Skip to navigation

Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-3947

OVHcloud CLI GitHub Releases Hijacked to Distribute Secret-Stealing Malware (v0.11.0-v0.15.0)

highMONITORING

An attacker using a compromised OVHcloud contributor GitHub account (HassenBF) replaced six assets on each of five existing ovhcloud-cli releases (v0.11.0-v0.15.0) with a trojanized build that steals secrets stored on disk. The malicious assets were live for 94 minutes on 2026-10-19 (12:47-14:21 UTC) before OVHcloud removed them and published an immutable v0.16.0.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-3947
Also known asOVHcloud CLI supply chain compromise
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsOVHcloud ovhcloud-cli (GitHub release assets)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-494, CWE-1357, CWE-506
AttributionGlassWorm (medium confidence)
MalwareForceMemo, GlassWorm
Toolsovhcloud-cli
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol, T1074.001 Data Staged, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer and 14 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstechnology, cloud services, software development
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-24, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3947 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 57 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: OVHcloud CLI Trojanized Release Download, Install Script or Self-Upgrade (Process Telemetry)

Detects process-creation evidence of the TL-2026-3947 supply-chain compromise of github.com/ovh/ovhcloud-cli: curl/wget/PowerShell fetching release assets from /ovh/ovhcloud-cli/releases/download/, execution of the unverified install.sh, the CLI's built-in upgrade command, or a hash matching the malicious v0.15.0 Linux arm64 archive (SHA-256 3833daff...28933cb). Tampered assets for v0.11.0-v0.15.0 were live 2026-10-19 12:47-14:21 UTC; events inside that window (epoch 1792414020-1792419660) are flagged in_exposure_window=yes and should be triaged first because every secret readable on those hosts must be treated as exposed.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1195, T1195.002, T1036.005
  • Data sources: sysmon, sysmon_linux, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" OR sourcetype="sysmon:linux") EventCode=1 earliest=-14d
 ((Hashes="*3833daffcaaaab27e4e0e0833240ffcb1df8df648f4ec0bc4a75c176e28933cb*")
 OR (CommandLine="*github.com/ovh/ovhcloud-cli/releases/download/*" (Image="*curl*" OR Image="*wget*" OR Image="*powershell*" OR Image="*pwsh*"))
 OR (CommandLine="*raw.githubusercontent.com/ovh/ovhcloud-cli/*" CommandLine="*install.sh*")
 OR (Image="*ovhcloud-cli*" CommandLine="* upgrade*"))
| eval in_exposure_window=if(_time>=1792414020 AND _time<=1792419660,"yes","no")
| eval trigger=case(like(Hashes,"%3833daff%"),"malicious_sha256",like(CommandLine,"%releases/download%"),"release_asset_download",like(CommandLine,"%install.sh%"),"install_sh_fetch",true(),"cli_self_upgrade")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(trigger) as trigger values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_image by host user Image in_exposure_window
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - in_exposure_window

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where SHA256 =~ '3833daffcaaaab27e4e0e0833240ffcb1df8df648f4ec0bc4a75c176e28933cb'
    or (ProcessCommandLine has 'github.com/ovh/ovhcloud-cli/releases/download/' and FileName in~ ('curl', 'curl.exe', 'wget', 'powershell.exe', 'pwsh.exe'))
    or (ProcessCommandLine has 'raw.githubusercontent.com/ovh/ovhcloud-cli' and ProcessCommandLine has 'install.sh')
    or (FileName in~ ('ovhcloud-cli', 'ovhcloud-cli.exe') and ProcessCommandLine has ' upgrade')
| extend Trigger = case(SHA256 =~ '3833daffcaaaab27e4e0e0833240ffcb1df8df648f4ec0bc4a75c176e28933cb', 'malicious_sha256', ProcessCommandLine has 'releases/download', 'release_asset_download', ProcessCommandLine has 'install.sh', 'install_sh_fetch', 'cli_self_upgrade'),
    InExposureWindow = Timestamp between (datetime(2026-10-19T12:47:00Z) .. datetime(2026-10-19T14:21:00Z))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256, Trigger, InExposureWindow
| order by InExposureWindow desc, Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: OVHcloud CLI Trojanized Release Download or Install Script Execution
id: 6f1c2a52-8b0e-4d7a-9a43-3e5b7c1d9f20
status: experimental
description: Detects curl/wget fetching ovhcloud-cli release assets, execution of the unverified ovhcloud-cli install.sh, or the CLI built-in upgrade command. Tampered v0.11.0-v0.15.0 assets were served from GitHub releases on 2026-10-19 between 12:47 and 14:21 UTC (TL-2026-3947).
references:
  - https://opensourcemalware.com/blog/glassworm-hacks-ovh-clouds-cli-tool
  - https://github.com/ovh/ovhcloud-cli/issues/300
  - https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/hackers-hijack-five-ovhcloud-cli.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-20
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1195
  - attack.t1195.002
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_download:
    Image|endswith:
      - '/curl'
      - '/wget'
    CommandLine|contains: 'github.com/ovh/ovhcloud-cli/releases/download/'
  selection_install:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'raw.githubusercontent.com/ovh/ovhcloud-cli'
      - 'install.sh'
  selection_upgrade:
    Image|endswith: '/ovhcloud-cli'
    CommandLine|contains: ' upgrade'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate installation or upgrade of ovhcloud-cli outside the 2026-10-19 12:47-14:21 UTC exposure window
  - Provisioning scripts that pin and verify a clean v0.16.0 or later release
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate ovhcloud-cli installs or upgrades performed outside the 2026-10-19 12:47-14:21 UTC exposure window (in_exposure_window=no)
  • CI/CD jobs that download a pinned, hash-verified ovhcloud-cli v0.16.0 or later release

Tuning notes: Treat in_exposure_window=yes as a confirmed-exposure triage queue: isolate the host and rotate ~/.ovh.conf, OVH application/consumer keys, SSH keys, .npmrc/.pypirc/.netrc tokens and kube configs from a clean machine. Outside the window, exclude build hosts that verify hashes against v0.16.0 (immutable). The published SHA-256 is the Linux arm64 archive hash, so it only matches where file/archive hashes are logged; the extracted binary hash was not published. Adjust the index and sourcetype names to your Sysmon deployment.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • OVHcloud CLI Tampered Release Asset and GlassWorm IOC Hashes on Disk or Fetched in Exposure Window · unlock with TL Creds
  • ovhcloud-cli Spawning Locale and Timezone Discovery — Russian Geofence Check · unlock with TL Creds
  • Solana Dead-Drop Wallet and Embedded AES-256-CBC Key/IV Strings in Endpoint or Network Telemetry · unlock with TL Creds
  • Activity by Compromised GitHub Account HassenBF (ovh Org Contributor) · unlock with TL Creds
  • ovhcloud-cli Writing [indicator] Throttle File — Trojanized Build Re-run Guard · unlock with TL Creds
  • ovhcloud-cli Outbound Connection to Non-OVH, Non-GitHub Destination · unlock with TL Creds
  • ovhcloud-cli Reading Foreign Credential Stores (auditd) — Secret Theft Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • ovhcloud-cli DNS Lookups of Solana RPC Endpoints — Blockchain Dead-Drop C2 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-24, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 57 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3947.

Sample indicators (3 of 57)

  • IP address: 217.69.0[.]159
  • Domain: solana[.]drpc[.]org
  • URL: hxxps://solana[.]api[.]onfinality[.]io/public

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 57 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

57 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

On 2026-10-19 an attacker with write access via a hijacked contributor account (GitHub user HassenBF, ID 4911006, a non-public member of the ovh organization) uploaded tampered release assets to the official github.com/ovh/ovhcloud-cli releases page. Rather than pushing new versions or running the CI/CD pipeline, the attacker overwrote existing assets on v0.11.0, v0.12.0, v0.13.0, v0.14.0 and v0.15.0: the macOS x86_64/arm64, Linux x86_64/arm64 and Windows x86_64 archives plus checksums.txt (hashes updated to match the malicious binaries). Linux i386, Windows i386, Windows arm64 and WebAssembly builds were untouched. v0.10.0 is clean. Release immutability was not enabled on the legacy releases, which is the stated root cause. The malicious window is reported as 12:47-14:21 UTC (94 minutes); OpenSourceMalware places the asset replacement itself at 12:47-13:12 UTC. The original hunt feed quoted 14:47-16:21, which is consistent with UTC+2 local time; UTC values from the technical write-ups are used here.

Detection came from a customer CI job that pinned the SHA-256 of ovhcloud-cli_Linux_arm64.tar.gz and began failing; the reporter opened GitHub issue #300 at about 13:50 UTC. Inspecting the binary with go version -m showed the tampered v0.15.0 Linux arm64 build carried the pseudo-version v0.15.1-0.20261013083505-5ead8ef9b43d+dirty, revision 5ead8ef9b43d354dfb5caadff803b11afc8c5c58 (genuine release: 760fd72), vcs.modified=true, a build timestamp of 2026-10-13T08:35:05Z, a '-ldflags=-s -w' flag absent from genuine releases, and no internal/version.Version linker flag. The original and malicious Linux arm64 archive hashes are 5c2beb56e6d83a4b426565a1557791ef759316abcc4effb38dd627c90aeb80e0 and 3833daffcaaaab27e4e0e0833240ffcb1df8df648f4ec0bc4a75c176e28933cb.

OVHcloud states the binary was designed to retrieve secrets from disk, including the local .ovh.conf file and the application key, application secret and consumer key environment variables; CEO Octave Klaba described the malware quality as poor but able to go all the way. OpenSourceMalware's analysis reports a geofence (waits 10 seconds, then exits if the system looks Russian: a Russian language indicator plus a Russian timezone or UTC offset between +2 and +12), a throttle file ~/init.json so the payload re-runs at most every two days, and a second stage retrieved through a Solana dead-drop (wallet BjVeAjPrSKFiingBn4vZvghsGj9KCE8AJVtbc9S8o8SC, base64 JSON in transaction memos) and decrypted with AES-256-CBC. Secrets at risk include OVHcloud API/consumer keys, cloud provider credentials, SSH keys, .npmrc/.pypirc/.netrc tokens and Kubernetes configs. Exfiltration destinations and C2 endpoints for the binary itself were not publicly confirmed in the sources.

Exposed install paths: the official install.sh (no hash verification), direct release downloads, CI jobs fetching archives without pinned hashes, and the CLI's built-in upgrade command (macOS/Linux). Homebrew (pinned SHA-256), go install, source builds, Docker images and pre-compromise installs were not affected, per SecurityOnline. OVHcloud removed the assets at 14:21 UTC, published v0.16.0 with a signed tag at about 17:16 UTC marked immutable, and enabled release immutability.

Attribution is tentative. OpenSourceMalware links the account to GlassWorm (ForceMemo campaign) through a shared Solana wallet in public GlassWorm indicator lists and amend-and-force-push loader injection into the account's personal repositories from 2026-03-05, but states that the link between the March compromise and the October replacement rests on the shared account identity, not on direct observation, and calls it an inference. The initial access method for the account (infostealer versus token theft) and the exposure of the TAP_GITHUB_TOKEN remain unresolved.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1074.001 Data Staged

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1480 Execution Guardrails

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Execution

T1059.007 JavaScript; T1204.002 User Execution

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol; T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1132.001 Data Encoding; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1195.001 Supply Chain Compromise; T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain

Discovery

T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1614.001 System Language Discovery

Persistence

T1176 Software Extensions; T1543.001 Create or Modify System Process

Credential Access

T1552.001 Credentials In Files; T1552.004 Private Keys

Resource Development

T1586 Compromise Accounts

Remediation

Patches

  • Upgrade to ovhcloud-cli v0.16.0 (immutable release, signed tag)

Immediate actions

  • Delete any ovhcloud-cli binary obtained from GitHub releases or install.sh between 2026-10-19 12:47 and 14:21 UTC, or any v0.11.0-v0.15.0 binary, and update to v0.16.0
  • Treat every secret readable on a machine that ran an affected binary as exposed: rotate OVHcloud application/consumer keys (~/.ovh.conf, environment variables), cloud provider credentials, SSH keys, .npmrc/.pypirc/.netrc tokens and Kubernetes configs, from a separate clean machine
  • Check hosts for the ~/init.json throttle file and for binaries matching the malicious SHA-256 hashes
  • Verify downloaded assets with gh release verify-asset against the immutable v0.16.0 release

Workarounds

  • Avoid the CLI's built-in upgrade command and install.sh until verified; install via pinned Homebrew cask or build from source

Longer-term hardening

  • Pin SHA-256 hashes for third-party binaries fetched in CI/CD and verify against an independent source, not the checksums.txt hosted beside the asset
  • Prefer go install, source builds or pinned Homebrew casks over unpinned prebuilt release downloads
  • Enable release immutability and signed tags on all repositories, including legacy releases
  • Enforce MFA and short-lived tokens for contributor accounts and audit write access of non-public organization members

Affected and fixed versions

  • OVHcloud — ovhcloud-cli (GitHub release assets)
    Vulnerable versions: v0.11.0; v0.12.0; v0.13.0; v0.14.0; v0.15.0 (macOS x86_64/arm64, Linux x86_64/arm64, Windows x86_64 archives downloaded from GitHub releases or install.sh in the exposure window)
    Fixed in: v0.16.0 (immutable); v0.10.0 (clean)

Timeline

Last updated · 6 updates · revalidated 6× · latest source

  • The contributor's personal MacBook is compromised through the malicious VS Code extension color-picker-universal 2.8.91, which OVHcloud attributes to GlassWorm. GitHub credentials are stolen and a persistent NodeJS service is set up. The contributor's OVHcloud-issued laptop was not affected.
  • Earliest observed activity on the Solana wallet BjVeAjPrSKFiingBn4vZvghsGj9KCE8AJVtbc9S8o8SC later used as the GlassWorm ForceMemo dead drop (per StepSecurity).
  • Earliest verified attacker activity on the HassenBF GitHub account (02:41:17 UTC): four personal repositories force-pushed within 42 seconds with an injected locked-ioc-22 loader (amend-and-force-push), per OpenSourceMalware.
  • Force push to the padel-bot repository adds a locked-ioc-22 loader (22:49:53 UTC), the fourth HassenBF personal repository modified in the ForceMemo-style amend-and-force-push pattern.
  • StepSecurity publicly disclosed the ForceMemo campaign: hundreds of GitHub Python repositories compromised through account takeover and force-push.
  • Earliest of the affected releases (v0.11.0) published; v0.11.0-v0.15.0 were published between 2026-04-14 and 2026-09-16.
  • CrowdStrike, Google and Shadowserver disrupt GlassWorm's four C2 channels (Solana memos, BitTorrent DHT, Google Calendar dead drops, VPS servers). CrowdStrike assesses the operators as probably Russia-based, without conclusive evidence.
  • Legitimate ovhcloud-cli v0.15.0 published (genuine commit 760fd72).
  • Build source commit locked-ioc-8 dated 2026-10-13T08:35:05Z, later embedded in the trojanized binaries with vcs.modified=true.
  • Branches dev/test-changest and test/trigger-probe deleted from the repository (14:34:11 UTC), four days before the asset replacement.
  • OVHcloud CEO Octave Klaba publicly confirms the compromise on X, advising users to delete or update the CLI and change all secrets stored on disk; notes release immutability was disabled.
  • OVHcloud publishes immutable v0.16.0 with a signed tag at about 17:16 UTC, enables release immutability, and advises rotating all locally stored secrets.
  • OVHcloud removes the malicious assets at 14:21 UTC, closing a 94-minute exposure window (12:47-14:21 UTC).
  • Customer CI job pinning the SHA-256 of locked-ioc-15 fails; issue #300 opened at about 13:50 UTC with go version -m evidence.
  • Attacker uploads tampered archives and locked-ioc-21 to five existing releases between 12:47 and 13:12 UTC; the CI/CD pipeline was never run.
  • OVHcloud publishes GHSA-862f-55f5-vmvw with the malicious MD5s, the Solana wallets, exfiltration server locked-ioc-24:443 and remediation steps. The malicious assets were downloaded about 250 times, and the account was suspended.
  • Security press (Cyber Security News and others) report the incident; OpenSourceMalware attributes it tentatively to GlassWorm.
  • 20:26 UTC: the attacker-controlled loader repositories were force-pushed again and history rolled back; StepSecurity recovered the stage-1 locked-ioc-22 from an orphaned commit.
  • SecurityWeek publishes coverage; OVHcloud has not publicly confirmed the GlassWorm attribution.

Update history

Sources cited

More from GlassWorm

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated .

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats