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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-3758

Malicious open-source packages: axios npm account hijack (plain-crypto-js / WAVESHAPER.V2), tensorflow-opt PyPI miner, and Contagious Interview multi-ecosystem campaign

highACTIVE

On 2026-03-31 the npm maintainer account for axios (~100M weekly downloads) was hijacked and versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 were published with an injected dependency, plain-crypto-js@4.2.1, that dropped a cross-platform RAT (WAVESHAPER.V2) from sfrclak.com. Google attributes the activity to North Korea-nexus UNC1069 (Sapphire Sleet/BlueNoroff). First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3758
Also known asaxios npm supply chain attack, MAL-2026-2307, MAL-2026-983, Contagious Interview
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsaxios (npm) axios; npm plain-crypto-js; PyPI tensorflow-opt
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-1357
AttributionUNC1069, APT38 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusNorth Korea
MalwareBeaverTail - S1246, FlexibleFerret, InvisibleFerret - S1245, OtterCookie, SILKBELL, WAVESHAPER
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.002 AppleScript, T1059.006 Python, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstechnology, software development, finance, cryptocurrency
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3758 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: WAVESHAPER.V2 Windows Persistence - Run Key, system.bat and Renamed PowerShell wt.exe

Detects the Windows WAVESHAPER.V2 post-exploitation chain: %TEMP%\6202033.ps1 execution, a PowerShell copy masquerading as %PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe (OriginalFileName PowerShell.EXE), the dropped system.bat, and Run-key persistence pointing at them.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1547.001, T1036, T1059.001
  • Data sources: sysmon, defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-7d
((EventCode=1 ((Image="*\\ProgramData\\wt.exe" AND OriginalFileName="PowerShell.EXE") OR CommandLine="*6202033.ps1*"))
 OR (EventCode=11 (TargetFilename="*\\ProgramData\\wt.exe" OR TargetFilename="*\\ProgramData\\system.bat" OR TargetFilename="*\\6202033.ps1"))
 OR (EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*" (Details="*system.bat*" OR Details="*\\ProgramData\\wt.exe*")))
```wt.exe in ProgramData is a renamed PowerShell copy; legitimate Windows Terminal lives under WindowsApps```
| eval behavior=case(EventCode=1,"renamed PowerShell (wt.exe) or 6202033.ps1 execution", EventCode=11,"WAVESHAPER.V2 file drop (wt.exe / system.bat / 6202033.ps1)", EventCode=13,"Run-key persistence to system.bat / wt.exe", true(),"other")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(behavior) as behaviors values(Image) as images values(TargetFilename) as files values(TargetObject) as reg_keys values(Details) as reg_data by host, User
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)

Microsoft KQL

let lookback = 7d;
let proc = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
    | where (FolderPath endswith @"\ProgramData\wt.exe" and ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "PowerShell.EXE")
        or (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "6202033.ps1")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Behavior = "renamed PowerShell (wt.exe) or 6202033.ps1 execution", Detail = ProcessCommandLine, ActorProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName;
let files = DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
    | where FolderPath endswith @"\ProgramData\wt.exe" or FolderPath endswith @"\ProgramData\system.bat" or FolderPath endswith @"\6202033.ps1"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Behavior = "WAVESHAPER.V2 file drop", Detail = FolderPath, ActorProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName;
let reg = DeviceRegistryEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
    | where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet" and RegistryKey has @"CurrentVersion\Run"
    | where RegistryValueData has_any ("system.bat", @"\ProgramData\wt.exe")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Behavior = "Run-key persistence to system.bat / wt.exe", Detail = strcat(RegistryKey, " = ", RegistryValueData), ActorProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName;
union proc, files, reg
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: WAVESHAPER.V2 Windows Run-Key Persistence via system.bat or ProgramData wt.exe
id: 2e9d6b18-54a3-4f07-8c3b-91d7a60e4f12
status: experimental
description: Detects a Run-key value pointing to system.bat or a renamed PowerShell copy at %PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe, the persistence used by the Windows WAVESHAPER.V2 payload (%TEMP%\6202033.ps1) delivered by the axios supply-chain compromise.
references:
  - https://www.first.org/blog/20260420-Malicious-Packages-Dont-Fit
  - https://www.ox.security/blog/axios-compromised-with-a-malicious-dependency/
  - https://www.csa.gov.sg/alerts-and-advisories/advisories/ad-2026-002/
  - https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-2307
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/16
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1547.001
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1036
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
  category: registry_set
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Run'
    Details|contains:
      - '\ProgramData\wt.exe'
      - '\ProgramData\system.bat'
      - '6202033'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Administrative scripts that register a system.bat from ProgramData as a Run value
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Admin scripts that deploy a ProgramData system.bat through a Run key
  • Software packaging tools that place renamed helper executables in ProgramData

Tuning notes: OriginalFileName=PowerShell.EXE with an image path outside System32/SysWOW64 is the high-fidelity signal and can be generalised to all renamed PowerShell. Allowlist known-good ProgramData batch files by hash.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Known-Malicious Package Install - [indicator] and Contagious Interview (Resource Hijacking / Loader) · unlock with TL Creds
  • WAVESHAPER.V2 macOS / Linux Backdoor - osascript Temp Scripts, com.apple.act.mond and [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
  • Proxy / Firewall Request to WAVESHAPER.V2 Payload URL [indicator]:8000/6202033 · unlock with TL Creds
  • plain-crypto-js / [indicator] Malicious Package Present on Disk · unlock with TL Creds
  • WAVESHAPER.V2 PowerShell Script-Block Indicators (peinject, C2 and Decode Routine) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Contagious Interview Staging Endpoint and Community-Observed DPRK Sibling Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • Axios / plain-crypto-js Postinstall Dropper Execution (WAVESHAPER.V2 Initial Access) · unlock with TL Creds
  • WAVESHAPER.V2 C2 Beaconing to [indicator] / [indicator] (60-second Interval) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3758.

Sample indicators (3 of 27)

  • IP address: 142.11.206[.]73
  • Domain: sfrclak[.]com
  • File hash: e10b1fa84f1d6481625f741b69892780140d4e0e7769e7491e5f4d894c2e0e09

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

27 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

4 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

The same FIRST.org analysis highlights the born-bad PyPI cryptominer tensorflow-opt and the Lazarus-linked Contagious Interview campaign (at least 58 packages sharing infrastructure) as evidence that malicious packages need removal/rollback-oriented intelligence rather than CVE-style patch handling.

This record consolidates three malicious-package cases cited in the FIRST.org blog 'Malicious Packages Don't Fit the Vulnerability Intelligence Model' (Jenn Gile, OpenSourceMalware, 2026-04-20). The central argument is that intentionally malicious registry packages have no vulnerable-to-fixed version path: they cannot be patched, only removed from the registry or rolled back, and they need indicator-centric intelligence (registry accounts, emails, domains, C2 endpoints, behavior) rather than CVE/CVSS handling. No CVE or CVSS applies; severity is an analyst assessment under the supply-chain criterion.

Axios compromise (2026-03-31). An attacker hijacked the primary axios maintainer's npm account and published axios 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 within roughly 40 minutes of each other. Both add a dependency on plain-crypto-js@4.2.1, a package staged by the throwaway account nrwise (emails ifstap@proton.me and nrwise@proton.me) about 18 hours before the attack. The version was pinned before it was uploaded, so scanners resolving it earlier saw nothing suspicious. Its postinstall hook runs an obfuscated setup.js (reversed base64 plus XOR layers; Google calls the dropper SILKBELL), which detects the OS and fetches a platform payload from sfrclak.com:8000 (142.11.206.73; URL path /6202033). The payloads are WAVESHAPER.V2 variants: a PowerShell script on Windows (staged as %TEMP%\6202033.ps1, with Run-key persistence via a hidden batch file and a copy of PowerShell as %PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe), a C++ universal Mach-O on macOS (dropped as /Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond, executes AppleScript through osascript from /tmp/.XXXXXX.scpt files and unlinks them), and a Python script on Linux (/tmp/ld.py). All beacon every 60 seconds and support kill, rundir, runscript and peinject (in-memory binary execution). After running, the package removes itself and swaps in a clean package.json. The malicious versions were live for about three hours (00:21-03:20 UTC) before npm unpublished them and reverted the latest tag to 1.14.0; automated mirrors such as @depup/axios republished 1.14.1 within 17 minutes. Google GTIG attributes the activity to UNC1069 (financially motivated, North Korea-nexus) based on WAVESHAPER.V2; Microsoft independently tracks it as Sapphire Sleet and CrowdStrike (moderate confidence) as Stardust Chollima. OX Security noted a possible TeamPCP link as unconfirmed.

tensorflow-opt (PyPI). A 'born bad' package that impersonates TensorFlow extensions (dependency-confusion style) and was never legitimate. It stayed on PyPI for years across roughly 31 versions (0.6-0.40) and, when its start method is called, copies a cryptominer into the TensorFlow install directory and mines to a hardcoded wallet. OSV records it as MAL-2026-983 (reported by Kamil Mankowski) and it was removed in late February 2026.

Contagious Interview. A North Korea-linked campaign (the source attributes it to Lazarus Group; other vendors tie it to UNC4034/UNC1069/Sapphire Sleet clusters) in which fake recruiters on LinkedIn, Telegram and Slack lure developers into running trojanized code. The article cites at least 58 npm packages sharing infrastructure; the Cloud Security Alliance reports 1,700+ malicious packages since January 2025 across npm, PyPI, Go, crates.io and Packagist, using a 'factory model' loader ported across languages, deferred execution inside legitimate functions, and a shared staging endpoint (apachelicense.vercel.app). Malware families include BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, FlexibleFerret and WAVESHAPER.V2, focused on developer-environment compromise, browser credential and session-token theft, and crypto-wallet exfiltration.

Defensive takeaway: treat any host or CI runner that installed axios 1.14.1/0.30.4 or plain-crypto-js@4.2.1 as fully compromised, rotate all reachable credentials, block the C2, and consume malicious-package feeds (OSV MAL-* records, OpenSourceMalware) keyed on package, account, email and domain indicators.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1070.004 File Deletion; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1620 Reflective Code Loading

Discovery

T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.002 AppleScript; T1059.006 Python; T1059.007 JavaScript

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain; T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service

Impact

T1496 Resource Hijacking

Persistence

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Credential Access

T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains

Remediation

Patches

  • No patch exists; downgrade to axios 1.14.0 or 0.30.3 (or earlier safe releases) and remove plain-crypto-js

Immediate actions

  • Identify installs of axios 1.14.1 / 0.30.4 and plain-crypto-js 4.2.1 in lockfiles, node_modules, CI caches and container images
  • Treat affected hosts and CI runners as fully compromised; isolate and rebuild rather than clean
  • Rotate all credentials, API keys, tokens and SSH keys reachable from affected systems
  • Block sfrclak.com and 142.11.206.73 (TCP/8000) at DNS, proxy and firewall; search logs for requests to /6202033
  • Hunt for /Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond, /tmp/ld.py, %TEMP%\6202033.ps1 and %PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe

Workarounds

  • Pin axios to <=1.14.0 / <=0.30.3 via overrides/resolutions
  • Remove tensorflow-opt from Python environments and block it at the package proxy

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce a 1-7 day minimum package age before installing newly published versions
  • Pin dependencies and commit lockfiles; use npm ci in CI
  • Consume malicious-package intelligence (OSV MAL-* records, OpenSourceMalware) keyed on packages, accounts, emails and domains
  • Require phishing-resistant MFA and provenance/trusted publishing for registry maintainer accounts
  • Restrict install-time lifecycle scripts (ignore-scripts) where feasible

Affected and fixed versions

  • axios (npm) — axios
    Vulnerable versions: 1.14.1; 0.30.4
    Fixed in: 1.14.0; 0.30.3
  • npm — plain-crypto-js
    Vulnerable versions: 4.2.1
  • PyPI — tensorflow-opt
    Vulnerable versions: 0.6 through 0.40

Timeline

  • Contagious Interview campaign first publicly documented (Palo Alto Unit 42), per the Cloud Security Alliance note
  • Contagious Interview package publication accelerates; 1,700+ malicious packages across five ecosystems identified from January 2025 onward
  • OSV records tensorflow-opt (PyPI, versions 0.6-0.40) as malicious (MAL-2026-983); package removed from PyPI around 2026-02-24 after surviving for years
  • Staging account nrwise (locked-ioc-12) publishes plain-crypto-js approximately 18 hours before the axios compromise
  • Socket, OX Security and other vendors publish analysis of the compromise; OSV records MAL-2026-2307
  • Axios maintainer account hijacked; axios 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 published within ~40 minutes with plain-crypto-js@4.2.1 dependency; live roughly 00:21-03:20 UTC before npm unpublished them and reverted latest to 1.14.0
  • CSA Singapore issues advisory AD-2026-002; Google GTIG attributes the axios compromise to UNC1069 and Microsoft to Sapphire Sleet
  • Contagious Interview expansion to npm, PyPI, Go Modules, crates.io and Packagist publicly disclosed
  • FIRST.org publishes 'Malicious Packages Don't Fit the Vulnerability Intelligence Model' citing axios, tensorflow-opt and Contagious Interview

Sources cited

More from UNC1069

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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