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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-4148

Operation Serengeti III: INTERPOL-coordinated Africa-wide cybercrime crackdown (1,462 arrests, $105M recovered)

mediumMONITORING

INTERPOL-coordinated Operation Serengeti III ran from 2026-06-29 to 2026-08-31 across 20 African countries plus the United States, producing 1,462 arrests, 10,909 dismantled malicious networks and over $105 million in recovered funds against an estimated $385 million in victim losses. It targeted ransomware, business email compromise, phishing, investment and pension fraud, mobile loan apps and illegal crypto mining.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-4148
Also known asOperation Serengeti 3.0, Serengeti III
SeverityMEDIUM
First disclosed
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1566 Phishing, T1583 Acquire Infrastructure, T1585.001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts, T1589.001 Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials, T1657 Financial Theft, T1684.001 Impersonation
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinance, government administration, individuals, retail, energy
Target regionsAfrica, Asia, North America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-22, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-4148 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 12 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Serengeti III TL-2026-4148 — Mailbox Rule Forwarding or Hiding Mail After Account Takeover (T1114.003)

Detects creation or modification of Exchange inbox rules that forward, redirect or delete mail, the standard post-compromise step in BEC used to hide payment-diversion threads. Linked to the BEC and credential-harvesting activity in Operation Serengeti III (TL-2026-4148). Maps to T1114.003, T1656 and T1657.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1114.003, T1656, T1657
  • Data sources: o365:management:activity (index=o365), OfficeActivity, m365 audit
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: medium

Splunk SPL

index=o365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload=Exchange Operation IN ("New-InboxRule", "Set-InboxRule", "UpdateInboxRules") earliest=-24h
``` Serengeti III TL-2026-4148 BEC: rule that forwards, redirects or deletes mail ```
| where match(_raw, "(?i)(ForwardTo|ForwardAsAttachmentTo|RedirectTo|DeleteMessage|MarkAsRead.{0,80}MoveToFolder)")
| table _time UserId ClientIP Operation ObjectId Parameters

Microsoft KQL

OfficeActivity
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where OfficeWorkload == "Exchange"
| where Operation in~ ("New-InboxRule", "Set-InboxRule", "UpdateInboxRules")
| where Parameters has_any ("ForwardTo", "ForwardAsAttachmentTo", "RedirectTo", "DeleteMessage")
| project TimeGenerated, UserId, ClientIP, Operation, OfficeObjectId, Parameters

Sigma

title: Suspicious Exchange Inbox Rule Forwarding or Deleting Mail
id: 9a1d7c40-52be-4e83-b6f9-0c3e8a5d7b12
status: experimental
description: Detects Exchange Online inbox rules that forward, redirect or delete messages, a BEC post-compromise technique tied to Operation Serengeti III (TL-2026-4148).
references:
    - https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/10/22/interpol-africa-cybercrime-crackdown-operation-serengeti-iii/
    - https://www.group-ib.com/media-center/press-releases/interpol-operation-serengeti-iii/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/22
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1114.003
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1656
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1657
logsource:
    product: m365
    service: audit
detection:
    selection:
        Operation:
            - 'New-InboxRule'
            - 'Set-InboxRule'
            - 'UpdateInboxRules'
    keywords:
        Parameters|contains:
            - 'ForwardTo'
            - 'ForwardAsAttachmentTo'
            - 'RedirectTo'
            - 'DeleteMessage'
    condition: selection and keywords
falsepositives:
    - Users forwarding mail to a personal or delegate mailbox by policy
    - Auto-archive rules that delete newsletters
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Approved automatic forwarding to assistants or shared mailboxes
  • Users deleting newsletters with a rule

Tuning notes: Exclude rules whose forward target is an internal or allow-listed domain; raise severity when the ClientIP is new for the user or the rule is created within an hour of a risky sign-in.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Serengeti III TL-2026-4148 — Safe Links Phishing URL Click-Through (T1566.002) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Serengeti III TL-2026-4148 — Payment-Change Email With From/Return-Path Domain Mismatch (T1656/T1657) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Serengeti III TL-2026-4148 — Outbound Connections to Crypto-Mining Pools (Stratum, T1496) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Serengeti III TL-2026-4148 — Browser Opening HTML Attachment From Outlook Cache (T1566.001) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Serengeti III TL-2026-4148 — Backup and Shadow Copy Deletion Before Ransomware (T1490/T1486) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Serengeti III TL-2026-4148 — Crypto-Miner Process Command Line (Stratum/XMRig, T1496) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Serengeti III TL-2026-4148 — Phishing/BEC Lure Mail Fan-out From Single Sender Domain (T1566) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Serengeti III TL-2026-4148 — Credential POST to Newly Registered Domain (Phishing Kit, T1566.002/T1589.001) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-22, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 12 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-4148.

12 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Operation Serengeti III is the third annual INTERPOL-coordinated cybercrime sweep in Africa, following Operation Serengeti (2024: 1,006 arrests, about $44 million recovered) and Serengeti 2.0 (2025: 1,209 arrests, about $97.4 million recovered). The 2026 iteration ran from June 29 to August 31, 2026 and involved law enforcement from 20 African countries plus the United States (21 countries). It was announced publicly on 2026-10-22. Results reported by INTERPOL-derived coverage: 1,462 suspects arrested, 10,909 malicious networks and infrastructure dismantled, 65,929 victims identified, an estimated USD 385 million in cumulative victim losses, and over USD 105 million recovered. Several investigations remain open for suspect identification and evidence analysis.

Targeted crime types were online fraud, ransomware, business email compromise (BEC), phishing, online investment and pension scams, digital extortion, cryptocurrency theft and investment fraud, illegal cryptocurrency mining, fraudulent vehicle imports and malicious mobile lending apps. The sources are law-enforcement and press reporting; they name no CVEs, malware families, named threat actors or technical indicators (domains, IPs and C2 servers are mentioned only generically), so this record is a trend and enforcement-context entry rather than an exploit analysis.

Notable country actions: In Uganda, 365 foreign nationals were arrested and two transnational fraud rings dismantled; they ran rotating call centers pushing fake online investment platforms at pensioners. In Angola, 9 suspects were arrested, two illegal crypto mining centers shut down, more than 2,000 mining devices seized, along with six illegal power transformation stations valued above USD 1 million. In Nigeria, a suspect running a large-scale phishing and BEC operation that harvested software credentials and amassed approximately 2.1 million email addresses was arrested and a luxury vehicle recovered; a second Nigerian case involving investment fraud run through messaging apps led to one arrest and traced about USD 2.4 million of cryptocurrency-laundered proceeds. Tanzania dismantled a malicious mobile loan app scheme, Gabon disrupted a social-media vehicle import fraud network, and the Republic of Congo arrested 30 cybercrime suspects. A separate Ghana/Nigeria action reportedly arrested 28 and identified over 100 human trafficking victims.

Private-sector partners reported across sources include Group-IB (intelligence on phishing kits, botnets, threat actors and fraudulent social media accounts, plus crypto investment scam and BEC infrastructure), Team Cymru, Kaspersky, Fortinet and Meta; the GLACY-e project (EU/Council of Europe) is also cited. Defender relevance: confirms continued high-volume BEC, phishing, investment-fraud and ransomware activity originating in or targeting Africa, and the value of infrastructure-level intelligence sharing for takedowns. Severity and status are analyst assignments, not source statements.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Initial Access

T1566 Phishing

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1585.001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts

Reconnaissance

T1589.001 Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials

Impact

T1657 Financial Theft

Defense Evasion

T1684.001 Impersonation

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Enforce DMARC/SPF/DKIM with reject policies and flag look-alike and newly registered sender domains to counter BEC and phishing
  • Require out-of-band verification for payment instruction and bank detail changes
  • Report fraud promptly to national CERTs, law enforcement and financial institutions to enable fund recall

Workarounds

  • Restrict installation of unvetted mobile loan or lending apps on managed devices
  • Monitor for anomalous power and compute consumption that may indicate unauthorized crypto mining

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy phishing-resistant MFA to limit the value of harvested credentials
  • Run user awareness training on investment, pension and romance-style scams
  • Maintain offline, tested backups and ransomware response plans
  • Consume shared threat intelligence on phishing kits and fraud infrastructure

Timeline

  • Original Operation Serengeti concluded with 1,006 arrests across 19 African countries and about $44 million recovered
  • Operation Serengeti 2.0 announced: 1,209 arrests and about $97.4 million recovered across 18 African countries plus the UK
  • Operation Serengeti III begins across 20 African countries and the United States, coordinated by INTERPOL
  • Active operational phase of Serengeti III ends with 1,462 arrests and 10,909 malicious networks dismantled
  • Group-IB, Team Cymru, Kaspersky, Fortinet and Meta identified as private-sector supporters; several investigations remain open
  • INTERPOL results announced: over $105 million recovered, 65,929 victims identified, about $385 million in estimated losses

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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