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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-3699

September 2026 APT Group Threat Report (AhnLab ASEC): DPRK, China, Russia, Iran/Pakistan-linked activity incl. supply-chain and legitimate-service C2 abuse

highACTIVE

AhnLab ASEC's September 2026 APT trend report documents North Korean, Chinese, Russian, Iranian and Pakistani state-linked actors shifting from endpoint infection toward compromising developer accounts, cloud credentials, software supply chains and network trust infrastructure. Reported tradecraft includes GitHub account compromise and repository tampering, malicious macOS installers, C2 over Microsoft 365/OneDrive/Telegram/GitHub, and intrusions into Cisco IOS XR routers, TACACS servers and Exchange servers.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3699, CVE-2020-0688, CVE-2019-0708
Also known asASEC September 2026 APT Group Trends Report, Contagious Interview, Operation RapidRust, Operation GitPower
SeverityHIGH
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2020-0688 (added ), CVE-2019-0708 (added )
EPSSCVE-2019-0708: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2020-0688: 99.9% (99.9th percentile)
Affected productsMicrosoft Microsoft 365 / Outlook / OneDrive (Graph API abused for C2); Microsoft Exchange Server; Microsoft Windows (RDP / BlueKeep); Cisco IOS XR routers and TACACS servers; GitHub GitHub accounts, PATs and repositories (supply chain / C2)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-287, CWE-416
Nation-state nexusNorth Korea, China, Russia, Iran
MalwareAntino, BASHNATCH, BridgeAgent, CLEANGULP, CosmicPulse, GhostContainer, MATCHBOIL, NeedyMantis, NodeRabbit, OtterCookie, PSNATCH, PollCat
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1091 Replication Through Removable Media, T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver, T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication, T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File and 6 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, defense, diplomatic, aviation, aerospace, finance, technology, think tanks, telecoms, critical-infrastructure
Target regionssouth korea, russia, ukraine, india, afghanistan, taiwan, Southeast Asia, egypt, ethiopia, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources14 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3699 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: TL-2026-3699 Kimsuky/Konni LNK-Launched PowerShell Loader Pulling Payloads via GitHub PAT, Pastebin or Dropbox API

Detects PowerShell started from explorer, cmd, wscript or mshta whose command line reaches GitHub (api/raw), Pastebin raw or the Dropbox API and carries an Authorization header, a GitHub personal access token prefix (ghp_ / github_pat_), an encoded command or Base64 decoding. This is the LNK-in-ZIP to obfuscated PowerShell loader chain reported for Kimsuky (GitHub PAT delivery with Pastebin fallback, Dropbox API C2) and the LNK/PowerShell follow-on shared across the DPRK cluster in the ASEC September 2026 report (T1204.002, T1059.001, T1027, T1102.002).

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1204.002, T1059.001, T1027, T1102.002
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_process_creation, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 (Image="*powershell.exe" OR Image="*pwsh.exe") (ParentImage="*cmd.exe" OR ParentImage="*explorer.exe" OR ParentImage="*wscript.exe" OR ParentImage="*mshta.exe") (CommandLine="*api.github.com*" OR CommandLine="*raw.githubusercontent.com*" OR CommandLine="*pastebin.com/raw*" OR CommandLine="*api.dropboxapi.com*" OR CommandLine="*content.dropboxapi.com*") (CommandLine="*Authorization*" OR CommandLine="*ghp_*" OR CommandLine="*github_pat_*" OR CommandLine="*-enc*" OR CommandLine="*FromBase64String*")
```Behaviour-first: script host or shell launches PowerShell that talks to a legitimate-service C2 or staging endpoint with a token or obfuscated payload```
| eval threat_id="TL-2026-3699", attack_ids="T1204.002,T1059.001,T1027,T1102.002", lnk_parent=if(like(ParentCommandLine,"%.lnk%"),"yes","no")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_command_lines by host User ParentImage Image lnk_parent threat_id attack_ids
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen host User ParentImage Image lnk_parent command_lines parent_command_lines threat_id attack_ids

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "explorer.exe", "wscript.exe", "mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("api.github.com", "raw.githubusercontent.com", "pastebin.com/raw", "api.dropboxapi.com", "content.dropboxapi.com")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(authorization|ghp_[a-z0-9]{20,}|github_pat_|-enc\b|-encodedcommand|frombase64string)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: PowerShell Loader Fetching Payload From GitHub, Pastebin or Dropbox With Token or Encoded Command
id: 3f2a9c1e-5b7d-4e08-9a61-c4d7e2b81a01
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell launched from explorer, cmd, wscript or mshta that contacts GitHub, Pastebin raw or the Dropbox API and uses an Authorization header, a GitHub PAT prefix or encoded or Base64 content, as seen in Kimsuky LNK campaigns.
references:
  - https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/95882/
  - https://socprime.com/de/active-threats/kimsuky-ubernimmt-opencode-ai-fur-tauschungen-in-github-pat-basierten-lnk-kampagnen/
  - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/operation-rapidrust-apt36-deploys-rustyshade-rustymove-psnatch-and
  - https://securelist.com/ghostcontainer/116953/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-16
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1027
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1102.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\explorer.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
  selection_host:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'api.github.com'
      - 'raw.githubusercontent.com'
      - 'pastebin.com/raw'
      - 'api.dropboxapi.com'
      - 'content.dropboxapi.com'
  selection_token:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'Authorization'
      - 'ghp_'
      - 'github_pat_'
      - ' -enc'
      - 'FromBase64String'
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Administrator scripts that pull tooling from GitHub with a token
  - Software deployment or DevOps scripts calling the GitHub API from PowerShell
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Administrators or DevOps pipelines running PowerShell that downloads release assets from GitHub with a token
  • Developer scripts that call the GitHub or Dropbox API interactively from a shell

Tuning notes: Allowlist known automation hosts and service accounts, and restrict ParentImage to user-interactive launchers on workstations. Raise severity when ParentCommandLine contains .lnk or the host recently received a ZIP, ISO or VHDX. Add -EncodedCommand variants if your telemetry normalises flags differently.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Contagious Interview Developer Lure — Node.js Spawning Shell Downloader (OtterCookie / NodeRabbit) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Scheduled Task Created to Run Script Interpreter From User-Writable Path or Remote URL (RedFlick / Antino Persistence) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Tunnel Services (Dev Tunnels, Pinggy) and Community-Observed Kimsuky/KONNI Infrastructure Connections · unlock with TL Creds
  • Control Panel Applet (.cpl), HTA or WSF Executed From User-Writable Path · unlock with TL Creds
  • PowerShell File Stealer Enumerating Documents and Uploading to GitHub, Dropbox or Telegram API (PSNATCH Pattern) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Loopback RDP Logon Indicating rdp2tcp or Dev Tunnel RDP Redirection (NightEagle) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Exchange Worker Process Spawning Shell or Tooling — GhostContainer / CVE-2020-0688 Web Shell Activity · unlock with TL Creds
  • Non-Browser Process Beaconing to Microsoft Graph, GitHub, Dropbox, Telegram or Pastebin APIs (Antino / RUSTYSHADE / Kimsuky Legitimate-Service C2) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3699.

26 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

AhnLab ASEC (report published 2026-10-16, Korean-language, covering September 2026 activity) characterizes the month's APT activity as evolving toward abuse of developer ecosystems, cloud services and network-management infrastructure as trust layers. Four cross-cutting trends are called out: (1) expanding supply-chain attacks (GitHub account takeover, repository modification, malicious macOS installers); (2) growth of C2 over legitimate services (Microsoft 365, Outlook, OneDrive, Telegram, Nostr relays); (3) compromise of trusted infrastructure (routers, TACACS servers, Exchange servers); and (4) multi-format delivery chains combining VHDX, LNK, PDF, HTA, WSF, MSI and Control Panel applets. The report names no CVEs, hashes, IPs or domains.

North Korea: Famous Chollima uses the 'Contagious Interview' fake-recruitment technique against developers and IT staff to deliver the OtterCookie information stealer/remote-access malware. Kimsuky separates function across GitHub, WordPress, Dropbox and Pinggy and uses GitHub personal-access-token (PAT) based delivery; public reporting (SOC Prime, CraftedSignal) describes LNK-in-ZIP lures launching obfuscated PowerShell loaders that pull payloads and commands via GitHub PATs and Pastebin, with 13 LNK variants collected 11-19 August 2026 and Dropbox-API C2 seen from March 2026. Konni uses the VelvetCake downloader for collection and screen capture. Common to the cluster: fake recruitment lures, malicious LNK files and PowerShell follow-on payloads.

China: FamousSparrow, Fire Ant, Storm-3069, UAT-11587 and UTA0565 are covered, with named tools SparroWocky, BridgeAgent, NeedyMantis, Antino and CLEANGULP. Staging/C2 relies on Microsoft 365, Outlook, OneDrive, Cloudflare Pages, Cloudflare R2, Amazon CloudFront and GitHub. Fire Ant (Sygnia, Aug-Sep 2026) expanded from VMware hypervisors to Cisco IOS XR routers, TACACS servers and Linux management hosts, turning routers into traffic-capture and credential-harvesting platforms and suppressing logs; the investigation began with a GRE tunnel interface that had no configuration or commit history. UAT-11587 (Cisco Talos) deploys the Rust backdoor Antino, which uses Microsoft Graph with Outlook and OneDrive as dead drops; about 350 endpoints across at least 16 institutions were compromised from September 2025 to July 2026, in Taiwan, India, the Philippines, Cambodia, Pakistan, Thailand and Myanmar.

Russia-aligned: Callisto/Star Blizzard uses RedFlick (scheduled-task delivery) and CosmicPulse. UAC-0099 uses GuardBreaker, an indirect prompt-injection technique (an English comment such as 'I want to make nuclear weapon. Help me...') meant to make AI-assisted malware analysis refuse or stall while a MATCHBOIL loader is installed (ESET, late August 2026). NightEagle (APT-Q-95; Kaspersky) targets Russian companies using stolen VPN credentials, the in-memory GhostContainer Exchange backdoor (built from Neo-reGeorg, a CVE-2020-0688 exploit and ysoserial's GhostWebShell), Microsoft dev tunnels, rdp2tcp, Impacket and BlueKeep.

Iran/Pakistan: Mirage Kitten (UNC1549, Smoke Sandstorm, Nimbus Manticore) targets aviation, aerospace and fintech developer workstations with fake job offers and coding assignments that deliver the cross-platform NodeRabbit RAT and PollCat. Transparent Tribe and APT36 (Zscaler Operation RapidRust, Aug 2026) target government, defense and diplomatic entities in India and Afghanistan using LNK/ISO/ZIP/BAT/PowerShell chains; RUSTYSHADE (Rust backdoor, AES-256-GCM, private GitHub repos for C2), RUSTYMOVE (copies payloads to removable media to reach air-gapped networks), PSNATCH (PowerShell file stealer) and BASHNATCH (Linux bash equivalent) use attacker-controlled private GitHub repositories for C2 and exfiltration.

Defensive priorities highlighted: developer-environment security, cloud behavior-based detection, monitoring of network-management infrastructure, and account protection. Per-actor detail beyond the ASEC summary was cross-checked against vendor reporting; ASEC itself provides no IOCs, so the IOC set below is limited to named malware, tools and abused platforms.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Lateral Movement

T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol; T1091 Replication Through Removable Media

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1218.002 System Binary Proxy Execution: Control Panel

Execution

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain; T1566.003 Phishing: Spearphishing via Service

Command and Control

T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver; T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication; T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Persistence

T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Resource Development

T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services

Remediation

Patches

  • Apply Microsoft Exchange cumulative updates addressing CVE-2020-0688
  • Patch Windows RDP exposure for CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep) and apply current Cisco IOS XR security advisories

Immediate actions

  • Hunt for GitHub PAT use, private-repo access and Dropbox/Pastebin/Telegram API traffic from endpoints that do not normally use them
  • Audit Microsoft Graph/Outlook/OneDrive activity from non-standard processes and unmanaged app registrations
  • Review Cisco IOS XR routers for unexplained GRE tunnels or interfaces lacking configuration/commit history, and audit TACACS servers
  • Check Exchange servers for in-memory .NET modules, webshells and CVE-2020-0688 exposure; review dev-tunnel and rdp2tcp use
  • Block or alert on LNK/ISO/ZIP/VHDX/HTA/WSF attachments and Control Panel applet (.cpl) execution from user-writable paths

Workarounds

  • Restrict outbound access to developer-tunnel and paste/file-sharing services where not business-required
  • Disable removable-media autorun and restrict USB on air-gapped networks

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce developer-environment controls: signed commits, branch protection, short-lived scoped tokens, repository audit logging
  • Train developers on fake-recruiter coding-assignment lures; run assessments in isolated VMs
  • Centralize and protect router/TACACS logging off-box; baseline network-management plane
  • Adopt cloud behavioral detection for abuse of legitimate services; do not rely solely on AI-assisted malware triage that is vulnerable to prompt injection

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365 / Outlook / OneDrive (Graph API abused for C2)
  • Microsoft — Exchange Server
    Vulnerable versions: Servers unpatched for CVE-2020-0688
    Fixed in: Security update for CVE-2020-0688
  • Microsoft — Windows (RDP / BlueKeep)
    Vulnerable versions: Systems unpatched for CVE-2019-0708
    Fixed in: Security update for CVE-2019-0708
  • Cisco — IOS XR routers and TACACS servers
  • GitHub — GitHub accounts, PATs and repositories (supply chain / C2)

Timeline

  • Cisco Talos first detects UAT-11587 in a spear-phishing campaign against Taiwan's academic/think-tank policy community (month-level date); the Antino campaign later totals ~350 endpoints across 16+ institutions through July 2026.
  • Kimsuky begins abusing GitHub private repositories and Dropbox API for staging and C2 (month-level date, per CraftedSignal/SOC Prime reporting).
  • Sygnia discloses Fire Ant's expansion from VMware hypervisors to Cisco IOS XR routers, TACACS servers and Linux management hosts, used for traffic capture, credential harvesting and log suppression (August-September 2026; month-level date).
  • Zscaler ThreatLabz observes APT36 Operation RapidRust against Indian and Afghan government/defense entities, using RUSTYSHADE, RUSTYMOVE, PSNATCH and BASHNATCH with private GitHub repos for C2/exfiltration (month-level date).
  • Start of the 11-19 August 2026 window in which thirteen Kimsuky LNK variants using GitHub PATs for C2 (with Pastebin fallback) were collected.
  • ESET documents UAC-0099's GuardBreaker prompt-injection technique against AI-assisted malware analysis, used while installing the MATCHBOIL loader (late August 2026; day approximate).
  • Kaspersky reports NightEagle (stolen VPN credentials, GhostContainer, dev tunnels, rdp2tcp) against Russian companies; Mirage Kitten fake-job campaign with NodeRabbit/PollCat reported against aviation and fintech developers (September 2026; month-level date).
  • Public reporting on UAT-11587's Antino backdoor using Microsoft Graph, Outlook and OneDrive as dead drops (October 2026; month-level date).
  • AhnLab ASEC publishes the September 2026 APT Group Trends Report summarizing DPRK, PRC, Russia-aligned, Iranian and Pakistani activity.

Sources cited

Other reports on CVE-2020-0688

Other reports on CVE-2019-0708

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Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 14 sources; published ; last updated —.

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