Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-3955
Unnamed PHP backdoor leveraging php-win.exe and cutt.ly shortened-URL C2 (scheduled task 'ClockLauncher')
dfir.ch dissects an unnamed PHP-based remote access tool that polls a cutt.ly shortened URL, decodes the utm_source value in the redirect Location header (URL-decode, then double Base64) and runs the result with eval(). It persists via a SYSTEM scheduled task 'ClockLauncher' that runs run-clock.bat, which launches 5.php with the windowless GUI binary php-win.exe. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-3955 |
|---|---|
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-94 |
| Tools | Atera, Bluetrait |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-3955 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 14 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: PHP GUI Interpreter (php-win.exe) Running from Writable Path or Launching 5.php — Unnamed PHP Backdoor
Detects php-win.exe or php.exe executing from Windows\Temp, AppData, ProgramData or Users\Public, or running 5.php / being launched by run-clock.bat. The unnamed PHP backdoor (TL-2026-3955, dfir.ch) stages a portable PHP runtime in C:\Windows\Temp\{GUID}\php_2\ and uses the windowless GUI binary php-win.exe, which tested EDR products did not alert on. Behaviour-first: a PHP interpreter outside an approved install path is rare on Windows endpoints.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1059, T1564.003, T1059.003
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security_4688, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 (Image="*\\php-win.exe" OR Image="*\\php.exe") (Image="*\\Windows\\Temp\\*" OR Image="*\\AppData\\*" OR Image="*\\ProgramData\\*" OR Image="*\\Users\\Public\\*" OR CommandLine="*5.php*" OR ParentCommandLine="*run-clock.bat*") | eval gui_binary=if(like(Image,"%php-win.exe"),1,0), from_batch=if(match(ParentCommandLine,"(?i)\\.(bat|cmd)"),1,0), runs_5php=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)5\\.php"),1,0) | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_image values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_cmd by host User Image gui_binary from_batch runs_5php | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen) | sort - runs_5php - from_batch - countMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("php-win.exe", "php.exe")
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Windows\Temp\", @"\AppData\", @"\ProgramData\", @"\Users\Public\")
or ProcessCommandLine has "5.php"
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "run-clock.bat"
| extend GuiBinary = FileName =~ "php-win.exe", FromBatch = InitiatingProcessCommandLine has ".bat", Runs5Php = ProcessCommandLine has "5.php"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, GuiBinary, FromBatch, Runs5Php, SHA256
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: PHP Interpreter Executed from Writable Path or Running 5.php (Unnamed PHP Backdoor)
id: 5b1c8e0a-3f6d-4c21-9a47-1d2e7f8b9c01
status: experimental
description: Detects php-win.exe or php.exe executing from user-writable or temp locations, running 5.php, or launched by run-clock.bat, as seen in the unnamed PHP backdoor TL-2026-3955.
references:
- https://dfir.ch/posts/dissection_php_backdoor/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-20
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1564.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\php-win.exe'
- '\php.exe'
selection_path:
Image|contains:
- '\Windows\Temp\'
- '\AppData\'
- '\ProgramData\'
- '\Users\Public\'
selection_script:
CommandLine|contains: '5.php'
selection_parent:
ParentCommandLine|contains: 'run-clock.bat'
condition: selection_img and (selection_path or selection_script or selection_parent)
falsepositives:
- Developers running a portable PHP runtime from a user profile
- Legitimate PHP-based applications installed under ProgramData or AppData
level: high
Known false positives:
- Developer workstations running portable PHP builds from AppData or user folders
- Legitimate PHP-based software (for example local web stacks) installed under ProgramData
Tuning notes: Allow-list approved PHP install paths and developer groups. Raise severity when the path is under Windows\Temp, the binary is php-win.exe, or the parent is a .bat run by a SYSTEM task. Requires Sysmon EventCode 1 or MDE process telemetry; adjust the index name to your environment.
- [indicator] Launcher Spawning [indicator] — Batch-to-PHP Execution Chain · unlock with TL Creds
- PHP Interpreter Spawning Silent msiexec / RMM Agent Install · unlock with TL Creds
- High-Frequency [indicator] Polling from a Single Process — Beacon Cadence · unlock with TL Creds
- PHP Backdoor Staging Files Created in Windows\Temp ([indicator], [indicator], [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
- ClockSystemService or PHP-Based Service Installed (Event ID 7045) · unlock with TL Creds
- PHP Interpreter Spawning Shell, Downloader or Recon Child Process (eval/system() Tasking) · unlock with TL Creds
- ClockLauncher Scheduled Task Creation — SYSTEM Boot Persistence via [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- [indicator] Dead-Drop C2 Polling by Non-Browser Process (PHP Backdoor) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 14 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-3955.
Sample indicators (2 of 14)
- Domain:
cutt[.]ly - Domain:
pastebin[.]com
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 14 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The authors report the EDR products they tested did not alert on the PHP execution.
The backdoor was found during incident response by Asger Deleuran Strunk and dissected by Stephan Berger (dfir.ch, published 2025-11-16). Persistence is a scheduled task named ClockLauncher (C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\ClockLauncher). The task XML shows a boot trigger, RunLevel HighestAvailable, principal S-1-5-18 (SYSTEM), a registration date of 2025-10-01 and the author string COMPANY\ADM. The task launches run-clock.bat from C:\Windows\Temp\{0B1281F3-C9BC-4B85-AD92-0803ED04208F}\php_2\. That batch file changes into the directory and starts php-win.exe against 5.php, which loops indefinitely.
php-win.exe is a legitimate PHP distribution binary. It is the same interpreter as php.exe but is flagged as a GUI application instead of a console application, so it runs with no visible window. Dropping a portable PHP runtime into a temp directory lets the operator run a scripting-language implant without any custom compiled binary.
5.php runs a loop with a randomized sleep (the analysis reports rand(10, 30) seconds). Each iteration uses curl to request the shortened URL https://cutt.ly/praXEwzs and reads the HTTP Location header of the redirect. The command URL is built from the utm_source query parameter in that header. The value is URL-decoded, then Base64-decoded twice. The content retrieved from the resulting URL is passed to eval(). Using a URL shortener as a dead-drop means the operator can change tasking by editing the shortlink destination, and the only network indicators are connections to cutt.ly and whatever host the decoded URL points to. The source publishes no hashes, IPs, attribution or malware-family name.
A service named ClockSystemService (LocalSystem) was also present and stopped during the investigation, which suggests secondary persistence.
In lab reproductions the authors used a simplified PHP stub (curl to a pastebin.com raw URL followed by eval) and then used PHP system() calls to download and silently install an RMM agent (Bluetrait) with msiexec /qn. They report that the EDR they tested raised only a single medium alert, for the attempted Atera installation, and nothing for php-win.exe execution or the Bluetrait installation. The Bluetrait service installation was visible as Windows Event ID 7045 with an image path under C:\php8.4. The pastebin and Bluetrait items are lab artifacts, not observed attacker infrastructure. Detection guidance from the source is to review AutoRuns data for suspicious scheduled tasks. Severity is an analyst judgment; no CVE is involved.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec; T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
Execution
T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Privilege Escalation
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver; T1219 Remote Access Tools
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Hunt for php-win.exe and php.exe running from C:\Windows\Temp or other non-standard paths
- Disable and remove the ClockLauncher scheduled task and the ClockSystemService service, then delete the php_2 directory and run-clock.bat/5.php
- Block or alert on cutt.ly access from servers and non-browser processes
- Review Event ID 7045 and 4698 for unexpected service and scheduled task creation
Workarounds
- Application allow-listing to block php-win.exe and php.exe outside approved directories
- Egress filtering of URL-shortener domains where not required
Longer-term hardening
- Baseline scheduled tasks and AutoRuns data across the fleet and review diffs regularly
- Alert on interpreter runtimes (PHP) running outside approved install paths
- Restrict unsanctioned RMM agent installation with application control
- Tune EDR to cover script-runtime execution that spawns curl and msiexec
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: Windows systems where the PHP runtime can be staged and a SYSTEM scheduled task created
Timeline
- StartBoundary date recorded in the ClockLauncher scheduled task trigger XML
- ClockLauncher scheduled task registered (SYSTEM, boot trigger, HighestAvailable, author COMPANY\ADM) to run locked-ioc-7
- Researcher lab testing of locked-ioc-9 execution, pastebin eval stub and Bluetrait/Atera RMM installation against EDR (date per analysis of the article)
- Source recommends reviewing AutoRuns data and scheduled tasks to find the ClockLauncher persistence; Event ID 7045 captured the lab RMM service install
- Authors report tested EDR raised only one medium alert (attempted Atera install) and none for locked-ioc-9 execution or Bluetrait installation
- Article discloses the locked-ioc-10/praXEwzs shortlink C2 and the utm_source URL-decode plus double-Base64 decoding chain feeding eval()
- dfir.ch publishes 'Dissection of a PHP Backdoor leveraging locked-ioc-9' by Stephan Berger, crediting Asger Deleuran Strunk with the initial discovery
Sources cited
- MITRE ATT&CK T1053.005 Scheduled Task MITRE · Research
- MITRE ATT&CK T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver MITRE · Research
- MITRE ATT&CK T1219 Remote Access Tools MITRE · Research
- MITRE ATT&CK T1564.003 Hidden Window MITRE · Research
- Dissection of a PHP Backdoor leveraging php-win.exe (Stephan Berger) dfir.ch · Blog · 2025-11-16
- dfir.ch blog (Stephan Berger) dfir.ch · Blog
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.