Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-4162

SEO Poisoning Campaign Delivers New Armorsteal Infostealer via Fake Chocolatey and Microsoft Activation Scripts Sites

highACTIVE

SEO Poisoning Campaign Delivers New Armorsteal Infostealer (TL-2026-4162), also tracked as Armorsteal, is a high-severity malware campaign, first published 2026-10-22. It has no confirmed attribution, affects Microsoft Windows, maps to 17 MITRE ATT&CK techniques (T1005, T1027, T1053), and is covered by 9 detection rules and 27 indicators of compromise.

Severity
HIGHAssessed severity
CVEs
0None referenced
Techniques
17MITRE ATT&CK
Actors
0Not attributed
Detection rules
9SPL · KQL · Sigma
IOCs
27Indicators of compromise

Key facts for TL-2026-4162

Threat ID
TL-2026-4162
Also known as
Armorsteal
Severity
HIGH
Status
ACTIVE
Category
MALWARE
First published
Last reviewed
Attribution confidence
LOW
Motivation
FINANCIAL
Target sectors
technology, cryptocurrency, gaming, consumer
Target regions
Global
Detection rules
9
Indicators of compromise
27

Malware and tooling in SEO Poisoning Campaign Delivers New Armorsteal Infostealer

Malware and tooling: Armorsteal, Python

How SEO Poisoning Campaign Delivers New Armorsteal Infostealer works

Zscaler ThreatLabz reports an SEO poisoning campaign using fake sites impersonating the Chocolatey package manager and Microsoft Activation Scripts (MAS) to deliver malicious PowerShell installers that deploy the new Armorsteal malware. Armorsteal combines a signed-task remote access module, a keylogger/clipboard-hijacking surveillance module and an infostealer targeting Discord tokens, browser data, crypto wallets, SSH keys, Steam sessions and password managers.

In September 2026 Zscaler Threat Hunting identified an SEO poisoning campaign in which users searching for terms such as "chocolatey install windows" or "Microsoft Activation Scripts" were directed to lookalike sites: choclatey[.]org (registered 2026-09-01) impersonating Chocolatey and massgravel[.]net (registered 2026-08-30) impersonating the MAS/Massgrave project. Both lures serve a malicious install.ps1 that requests elevation, hides the PowerShell window, downloads a ZIP archive to C:\Windows\SystemHealth\Update\, runs a legitimate piece of software to avoid suspicion, and unpacks a Python 3.11 runtime together with Pyarmor-protected (Pyarmor 9.1.7 trial) Python scripts.

Persistence is established with two scheduled tasks: SysCheck2 (user logon, highest privileges) and SysCheckX (system boot, SYSTEM, 45-second delay), both launching the remote access module SysMon.py. SysMon.py exits if ipinfo.io reports a Google, Amazon, Microsoft or Azure organization (cloud sandbox evasion), collects host details including the motherboard serial number used as machine ID, and communicates over HTTPS with a hardcoded list of four C2 domains (user agent python-requests/2.31.0). It checks /downloadables/configf.json, posts host data to /receive_infof, and polls every 60 seconds for per-victim tasks (/get-onetime-code/{machine_id}) and global tasks (/get-global). Every task is verified against an embedded RSA-2048 public key before execution; version files (onetime_version.txt, global_version.txt) prevent replay. Global tasks can replace SysMon.py (SHA256-verified) and update the C2 list.

SysMon.py downloads two further modules. basrq.py is a surveillance module: multi-language keylogging with window titles, clipboard monitoring every 0.5 s with replacement of cryptocurrency wallet addresses (Bitcoin, Litecoin, Monero, Ethereum, TRON, XRP, Dogecoin, TON, Solana), keyword-triggered screenshots, and fake Exodus/MetaMask/Phantom transaction notifications. Keylogs are gzip-compressed (keylogs.gz) and screenshots XOR-encrypted with the SHA256 digest of a hardcoded string, uploaded to /black-watch/ endpoints. got.py is the stealer: it targets 22 Discord client variants, 21 wallet extensions/desktop apps, BIP39 seed phrases found by searching drives A: to Z:, browser cookies via Chrome DevTools Protocol on port 9222, saved passwords (using the public Chrome App-Bound Encryption chrome-decryptor tool), autofill and card metadata, password managers (KeePass, 1Password, RoboForm, Password Safe, Enpass, Bitwarden, Dashlane), SSH keys and Steam session data, and exfiltrates to /infame/receive/zip, /infame/receive/dt, /ws/{machine_id}, /pwd and /upload/st.

Infrastructure evolved over time: the primary C2 workerstats[.]net was registered 2026-01-28, with standby domains datamons[.]org (2026-05-19), supertrap[.]net (2026-08-29) and niceer[.]net (2026-09-01). The fake Massgrave site was taken down 2026-09-25 and the fake Chocolatey site 2026-10-01; in early October the operators shifted to pymons[.]is and reactivated datamons[.]org, with a phase 2 lure host and C2 on new IPs and token-gated /C2/?t=[token]451 and 452 requests returning /p/[32hex].zip. Zscaler's infrastructure analysis indicates a single coordinated operation; no threat actor is attributed. BeaconBeagle lookups for workerstats.net and 186.2.175.183 returned no matches at research time.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques used in TL-2026-4162

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Persistence

T1053 Scheduled Task/Job

Credential Access

T1056 Input Capture; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1552 Unsecured Credentials; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1608 Stage Capabilities

Affected products and versions in SEO Poisoning Campaign Delivers New Armorsteal Infostealer

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints where users run the malicious install.ps1

Remediation for SEO Poisoning Campaign Delivers New Armorsteal Infostealer

Immediate actions

  • Block the Armorsteal C2 and lure domains (workerstats.net, pymons.is, datamons.org, niceer.net, supertrap.net, choclatey.org, massgravel.net) and associated IPs at DNS, proxy and firewall
  • Hunt for the scheduled tasks SysCheck2 and SysCheckX and the directory C:\Windows\SystemHealth\Update\ and isolate matching hosts
  • Reset Discord tokens, browser-saved credentials, SSH keys, Steam sessions and password manager master credentials on affected hosts, and move crypto funds to new wallets with fresh seed phrases
  • Invalidate active browser sessions and cookies for accounts used on infected hosts

Workarounds

  • Use trusted software sources and verify domain spelling (chocolatey.org) before running installer commands

Longer-term hardening

  • Teach users to install Chocolatey and MAS only from official sources and never to run copy-pasted PowerShell from search results
  • Alert on python-requests user agents and Python runtimes executing from C:\Windows paths, and on Python processes launched by scheduled tasks
  • Monitor for chrome remote-debugging port 9222 use by non-browser processes
  • Enforce PowerShell Constrained Language Mode / script logging and application control

Timeline of SEO Poisoning Campaign Delivers New Armorsteal Infostealer

  • Primary C2 domain workerstats[.]net registered
  • Standby C2 domain datamons[.]org registered
  • Standby C2 domain supertrap[.]net registered
  • Fake Massgrave/MAS lure domain massgravel[.]net registered
  • Fake Chocolatey lure choclatey[.]org and standby C2 niceer[.]net registered
  • Zscaler Threat Hunting identified the SEO poisoning campaign (September 2026; exact day not stated in source)
  • Fake Massgrave website taken down
  • Fake Chocolatey website taken down
  • Early October 2026 (exact day not stated): operators shifted to pymons[.]is and reactivated datamons[.]org, with new lure host and C2 IPs
  • Zscaler ThreatLabz published analysis of the Armorsteal malware

Sources cited for SEO Poisoning Campaign Delivers New Armorsteal Infostealer

Detection coverage for TL-2026-4162

As of 2026-10-22, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-4162 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account; a free account unlocks full detection query text in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma; paid tiers add raw indicator values, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

9 detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · Blue and above. Compare plans
27 indicators of compromise · Red and above. Compare plans

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