Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-3827
TrickBot masrv Module: Masscan-based Network Scanner with Anchor/Bazar Infrastructure Overlap
Kryptos Logic analyzed 'masrv', a TrickBot module that embeds the open-source Masscan port scanner. It pulls IP ranges, port ranges and scan rate from C2 over HTTP and posts discovered open ports back, giving operators internal-network reconnaissance. The sample was compiled 2020-12-04 and had not been observed in the wild at time of reporting. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3827 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | masrv, TrickBot Masscan module |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (32-bit and 64-bit) |
| Attribution | TrickBot operators (low confidence) |
| Malware | Anchor - S0504, Bazar - S0534, BazarBackdoor, masrv |
| Tools | Masscan, Trick Bot |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1106 Native API, T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 5 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3827 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 30 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: TrickBot masrv C2 - /mass/ Command URIs and Hardcoded Anchor/Bazar IPs
Detects HTTP traffic matching the masrv C2 scheme http://<c2>:<port>/<gtag>/<botID>/mass/<command> (commands freq, domains, rate, npcap.exe, over, and the results POST with command 81), or any HTTP connection to the 24 hardcoded Anchor/Bazar-associated IPs embedded in masrv (TL-2026-3827). The 'domains' command carries the IP and port ranges to scan, and the POST to /81 returns discovered open ports.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1105, T1041
- Data sources: stream:http, web_proxy, CommonSecurityLog
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=web sourcetype="stream:http" (uri_path="*/mass/*" OR dest_ip IN ("51.254.25.115","193.183.98.66","91.217.137.37","87.98.175.85","185.121.177.177","169.239.202.202","198.251.90.143","5.132.191.104","111.67.20.8","163.53.248.170","142.4.204.111","142.4.205.47","158.69.239.167","104.37.195.178","192.99.85.244","158.69.160.164","46.28.207.199","31.171.251.118","81.2.241.148","82.141.39.32","50.3.82.215","46.101.70.183","5.45.97.127","130.255.78.223"))
| eval mass_cmd=if(match(uri_path,"^/[^/]+/[^/]+/mass/(freq|domains|rate|81|over|npcap[.]exe)/?$"), replace(uri_path,"^.*/mass/",""), null())
| eval c2_signal=case(mass_cmd="81" AND http_method="POST", "masrv_results_post", isnotnull(mass_cmd), "masrv_mass_command", NOT like(uri_path,"%/mass/%"), "hardcoded_anchor_bazar_ip")
| where isnotnull(c2_signal)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(mass_cmd) as mass_commands values(http_method) as methods by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, site, c2_signal
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| sort - countMicrosoft KQL
let c2Ips = dynamic(["51.254.25.115","193.183.98.66","91.217.137.37","87.98.175.85","185.121.177.177","169.239.202.202","198.251.90.143","5.132.191.104","111.67.20.8","163.53.248.170","142.4.204.111","142.4.205.47","158.69.239.167","104.37.195.178","192.99.85.244","158.69.160.164","46.28.207.199","31.171.251.118","81.2.241.148","82.141.39.32","50.3.82.215","46.101.70.183","5.45.97.127","130.255.78.223"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| extend UriHit = RequestURL matches regex @"/[^/]+/[^/]+/mass/(freq|domains|rate|81|over|npcap[.]exe)/?(\?.*)?$"
| where DestinationIP in (c2Ips) or UriHit
| extend MassCommand = extract(@"/mass/([^/?]+)", 1, RequestURL)
| extend Signal = case(UriHit and RequestMethod =~ "POST" and MassCommand == "81", "masrv_results_post", UriHit, "masrv_mass_command", "hardcoded_anchor_bazar_ip")
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, RequestMethod, RequestURL, MassCommand, Signal
| order by TimeGenerated descSigma
title: TrickBot masrv C2 - mass Command URIs or Hardcoded Anchor/Bazar IP
id: 9c4b7e21-6a35-4f80-a1d9-2e5f8b7c6a04
status: experimental
description: Detects proxy-logged HTTP requests matching the TrickBot masrv C2 URI scheme /<gtag>/<botID>/mass/<command> (freq, domains, rate, 81, over, npcap.exe) or direct-to-IP requests to the hardcoded Anchor/Bazar-associated addresses embedded in masrv (TL-2026-3827).
references:
- https://www.kryptoslogic.com/blog/2021/02/trickbot-masrv-module/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-17
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1105
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1041
- attack.s0266
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection_uri:
c-uri|re: '/[^/]+/[^/]+/mass/(freq|domains|rate|81|over|npcap[.]exe)/?$'
selection_ip:
cs-host|re: '^(51[.]254[.]25[.]115|193[.]183[.]98[.]66|91[.]217[.]137[.]37|87[.]98[.]175[.]85|185[.]121[.]177[.]177|169[.]239[.]202[.]202|198[.]251[.]90[.]143|5[.]132[.]191[.]104|111[.]67[.]20[.]8|163[.]53[.]248[.]170|142[.]4[.]204[.]111|142[.]4[.]205[.]47|158[.]69[.]239[.]167|104[.]37[.]195[.]178|192[.]99[.]85[.]244|158[.]69[.]160[.]164|46[.]28[.]207[.]199|31[.]171[.]251[.]118|81[.]2[.]241[.]148|82[.]141[.]39[.]32|50[.]3[.]82[.]215|46[.]101[.]70[.]183|5[.]45[.]97[.]127|130[.]255[.]78[.]223)(:[0-9]+)?$'
condition: selection_uri or selection_ip
falsepositives:
- Legitimate web applications that use a /mass/ path segment (for example bulk-action APIs)
- Stale threat-intel IPs reassigned to unrelated hosting customers
level: high
Known false positives:
- Legitimate web applications or bulk-action APIs that use a /mass/ path segment, for example /<tenant>/<id>/mass/rate
- Hardcoded IPs are older Anchor/Bazar associations and may have been reassigned to unrelated hosting customers
Tuning notes: The two-segment-prefix, fixed-command URI regex is specific; if you see benign hits, require direct-to-IP hosts or a non-categorized destination. Treat masrv_results_post (POST to /81) as confirmation that scanning already ran and escalate to scoping the sending host. Adapt index, sourcetype and field names to your proxy (stream:http, bluecoat, zscaler) and refresh the IP list from the threat record, since the addresses are historical Anchor/Bazar associations.
- TrickBot masrv Endpoint Artifacts (Defender XDR) - NPcap Installer, Adapter Probe, DLL Hash · unlock with TL Creds
- Masscan-style Internal Sweep (Sentinel) - TrickBot masrv Network Scanner · unlock with TL Creds
- TrickBot masrv C2 (Sentinel) - /mass/ Command URIs and Hardcoded Anchor/Bazar IPs · unlock with TL Creds
- TrickBot masrv Endpoint Artifacts (Sigma) - NPcap Installer, Adapter Probe, DLL Hash · unlock with TL Creds
- Masscan-style Internal Sweep (Sigma Correlation) - TrickBot masrv Network Scanner · unlock with TL Creds
- TrickBot masrv C2 (Sigma) - /mass/ Command URIs and Hardcoded Anchor/Bazar IPs · unlock with TL Creds
- TrickBot masrv Endpoint Artifacts - NPcap Installer, Adapter Probe, Known DLL Hash · unlock with TL Creds
- Masscan-style Internal Sweep from Single Host (TrickBot masrv) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 30 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3827.
Sample indicators (3 of 30)
- IP address:
51.254.25[.]115 - File hash:
2c29de91a5be3bffafb521e04b88819d23c6f71843c8f2d54516ec2afefd24c6 - IP address:
193.183.98[.]66
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 30 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
masrv is a network reconnaissance module for the TrickBot modular trojan, delivered as a 32-bit or 64-bit DLL (the analyzed samples are debug builds) exporting two functions, Start and Control. The module embeds Masscan and uses Masscan's own packet-level TCP/IP stack, which requires the NPcap driver (NPcap\Packet.dll). If NPcap is absent, masrv downloads an installer named npcap.exe from the C2 and runs it via CreateProcessA or ShellExecuteExA.
C2 communication is plain HTTP using URIs of the form http://<c2>:<port>/<gtag>/<botID>/mass/<command>, where gtag is the campaign ID from the bot config and botID identifies the victim. At startup the module issues GET requests for the commands 'freq' (reporting frequency), 'domains' (despite the name, the IP and port ranges to scan) and 'rate' (packet transmission rate), and can fetch 'npcap.exe'. Discovered open ports are aggregated and POSTed to the C2 with command '81' at the interval set by 'freq'; a 'over' GET signals scan completion. For adapter selection the module reads the ARP table and local IP table (GetIpNetTable, GetIpAddrTable) and verifies connectivity with 'ping 8.8.8.8 -S <local_IP>'.
The module carries an unreferenced Anchor C2 communication function and a hardcoded list of IP addresses previously associated with Anchor and Bazar infrastructure, consistent with TrickBot developers' practice of sharing code across toolsets. Debug strings and PDB paths (D:\Project\masrv\build-masrv\debug\Desktop_msvc_15_0_32bit|64bit\masrv.pdb) show it was built from a Qt/MSVC 2017 project. Kryptos Logic dates the compilation to 2020-12-04 and reported the module had not yet been seen deployed, suggesting testing or early development after the October 2020 Microsoft-led disruption of TrickBot. Secondary reporting (Security Affairs) assesses that the scan results would help operators plan lateral movement; this is analyst inference rather than observed behavior.
Defenders should treat the module as a precursor to internal reconnaissance: high-rate SYN scanning from a single workstation, an NPcap installation not initiated by an administrator, and HTTP requests with a /mass/ path segment to non-corporate hosts are the main observable behaviors.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Discovery
T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1046 Network Service Discovery
Command and Control
Execution
Reconnaissance
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block the hardcoded masrv/Anchor/Bazar IP addresses listed in the IOCs at the perimeter and alert on any historical connections
- Hunt for the masrv DLL SHA-256 hashes and the strings 'maserv.txt' and '/mass/' HTTP paths on endpoints and in proxy logs
- Alert on unexpected NPcap installations (npcap.exe) on non-administrative workstations
Workarounds
- Restrict outbound HTTP to categorized/proxied destinations to prevent direct-to-IP C2 requests
- Use application allow-listing to block unsigned DLL modules and unauthorized driver installers
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with detection for high-rate port scanning originating from user endpoints
- Monitor east-west traffic for single hosts sweeping many IPs/ports (Masscan-style SYN scans)
- Segment internal networks so a compromised workstation cannot reach management and server ports broadly
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (32-bit and 64-bit)
Vulnerable versions: Hosts infected with TrickBot; no software vulnerability is exploited
Timeline
- October 2020: Microsoft-led disruption effort against TrickBot infrastructure; the botnet subsequently rebounded (exact day not stated in the cited sources).
- December 2020: TrickBot adds UEFI/BIOS inspection capabilities, per Threatpost's resurgence context.
- masrv DLLs compiled (13:19:27 timestamp per Kryptos Logic).
- Kryptos Logic begins analysis of the masrv module (research window 2021-01-29 to 2021-02-01).
- Researchers report the module had not been observed deployed in the wild, suggesting testing/early development.
- Kryptos Logic publishes 'TrickBot masrv Module' with hashes, hardcoded IPs and YARA indicators.
Sources cited
- Masscan: Mass IP port scanner (upstream open-source project) GitHub · Code repository
- TrickBot masrv Module (Kryptos Logic) kryptoslogic.com · Blog · 2021-02-01
- TrickBot Continues Resurgence with Port-Scanning Module (Threatpost) threatpost.com · News
- Experts discovered a new Trickbot module used for lateral movement (Security Affairs) securityaffairs.com · News
- TrickBot Port-Scanning Module (G5 Cyber Security) blog.g5cybersecurity.com · News
Previous and next in malware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 5 sources; published ; last updated —.