, India, Retail & E-Commerce) listed on the Vexy leak site with 34.88 GB claimed exfiltrated; discovered 11:22 UTC

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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